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April, 1916— November, 1918 

by . 

United Stales Ambassador to Russia under the Czar, 
the Provisional Government and the Bolshevists 






h ^3 

Copyright, 1921, by 

Published August, 1921 
Reprinted October, 1921 





My commission as Ambassador to Russia was dated 
March 9th, 1916. As I was so long in regaining my health 
and strength after leaving Russia, I offered to resign the 
Ambassadorship three or more times, but each time the 
Secretary of State or the Acting Secretary dissuaded me 
from presenting my resignation. I have drawn no salary 
as Ambassador since the 26th of April, 1919, but since 
then I have held myself subject to being sent back to 
Russia as American Ambassador in the event a stable 
government was established there. At no time was there 
any likelihood of our recognizing the Bolshevik Soviet 
Government. My resignation as Ambassador to Russia 
was presented on the 3rd of March, 1921, but I have not 
had advice of its acceptance up to the present writing. 
It will be seen, therefore, that my services have covered 
five years. 

During this period I was credited to the Monarchy of 
Russia thirteen months. I represented the United States 
with the Provisional Government of Russia for eight 
months. I remained in Russia from the inception of 
Bolshevik usurpation and until within five days of the 
Armistice, when a surgical operation necessitated removal 
to a hospital in London. Upon leaving the hospital I 
went by direction of the Secretary of State to Paris, 
to be present at the meeting of the Peace Conference in 
February, 1919. My urgent recommendation that I be 
sent back to Petrograd was under consideration. I was 
continued as Ambassador to Russia on the inactive list 


and without pay, holding myself in readiness to return 
if there should be at any time a favorable decision upon 
my recommendation. 

Bolshevism began to show itself eighteen months be- 
fore my departure from Russia. I saw its spasmodic 
manifestations through the summer of 1917, its usurpa- 
tion of power in the autumn of that year. I was in the 
midst of Lenin's experiment in government for more 
than a year. I have seen this monstrosity run its course, 
to become the world wide danger which my observation 
at close hand had convinced me it w T ould become. I have 
kept in close touch with developments in Russia up to 
the present time, reading most of the articles written by 
newspaper men and magazine authors who have jour- 
neyed to Russia, having obtained the consent of the 
Soviet Government previous to entering that country. 

On the 25th of February, 1917, I sent this cablegram 
from Petrograd : 

"Secretary of State, 

1 i Strictly confidential for President. Understand Cus- 
tomary to tender resignation on beginning of new term. 
Mine is herewith presented. Thoroughly reconciled to 
return or entirely willing to remain or to serve in any 
position where you think can be most effective. Personal 
interest and inclination subordinated to country's welfare 

in this critical juncture. 


I received no reply to the tender of my resignation, but 
I thought nothing strange of this, as the diplomatic regu- 
lations state an ambassador or a minister does not have 
to resign; he should take the sending of his successor's 
name to the Senate for confirmation as a removal or 


While at Vologda, I received from the Secretary of 
State, under date of May 24th, 1918, this cable : 

"The following is for your information: Governor 
Gardner of Missouri has stated that on account of the 
recent death of Senator Stone, he desired to appoint you 
to vacancy in the Senate. In reply the Department has 
stated that your services are regarded as essential to the 
Governments relations with Eussia, and that you could 
not be dispensed with at this time. 

* * The above statement was made by the Department in 

full confidence of your desire to serve where you are most 


" Lansing.' ' 

This was exceedingly gratifying to me, not only be- 
cause of the compliment Governor Gardner paid me, but I 
considered it an answer to my tendered resignation. 

Before leaving Petrograd for Vologda, I received two 
cablegrams from the Department of State. The first one 
authorized me to leave Petrograd when I considered it 
unsafe. The second authorized my departure " when- 
ever your judgment so dictates.' ' 

On my return to Washington a year later, I asked the 
Department of State where they expected me to go 
when they authorized me to leave Petrograd. The reply 
was, I was expected to go to London and await orders, 
or to return to Washington. My colleagues all endeav- 
ored to return to their own countries, but I cabled my 
Government that I did not think it wise to leave Russia, 
and would not do so unless ordered, and I went to 

After being in Vologda four or five days, the Depart- 
ment cabled me I should remain there until I considered 
it unsafe, when I could select my own location in Russia, 
if I thought any place was safe. 


While in Archangel, after the Department had been 
advised of my condition, Secretary of State, cabled me 
under date of October 11th, 1918: 

"The Department regards your devotion to duty as 
an example of the highest traditions of the Service. In 
order to be able to continue your valued service, I believe 
you should proceed at once to London for consultation 
as to whether surgical assistance can be rendered there. 
Please take all precautions in your journey. I am asking 
the Secretary of War for special assistance from the 
medical officers with Colonel Stewart. Advise me of your 
departure and your arrival in London. You will leave 
Poole in charge. Please accept my cordial good wishes 
for your speedy restoration to active work. 


On the 18th of November, 1918, Secretary of State 
Lansing cabled me through the American Embassy at 
London : 

"As you were advised October 12th, Department plans 
for you to return to Archangel unless situation changes, 
but no definite decision will be reached until your health 
is restored.' ' 

From the time of my arrival in Russia, I followed the 
practice of committing fully to paper the incidents, the 
interviews, the impressions, in short whatever interested 
me about Russia, whether official or unofficial. I endeav- 
ored to present to the Department of State not always in 
formal but rather in intimate and confidential detail the 
quickly shifting changes that were taking place in Russia. 
These reports are drawn upon extensively in the chapters 
which follow. 

In my personal letters to my family, to friends, to busi- 
ness associates, I wrote of Russia and of Russians, as I 


might have done in the freedom of a diary. Liberal ex- 
tracts from these 'letters have been introduced. From 
time to time my opinions of Russian leadership and of 
general conditions were revised, my hopes of govern- 
mental reform and stability shattered, my predictions 
were not realized. The readers of this narrative will 
discover that. I thought it best to carry them through 
these different times and perilous changes in the hope 
that they would reach the same conclusions that I did, 
and which conclusions have not been changed up to the 
present time. Those conclusions are that Bolshevism, if 
it dominates the world, will lead us back to barbarism. 

All the enciphered cables are set forth in paraphrases 

I cheerfully acknowledge my obligation, for their 
valued and helpful assistance, to Mr. Lyman Beccher 
Stowe and Mr. Walter B. Stevens. 



I First Impressions 3 

II German Influence in Russian Affairs . . 19 

III Treason in High Places 31 

IV Rumblings of Revolutions 52 

V The March Revolutions 59 

VI American Recognition of the Provisional 

Government 82 

VII The Council of Workmen and Soldiers ' 

Deputies 96 

VIII Significant Changes in the Ministry . . . 115 

IX The Diplomatic and Railway Commission . . 128 

X The July Revolution 134 

XI The Provisional Government and the Forces 

of Destruction 143 

XII The Break Between Kerensky and Korniloff 153 

XIII The Bolsheviks Overthrow the Government . 171 

XIV The Constituent Assembly Dispersed by Armed 

Bolsheviks 196 

XV The Diamandi Incident 216 

XVI The Brest-Litovsk Peace 223 

XVII Vologda — The Ddplomatic Capital .... 234 

XVIII Archangel and the Northern Government . 261 




XIX Allied Policies in Russia 297 

XX Bolshevism and the Peace Conference . . 306 

XXI Bolshevism in Principle and in Practice . . 328 

XXII Russia — The Chief Victim of the World War 341 

XXIII Retrospect 345 


David R. Francis Frontispiece 


The American Embassy, Petrograd, 1909-1917 22 

Terestchenko 86 

Paul Miliukoff 86 

Michael Rodzianko 86 

The American Railway Commission to Russia and Ambassador 

Francis at the American Embassy, Petrograd 132 

Alexander Kerensky 144 

N. Prebensen 218 

Sir George W. Buchanan 218 

Count Diamandi 218 

T. Noulens 218 

Ambassador Francis and His Staff Before the American Embassy, 

Vologda, Russia 238 

Last Conference of the Allied Chiefs in the American Embassy, 

Vologda, July 23, 1918 258 




At two o'clock in the morning on the 28th of April, 
1916, with the grinding of brakes and the pushing of 
people toward the doors, the Stockholm Express came 
to a stop in the Finland Station of Petrograd, and I 
realized that my duties as Ambassador from the greatest 
Republic of the New World to the Court of the mightiest 
Autocracy of the Old had virtually begun. It was dark 
and cold. I was alone except for my loyal colored valet, 
Philip Jordan. I had never been in Russia before. I 
had never been an Ambassador before. My knowledge 
of Russia up to the time of my appointment had been 
that of the average intelligent American citizen — unhap- 
pily slight and vague. In order to meet without quailing 
the heavy responsibilities and the unknown problems 
which lay before me I needed all the self-confidence born 
of my experience as Mayor of my City, Governor of my 
State, Member of the President's Cabinet, and as head 
for many years of my own business. 

Any momentary misgivings I may have felt, however, 
were soon dispelled by my cordial American greeting 
from the members of the Embassy staff who had loyally 
stood by to welcome me since 11 p.m., the hour at which 
the train had been due. 



As I began to familiarize myself with my duties I was 
appalled at the enormous amount of work and responsi- 
bility entailed by my uncongenial task as the represen- 
tative of German and Austrian interests in Russia. There 
were at the time one and a quarter million Austrian 
prisoners and a quarter of a million German prisoners 
in Russian prison camps. In addition there were about 
200,000 interned German civilians and 50,000 Austrians. 
I had to supervise the care and attention received by 
these hundreds of thousands of persons and act as the 
official intermediary between them and their govern- 
ments. This work was conducted from the Austrian 
Embassy which we had taken over at the time we as- 
sumed charge of Austrian interests. It required not 
only the exclusive services of a large corps of able assist- 
ants, known as the Relief Corps, but demanded my per- 
sonal attention for several hours daily. 

Among the first places that I visited was the German 
Embassy which was also, and for the same reason, under 
my charge. This capacious and imposing structure had 
been sacked by the Petrograd populace in 1914 in retali- 
ation for indignities which had been shown the Russian 
Empress Dowager when she passed through Berlin on 
her return from Switzerland to Russia after Germany's 
declaration of war against Russia. The angry crowd 
had done its work thoroughly. On inspecting this large 
building I found the luxurious furnishings mutilated and 
useless, the great mirrors broken, the electric light fix- 
tures twisted out of shape, and even the oil paintings of 
the German Emperors, Chancellors and Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, disfigured beyond repair. 

This huge, costly and partially demolished Embassy 
seemed to me to well symbolize the relations between 
Germany and Russia. This Embassy had been a part 
of Germany's long and persistent campaign to gain a 



dominating influence in Russia. At a pre-arranged meet- 
ing in Baltic waters on July 24th, 1905, Kaiser Wilhelm 
had induced his weak and easily influenced cousin, Nich- 
olas, to sign the secret Treaty of Bjorke. This Treaty, 
whose provisions became known several years later, 
bound the two nations mutually to assist each other 
against any third party and prohibited the conclusion 
of a separate peace with a common adversary. This 
agreement, signed during the Russo-Japanese War, was 
to become effective at the restoration of peace between 
Russia and Japan. It also provided that France was 
not to be informed of the Treaty until after it came into 
effect, when she should be invited to become a party to 
it. Obviously this Treaty would have been a breach of 
faith on Russia's part with her ally, France, and could 
only have resulted in severing the close relations between 
those countries and thus strengthening Germany at the 
expense of both which was, of course, the Kaiser's object. 
Thanks to Count Witte this mischievous Treaty never 
went into effect. He was at the time Minister of Finance 
and the dominating personality in the Government. He 
succeeded in over-ruling the Czar himself, and check- 
mating this intrigue of the German Emperor. By so 
doing, however, he incurred the displeasure of the Czar 
and the active hostility of the Czarina. 

I had heard before leaving America that the Russian 
Court circles were honeycombed with German spies and 
German sympathizers. As a result I was on the look- 
out for the activities of such persons. I also knew that 
important Russian industries, mines and financial insti- 
tutions were controlled by German capital. Immediately 
before the outbreak of the war 49% of Russia's foreign 
commerce was with Germany. In the same year Ger- 
many had taken advantage of Russia's weakened condi- 
tion because of her disastrous war with Japan to force 


upon her a commercial treaty in which all the advantages 
were on the side of Germany, and which was effective 
for ten years, or until the year 1915. The bitterness 
against Germany was greatly increased by the effects 
of this treaty. In fact, by the year 1914 the Russian 
industries that were not under German control were 
comparatively few. Germany well knew that public senti- 
ment in Russia would never tolerate the renewal of this 
unfair treaty and that knowledge was one of the imme- 
diate causes which induced Germany to force Russia into 
war in 1914. 

The bitterest enmity had grown up since the outbreak 
of the war, twenty-two months before, between the Rus- 
sian nobility who were purely Russian and those who 
were accused of German sympathies. The latter became 
known as the Court Party and were headed by the Em- 
press, who before her marriage had been a German 
Princess from Hesse-Darmstadt, and a cousin of the 
German Emperor. The Empress was said to have gained 
such a strong influence over the Emperor that even his 
mother, the Empress Dowager, to whom he had always 
been so devoted, could not counteract it. In fact, it was 
believed that at the behest of his wife the Emperor had 
required his mother to leave Petrograd. In any case, 
she had left and was living in Kieff. In addition there 
were many charges of the direct use of German and 
Austrian money in high places. The former Minister of 
War, Sukhomlinoff, had been charged by Grand Duke 
Nicholas with intentionally aiding the enemy by delib- 
erately failing to provide the troops with arms and am- 
munition. He had been arrested and imprisoned in the 
St. Peter and Paul Fortress. His wife, a beautiful and 
attractive woman, had accepted attentions from a Rus- 
sian General, who had been charged with taking a bribe of 
400,000 roubles from the enemy in return for informa- 


tion concerning Russian troop movements and the Rus- 
sian lack of ammunition. This General had been tried, 
convicted and shot. There was at this time a Russian 
Commission in America for the purchase of arms and 
munitions. It was commonly believed that a member 
of this Commission had been bribed to give wrong speci- 
fications for ammunition, and that when tried in actual 
battle it was found this ammunition could not be used. 
These exposures had naturally made the Russian people 
extremely anxious and suspicious. The Secret Service 
of the Empire also had corrupted several of the revolu- 
tionary leaders, among whom were Azef and Father 
Gapon, the leader of the Black Friday demonstration 
of 1905. Some of these leaders had been induced to 
make attempts upon the lives of members of the royal 
family and in some instances had actually committed 
murders with the knowledge of the Secret Service. The 
Secret Service was willing to offer up these royal per- 
sonages as sacrifices in order to obtain justification for 
suppressing the revolutionary spirit with an iron hand. 
I shall tell my story from here on largely by means of 
extracts from confidential letters and dispatches which 
I sent and received between April 28th, 1916, and No- 
vember 6th, 1918 — the dates marking my active services 
as Ambassador. Since leaving Russia, while still hold- 
ing the office, I have been on the inactive list. Although 
these dispatches and letters, so far from being written 
with a view to publication, were prepared in most cases 
for the confidential information of those to whom they 
were addressed, I shall use them for two reasons : first, 
because I wish my readers to know that there are no 
inaccuracies owing to lapses of memory on my part, and 
second, because it seems to me that many of these ac- 
counts have an added interest by reason of the fact that 


they were written immediately after the stirring events 

In a letter to my son, Perry Francis, written May 1st, 
1916, three days after my arrival in Petrograd, I said: 

"On the day of my arrival a note was sent to the 
Foreign Office asking when I would be received, and 
on the following day, Saturday, had an audience with 
Sazonoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and also with 
Stunner, President of the Council of Ministers, and also 
Minister of the Interior. My interview with Sazonoff 
was prolonged through an hour and twenty minutes and 
was by no means satisfactory. He was exceedingly cor- 
dial, but I was disappointed in that he said that Russia 
was not prepared at this time to negotiate any commer- 
cial treaty with our country or any other country until 
all of the Allies arrived at some understanding on eco- 
nomic questions. I told him my last advices were to the 
effect that he was willing and desirous of negotiating a 
new commercial treaty, to which he replied that he had 
so stated six months ago, but that not since June or 
July of 1915 had the subject been broached to him, and 
now it was too late as the Allies have agreed upon a 
program which provides for an understanding between 
themselves not only as to the prosecution of the war, 
but as to the commercial relations between themselves 
and friendly, neutral and belligerent countries after the 
close of the war. Of course, this is strictly confidential 
and should not be given to the public prints, nor told 
to anyone except those upon whom you can thoroughly 
rely. Immediately upon returning to the Embassy, I 
prepared a cablegram to the State Department of 500 
words, informing the Secretary of the situation and 
expressing my great disappointment. I told Sazonoff, 
who speaks very good English, that I was greatly dis- 
appointed, and in fact decidedly so, because to negotiate 


such a treaty had been the main object I had had in view 
when accepting the appointment as Ambassador. The 
Allies have called an economic council to meet in Paris 
about June first, at which this country will be repre- 
sented by the Comptroller of the Empire and four other 
potential officials. It seems, therefore, that the negotia- 
tion of a commercial treaty must be postponed until after 
the council is held ; it will continue in session about thirty 
days. There is no hope, therefore, of negotiating a 
tieaty between our country and Russia before July." 
When First Secretary Dearing made the appointment 
for my initial interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sazonoff there was no thought of my also calling upon 
Baron Sturmer, who was at the time both President of 
the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior, 
but a message was received at the Embassy the morning 
of the day I was to meet the Foreign Minister requesting 
that I call upon Minister Sturmer before going to the 
Foreign Office. I soon learned that there was friction 
between the two Ministers which undoubtedly accounted 
for this unusual request. I naturally called upon Sturmer 
as requested. Although he was exceedingly cordial and 
expressed himself as very anxious to establish closer 
relations with my Government, I was by no means favor- 
ably impressed by him. His appearance was as German 
as his name. His mind worked slowly and his tempera- 
ment was phlegmatic. In short, he impressed me as a 
dull man. Shortly after my presentation to the Emperor, 
he called on me at the Embassy. He was again extreme- 
ly cordial and emphatic in his protestations of a desire 
for close relations with the United States Government, 
but I liked him no better. As Minister of the Interior 
he had charge of the prison camps which it was the duty 
of the Relief Corps of the American Embassy to inspect. 
The entire Corps cordially disliked him and when in 


July, 1916, he was transferred — through the influence 
of the Empress and Rasputin as I later learned — and 
made Minister of Foreign Affairs, great was the rejoic- 
ing among the members of the American Relief Corps. 
Shortly after his appointment as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs he moved into a palatial summer residence on 
the island in the River Neva opposite the Winter Palace. 
Here I called one afternoon and met the Baroness 
Sturmer. During my conversation with her I could not 
help noticing how the Baron paced up and down the 
room and every now and again stopped in front of a 
long mirror in which he surveyed himself with evident 
satisfaction, while he turned up the ends of his mustaches 
which were in the style of the German Kaiser. 

After my original brief conversation with Baron 
Sturmer I went to the Foreign Office for my appointment 
with Minister Sazonoff. He greeted me cordially al- 
though he was not as excessively cordial as had been 
Sturmer. He looked about 55 years old, is slightly under 
medium height and of a spare build. His nose is rather 
prominent, his mouth firm set and his chin neither square 
nor pointed. His face and manner bore evidence of over- 
work and mental strain. His mind was evidently as 
alert as Sturmer 's lethargic. His replies to my questions 
were prompt to the point of abruptness. When I told 
him I had no experience in diplomacy but had accepted 
the appointment in the hope and expectation of negotiat- 
ing a commercial treaty between Russia and the United 
States he arose abruptly from his chair and made the 
statement given in the letter above. I could well imagine 
him entering the great Hall of Tsarskoe Selo Palace 
on the fateful night of July 31st, 1914, with his quick 
firm step to tell the Emperor that Germany had declared 
war. The royal family and some prominent members 
of the nobility were attending an entertainment at the 


Palace when the Foreign Minister entered, and went 
direct to his Majesty, took him to one side, told him the 
ominous news and then left the hall with him while the 
entertainment continued and the guests were left to 
speculate on what had happened. 

Within ten days of my arrival in Petrograd I deter- 
mined to make the acquaintance of the American colony, 
so I invited the Americans to tea at the Embassy on a 
Sunday afternoon. The invitations were generally ac- 
cepted and the guests remarked that they had not real- 
ized there were so many Americans in Petrograd. They 
seemed greatly pleased and were, in fact, profuse in 
their expressions of appreciation. Although the colony 
is so small it has been split into factions — a condition 
that seems to have been brought about by rivalry be- 
tween some of the American women in regard to what 
is called the American Refuge (an orphan asylum sup- 
ported by Americans). 

But the war was the all-absorbing subject in Russia 
at this time. Everyone in any position of responsibility 
was under the highest tension. Recruits were being 
drilled on the street in front of the Embassy. This street 
is nearly 200 feet wide and paved with cobblestones which 
are not pleasant to walk upon, but the soldiers didn't 
seem to mind them. These soldiers often sang familiar 
Russian airs. They are plaintive but enchanting — so 
much so that one found the airs running through one's 
mind long after the songs had ceased. Soldiers were 
being sent out of the city by train loads, thousands daily, 
but no one knew where they were going except the gen- 
eral in supreme command. 

The hatred of Germany was intense, just as the feeling 
in Germany toward England was exceedingly bitter. 
The merchants and all of the people seemed to feel that 
Germany had for a century or more been growing rich 


at the expense of Russia, and that during the Russian- 
Japanese War Germany took advantage of conditions to 
force upon Russia a burdensome treaty whereby Ger- 
many not only got advantage over other countries, but 
was enabled to exact tribute from all of her patrons in 
Russia. The Russian merchants, and in fact the nobility 
and even the Emperor himself, seemed determined that 
no other country should ever occupy the same relation 
to Russia that Germany did before the war. Such a posi- 
tion pleased me to a degree, as I had been fearful on 
account of the financial aid she was rendering to Russia 
that England might be planning to assume a position of 
superiority over other nations in her relations to Russia. 
I was not fully qualified as Ambassador until I had 
been received by the Czar. This was both an impressive 
and pleasant experience, which I described to Mr. Polk 
in the following letter : 

"American Embassy, 
"May 9th, 1916. 
* ' Dear Mr. Secretary : 

"I address you mainly for the purpose of making a 
report about my reception by the Emperor and Empress 
on Friday, May 5th, advices of which I have cabled the 

"The day before calling on the Emperor and Empress, 
accompanied by First Secretary Dearing, I called upon 
Baron Korff, Grand Master of Ceremonies, and also 
upon Dame d'honneur Elizabeth Narychkine, Maitresse 
de la Cour Imperiale ; both of these calls were very agree- 
able, both officials responding promptly and cheerfully 
to my expressed desire of increasing the good feeling 
existing for so many years between Russia and the 
United States. 


"The following day, Friday, accompanied by the Em- 
bassy staff and the Commercial Attache, I went to a 
special station on the railroad leading to Tsarskoe-Selo 
where a special train was waiting, which conveyed us 
to the Emperor's station, near the castle, after a journey 
of about 25 minutes. There we were met by the Master 
of Ceremonies and his staff all arrayed in gorgeous uni- 
forms. It has been the custom of my predecessors, I 
am told, to wear uniforms on such occasions as this and 
on many other occasions, but I have not yet procured 
a uniform and don't know that I shall; my impression 
is that some of the Secretaries have them, but they are 
not permitted to wear them unless the Ambassador is 
so attired. We journeyed from the station to the palace 
in vehicles so rich in gilt finish that they had better be 
termed chariots. The one in which I was, was drawn 
by six horses with an outrider on the front lead horse. 
The only one who accompanied me in this carriage was 
a uniformed and titled attache of the Master of Cere- 
monies, whose name I do not recall. In the second ve- 
hicle were Dearing and Mr. Peirce; in the third were 
Second Secretaries White and Sterling; in the fourth 
were Third Secretary Ryan and Commercial Attache 
Baker; in the fifth Lieutenant Riggs and Captain Mc- 
Cully; in the sixth was Captain Breckinridge of the 
Marine Corps, — ten in all including myself. In each 
vehicle was a member of the retinue of Baron Korff. 

"The drive to the castle was about half a mile; on 
arrival the doors were opened and there were more uni- 
formed servants ready to receive us than I could count. 
After a very short delay I was conducted to a room where 
I found the Emperor awaiting me. The doors were 
closed behind me; the Emperor advanced and gave me 
a cordial handshake and accompanied me to a seat. The 
staff were all outside awaiting my return, and although 


the conference lasted but about 35 minutes by the watch, 
as they were kept standing during this time, it must have 
seemed like hours to them. 

" After expressing to the Emperor my appreciation 
of the honor conferred by his receiving me, I handed 
him the sealed missive from the President and almost 
immediately proceeded to tell him that I had come to 
Russia mainly for the purpose of negotiating a new com- 
mercial treaty. He smiled and said that Russia was 
equally desirous to have a new treaty, and trusted there 
would be no difficulty in negotiating one. (As I later 
learned this was a very characteristic attitude. This 
unfortunate monarch was always trying to avoid diffi- 
culties.) At some stage of the conversation I congratu- 
lated him upon his vodka edict, at which he seemed 
pleased, saying that when it was first issued the period 
for its operation was limited to 30 days, or during mobi- 
lization. The appeals from women, communities, and 
associations, however, were so numerous and importu- 
nate that it be extended for the duration of the war, 
which at that time doubtless no one thought would last 
more than a few months, that he prolonged the operation 
of the edict to make it contemporaneous with the war; 
as the war progressed and the benefits of the prohibition 
of the sale of vodka became more and more apparent, 
he issued formal edict making the prohibition perpetual. 

"He asked me with great interest about the relations 
between our country and Germany and I told him that 
the first official information received at the Embassy 
was in regard to treatment of merchant vessels by the 
Allied and Belligerent Powers, but that the newspapers 
contained reports to the effect that Germany's reply to 
the President's note suggested arbitration and that they 
further stated that the proposition had not been accepted. 
I also told him that our official advices from Washington 


which had been transmitted to the Foreign Office were 
not only a virtual reply to Germany's proposition to 
arbitrate, but an announcement to the world of the posi- 
tion assumed by the United States on the question so 
long discussed — a position our country meant not only 
to observe, but to enforce. His reply was, 'Of course 
such matters cannot be arbitrated.' I told him that 
as the representative of a neutral country, I should be 
discreet in my expressions concerning the great war in 
which Russia and most of Europe was engaged, espe- 
cially as the United States was here looking after the 
interests of Germany and Austria. During this state- 
ment he was smiling and bowing his head affirmatively, 
and when later I told him that my personal sympathies 
were with the Allies and had been from the beginning 
and that my sentiments on the subject were well known 
in the community where I lived and also throughout 
the country, he smiled in a pleased manner, and said he 
was confident such was the case but was delighted to 
hear it from my own lips. 

"When I told him I was residing at the Embassy, he 
expressed satisfaction, but when I went further and 
told him that I planned to make an effort to induce my 
country to purchase a home for the Embassy in Petro- 
grad, he was exceedingly pleased and said such action 
would be very gratifying to the Russian people. 

"At the end of the interview — I can't recall whether 
it was terminated by the Emperor or myself — upon aris- 
ing I asked if I could present the Embassy staff. He 
replied, 'Of course.' As I approached the door a uni- 
formed man who had been guarding it, threw the doors 
open and the staff entered. I presented them one by 
one to the Emperor who shook hands with each. I said 
something about each man and the Emperor also made 
some personal remark to each one. 


"After this ceremony which must have required ten 
minutes, I was conducted to another room in the castle 
where the Empress was waiting to receive me. She very 
gracefully advanced with extended hand and after a 
genuine American handshake, conducted me to a seat. 
Suffice it to say she was exceedingly gracious, and so in- 
teresting that when back on the way to Petrograd I was 
asked by the members of the staff how she was attired 
I was compelled to admit that she was so entertaining 
that I had forgotten to note how royalty dressed on such 
occasions. I am thinking of writing to the Mistress of 
the Robes to ask how the Empress was dressed, but shall 
not do so before being told whether that would be proper 
form, — of course, I have no curiosity myself in the sub- 
ject, but all the ladies whom I meet seem to be very much 
interested and furthermore it would give an opportunity 
to state why I made the inquiry. This, however, is 
pleasantry. The special train conveyed us back to Petro- 
grad where we arrived about 4 :30 p.m. The Petrograd 
papers all stated that the Emperor and Empress had 
received me. I now am a f ullfledged Ambassador ; until 
my reception by the Emperor First Secretary Dearing 
was Charge d'Aff aires and signed all the official com- 
munications to the Russian Government. 

"Upon my return to the Embassy I remitted 300 
roubles to a member of Baron Korff 's staff for distribu- 
tion among the liveried men who drove and rode the 
horses and received me at the palace; I was told that 
such was the custom and such would be expected of me. 

"I have the honor to be, sir, 

"Your obedient servant, 

"David R. Francis.' ' 

As my conversation with the Emperor was drawing 
to a close my attention was attracted by a very fine life- 


sized portrait. I remarked to His Majesty that it was 
a very fine likeness of him. He smiled and replied, "It 
is not me at all, but my cousin, King George. You are 
not the first one, however, who has mistaken that paint- 
ing for a portrait of me." 

The Emperor's domestic relations were ideal. He 
was devoted to the Empress and to his children, particu- 
larly the frail little Czarovitch. Before his marriage to 
Princess Alix of Hesse-Darmstadt, he was said to have 
been devoted to Dshesinskaya, the ballet dancer; who, 
until some weeks after the March Revolution lived in a 
beautiful palace across the River Neva from the Ameri- 
can Embassy, and had charge of the Imperial ballet. 
However this may have been, his love for the Empress 
and his faithfulness to her were never questioned. 

I cannot better describe the relations between the royal 
couple and the character of each than by telling the fol- 
lowing story as related by Dr. Dillon, the well-known 
British publicist and authority on Russia, whose son was 
a member of my staff. 

Once a nobleman of great experience and progressive 
tendencies was received in audience by the Czar. He 
laid before the sovereign the wretched state of the peas- 
antry, the resulting general unrest and the strong neces- 
sity of remedying it by a modification of the political 
machinery of the Government. The Emperor, after lis- 
tening very attentively and approvingly to his visitor, 
said, "I know. Yes, yes. You are right, quite right." 
The nobleman retired well satisfied with his interview 
and feeling certain that the monarch would mollify his 
policy. Immediately afterwards a great landowner, also 
a member of the nobility, was ushered in and he unfolded 
a very different story. He sought to show that affairs 
were quite satisfactory with the exception of the leniency 
of the throne toward peasants, "What is needed, Sire, 


is an iron hand. The peasants must be kept in their 
place by force, otherwise they will usurp ours. To yield 
to them and treat them as though they were the masters 
of the country is a great crime." To this statement, 
Nicholas II, after giving an attentive audience, said, 
"Yes, yes, I know. You are right, quite right." The 
second visitor departed as pleased with his interview 
as the first had been. A side door opened, the Empress 
entered, and said to the Czar: "You really must not go 
on like this, Nicky. It is not dignified. Remember you 
are an autocrat. You should show a will strong enough 
to stiffen a nation of 150,000,000 people!" 

"But what is it you find fault with, darling?" 

"Your want of resolution and of courage to express it. 
I have been listening to the conversation you have just 
had. Count S., whom you first received, pleaded the 
cause of the disaffected. You assented to everything he 
advanced telling him he was ' right, quite right.' Then 
M. Y. was introduced. He gave you an account of things 
as they really are and you agreed with him in just the 
same way saying, 'You are right, quite right V Well, 
now such an attitude does not befit an autocrat. You 
must learn to have a will of your own and assert it." 

"You are right, dear, quite right," was the reply of 
the Czar. 

I never met the Empress again, but I shall always 
remember her as a dignified, graceful and exceedingly 
handsome woman, with strong features and a pleasant 
expression. She was very proud and very jealous of the 
royal prerogatives of the Emperor. She was an absolute 
monarchist by birth, by nature and by training. She 
supplanted her mother-in-law, the Empress Dowager, in 
dominating the weak-willed Emperor who had such a 
dread of controversy that he would agree with anyone 
on any subject so long as they were in his presence. 



On July 22nd all Russia was startled by the sudden 
and unexpected resignation of Foreign Minister Sazo- 
noff. Ten days later I wrote Secretary Lansing the fol- 
lowing letter about this resignation : 

"Personal and confidential 

"Petrograd, July 25th, 1916. 
"Dear Mr. Secretary: 

"The resignation of Foreign Minister Sazonoff and 
the appointment of Minister of Interior Stunner as his 
successor was announced in the papers Sunday morning, 
July 23rd, and was a great surprise to all classes of peo- 
ple and to every section of the country. On Monday, July 
10th, upon which day I was expecting a conference with 
Mr. Sazonoff concerning a plan between the Allies and 
Belligerents whereby America could extend aid to Po- 
land, etc., the Embassy was informed by telephone that 
the Minister had been called to the front to confer with 
the Emperor. Mr. Sazonoff returned to Petrograd the 
morning of Thursday, July 13th. I saw him that after- 
noon in company with Mr. Samuel McRoberts, of the Na- 
tional City Bank of New York, who had asked to pay his 
respects, and to whom the Minister extended a cordial 
welcome because Mr. McRoberts had formed the Ameri- 
can syndicate which loaned $50,000,000 to the Russian 
Government. Mr. Sazonoff complained of being tired 
and said that on the following day, July 14th, he would go 
to Finland for a rest of two or three weeks. He was in 



Finland when his resignation was announced and is still 

" Universal regret is expressed at the retirement of 
Mr. Sazonoff, which he and the Emperor and all mem- 
bers of the Government attribute to ill health. At the 
same time there are rumors to the effect that his parting 
with the Emperor on July 12th was not only friendly but 
affectionate; the Emperor, it is said, kissed him three 
times and expressed the highest appreciation of his pub- 
lic services. The day after the Minister's departure the 
Empress joined the Emperor at his military headquar- 
ters, and two days later Mr. Sazonoff received a telegram 
asking for his immediate resignation. "Whether this is 
true no one can say authoritatively. It is generally be- 
lieved, however, that the Empress is very desirous of 
peace. She has long been suspected of German sym- 
pathies. One story was to the effect that when Minister 
Sazonoff was directed to submit to Russia's Allies pro- 
posals of peace suggested by Germany, he refused to do 
so, whereupon Mr. Sturmer said he would submit such 
proposals if the Foreign Minister declined to do so, and 
that thereupon Mr. Sazonoff resigned. 

' ' Mr. Sturmer is looked upon as a reactionary ; in fact 
that is his record. Some charge him with being an op- 
portunist and with having no convictions. He is not 
reputed to possess a keen intellect or an incisive mind; 
on the contrary he is said to be slow of comprehension, 
but stubborn and possessed of great courage. I have 
had two conferences with him, and must say that he did 
not impress me as a man with breadth of view or imbued 
with high ideals. He is of German origin, but his loyalty 
to Russia in this contest has never been questioned. As 
Minister of the Interior his jurisdiction has been very 
extensive and his power great. 

"This would indicate that the court party of the Em- 


pire is preparing to counteract what they fear will be 
a liberal movement on the part of the people after the 
close of the war. It is now charged that Russia is plan- 
ning to make a separate peace with Germany. One re- 
port is to the effect that von Lucius, present Minister 
from Germany at Stockholm, has recently made a secret 
visit to Russia and suggested terms of peace which are 
attractive to Russia and not objectionable to France, 
as they provide for ceding to France Lorraine, which 
has belonged to Germany since 1870. It is not fully 
known what concessions are proposed for England, but 
she is to be propitiated by being allowed to retain the 
German South African Colonies which she has captured. 
Japan will be appeased by being permitted to retain the 
territory she has captured in the Far East. It is said 
that Germany is willing to recognize the integrity of 
Belgium and to indemnify her for damage inflicted. 

"In the meantime Russia is marshaling the largest 
army ever assembled. She has already called 16,100,000 
men, and in a call issued ten days ago increased this 
number by 2,500,000, making a total of 18,600,000. What 
an army ! What a menace it would be to other countries 
if these men were armed and well organized! It may 
be that the supporters of an absolute monarchy in Russia 
are asking themselves what such an army, well disci- 
plined and conscious of its strength, will do in Russia 
when there are no more foreign enemies to fight. These 
soldiers are as fine looking men as I ever saw carry a 
musket. I have seen thousands of them coming into Pet- 
rograd in obedience to a call, fresh from the fields, boys 
who had never before seen a village of over 2,000 inhabi- 
tants, with sunken chests, slip-shod gait and careless 
carriage. After three or four weeks of drill, equipped 
with military clothing, including boots of which they are 
very proud, they march singing through the streets with 


swinging gait, heads high in the air, chests out-thrown, 
and their very countenances manifesting pride in their 
country and consciousness of their own power. After ar- 
rival in their barracks they are given the most nourishing 
food, including meat which previously they had had not 
more than once a week, — soup and black bread having 
been their principal means of subsistence. 

"The last call, which comprised 2,500,000 men, was to 
have gone into effect July 15th-28th, but yesterday the 
date when the call was to be effective was postponed from 
July 15th to August 15th. This change of date may not 
have any significance, but it was determined upon the day 
after Sazonoff 's resignation and Stunner's appointment. 

"Minister Sazonoff was and is a bitter enemy of Ger- 
many. Von Lucius, present Minister to Stockholm, was 
Counselor of the German Embassy in Petrograd and its 
ruling spirit when the war began. He told me in Stock- 
holm that he and Sazonoff were formerly friends, but 
that Sazonoff now dislikes him very intensely. Sazonoff 
told me on the other hand, that he had never liked von 
Lucius, never trusted him, and if he did not consider 
him crazy and irresponsible, would say he was a liar and 
a rascal. 

"You have probably seen before reading thus far that 
I am disposed to share in the belief that the resignation 
of Sazonoff was forced and that the promotion of Stur- 
mer is a triumph for the party of reaction and for the 
champion of absolute monarchy in Russia, although the 
victory may be due in part to the strengthening of pro- 
German sentiment in the Empire. 

"I have the honor to be, sir, 

"Your obedient servant, 

"David R. Francis.' ' 

In a later letter to the Secretary of State on the same 


subject, written August 14th, I said: "The new Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Baron Sturmer, who is still President 
of the Council of Ministers, does not seem to have the 
respect of any of the prominent Russians whom I have 
met. His predecessor, Mr. Sazonoff, was looked upon as 
a statesman, but when I asked the president of a large 
bank in Petrograd, a man who is said to be the ablest 
financier in the Empire, what he thought of Baron Stur- 
mer 's appointment to the Foreign Office, he said, 'It is 
just as appropriate as would be the appointment of a 
tailor to the place I occupy. ' It is generally believed 
that the reactionaries are in the saddle and were looking 
for an opportunity to unhorse Minister Sazonoff, who is 
looked upon as a liberal. Baron Sturmer is said to 
have remarked after learning of the first victories of 
General Brousiloff in Galicia, 'One or two more such 
victories and we can do away with the Duma. ' Whether 
these reports are true remains to be proven. There is 
no doubt, however, that the liberal or progressive element 
in Russia is greatly disappointed and chagrined at the 
removal of Sazonoff and the appointment of Sturmer. 
I think in a former letter I stated that while the loyalty 
of Sturmer had never been questioned, that he and the 
reactionaries generally were more disposed to sympa- 
thize with Germany than any other element in Russia. 
My view concerning the benefit to the plain people of 
Russia through their education and the broadening of 
their views by the war is stronger now than when ex- 
pressed two or three weeks ago. I do not think there 
will be a revolution immediately after the close of the 
war; that would be premature, but if the Court Party 
does not adopt a more liberal policy by extending more 
privileges to the people and their representatives in the 
Duma, a revolution will take place before the lapse of 
even a few years. 


"In the meantime, not only are the Russian people 
acquiring more information concerning the resources of 
their own country, but it seems to me that the attention 
of the world is becoming directed or fixed more intently 
on Russia from day to day. European and American 
newspapers and periodicals all dwell upon the magnifi- 
cence of this Empire, and its undeveloped wealth and 
immense possibilities. There will be a great competition 
for the trade of Russia after the close of the war. Ameri- 
can enterprise is already looking with interested eyes 
on the mineral deposits, the great water power, and the 
opportunities for railroad construction which this coun- 
try offers. Several Americans are going home by the 
steamer which takes this pouch, but there is not one of 
them that is not planning to return to Russia, as all think 
there is no field on earth to be compared with this. The 
National City Bank has decided to open a branch here, 
and I think it is not only a good move for that institution 
but will prove highly beneficial to the commercial re- 
lations of the two countries. I have no intention or 
desire to violate the neutrality of America, but in my 
judgment American capital and ingenuity should be en- 
couraged here in order to offset, if nothing more, the 
well-designed plan of England, and perhaps France also, 
to capture the trade of Russia after the war through the 
operation of the resolutions passed at the Economic 
Conference of the Allies held in Paris, June 17th-20th. 
There have been many Americans here, and perhaps there 
are some now, who are unwise enough to take advantage 
of the necessities of Russia to extort unreasonable prices 
for what they have to sell; that is short-sighted policy, 
however, and one which I am advising all Americans to 
avoid. Your cautions concerning the improper use of 
the pouch are timely and just, but all other embassies 


and legations here do not hesitate to nse their respective 
pouches to promote commerce for their countries. ,, 

In a later letter written to my friend and business asso- 
ciate, Breckinridge Jones, President of the Mississippi 
Valley Trust Company, St. Louis, I expressed my view of 
an Ambassador's opportunities and obligations regard- 
ing commercial relations — a view which longer experience 
has strengthened. 

"It has been the policy of our foreign representatives 
of the diplomatic service to eschew all commercial mat- 
ters and refer them to the consuls. My judgment from 
the beginning was, and my experience of seven months 
has only served to strengthen that opinion, that friendly 
diplomatic relations could be engendered and fostered 
and promoted by close commercial relations. Conse- 
quently, from the beginning, since taking charge here 
April 28th last, I have devoted much thought and time 
to cultivating direct commercial relations between the 
United States and Eussia. Several hints were given 
me soon after I came that I had too keen a scent for 
commerce to make an ideal diplomat; but such insinua- 
tions only served to amuse me and had no effect upon 
my plans. Very soon after I came an Economic Confer- 
ence between the Allies was planned and held June 17th- 
20th. Immediately upon being advised of the resolutions 
there adopted, I called upon the then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Sazonoff and told him that those resolutions, al- 
though ostensibly and professedly adopted to destroy 
the commercial prestige of Germany, would operate with 
almost equal effect against all neutral countries and could 
not be enforced. It was not long thereafter before Brice 
and some other broad-minded Britishers expressed the 
same view. Those resolutions have never been confirmed 
by Eussia either through the Duma or the Council of 


" There is a limit, however, to promoting American 
commerce with Eussia, beyond which it would be unwise 
for me or anyone to go, as there is a feeling more preva- 
lent in England than in any other foreign country and 
more so in France than in Eussia, but a feeling that is 
growing here, to the effect that America is being so 
enormously enriched by the prosecution of the war that 
she does not wish to end it. You can see without my go- 
ing further into this subject that if I should ostensibly 
devote more time to the prosecution of commerce than to 
the diplomatic relations between the two countries, this 
feeling, which does great injustice to America, would be 
strengthened and might find expression in a way that 
would be not only disagreeable but offensive to me and 
to our countrymen. In England and to a less extent in 
France there is a feeling that the war now being waged 
is for the great principles in which America is as much 
interested as any other country, and consequently the 
United States, instead of holding aloof and getting 
enormous prices for what she furnished, should be par- 
ticipating in the conflict." 

At about the same time (October 26th, 1916), in a letter 
to my friend, Hamilton Cooke, of St. Louis, I wrote: 
"An American doctor who came here at the beginning 
of the war and tendered his services to Eussia, Dr. Hurd, 
who is now Surgeon-General of an army corps of 40,000 
men, an American soldier of fortune about 6 feet 2 inches, 
and weighing 250 pounds, came to Petrograd from the 
front not a great while ago, and told me he had seen a 
Eussian army advancing in which only every other man 
had a gun and the men without guns were told to seize 
the guns of their armed comrades when they fell. * * 

I wrote in 1920, "the German people are continuing 
to show their appreciation of the resources of Eussia 
by supporting the Bolsheviks in their efforts to dominate 


Eussia. The Bolshevik army is at present organized 
and disciplined by German officers and German commer- 
cial agents are the only ones permitted to enter Bol- 
shevik Eussia. Germany was threatened at one time 
by Bolshevik domination but checkmated the movement 
by forming a republic which is nominally socialistic but 
far from a Soviet Eepublic. The German mind works 
in various ways and by devious methods. It embraces 
any strategy to accomplish its end. Germany having 
been defeated in its effort to subjugate the world by 
force is resorting to other means and is pushing with 
unparalleled energy and activity her well-planned eco- 
nomic conquest of Eussia and the world/ ' 

Although it had no connection with the loan referred 
to in the letter to Secretary Lansing, I believe it would 
here be appropriate to mention some of the facts and 
figures relative to Eussia 's wealth which I gathered 
about a year and a half later at the time I was recom- 
mending that our Government extend financial assistance 
to the Provisional Government of Eussia. I found that 
aside from her public buildings and domiciles formerly 
occupied by the imperial family and state officials, Eussia 
had millions upon millions of acres of tillable lands, 
forests of immeasurable extent, ore deposits both pre- 
cious and base, to say nothing of vast water power. I 
talked with N. Pokrovsky, former Comptroller of the 
Empire and former Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
then Chairman of the Commission engaged in appraising 
the value of Eussia's property. I also talked with sev- 
eral of the leading business men and bankers of Eussia, 
and they all said that Eussia 's wealth far exceeded that 
of any other country on the earth. I asked if two hun- 
dred billion roubles (a rouble is equivalent to 51% cents) 
would be an overestimate, to which the invariable reply 
was, ' ' It 's very much greater than that ! ' ' This property 


includes crown lands, but does not comprise land or 
property privately owned and upon which taxes are paid. 
It is similar to the public domain of the United States 
which was sold by the Government to actual settlers. I 
am of the opinion, therefore, that although the national 
debt of Russia is forty-one billion roubles, it might be 
doubled, or trebled or quadrupled without jeopardizing 
the interests of the holders of Russian bonds. The re- 
sources of the country owning between one-seventh and 
one-sixth of the dry land on the globe and having a popu- 
lation of nearly two hundred million, possessed of com- 
mon sense and kindly instincts is, in fact, incalculable. 

On September 23rd, 1916, I wrote Mr. Lansing re- 
garding my efforts to improve commercial relations be- 
tween Russia and America by securing a direct cable 
between the two countries. I said : 

"I took up with the Premier and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs the question of laying a cable to the United 
States, and also made calls in relation thereto upon the 
Minister of the Interior, the Director-General of Posts 
and Telegraphs, and the Minister of Finance, — all of 
whom expressed themselves quite favorably toward the 
project. Finance Minister Bark was almost enthusiastic, 
and when I ventured to tell him of the complaints that 
had come to my hearing from American and Russian 
merchants as to the commercial domination of England, 
he bowed affirmatively and said that while not speaking 
officially it was personally distasteful to him. It has been 
reported in Petrograd several times that Minister Bark 
was to be removed because he was wholly under English 
influence. England is financing all of the Allies, who 
are no doubt depending upon her for such service, con- 
sequently they must accept the terms she imposes. 

"It is very desirable that American merchants should 
get a firm foothold in Russia while the opportunity is 


presented. It is, consequently, very important that this 
cable should be laid at once. As you have been advised 
in several other communications, I took up the subject 
with the Western Union Telegraph Company just before 
clearing from New York for Eussia, and have since ex- 
changed several letters with the President of the com- 
pany, Mr. Newcomb Carlton, and am in receipt of a cable 
from him which is confined to two words, 'Six million. ' 
That is in reply to a letter of mine asking him the cost 
of laying such a cable and suggesting that he frame his 
reply so that no one would understand it except myself. 
I conclude, therefore, that the cable can be laid for $6,- 
000,000, and so told Minister Bark. He expressed very 
great surprise that it would not cost more and said that 
he would recommend to the Council of Ministers that 
an appropriation to the amount of $3,000,000 be made 
and that the cable be owned half by our Government and 
half by his, and I cabled you to that effect. 

" Russia seems to have become aroused to her woful 
want of transportation facilities and is planning the 
construction of many lines of railroads for which she 
will have to buy a large quantity of material. She has 
within her borders boundless forests and immeasurable 
deposits of iron, ore and coal, but the demands of the peo- 
ple are immediate and will have to be supplied to a great 
extent from other countries. We should be prepared to 
take advantage of the situation, and direct cable com- 
munication is essential to that end. 

"I trust that you will look favorably upon this project 
and will give it your potential personal and official 

The Russian government carried out its part of the 
bargain and appropriated the $3,000,000, but our govern- 
ment declined to participate on the ground that it could 
not engage in business enterprises. 


This Russia whose wealth, exclusive of private lands 
and property, is underestimated at 200,000,000,000 
roubles, and whose population is almost 200,000,000, is 
the prize for which Germany has been contending for 
generations; first, through commercial penetration 
(which would have been complete and permanent within 
another decade) ; second, by war; and then by means of 


In spite of what Foreign Minister Sazonoff had told 
me of Russia's unwillingness to negotiate any commer- 
cial treaty with any country until the future economic 
relations between Russia and her Allies had been defi- 
nitely determined, such a treaty with Japan was an- 
nounced about sixty days later which must have been 
in process of negotiation at that time. In a letter written 
about this time, I commented in these terms on the situa- 
tion thus created : 

" Russia's position at this time is dangerous or cer- 
tainly very serious. Japan took advantage of Russia's 
inability to protect her Eastern Border and dictated a 
Russian-Japanese Treaty, much to my regret, although 
I was unable to prevent it; however, I did express my 
disapproval of it to SazonofF immediately after its 

"No one here outside of the Ministry, and not all of 
the Ministers, in my judgment, knew anything about this 
Japanese Treaty until it was promulgated, and I have 
never ceased to suspect that there are some provisions 
in the treaty which have never been made public. The 
Japanese Ambassador, Motono, who negotiated the 
treaty, was immediately made a Viscount by the Mikado, 
and has since been called to Japan, where he was in- 
stalled last week as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Japan 
had banquets, and bonfires and festivals in celebration 
of the treaty, but there has never been any expression 
of approval of it in Russia — in fact the people of this 



country in private conversation with me and with others 
have expressed very great regret that such a treaty 
was entered into. I believe, as stated above, that Japan 
forced that treaty upon Russia; of course, Japan is an 
ally of Russia in this war ; she was far-seeing and adroit 
enough to declare war against Germany soon after Ger- 
many declared war against Russia. But if reports here 
are true, Japan made Germany believe not only that she 
would not join Germany's enemies but would become an 
ally of Germany, and Germany believed that Japan was 
honest in this intention until Japan secured a number 
of men-of-war and some great munitions of war which 
she had ordered from Germany, then she declared war 
against Germany in order to become the possessor of 
Germany's holdings on the Chinese coast. Japan is 
now making every effort to strengthen her foothold in 
China, and the United States should watch the progress 
of this effort diligently and jealously. The Japanese are 
not only unscrupulous, but bright and resourceful and in- 
tensely patriotic. China has a population of 400,000,000 
— twice that of Russia and four times that of the United 
States. If Japan secures control of China, she can form 
and discipline an army that will be even larger than the 
enormous one that Russia has now and then there will 
be a \ Yellow Peril' indeed." 

I never knew exactly what the terms of this Russo- 
Japanese Treaty were until it was published in De- 
cember, 1917, by the Soviet Government together with 
the other secret treaties into which the Imperial Govern- 
ment had entered. The first two articles of this treaty 
give its essentials. They read: 

Article I. 

"Both the High Contracting Parties recognize that 
the vital interests of both of them require the preserva- 


tion of China from the political mastery of any third 
Power nourishing hostile intentions against Russia or 
Japan — and, therefore, mutually bind themselves in 
future, whenever the circumstances demand it, to enter 
with each other into open-hearted communications based 
on entire confidence, in order to take together the meas- 
ures that shall be necessary to exclude the possibility of 
such a situation of affairs arising (in China )." 

Article II. 

"In the event that, as a consequence of measures 
adopted by the common consent of Russia and Japan, 
on the basis of the preceding article, war were to be de- 
clared by any third Power, contemplated by the first 
article of this convention, against one of the Contracting 
Parties, the other Party, at the first demand of its ally, 
must go to her assistance ; each of the high Contracting 
Parties hereby undertakes, in case such a, situation were 
to arise, not to make peace with the common enemy with- 
out first having received its ally's consent to do so." 

On December 20th, 1916, M. ProtopopofT, who had been 
the Vice-President of the Duma, was appointed by the 
Czar as Minister of the Interior. He was looked upon 
as a Liberal at the time of his appointment, but almost 
immediately on assuming this portfolio he became a Re- 
actionary of the most extreme type. This sudden change 
of front was naturally bitterly resented by his former 
Liberal associates. 

I never had any extended conversation with Proto- 
popoff, the Czar's most hated Minister. He had been 
an unusually successful business man before he entered 
public life and had been highly respected in commercial 
circles. He was a member of the Russian delegation 
to the Economic Conference held in Paris in June, 1916. 
On his way back to Russia he was believed to have had 
a. preconcerted meeting in Stockholm with agents of the 
German Government for the purpose of discussing the 


terms of a separate peace between Germany and Russia. 
It was freely asserted and generally believed that he 
owed his appointment to the Ministry to the monk Ras- 
putin. A leading merchant in Petrograd told me that 
he thought his elevation to high office must have upset 
his reason. By way of illustration, he said Protopopoff 
had recently remarked to him, ' l Since I have come into 
contact with the Czar, I have changed my mind about 
him. I have really come to hold His Majesty in high 
esteem and I think he likes me, too." 

Protopopoff was charged with (deliberately making 
food scarce for the purpose of inciting uprisings among 
the people which would give him an excuse for their 
ruthless suppression and also make possible a separate 
peace with Germany. As Minister of the Interior, he 
controlled the police of the entire Empire. In order to 
make them his ready tools, he not only offered them 
material increase in pay, but promised to pay an hono- 
rarium of 2,000 roubles to the family of any policemen 
who should be killed. He deliberately deceived the Em- 
peror and the Empress as to the state of public sentiment 
by arranging to have them receive scores of letters pur- 
porting to come from the peasants and the plain people 
in which the supposed writers affirmed their undying 
allegiance to the monarchy and advised the suppression 
with an iron hand of all outbreaks of the people. Each 
letter came from a different locality and alleged to give 
the sentiment of that part of the Empire. He also had 
machine guns placed on the tops of the buildings, includ- 
ing even the Saint Isaacs and Kazan Cathedrals, with 
which to shoot dQwn the people should they gather in 
crowds to defy the authorities. 

When I left Petrograd, February 27th, 1918, Proto- 
popoff had been transferred from the prison of the Saint 


Peter and Paul Fortress to an insane asylum. Whether 
he still lives I do not know. 

In concluding a dispatch to the Secretary about No- 
vember 7th, 1916, 1 wrote as follows : 

" There have been manifestations lately of unrest 
among the workers in the factories and also among the 
long lines of people waiting to be served small amounts 
of sugar or meat in the shops where such things are dis- 
tributed. I have heard it rumored that these rumblings 
are instigated by German money, and I have also heard 
it charged by an intelligent man who gave the informa- 
tion to me in the most confidential way that the Govern- 
ment itself through its emissaries is attempting to bring 
about an uprising of the people in order to give Eussia 
an excuse to negotiate a separate peace. Every Minister 
in the Government is solicitous about the tenure of his 
office. The Duma will meet in pursuance of adjournment 
on November lst-14th. To-day's papers state that Prime 
Minister Sturmer will be unable to address the Duma 
because of illness. He is not seriously ill and the meeting 
is one week off. It would seem that he fears to go 
through the ordeal/ ' 

At a meeting of the Duma held a week or ten days 
later, the reason for Prime Minister Sturmer 's reluc- 
tance to appear before that body was explained in a 
thunder-bolt oration by Professor Paul Miliukoff, the 
Eussian scholar and statesman who is so well and favor- 
ably known in this country, — which is — in my view, such 
a classic example of oratory and so suggestive of the old 
Hebrew prophets or of Cicero 's attacks on Cataline that 
I am going to reproduce it in full. 

1 * Gentlemen : 

"We have all heard of funeral orations, sad affairs, yet 
they serve some purpose. Let us analyze these purposes. 


Firstly, we see such orations remind the relatives and 
friends of the deceased of some of his good qualities. 
Secondly, they may inspire a listener to imitation; and 
thirdly, they give the orator an opportunity to relieve his 
feelings, or, better still, to practice his oratorical power. 

"But have you noticed, Gentlemen, that whatever the 
aim of the oration it leaves the dead dead ? What would 
you, I wonder, think of an individual who should attempt 
an oration to resurrect the dead — to revive the spirit 
which has passed and bring him back amongst the living! 
Mad? Yes, I agree; yet there are such occasions when 
such an endeavor would be permissible. Gentlemen, I 
am standing on this Tribune with this mad desire upon 
mo. Like a fire this desire has burned into my very soul. 
I want to deliver an oration over the dead, to resurrect 
it, because we, the mighty Russian Empire, cannot think 
of leaving dead the most precious entity in a nation's 
possession. The corpse over which I, together with the 
bulk of Russian society, weep tears of blood must not 
remain lifeless. Yfe must revive it. You and I must 
use superhuman effort, all our powers, magic, witchcraft, 
call it what you like — but it must be made to live. This 
highest inheritance of a nation — its honor — must not be 
buried. Tarry with me, have patience with me, I am a 
sorrowful mourner. Honor has died in Russia and be- 
fore the world at large becomes aware of our dead we 
must bring it to life again. 

"Do you know that unless you act now, unless you do 
your very utmost, the name of Russia will stink in the 
nostrils of humanity? Even the most savage tribes of 
the world will turn aside on the approach of a Russian, 
because Russia is about to betray the trust of her Allies. 
Allies of whom she should be proud, like the gaolbird 
when he is received by the Mayor and Corporation. 
Allies to whom she ought to listen with respect and 

' * The oldest civilized countries in the world, the oldest 
democracies. Allies who are careful in the selection of 
their friends. Allies who have lowered their prestige to 
call us friends. Allies who have helped us. Allies who 
have worked for us. Allies who fight for us. Allies of 


blood's wealth. And these are to be betrayed. Judas 
has closed the bargain! Judas is the traitor amongst 
us. I quite understand your turmoil. I can read the 
terror in your eyes. Even the President's hand is quak- 
ing. He rings his bell nervously, but even the bell 
revolts ; it strikes, but instead of its usual shrill note you 
hear it muffled — the funeral bell. No, it will not quiet 
me; its sound reechoes in my soul and urges me to 
further effort. I have here the evidence of Judas. Evi- 
dence in the cold figures — shekels, Gentlemen. The pieces 
of silver of betrayal. A new sound comes out of the 
bell ; the jingle of silver, the blood money. 

"Either Eussia is a fool or a knave. "Which is it? 
"Was it not madness to appoint as a Prime Minister a 
man with a name and a face apart from our sympathies 
and methods; a man of a race with whom we are at 
war ! Is it a frolic in which our manhood from the lowest 
of peasants upwards is shedding its precious blood? Is 
it a money-making expedition into which we are sent? 
Are the trenches the steps towards riches for the Premier 
and his clique? Are the moans of the wounded, the 
groans of the dying, only the accompaniment of a festival 
— a carnival? Is it only another method of shedding 
Eussian blood by German autocrats in Eussia? Has it 
all been prearranged? Answer! Let your conscience, 
your soul, answer before you howl like a band of hooli- 
gans or starving wolves. What are we allowing to take 
place? Why are we silent? Yes, silence, our silence, is 
golden to Stunner and his colleagues; but for us, for 
our generations to come, it is a crime, a terrible bloody 
crime ; when honor is buried all we shall have to leave to 
our descendants is disgrace, an everlasting disgrace 
which even time will not efface. Awake, you sons of 
Eussia, you representatives of the Eussian people, and 
bestir yourselves to avert this, the greatest catastrophe ! 

"Stunner is in negotiation for separate peace. 

"Stunner has betrayed Eussia. 

' ' Stunner is disarranging supplies for our brave sons 
and brothers in the trenches. 

1 ' Stunner is doing it for German money. I have here 
a document which shows every mark which he received 


from Germany from July, 1901, to July, 1916. Let him 
come and deny it, and, if I am allowed to live after this 
(though I'll gladly die if honor lives) I will bring wit- 
nesses to prove the truth. 

" Traitors and spies are amongst us. 

"No doubt, says Stunner, separate peace will be bene- 
ficial to Eussia when arranged by Sturmer, but what is 
Eussia without honor? Eise up; dead Honor! Arise 
from thy Coffin, and let us see thee live ! Come face thy 
high position! Accuse him in front of this Assembly; 
let thy voice thnnder! 

"Yes, I am emotional, but where is the man who know- 
ing all this can be cool — can be unmoved? "Why look! 
There sits the Ambassador of an Allied Country, the 
coldest and calmest, and yet, though he follows me with 
difficulty, he is pale, he is perturbed. 

"I am cool in comparison with the crime with which 
I am charging Sturmer. I wish I were younger. I wish 
the spirit of 1905 were upon me — it would be practical 
emotion then. You accuse me of shouting, of being mad. 
I agree ; but if you are sane after having heard what I 
have said, you also are traitors. All right. I withdraw ; 
it is against the regulations to call you traitors; it is 
admittedly heated. I know you too well to even think it 
of you. On the contrary, I am standing on this Tribune 
only because you are honest men and true. You will not 
tolerate these things, now you know of them. You will, 
as I said in the beginning, resurrect dead honor and bring 
gratitude instead of contempt into the hearts of our 
children. Eachel, we are told, is crying for her children ; 
if you open your ears you will hear a heartbroken sol) — a 
sob which will fill you with horror. Do you know who 
is crying? Eussia! The gallant Eussia, the brave Eus- 
sia, the Mother of us all, bad and good, is crying. Her 
heart is breaking. Are we to help her — we, her sons? 
This heartens me. This is the miracle I have been work- 
ing for. The dead has come back to life. Your shouts of 
encouragement are its first signs of life. 

"Now with a live honor in our midst we can speak 
more calmly, we can deliberate. 

"As you know, our agreement with our Allies does 


not permit a separate peace — with one exception. This 
exception should have been known to onr statesmen only, 
but it is known in Berlin. And Berlin has its friends 
here ; what is easier therefore than to make the exception 

"Now just take the trouble to analyze the activity of 
the Sturmer Ministry since its inception. What were all 
measures adopted for! What were they intended to pro- 
duce? The oppression, the disorganization? What is 
the aim of all these acts ? Dissatisfaction of the masses ? 
What does such dissatisfaction produce? Eevolution! 
Eed, bloody revolution! And this is the exception to 
make separate peace possible. 

' * No, Berlin does not pay money for nothing ! Sturmer 
had to earn it and he did. He paved the way for a revo- 
lution as the means of separate peace. Must not the 
great Eussian public be told of this and be warned to 
suffer and be patient ? But were it not better to remove 
the cause of their suffering, their anxiety? 

"Gentlemen, this traitor, this German, must go. No 
matter what excuse be made for him. For the sake of 
honor, to reestablish the confidence of our Allies, 
Sturmer, nay, the whole German clique, must go. 

"Just a few words more, Gentlemen, these are history- 
making epochs. Eussia's hope, Bussia's life, is based 
on her alliances ; these alliances depend on victory. The 
Eussian Duma, though it has no power, must help to 
achieve it. The people stand helpless awaiting your lead, 
you the representatives of the people, are responsible. 
You must act." 

Soon after the meeting in which this attack upon 
Sturmer was made, I wrote Secretary Lansing that in 
my judgment the Government was preparing to do two 
things : one to abandon to her fate her small Ally, Eou- 
mania, whom she had induced to enter the war through 
promises of support, and, second, to make a separate 
peace with Germany. I said that I believed this had been 
the underground plan of the Ministry ever since Sturmer 
became Prime Minister in July, and knowledge of these 


plans or plots reaching the Duma had caused the out- 
breaks of wrathful denunciation. 

Attacks such as MiliukofPs upon the Prime Minister, 
instead of causing the Emperor to prorogue the Duma, 
as would have been the case a few years earlier, led him 
to dismiss Stunner, who quickly disappeared into igno- 
minious oblivion. He later died in prison in the Saint 
Peter and Paul Fortress, and his wife after an attempt 
to cut her throat is now in the insane asylum. 

"While the removal of Stunner temporarily allayed pub- 
lic indignation, the appointment of M. TrepofY as 
his successor was not reassuring. Trepoif, although 
opposed to a separate peace, was also a reactionary and 
was not satisfactory to the Duma. He was, moreover, a 
man with deep convictions and iron nerve, and on that 
account more dangerous than Stunner, who was venal 
and with neither convictions nor strength. As I said at 
the time of his appointment Trepoff was a man who 
would not hesitate to demand that the Emperor dissolve 
the" Duma if that body opposed him, and such action 
could hardly fail to result very seriously. 

On November 18th, shortly after Stunner's dismissal 
and TrepoiPs appointment, I attended a turbulent and 
stirring session of the Duma. I was the only Ambas- 
sador in the diplomatic loge when the President called 
the meeting to order, but a few minutes later was joined 
by the Italian, British and French Ambassadors suc- 
cessively. After a few remarks by the President, Pre- 
mier Trepoff was introduced, advanced to the Tribune 
and tried to read a written speech. His voice was inau- 
dible amid the taunts, shouts, clapping and stamping 
from the "Left." Three times he returned to the Trib- 
une from his seat in the space at the right of the Presi- 
dent, reserved for the Ministry. The President used 
a bell in his efforts to keep order instead of a mallet 


as in other deliberative assemblies. Three times the 
Premier's efforts to be heard were drowned in the 
uproar. Finally after the expulsion of a half dozen of 
the most obstreperous disturbers, he got a hearing, read 
his address, and received perfunctory applause. He 
denied that Eussia had sought a separate peace, and 
said that no peace would be concluded that did not give 
Eussia control of the Dardenelles and added that Eus- 
sia 's Allies had agreed to this. At this point a number 
of the members looked curiously toward Sir George 
Buchanan, the British Ambassador, who sat next to me, 
but his expression showed no trace of dissent. 

Several speakers followed the Premier, but the speech 
of General Purishkevich was the only one which created 
a sensation. The General had been well known as an 
ultraconservative — a member of the " Eight' ' and joined 
the "Left." He made specific charges that German 
influence had permeated not only Court and military 
circles, but banking and commercial affairs also. He 
accused some of the Eussian Generals with inefficiency 
and indifference, if not actual treachery. He cited one 
General in particular who had used freight cars to trans- 
port mineral waters to his headquarters which should 
have been used to haul munitions and soldiers to Eou- 
mania — Eussia 's small and sorely pressed Ally. He 
made other definite charges against the army, of which 
he claimed to have documentary evidence and stepping 
to the Ministerial Bench he handed the Minister of "War 
a document. He was merciless in his criticism of the 
Ministry, saying that the Minister and Duma could not 
work together — one or the other must go. He singled 
out Minister of the Interior Protopopoff for his bitterest 
denunciation. Protopopoff had not stayed to hear what 
the General had to say about him. 

He told of a movement to start a daily newspaper in 


Petrograd which should be under German influence and 
should advocate a separate peace between Russia and 
the Central Empires. He charged that ten prominent 
banks in Russia had agreed to subscribe 500,000 roubles, 
each, to this paper, but that seven of them on learning its 
real purpose had withdrawn their support. The three 
that remained were the International Bank of Commerce, 
the Russian Bank of Foreign Trade and the AzofT-Don 
Bank. He stated that of the assets of the Russian Bank 
of Foreign Trade of 70,000,000 roubles only 20,000,000 
was Russian capital, the remaining 50,000,000 being Ger- 
man. Further he said that of the 170,000,000 roubles 
representing the combined capital of the three banks, 
50,000,000 only was Russian, the rest, or 120,000,000, 
being German. 

When General Purishkevich took his seat he received 
a great demonstration of approval both from the mem- 
bers and from the spectators in the galleries. 

On December 17th, O.S. 1916, all Russia was stirred 
by the report of the murder of Rasputin, the monk, who 
had exercised such a dominant influence over the royal 
family, particularly the Czarina, In January I wrote 
Counselor Polk a personal letter in which I gave him 
the most authentic version I could then obtain of the 
murder. I said: 

"I have heard some of the particulars from a very 
authentic source concerning the killing of Rasputin — the 
monk or pretender who was killed because he was sup- 
posed to have too much influence with the Empress and 
was bringing disgrace on the royal family. You have 
no doubt read in the public prints of this man. He was 
uneducated and untidy in his dress, but had a wonderful 
eye and hypnotic influence. He undoubtedly had access 
to the Empress at all hours and through her was very 
potential with the Emperor. Consequently his assistance 


was sought by all aspiring to power and position. He 
was a man of extraordinary if not unprecedented sexual 
passions. He was very human in other regards, having 
an appetite for liquor and rich food, notwithstanding 
his obscure origin. 

' i On the night of the tragedy he was sent for to come to 
the house of Prince Usoupoff, a fine palace on the Moika. 
It appears there had been a dinner at this house attended 
by Eussian ladies, who, however, had taken their depar- 
ture before Easputin arrived. After considerable drink- 
ing Easputin began to boast of his power, claiming to 
have influenced a number of appointments to official posi- 
tions, and even asserted that he had illicit intercourse 
with many women of high position, calling them by 
names. He went so far as to say that his next mistress 
would be a well-known young Grand Duchess of the royal 
family whose character is above reproach and who is 
very well thought of by all classes in Eussia. When he 
made that statement, it is said that the host, Prince 
Usoupoff, drew his pistol and laid it down on the table 
in front of Easputin, and told him that after making such 
a statement it was time for him to kill himself. Easputin 
grasped the pistol but instead of firing it at himself, shot 
at Usoupoff, whom he fortunately missed, the bullet 
going through a door and attracting the attention of the 
police on the outside. The other members of the party 
then drew their weapons and began to fire at Easputin, 
who tried to leave the room. The young noblemen con- 
tinued to fire and Easputin fell to the floor just before 
reaching the door, having been shot three times through 
the back. No one knows who fired the fatal shots — in 
fact it is said that none of those present admitted having 
fired at all. My information, however, is from a source 
which is said to be very reliable. Prince Demitry, a son 
of a Grand Uncle of the Emperor, and Prince Usoupoff, 


the son of one of the richest if not the richest nobleman 
in Russia, and General Purishkevich are generally 
thought to have been the only ones present. After Ras- 
putin was killed an automobile was sent for, driven by 
the owner, another nobleman, Count Pistelcorse, con- 
nected by marriage with the Grand Duke Paul — the 
Emperor's uncle. It came to the house, the body of 
Rasputin was placed in it, and taken across the Neva to 
one of the bayous or inlets of that river, where it was 
put through a hole cut in the ice. The body was dis- 
covered there in a few days after a thorough search by 
the police, was identified and taken to a hospital on this 
side of the river. It is said that the Empress went to this 
hospital herself, had the body removed to Tsarskoe-Selo, 
about twelve miles out of the city limits, and that funeral 
services were held in the Emperor's church and the body 
buried in the grounds of the palace. It is said to be 
the intention of the Empress to erect a chapel over this 
body and to locate its altar immediately over the grave. 
Whether these reports are true it is difficult to say, but 
at any rate they are generally believed. Other accounts 
of the killing of Rasputin have come to me since, but I 
do not know that they are any more authentic than the 
version given. 

"It was thought for a day or two after Rasputin's 
death that nothing would be done about it ; everyone feel- 
ing that his removal would be beneficial from every view- 
point. In fact the Emperor who was at the Front when 
the killing occurred is said to have been not displeased 
when the news reached him and as especially talkative 
and good-humored when enroute from the front to 
Tsarskoe-Selo. But in a few days a change came over the 
Emperor concerning the punishment of those who had 
killed Rasputin. Meantime the Empress had herself 
signed an order for the arrest of Demitry and had given 


it to a much beloved Russian General of advanced years 
whose name I don 't recall. "When the General presented 
the order of arrest to Demitry, the latter said he was a 
member of the royal family and no one could order his 
arrest except the Emperor himself. Thereupon the old 
General said, 'If you don't observe this it will be the 
cause of my downfall, and I appeal to you through per- 
sonal consideration for me to consider yourself a pris- 
oner in your own house,' to which Demitry consented. 
About two days after the Emperor 's arrival, he ordered 
Demitry to military service in Persia and is said to have 
prohibited his return to Petrograd for a period of twelve 
years. He banished Usoupoff to his estates somewhere 
in Southern Russia. Purishkevich, a General in the 
Army, and the same who had made the bitter speech in 
the Duma against Protopopoff, had assembled a trainload 
of supplies for the relief of the Russian w r ounded which 
was waiting for him on a side-track in the suburbs of 
Petrograd. He joined it about daylight and went to the 
front where he is supposed to be now, distributing the 
supplies. It is probable, however, that some punishment 
has been inflicted upon him. 

"On January 1st, all the members of the royal family, 
including many Grand Dukes and Grand Duchesses, 
united in a ' round robin' to the Emperor, asking his 
clemency for Demitry on the ground that his health is 
broken and that Persia where he has been ordered to 
special service on the staff of the commander of the 
Russian forces is a very unhealthy country. This 
' round robin' was signed by the Empress Dowager 
who is at Kieff where she has been ever since my arrival 
here. It is said that she is not permitted to return to 
Petrograd by order of the Emperor, and while a strong 
woman and exceedingly popular in Russia, she admits 
that she has no influence over her son who seems to have 


been prejudiced against her by his wife, the Empress. 
This ' round-robin y was presented to the Emperor by the 
Queen Dowager of Greece, who lives in Petrograd. The 
Emperor, however, was immovable and handed the peti- 
tion back to the Queen Dowager of Greece, after writing 
on the reverse side that he was surprised such a petition 
should be presented to him, as he could not permit so 
heinous a crime to go unpunished. It is reported that 
the new count who drove the automobile which conveyed 
Rasputin's body from UsoupofPs house across the river 
was ordered to leave Petrograd for two months ; that all 
of the signers of the 'round robin ' were informed that 
they would find it beneficial to their health to make a visit 
of from two to four weeks to their respective country 

"The Minister of the Interior, Protopopoff, was said 
to have gone into a trance when talking to the Empress a 
short time before the assassination and when he re- 
covered himself to have said in answer to an inquiry 
that he had communicated with Jesus Christ, who had 
told him to follow the teachings of the Saint Rasputin. ' ' 

In a letter to Frederick Sterling who had been Second 
Secretary of the Embassy when I arrived in Petrograd, 
and who was a St. Louisan, I wrote on January 8th, 1917 : 

"Not long before this murder both the Imperial 
Council and the Congress of Nobles had passed resolu- 
tions inveighing against 'the invisible influences ' sur- 
rounding the Government. The influences are commonly 
referred to as 'dark forces. ' The Emperor has been 
undoubtedly very much provoked by all these hostile 
demonstrations, and in his appointment of reactionaries 
is showing a defiant attitude. Trepoff has resigned as 
Premier, and is said to have told the Emperor that he 
would not serve longer with Protopopoff. His resigna- 
tion was accepted after an interval of about two weeks. 



IgnatiefT, Minister of Education, and Brobinsky, Minis- 
ter of Agriculture, have also both resigned for the same 
reason — namely, hostility to ProtopopofT. Prince Golit- 
zin has been appointed to succeed Trepoff as Premier. 
He is a reactionary and is said to have been appointed 
through the influence of the Empress. He has had charge 
of her charities and relief work. Last Sunday, which 
was the Eussian New Year's Bay, Eodzianko, the Presi- 
dent of the Duma, refused to shake ProtopopofPs hand 
and told him that he desired to have no relations with 
him at any time or place. Protopopoff: retorted, 'If that 
is the case I will send you a challenge !' Eodzianko 
turned on his heel with the remark, ' I hear you. ' Noth- 
ing has come of it however. ' ' 

In a letter to Mrs. Francis, January 15th, 1917, New 
Style, I wrote : 

"It has long been the custom in Eussia for the Emperor 
to receive the Diplomatic Corps on the Eussian New 
Year's Day, which is our January 14th. There was no 
reception January 14th, 1916, because the Emperor was 
at the front. It was generally understood there would be 
no reception this year, but the Embassy was notified by 
the Master of Ceremonies January 10th that the Em- 
peror would receive the Diplomatic Corps at 4 p.m., Janu- 
ary lst-14th at Tsarskoe-Selo, and that a special train 
would be provided for them leaving Petrograd at 2:35 
p.m., and leaving Tsarskoe-Selo for the return at 5:30 
p.m. I was in Moscow when this notice was received, and 
Counselor Wright was requested by the Master of Cere- 
monies to wire me and state that it was expressly desired 
that I should be present at the reception. 

"Accompanied by my staff I left Petrograd on the spe- 
cial train at 2:35 p.m., arriving at Tsarskoe-Selo about 
thirty minutes later. Each Ambassador was conveyed 
from the station to the castle, a distance of about one 


verst or two-thirds of a mile, in a separate carriage ; the 
Ministers and Staffs of the Embassies and Legations 
followed in carriages and sleighs loaded to their respec- 
tive capacities. Upon arrival at the castle the Diplo- 
matic Corps was conducted to a large room about 120 
feet long and about 40 feet wide, richly furnished in gold 
and red and lighted by hundreds of electric lamps. "When 
all were assembled each head of a mission took position 
in his proper order, accompanied by his staff, who stood 
two paces in the rear. A few minutes later the Emperor 
entered, accompanied by the Grand Master of Ceremo- 
nies and by the Marshal of the Court and also by twenty 
or thirty members of His Court. The Emperor advanced 
first to the British Ambassador, whom he engaged in 
conversation for iive or six minutes. The Ambassador 
read a paper to His Majesty, the contents of which were 
not made known to the other missions. The conversation 
between the Emperor and the Ambassador was not 
audible more than three or four feet away. I have not 
learned the contents of the paper read by Sir George 
Buchanan, but conclude that as I was not consulted that 
the Ambassador did not presume to speak for my Govern- 
ment. At the end of the conversation between the Em- 
peror and the Ambassador, the suite of the British 
Embassy, consisting of about fifteen men, were presented 
to the Emperor, each man shaking hands with His Maj- 
esty. After a few words addressed by the Emperor 
to the members of his suite, His Majesty advanced to 
the Italian Ambassador where the same proceedings were 
enacted ; the Italian Ambassador, however, did not have 
any paper in his hand and the conversation appeared to 
be of an informal character. The Emperor next ad- 
vanced to the French Ambassador, with whom he held 
conversation in an undertone for a few minutes and then 


the members of the French suite were presented — they 
were nine in number. 

" The Emperor then advanced to myself and after shak- 
ing hands cordially recalled my presentation to him last 
May. I remarked that I had learned a great deal more 
about his country and his people than I knew when I 
saw him last and had found much in both to admire and 
much to interest me. He expressed gratification, talking 
all the time in excellent English (I think his conversation 
with the Italian and French Ambassador and the Spanish 
Ambassador and, perhaps, with all of the other heads of 
the missions except Sir George Buchanan and myself 
was in French) and when I said to him that I had been 
endeavoring to promote closer relations between Eussia 
and America he smilingly and responsively replied : ' Yes, 
I have heard of your actions in that line and think con- 
siderable progress has been made.' After a few more 
words of casual conversation and with sincere expres- 
sion by me of New Tear's Greetings, I presented the 
nine members of my Staff to His Majesty and took occa- 
sion to say some word of commendation or explanation 
about each member. "We were all impressed with the 
cordiality of His Majesty's manner, by his poise and his 
apparent excellent physical condition, as well as by the 
promptness of his utterances. After leaving the Ameri- 
can Embassy, the Emperor next conversed with the 
Spanish Ambassador and then with the heads of all of 
the other missions, ending his very trying ordeal, which 
occupied about an hour and twenty minutes, in a talk with 
the Charge d 'Affaires of the Japanese Embassy. The 
Emperor was attired in a Cossack uniform, with an 
overcoat extending to within a few inches of his ankles. 
He is a man of medium stature and gave appearance of 
having supreme confidence in himself. During this hour 
and twenty minutes the members of the Diplomatic Corps 


all retained the positions to which, they were first 
assigned. The Emperor after leaving the Japanese 
Embassy, proceeded to the door and, turning with a 
dignified and graceful bow, saluted the entire Diplomatic 
Corps and then took his departure, accompanied by his 

* ' The Diplomatic Corps numbered over eighty persons ; 
the chief of every mission was in uniform except the 
American ; seven members of the American mission were 
in full dress suits with white vest, white tie and white 
gloves — the two Naval Attaches and the Military Attache 
were, of course, in their dress uniforms. After a light 
luncheon we were driven from the castle to the station 
in the same order and in the same vehicle that conveyed 
us from the station. The special train arrived in Petro- 
grad at the Imperial Station a few minutes after six 
o 'clock. 

" This entire ceremony was very impressive. The scene 
in the magnificent room was brilliant indeed. The 
Emperor appeared to me as taking advantage of the 
occasion to impress his royal personality upon all 

"On the same day the Emperor announced the new 
members of the Imperial Council; the names of these 
members are said to be nearly or quite all those of Reac- 
tionaries. If so, that is but another indication that His 
Majesty is not yielding in the slightest degree to the 
liberal sentiment which expressions in the Duma and in 
the Imperial Council during the past month, indicate has 
been spreading throughout the Empire.' f 

Little did any of us who were present at this reception 
know that we were witnessing the last public appearance 
of the last ruler of the mighty Romanoff dynasty. And 
as I look back on it I am convinced that just as little did 
the central figure, the Czar i>f $11 the Russians, realize 


that within sixty days he would be compelled to abdicate 
the throne of his ancestors. In fact he made the im- 
pression upon me and upon every member of my staff 
that he was more at his ease and felt more secure in his 
position than he did when I presented to him seven 
months earlier my letters from the President of the 
United States. This complacent monarch had no pre- 
monition of the storm that was brewing. This weak 
ruler had no idea that he was standing on a volcano 
whose eruption within seven short months was to bury 
himself and his dynasty. 


On December 23rd, 1916, I delivered to Foreign Min- 
ister Pokrovski President Wilson's communication to 
each of the Belligerents requesting them to state the 
terms upon which they would be willing to make peace 
and stop the terrible slaughter. A few days before I had 
delivered to the Minister the overtures for peace of the 
Central Powers which I had received from the State De- 
partment. These I handed him without comment. I had 
told Minister Pokrovski at that time, however, that I 
would shortly present to him a communication from the 
President of the United States, but that such message not 
only was not inspired by the note of the Central Empires, 
but was being prepared before it was known that the 
Central Powers were to make any overtures. I read the 
President's note to the Minister and then delivered the 
original to him. 

Almost exactly a month later I delivered to the Foreign 
Minister a copy of President Wilson's speech to the 
Senate in which he outlined the terms and conditions 
under which the United States might be willing to join 
with the other Powers for the preservation of the peace 
of the world after the close of the war — the celebrated 
fourteen points. The reaction to this message at the 
time can perhaps best be suggested by giving here an 
account of a dinner given to some of my colleagues of 
the Diplomatic Corps representing the Neutral countries 
and sent to the Secretary immediately afterwards. I 


"I gave a dinner in the Embassy last evening which 
was attended by the Ministers of Sweden, Norway, Den- 
mark, Holland, China, Siam and Serbia. There were 
eighteen plates but only six ladies as most of the mem- 
bers of the Diplomatic Corps are either unmarried or 
unaccompanied by their wives. The general subject of 
discussion was the President's message as I anticipated 
it would be. It is not surprising that the representatives 
of these smaller countries should be in entire sympathy 
with the President's desires, but all of them expressed 
doubt and fear lest his views might be so impractical as 
to prevent their being put into operation. I told them 
that they should bear in mind that this utterance of the 
President of the United States was not addressed to the 
Belligerents nor to the Neutrals, but to that branch of 
his own Government to which, in connection with himself, 
was entrusted the direction of our foreign relations ; that 
the message gave the conclusions of the President after 
mature deliberation as to the kind of a peace which in his 
judgment would prove lasting and for the preservation 
of which he would be willing to see our Government enter 
into a League with other nations. I reminded them that 
no revolution in the history of the world and in fact no 
reform had ever been broached or agitated or consum- 
mated that had not been the result of a moral conviction 
in the minds and hearts of men and that invariably the 
first expression of such conviction had appeared to the 
supporters of the 'old order' as a Utopian dream which 
society was unprepared to put into effect and that in 
most instances those advocating such changes had been 
charged with insincerity and accused of being moved by 
selfish objects. Of course, there were no speeches at this 
dinner and this conversation was a mutual interchange 
of views concerning the President's message and its 
bearing upon conditions which are unprecedented in the 
world's history. Every one of these ministers was 
prompt to avow his belief in the purity and unselfishness 
of the President's motives, while expressing the fear 
that his plan for peace would not be realized in connec- 
tion with the end of the present war. 

"The criticism of the President's message most fre- 


quently heard is of that expression that a peace based 
on victory of either side will not be a lasting peace. 
While admitting that a cessation of hostilities as the 
result of a war of conquest would result in a peace char- 
acterized by bitterness and resentment, the general feel- 
ing seems to be that Germany merits punishment and 
should be taught a lesson for the violation of her agree- 
ments and because of the policy which has characterized 
her prosecution of the war, which it is charged has been 
in defiance of all international law and of all of the 
instincts of civilized society." 

Discussion of this speech was, however, soon termi- 
nated by our breaking off of diplomatic relations with 
Germany on February 4th. I gave a statement to the 
newspapers concerning our rupture of diplomatic rela- 
tions with Germany immediately after the receipt of a 
cable from the State Department officially informing me 
of the act. This was necessary in order to give the Rus- 
sian people a clear idea of what the United States had 
done. Otherwise they would have thought we had de- 
clared war. In a letter to Secretary Lansing written at 
this time, I said: 

"The Russians are very much pleased with the stand 
we have taken and are already beginning to treat us as 
Allies. The French are delighted also and according to 
telegraphic reports there have been demonstrations of 
an enthusiastic nature in Paris. 

"I don't like the position of England, or rather that 
of the British Embassy here. Neither the British Ambas- 
sador nor the French nor the Italian has called nor have 
I met any one of them since Bernstorff was given his 
passports — it seemed to me that it would not have been 
improper for those Ambassadors to call and express 
gratification at least that our diplomatic relations with 
the arch-enemy of their countries had been severed. The 
Belgian Minister, deBuisseret, did call and expressed 


himself as being much pleased with the stand we had 
taken. The Siamese Minister called yesterday and stated 
that his Government had instructed him to ascertain what 
reply the Neutral countries had made or would make to 
the suggestion of President Wilson that they take similar 
action to ours. I told him that no official information had 
been received on the subject, and all I knew concerning it 
was what had appeared in the public prints. He told me 
he had called upon me first, but proposed to call upon the 
Ministers of the other neutral countries, and that when 
he left the Embassy he would go to the Norwegian Lega- 
tion. I requested him to telephone me the result of his 
conference with Minister Prebensen, which he did later 
and informed me that the Scandinavian countries had 
come to no conclusion other than an agreement to confer 
and make a joint reply. Meantime I had telephoned to 
the Chinese Minister and called at his Legation where 
he informed me of the action by his government. (China 
had followed President Wilson's advice and also severed 
diplomatic relations with Germany.) He seemed very 
much pleased and I was exceedingly so. I informed the 
Siamese Minister of the action taken by China and 
strongly urged him to recommend his government to do 
likewise — he virtually promised to do so." 

It is the practise in the diplomatic service for all 
Ambassadors and Ministers to submit their resignations 
at the close of a Presidential term. Accordingly on Feb- 
ruary 25th, I cabled mine to the President paraphrased 
in the following terms : 

" Understand that it is customary for Ambassadors to 
tender their resignations at the beginning of a new term. 
Mine is herewith presented. Am thoroughly reconciled 
to return or perfectly willing to remain, or would cheer- 
fully serve in any position where you thought I could be 
more effective. In this critical juncture personal inte- 


rests and inclinations should be subordinated to 
country's welfare." 

I also requested that if agreeable to the President it 
be published in the American papers. My object in 
desiring its publication was to indicate that I had no 
sympathy with the obstructionists in the United States 
who were seeking to keep us out of a just and inevitable 
war — particularly did I wish it understood that I entirely 
disagreed with Senator Stone of Missouri, my own State. 
In this connection, I might say that after I had served 
five months in Russia and had established not only pleas- 
ant, but friendly relations with the Russian Government, 
I was told by some of my friends among the Russian 
officials that I had originally been supposed to be pro- 
German in my sympathies and that my appointment was 
thought to have been brought about by pro-German influ- 
ences in America. This rumor was strengthened by my 
hailing from St. Louis, where the German element was 
supposed to predominate. 

On March 9th there had just occurred several demon- 
strations of dissatisfaction by the working people, espe- 
cially the women. These were caused by the ever-in- 
creasing difficulty in getting food. Long bread lines were 
constantly seen, one of them being just across the street 
from the Embassy; the women formed these at four or 
five o'clock in the morning and sometimes waited for 
hours with the thermometer 8 or 10 degrees below zero, 
and then on reaching the point of distribution, after 
enduring such hardships for so long, they were told there 
was no more bread or no sugar. That state of affairs 
prevailed for several weeks when finally there was no 
more black bread even. The women became clamorous, 
the men refused to work in the factories and the inevit- 
able consequence was a congregation of boisterous 


crowds on the streets demanding provisions, bread, and 
in some instances crying for peace. An assemblage of 
several thousand hungry people on a street near the 
Embassy was dispersed by the Cossacks, who did not, 
however, treat the people with cruelty or even harshly. 
The city is fortunately separated into sections by canals 
and by the River Neva, upon each side of which are large 
and compactly built areas. Communication between 
these sections is by bridges only. On these bridges Cos- 
sacks were stationed to prevent all suspicious-looking 
characters from crossing. It was suspected and charged 
that this scarcity of food was the result of design on 
the part of some of the members of the Government in 
order that internal dissensions might justify Russia in 
concluding a separate peace with the Central Empires. 
(Under the terms of Russia's agreement with her Allies 
she could only enter into a separate peace if obliged to 
do so by internal revolutionary disturbances.) The Cos- 
sacks who had always obeyed the Emperor's orders im- 
plicitly, regardless of consequences, were said to be 
advising the people, while dispersing them, to demand 
bread or the cessation of the war. 

When in the face of these critical and dangerous condi- 
tions, the Emperor prorogued the Duma, instead of 
enlarging its powers as he had solemnly promised his 
apprehensive Ministry he would do, one can readily 
understand that the effect was like throwing a burning 
match into a powder magazine. 

In the midst of this critical situation Baron Uchida, 
Japan 's present Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived in 
Petrograd as the new Japanese Ambassador. Soon after 
his arrival he called upon me and I promptly returned 
his call. I found that he felt particularly friendly toward 
the United States because he had served on the staff of 
the Japanese Embassy in Washington, while the Baron- 


ess was a graduate of Bryn Mawr College. Conse- 
quently our relations speedily became unusually close. 
Only four days before the outbreak of the March revolu- 
tion when the desultory street firing which preceded the 
outbreak had actually begun, I gave a dinner at the 
Embassy for the Baron and Baroness Uchida, which was 
the last function of its kind to be attended by Ministers 
of the Russian Empire. 

When bidding my guests good night, I expressed the 
hope that they would reach their homes safely. As they 
departed they made jesting references to the disturb- 
ances and were inclined to accept my solicitude about 
their safety as a conversational pleasantry. 


The gathering storm of Kevolution soon broke. The 
American Embassy was in the midst of the fighting. 
Many of the chief encounters could be seen from the 
Embassy. More could be heard. 

In a dispatch to the Department, I gave the following 
description of the situation: 

"As I have written you from time to time, there has 
been considerable unrest in Kussia for the past several 
months. I cabled you about two weeks ago that I had 
asked for a military guard to be placed at the Austrian 
Embassy which contains the office of the Second Divi- 
sion of the American Embassy, and where 12 or 15 of 
the Embassy employees live. (We had taken over the 
Austrian Embassy building when we took over Aus- 
trian interests in Eussia.) Although the Foreign Office 
promised to send the guard immediately, six days elapsed 
before any guard made its appearance and then only two 
soldiers were sent ; that guard was increased to 18 about 
a week ago. The Austrian Embassy is on Sergiuskaia 
Street, which is the next parallel street to Fourstatdskaia 
Street on the West. The Embassy is, as you know, at 
No. 34 Fourstatdskaia and faces' South; the block is 
perhaps 1,000 to 1,200 feet long; the street on the West is 
Liteiny, which is about 1,000 feet distant ; on the East is 
Voskresensky which is about 200 feet away. There are 
tram cars on both streets, but no cars have been operat- 
ing for two or three days. On Friday, March 9th, crowds 
visited a number of factories and ordered the men to 
stop work, which they promptly did. Yesterday, Sunday, 
there were soldiers in the streets and perhaps 50 people 
were killed or wounded, but most of the firing was with 


blank cartridges. Yesterday evening the order was given 
that no persons or vehicles should go on the streets 
to-day. About ten o'clock this morning a regiment of 
1,000 to 1,200 men stationed in barracks about two blocks 
from the Embassy mutinied and, according to reports, 
killed their commanding officer because he would not 
join them. 

u At 11:30 a.m., Mr. Miles phoned me from the Second 
Division in the Austrian Embassy that some of the muti- 
neers accompanied by many revolutionists had visited 
the munition factory adjoining the Austrian Embassy; 
had killed the officer in command there, and had ordered 
the men to quit work; that many of the employees and 
one lieutenant had come into the Austrian Embassy, 
crawling through the back windows to seek protection 
from the angry crowd. Mr. Miles said that he was at 
the time endeavoring to prevent more employees from 
entering the Embassy and fearing that the crowd might 
learn that the Embassy was being used as a refuge he 
called me up and requested an additional guard. I tele- 
phoned to the Foreign Office and was assured that the 
guard would be strengthened if possible, but that it must 
be done by the War Department or General Staff, with 
which the Foreign Office would immediately communi- 
cate. That was the last communication I had with the 
Imperial Foreign Office. 

"This is written at 8 p.m. For four or five hours 
(here have been crowds on the Liteiny which is the most 
frequented thoroughfare in this section of the city, and 
Secretary Bailey who came to the Embassy from his 
apartment at about 3 :30 p.m. reported that he had seen 
four dead and five wounded men lying on Liteiny. 
Within one hour thereafter many of the mutineers 
were seen walking on Fourstatdskaia in front of 
the Embassy, some with guns and some without. There 
also marched by the Embassy in the roadway a 
body of about one hundred men in citizens ' clothes who 
carried muskets but observed no order of marching and 
appeared to have no commanding officer. During this 
hour, from 4 to 5 p.m., there also passed in front 
of the Embassy a number of motor cars filled with sol- 


diers with guns, but in every car there were some citizens 
or men in citizens ' clothes who were no doubt revolu- 
tionists. About this hour the Embassy was informed by 
telephone that the Duma had been dissolved or pro- 
rogued until about the middle of April. I heard later 
that this order was issued yesterday afternoon but as 
there have been no newspapers for the past two days it 
was not known until the hour for the Duma's assemblage, 
and I suppose the members were ignorant of it until they 
went to the hall for the meeting. 

"At about 6 p.m., Captain McCully, the Naval 
Attache of the Embassy, who had left for his apartment 
about 5, telephoned that in his walk from the Embassy 
to his apartment, a distance of over a mile, he had seen 
neither police nor soldiers who acknowledged fealty to 
the Government, but had passed a thousand or more 
cavalrymen riding quietly toward the Neva and aban- 
doning the streets of the city to the mutineers and revo- 
lutionists. About 6:30 p.m. the telephone connection of 
the Embassy was severed. Between 7 :30 and this writ- 
ing, 9 :30 p.m., many rumors have come to the Embassy 
through the Secretaries and other attaches. Mr. Basil 
Miles, Director of the Second Division, took the women 
employees from the Austrian Embassy to the Hotel de 
France, where they are quartered for the night. The 
city seems entirely quiet but absolutely under the control 
of the soldiers who have mutinied, and of the revolu- 
tionists. It is reported that six regiments have joined 
the revolutionists and the Government seems to have 
abandoned all effort to curb the revolution. One rumor 
is to the effect that the Duma, after being dissolved, 
assembled notwithstanding the royal decree, and de- 
clared the Ministry deposed and made the President of 
the Duma, Rodzianko, the President of the Council of 
Ministers. The President of the Imperial Council, a 
Reactionary, is said to be under arrest. Another rumor 
is to the effect that Grand Duke Nicholas has been made 
Commander-in-Chief of all the Russian forces to sup- 
plant the Emperor. I cannot vouch for the truth of any 
of these rumors, but the Duma has certainly been pro- 
rogued until the middle of April, and the order to that 


effect is said to have been signed by the Emperor several 
days ago. 

"I had a telephonic talk with Moscow today about 
noon and Consul-General Summers reported that every- 
thing was quiet in that city ; the treatment of the Duma, 
however, will arouse every section of the Empire. No 
one can foretell what to-morrow will bring forth. It is 
said that the Ministers of State have all left their respec- 
tive houses for fear the revolutionists will arrest them. 
One theory is that the city has been abandoned and will 
be subjugated by being starved out. 

"Every thing depends upon the Army. If the Grand 
Duke Nicholas, who is known to be very antagonistic to 
Pro-German influences, which are said to be dominating 
the Emperor through the Empress, should assume com- 
mand of the Army it would be very likely to rally to his 
appeal. The Emperor, however, has many friends, and 
it is not likely that he will yield without a struggle. 

"The antagonism to the Minister of the Interior, 
Protopopoff, is bitter and quite general as he is charged 
with being the creature of Rasputin and is also suspected 
of German sympathy and of having assisted in bringing 
about the scarcity of food in order that the resulting 
unrest might justify Russia in making a separate peace. ' ' 

During this same eventful day the Countess Nostitz, 
who lives near the Embassy, called me up and told me 
that an army officer had just died in the lazaret on the 
first floor of her house, having been shot because he 
refused to give up his sword to the revolutionists. When 
I put up the receiver I ordered the "dvornicks" and 
employees of the Embassy who were standing on the 
the sidewalk "rubbering," to come into the house and 
lock the gates. 

At about midnight my secretary, Mr. Johnston, and I 
started out for a walk to see what was " doing.' 9 When 
less than a block from the Embassy door we saw a group 
of men on an intersecting street and heard rifle shots. 
Concluding that a walk in that direction would be indis- 


creet we started back toward the Embassy. Just as we 
turned the corner we came upon about fifteen soldiers 
carrying guns, but not in formation and evidently under 
the influence of liquor. As we passed one of them held 
his gun in very uncomfortable proximity to my secre- 
tary's stomach. We heard no further disturbances dur- 
ing the night. The twelve or fifteen members of the staff 
who lived in the Austrian Embassy after two or three 
unsuccessful attempts to reach that building, which is 
only three blocks away, decided to spend the night 
with us. 

The next morning there was still firing in the streets 
and many people were killed, a few accidentally. Many 
citizens, as well as the revolutionary soldiers, had arms. 
They paraded the streets and when they met an officer 
demanded his sword. If he refused to give it up they 
shot him. They showed a particularly unrelenting hatred 
of the police whom they shot on sight. The Commercial 
Attache's cook when two blocks from the Embassy saw 
a policeman's head severed from his body by a saber. 
The cook had hysterics for several hours afterwards. 
The police tried to disguise themselves in soldiers' uni- 
forms and in citizens' clothes. Some of them placed 
minute guns on the roofs of houses and fired into the 
crowds as they marched by. They also fired into the 
crowds from windows of houses and even from hospitals 
in which they had hidden. When this happened soldiers 
and students would raid the houses and kill all the police 
they could catch. In some cases they would lead them 
out into the street and then shoot them. 

I remained in the Embassy during the day. By 5 :30 
in the afternoon the shooting had become so incessant 
and so wild that for the first time I ordered the flag 
raised over the building. The Italian Embassy had 
raised three flags during the forenoon. Just before the 


flag was raised two soldiers had called at tlie Embassy 
and asked if there was an automobile in the building. 
The "dvornick" who opened the door, replied that there 
was one but that it was a small one and not a very good 
one (referring to my "Ford" which I had bought with 
which to go to and from the golf course), and he added 
"This is the American Embassy." 

At that the soldiers replied, "Why didn't you raise 
your flag?" and went away. During the day a crowd of 
soldiers and citizens visited the French Embassy with 
a band which played the Marseillaise, and one of the 
attaches came out and made a non-committal speech. 

During all of this time the Duma was in session, having 
refused to obey the Emperor's order to dissolve. They 
were striving to organize a Provisional Government. 
From time to time they issued orders and manifestoes 
signed by the President of the Duma, as Chairman of 
the Provisional Government Commission. The streets 
were filled with bands of soldiers who in many instances 
were led by students who as a class were very enthu- 
siastic revolutionists. 

During the night the firing was continuous, some of it 
by mitrailleuse. A barricade was made at the inter- 
section of Liteiny and Serguiskaia, a corner of the block 
in which the American Embassy is located, and there 
were placed three cannon pointing toward the Nevsky 
Prospect — the most frequented avenue in Petrograd. 
On this day also Lieu tenant-General Stackelberg was 
shot. He was a veteran of the Russo-Turkish and the 
Russo-Japanese Wars and had served as Military 
Attache with various Russian Embassies. For several 
months he had been the Military Commander of all the 
Russian hospitals in Petrograd. I had made his acquaint- 
ance in connection with the exchange of a German and 
an Austrian officer. I had seen him several times, highly 


respected him and also liked him very much. A band of 
soldiers demanded admission to the General's apartment. 
When the porter refused to admit them they fired on him 
and killed him after he had killed two of them. The 
General then came to the door with his revolver, and 
after killing several more of the soldiers, tried to escape. 
He was killed, however, after eleven of his assailants 
had fallen. The remaining soldiers then mutilated his 
body, rode their horses over it; and, according to one 
report, severed his head from his body, put it on a spike 
and used it as a target. 

On Wednesday, the 14th, the firing on the streets 
continued and desultory parties of from two to a dozen 
armed men wandered about without restraint of any 
kind. They were fired at from windows and from house- 
tops as they passed, supposedly by policemen, and when- 
ever this occurred the bands would fire back wildly. The 
Duma in the Tauride Palace was the place to which 
soldiers and revolutionists both armed and unarmed 
reported and to which they took such prisoners as they 
did not kill. Irresponsible soldiers, and citizens who had 
taken arms from the police or the armories, arrested, 
sometimes with and sometimes without orders, all the 
Ministers of the Imperial Government whom they could 
find except Pokrovsky, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and Grigorovitch, the Minister of the Admiralty. On 
arriving at the Duma the captives were turned over to 
tribunals which were often self-constituted and were 
locked up in rooms of the Palace. Ex-Premier Stunner 
was among those captured and after being confined for 
some time in the Palace was taken across the Neva to 
the prison of St. Peter and Paul Fortress. The arch- 
offender, Minister of the Interior, Protopopoff, could not 
be found, but finally went voluntarily to the Duma and 
approaching a student said, "Are you a student! " On 


receiving an affirmative reply, he said, "I am Protopop- 
off and I have come to give myself np. ' ' He was taken 
before one of the tribunals and had he not been protected 
would have been killed on the spot. He too, was confined 
in the prison of St. Peter and Paul. Another hated char- 
acter, Sokomlinoff, ex-Minister of War, was brought to 
the Duma and when the enraged soldiers were prevented 
from killing him they demanded that he be led down a 
hall some 300 feet long, so that they might have oppor- 
tunity to tell him to his face their opinion of his 
treachery. He, too, was at length locked up in St. Peter 
and Paul Prison. Many army officers from Lieutenant- 
Generals to Lieutenants were also seized and taken to 
the Duma. Among these was General (Count) Nostitz, 
a wealthy nobleman whose wife is an American and who 
was in the entourage of the Emperor. Two other high 
Russian officers married to American women, Prince 
Belloselsky, who married a Miss Whitman of New York, 
and Baron Ramsai, whose wife was a Miss Whitehouse, 
obeyed the summons of the Duma and took the oath of 
fealty to the new Government. The number of such 
officers finally became so great they could not all get in 
the Tauride Palace, whereupon they were directed to go 
to the Officers Club on the Liteiny, about two blocks from 
the Embassy, and to register their allegiance. 
As I said in my report to the Department: 

"During the day, March 14th, the Duma Commission 
headed by its President, Rodzianko, made considerable 
headway toward asserting its authority and restoring 
order. That commission was empowered by the Duma 
to name a Ministry, the composition of which was 
announced the following day. The members of that 
Ministry are men of education, of good records, some 
of them possessed of great wealth, and their selection 
does great credit to the judgment of the Commission by 
which they were chosen. 


" About midnight, it became known that a body of 
armed men, the Gens d'Armes, who were supposed to be 
loyal to the Emperor, were to arrive at the Baltic station 
to suppress the revolution. Revolutionary representa- 
tives were sent to the station to meet them and to per- 
suade them to join the revolution; armed bodies were 
also sent to the station to resist the new-comers in the 
event they could not be persuaded or converted. Upon 
arrival, however, these supposedly loyal men also joined 
the revolution. It had been reported during the day that 
the garrison at Tsarskoe-Selo, the palace where lived 
the Empress, her four daughters and one son, had also 
gone over to the revolutionary party. The report proved 
to be true, as the Empress telephoned to Rodzianko and 
asked for protection. At about 12 :30 at night I walked, 
accompanied by my secretary, Johnston, around two or 
three blocks adjoining the Embassy. We met a body of 
armed men, two or three hundred in number, marching 
quietly down Sergiuskaia, and apparently commanded 
by non-commissioned officers. Firing was kept up dur- 
ing the night, but was not so frequent as during the 
preceding nights. As we were returning to the Embassy 
we were stopped by two very alert soldiers and asked 
who we were. Our reply appeared unsatisfactory and 
they called the non-commissioned officer commanding 
them. Upon his approach, I advanced toward him and 
pointing to myself said in Russian: 'Amerikanski PasoP 
— i American Ambassador. ' Thereupon he saluted me, 
motioned Mr. Johnston and myself to proceed and 
directed the two soldiers to pass on. In the light of sub- 
sequent events I must admit that these midnight walks 
of Tuesday and "Wednesday were more reckless than 
discreet. ' f 

u March 15th. 
"During this day comparative quiet prevailed. The 
abdication of the Emperor was authoritatively an- 
nounced and his manifesto published in circular form 
and distributed on the streets — no newspapers had been 
published since the morning of Saturday, March 10th. 
Later in the day, Grand Duke Michael, in whose favor 


the Emperor had abdicated, was summoned to the Duma 
and issued a manifesto accepting the authority trans- 
ferred to him on condition that the people of Russia so 
desired, and pledged himself that if the people desired 
it he would exercise the functions of the office under the 
control and advice of the representatives selected by the 
people. Meantime several manifestoes or proclamations 
and some orders had been issued by a committee calling 
itself ' Commission of Workingmen and Soldiers ' Depu- 
ties ' ; these publications were violent in tone and tended 
to alarm all law-abiding citizens, as they advised the 
soldiers, of whom there were thousands walking the 
streets, that they were not compelled to salute their 
officers and that they could by a vote select their own 
commanders. This commission is .still professing or 
attempting to exercise authority and is in almost con- 
tinuous session in the Duma building — in fact, they were 
meeting in the Duma hall last evening when I went to 
the Duma building unofficially, accompanied by my secre- 
tary and colored valet, Philip Jordan. This visit was 
made incognito, but in order to gain admission to the 
building I was compelled to reveal my identity to the 
guard, and upon doing so was shown every courtesy. I 
was asked whom I wished to see and although there was 
disappointment when I said 'no one/ and it was learned 
that I was only a sightseer, there was always a soldier 
or student at hand who spoke English and very courte- 
ously conducted me through the building. This was my 
second visit to the Duma building. On my first visit, 
the large white hall, called Catherine Hall, was filled 
with two regiments who were enroute from Siberia to 
France, but who on arriving in Petrograd had joined 
the revolution. On the second visit we were conducted 
to a door of the Duma hall where we saw a large audi- 
ence composed of soldiers and agitators or workingmen 's 
delegates listening to a speaker in the Tribune who wore 
a soldier 's uniform. ' ' 

1 'March 16th. 
"On this day there were still a few parties of armed 
men walking the streets and an occasional shot was heard 


but the new Ministry had assumed authority and issued 
a proclamation appealing to the reason and patriotism 
of the people and calling upon them to observe order and 
support the Provisional Government which had suc- 
ceeded the detested Administration of the Imperial 
power exercised by Protopopoff and his hated police. 
On this day the new Ministers assumed charge of their 
respective Departments and made some progress toward 
administering the affairs of the Government, a new 
Prefect of Police had been appointed and was endeavor- 
ing to suppress the irresponsible soldiers and armed 
civilians who had been walking the streets for five days 
without restraint. Reports came to Petrograd from Mos- 
cow, Kieff and other cities to the effect that the authority 
of the Provisional Government was being accepted and 
its representatives installed without bloodshed or oppo- 
sition of any kind. On the afternoon of this day the 
newspapers were again issued. The commanders of two 
of the Russian fronts under whom were hundreds of thou- 
sands of soldiers publicly announced their allegiance to 
the new government and it began to appear as if the 
revolution was successful in every respect. Reports of 
the unfortunate and unprovoked killing of some of the 
naval commanders even after they had acknowledged 
allegiance to the new government produced depression 
but the Imperial Government and its friends had been so 
completely over-awed that they made no attempt to resist 
the new order. In fact, all who were opposed to anarchy 
had about arrived at the conclusion that the only way 
to avoid such a reign was to yield willing allegiance to 
the new Ministry if not to support it aggressively. 

" March 17th. 
"On this day the abdication of the Emperor for him- 
self and son was officially promulgated. The authority 
of the new Ministers who had taken charge of their 
respective Departments was generally recognized. The 
soldiers and students and the unreasonable revolution- 
ists seemed to be exhausted and willing to rest and take 
stock of the surrounding conditions. By this time all 
thought of the Imperial Party attempting any opposition 


to the new Ministry was abandoned. The program of 
the Duma began to be discussed. The plan was a most 
comprehensive one and eminently wise. The Duma, a 
committee of which had named the Ministry, had practi- 
cally abdicated and all governmental authority was 
vested in a Council of Ministers, the personality of whose 
members seemed to meet with universal satisfaction, 
and in fact commendation. Meetings of the 'Commis- 
sion of Workingmen's and Soldiers' Deputies' were 
continued in the Duma. Soldiers in uniform and armed 
were marching in the streets and although they had few 
commissioned officers they were keeping step, observing 
discipline and making efforts to enforce order. The revo- 
lutionists were divided in judgment or preference as to 
whether the Provisional Government should be suc- 
ceeded by a republic or a constitutional monarchy. There 
was no difference of feeling, however, concerning the 
wisdom of respecting the authority of the Provisional 
Government. That was the condition at the end of six 
memorable days during which the extent and the marvel- 
ous success and the comparatively bloodless consum- 
mation of a widespread revolution had surprised and 
stunned even its projectors and most ardent champions. ' ' 

The day before I had said in a letter to Madden Sum- 
mers, Consul-General at Moscow: 

"Whitehouse and Riggs have just brought into the 
Embassy a report which seems authentic to the effect 
that the Czar has abdicated for himself and for the 
Czarevitch in favor of his brother Michael. And just 
before W. and R. met the man with whom they were 
talking and from whom they got this information, Schid- 
loffsky, one of the Duma Committee of Twelve, a tele- 
gram had been received from Grand Duke Michael also 
abdicating. These men reported that there was great 
excitement in the Duma and that Schidloffsky told them 
there was only one thing determined and that was that 
no Romanoff should succeed to the throne. The work- 


ingmen's party have been joined by some soldiers, I 
don't know bow many, and they bave a committee called 
'Committee of Workingmen's Party and Soldiers' Depu- 
ties'; tbis committee bas issued a number of proclama- 
tions — I tbink several daily — and these pronunciamentos 
bave been filled with rot. That organization demands a 

"The Ministry selected seems to be composed of good 
men whose selection reflects credit on the judgment of 
the authorities by whom they were chosen. I am much 
pleased to hear that the President of the Ministry, Lvoff, 
is a first cousin of your mother-in-law and that other 
members of the Ministry are connected with your family 
and that you know many of them personally. I have been 
of the opinion that it would be unwise to attempt to estab- 
lish a republican form of government in Eussia just now, 
but if such men as these are put at the helm, it is possible 
they may be able to steer through the breakers that beset 
its course. The Duma party favors a vigorous prosecu- 
tion of the war, but the utterances of the Workingmen 
and Soldiers Deputies Committee declare in favor of 
concerted action on the part of the proletariat of the 
belligerent countries in putting an end to a war which 
they say is waged in the interest of capital at the expense 
of labor and the laboring classes. 

"There is a rumor this afternoon that Emperor 
William has been deposed and there have been rumors 
extant for several days to the effect that there is a revo- 
lution in Germany. One report is that there was a bread 
riot in Berlin, and that the people went to the Imperial 
Palace en masse and demanded bread of the Emperor, 
who replied by turning the hose on them, and that there- 
upon the mob demolished the palace. There are so many 
rumors, however, that one does not know which to credit 
if any. ' ' 


I have since realized that these rumors of a German 
revolution and all similar rumors were deliberately circu- 
lated by the radical leaders in order to make their plan 
for a world revolution appear feasible. 

In a dispatch to the Department, of March 15th, in 
commenting on the revolution, I said : 

"This is undoubtedly a revolution, but it is the best 
managed revolution that has ever taken place, for its 
magnitude. The Duma is assuming control and is exer- 
cising its authority in Petrograd with rare good judg- 
ment. Its President, Rodzianko, is head of the provi- 
sional government and is called 'Chairman of the Com- 
mission. ' Bulletins are issued, although no newspapers 
are published, giving official information concerning 
events. This one that came to the Embassy this morn- 
ing gives the names of a new Cabinet of Ministers — in 
some cases two or more are appointed instead of one as 
heretofore. The Emperor was stopped on his way to 
Tsarskoe-Selo — from the front — and there are rumors 
about his being forcibly detained; in fact, one of the 
Assistant Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Polotsoff, made 
this statement to Mr. Miles yesterday afternoon. 

"Upon the whole Russia is to be congratulated in my 
judgment on the prospect of getting through an impor- 
tant change in government with so little bloodshed and 
without material interference with the war she is wag- 
ing with powerful antagonists. One cause of this revolu- 
tion is a suspicion on the part of the army and of the 
people who call themselves true Russians, that the 
Empress and those surrounding her have been planning 
a separate peace with the enemy and that the Emperor 
has yielded too often and too completely to her in- 
fluence. ' ' 

In a circular letter addressed to my colleagues in the 
American diplomatic service, I commented thus upon the 
outcome of the revolution: 

"At this writing, Saturday, March 24th, orderly quiet 


prevails and every day it continues strengthens the 
present government. The Government is the Ministry 
which is in absolute control and its authority is loyally 
recognized by the army and navy and by every munici- 
pality and province in Eussia so far as known. The 
duty and prerogative of this Ministry is to call a constit- 
uent assembly, or a convention as we would designate it, 
the members of which are to be chosen by universal 
suffrage, including women. That assembly will be em- 
powered to determine the kind of a government Eussia 
will have, whether a republic or a constitutional mon- 
archy. In the wise plan worked out by the Duma, 
through the Committee appointed to select the Ministry, 
care was taken that the Imperial succession should not 
lapse, and thus a claim of any member of the royal 
family to the throne by virtue of blood succession was 
barred. That was done by having the Emperor abdicate 
for himself and the Czarevitch in favor of his brother, 
Michael, and then Michael was ' persuaded ' to accept the 
transferred crown on condition that the people of Eus- 
sia so desired, and when and if so accepted to exercise 
its functions under the advice or control of a law making 
body elected by, and representative of, the people. " 

In a dispatch to the Secretary of State sent the next 
day, March 25th, I touched upon the vulnerable spot in 
the new Government — the point at which entered the 
poison which eventually destroyed the entire govern- 
mental organism. I said: 

"As to present conditions, the situation is very re- 
markable. While the authority of the Ministry is rec- 
ognized throughout Eussia the Ministers very candidly 
tell me that of the troops in Petrograd, numbering from 
100,000 to 150,000, a majority are on the side of the 
workingmen and are influenced more (if not absolutely) 


by the Committee of Workingmen's Party and Soldiers' 
Deputies than by the Ministry itself. The policemen, 
who were so bitterly hated by the people, and who were 
pursued so mercilessly during the three days of rioting, 
are all in confinement and are to be sent to the front. 
The patrol of the city is still under an officer called the 
1 Grande Archalnick,' who was selected by the Ministry 
with the approval of the Workingmen's and Soldiers' 
Deputies. The patrol is composed of soldiers who walk 
the streets in companies of two or four, and by what is 
called the 'city militia' — a body composed mostly of stu- 
dents, armed with guns and patrolling generally in 
groups of the same size. It speaks highly for the spirit 
of this revolution that notwithstanding the want of 
respect for authority, order is so well preserved — there 
are very few disturbances. On the first day of the revo- 
lution the prison doors were opened and the inmates 
liberated. The incentive to this action was the desire of 
the populace and the revolutionary soldiers to liberate 
the political prisoners, but they failed to make distinc- 
tion when they opened the prison doors, with the result 
that hundreds of hardened criminals were released to 
prey upon the public. Some of these criminals dressed 
in soldiers' uniforms went .to private residences and 
demanded admittance to search for firearms and while 
in the houses committed thefts. The present police 
authority is attempting to arrest these fugitive crimi- 
nals, and very few of them are still at large — many of 
them, in fact, are reported to have returned voluntarily 
to their prisons. 

"An assistant to the Prefect of Police called at the 
Embassy Monday or Tuesday and said he desired to send 
a guard of seven soldiers to protect the Embassy. I 
had seen no occasion for a guard, but thinking it unwise 
to refuse and fearing the Prefect knew more of the dan- 
ger of the Embassy than I did, I consented. Seven 
soldiers with guns and fixed bayonets appeared the fol- 
lowing day. One was stationed at the front door, the 
other at the gateway, and quarters were provided for 
the remaining five; these soldiers were given by the 
Embassy two roubles (Bs.2.00) per day each for their 


subsistence. Yesterday, March 24th, the Embassy was 
notified that there was no longer occasion for a guard 
and the soldiers left about 5 o 'clock in the afternoon. 

'"It is marvelous that there doesn't seem to be as 
much scarcity of food as there was before the revolution 
began, notwithstanding that the transportation lines have 
been crippled and fewer trains have been operated. 
Indeed the cause of the outbreaks was that the people 
believed that food was not half as scarce as the dealers 
or the Government supply station professed. 

" During the first two or three days of the revolution, 
March 12th-14th, the bread lines disappeared and I have 
neither seen nor heard of any during the past four days. 
Sugar which could not be obtained for three roubles (90c) 
per pound, I understand, is now on sale at eighty kopeks 
(24c) per pound, and it is the same with butter." 

An. eye-witness has described the abdication of the 
Czar and the events immediately preceding it in an 
account written for a Russian newspaper. 

It seems that on the night of March 14th, 1916, the 
Emperor's train, preceded by a train under command of 
Major-General Tsabel, Commandant of the Railway 
Regiment, was on the way from Staff Headquarters to 
Tsarskoe-Selo whither Nicholas had been summoned by 
the Empress. With the Emperor on the Imperial train 
were the feeble old Count Fredericks, the celebrated 
Admiral Niloff, former Commander of the Marines of the 
Guard and the Commandant of the Palace, Voeikoff. The 
Emperor 's companions were drinking heavily and Admi- 
ral Niloff kept urging the Emperor to drink. 

At this time the Emperor had not been informed of 
the situation in Petrograd and Voeikoff and Niloff were 
afraid lest he should learn the truth. At one o'clock 
General Tsabel became excited and told Voeikoff he must 
tell the Emperor, otherwise he, Tsabel, would tell him 
himself. Voeikoff agreed but told the Czar a much modi- 


fied story. Later, the Emperor called Niloff and asked 
him what was going on in Petrograd. Niloff answered 
that though there were great disorders, a telegram had 
just come stating that 700 knights of St. George were 
then on their way to Petrograd and that these brave 
soldiers could quickly put down all revolt. 

At this point General Tsabel entered the train and 

"All this is a lie! Your Majesty, they are deceiving 
you. Here is the telegram. See, it reads, 'Petrograd, 
Commandant of the Nicholas Railway Station, Lieu- 
tenant Grekoff. . . . Hold at Station Vishera Train No. 
A, and when you dispatch it send it to Petrograd and not 
to Tsarskoe-Selo.' " 

The Emperor jumped up. 

"What's this? Revolt! Lieutenant Grekoff com- 
mands Petrograd?" 

Tsabel replied : 

"Your Majesty, in Petrograd there are 60,000 soldiers 
with their officers at their head that have already gone 
over to the side of the temporary Government. Your 
Majesty has been declared dethroned. Rodzianko has 
proclaimed to the whole of Russia that a new order has 
come to hand. You cannot go ahead ; Deputy Bublikoff 
is running all the railroads." 

In extreme surprise, perplexity and anger the Emperor 
cried : 

"Why have you not told me anything about this 
sooner? Why are you telling me only now, after all is 

But after a minute with calm despondency he said : 

"Well, thank God! I'll go to Livadia. If the people 
want me to, I'll abdicate and retire to Livadia to my 
garden. I love flowers." 

At the station of Dno, they came up with the train of 


General Ivanoff, who reported to the Emperor all that 
had happened in the capitals and said : 

' ' The revolutionists have got the power in their hands. 
The only salvation now is to go to the army." 

One of those present belonging to the Emperor's suite 
affirms that at this moment General Voeikoff cried : 

"Only one thing remains to be done now. Open the 
Minsk front to the Germans and let the German armies 
come in and put down this rabble ! ' ' 

Drunk as he was, Admiral Niloff grew indignant and 
said : 

"That would hardly do any good, for they would take 
Russia and they would not give it up again to us. ' ' 

Voeikoff kept on urging his plan, however, assuring 
the Emperor that, according to what Princess Vassil- 
chikoff: had reported, Emperor William was making war 
not on Emperor Nicholas but on Russia with its anti- 
dynastic tendencies. 

To this the Emperor replied: 

"Yes, Gregory Ephimovich (Rasputin) often talked to 
me along this line, but we would not listen to him. This 
could have been done when the German armies were in 
front of Warsaw, but I never would have betrayed the 
Russian people/ ' 

So saying, the Emperor wept. 

Then, after a moment's silence, he added: 

"If only my wife and children have been saved, I shall 
go to Livadia and pass the rest of my life there in peace 
and quiet. Let Michael rule the best he can. By the 
way, he is liked." 

The Emperor had left Tsarskoe-Selo for Moghileff 
early Friday morning, March 9th, after being persuaded 
by the Empress and Protopopoff to destroy the decrees 
which he had promised the Ministry to issue to the Duma, 
extending the powers of the Duma, and promising a new 


Constitution to Russia. These decrees had been drawn 
up by the Council of Ministers and sent by Protopopoff 
to the Palace at Tsarskoe-Selo for the Emperor's signa- 
ture. When the Empress saw them she was very indig- 
nant, and, seconded by ProtopopofT succeeded in con- 
vincing the Emperor that he was making a mistake in 
adopting such a liberal policy. Nicholas II. in his weak- 
ness yielded to the arguments of his wife, ably and 
aggressively seconded by the Minister of the Interior, 
who assured the Emperor that he could suppress any 
uprising of the people. It was a fatal moment for the 
Czar when he yielded to this appeal of the Czarina. If 
he had been firm and had complied with his promise to 
the Council of Ministers the Revolution could at least 
have been deferred. Before a week had elapsed the 
Emperor had abdicated the throne which he had inherited 
from his ancestors and the Romanoff Dynasty was no 
more. If he had signed the liberal decrees prepared for 
him and which he had pledged himself to sign, the result 
would have been far different. Russia would have 
probably continued in the war until its successful ending 
and hundreds of thousands of lives of the youths of the 
Allies would have been spared. 

Rodzianko had telegraphed the Emperor once Monday 
the 12th and twice on Tuesday, but the telegrams had 
not been delivered to the Emperor until Tuesday eve- 
ning, when the Russian officer had threatened to commu- 
nicate their contents to the Emperor himself if General 
VoeikofF, Commandant of the Palace, did not deliver 
them to His Majesty. 

The Emperor at once decided to go to Petrograd, but 
his advisers persuaded him to go to Tsarskoe-Selo first 
and call a meeting of his Ministers. The special train 
was hastily prepared, and the Emperor started from 
Moghilefr" for Tsarskoe-Selo. During the night the train 


was stopped and upon Voeikoff being informed that the 
road was blocked he changed the route and the train 
proceeded. The next morning the Imperial Party 
arrived at Pskoff where it was held by the Superinten- 
dent of the Station to await the arrival of the two 
deputies of the Provisional Government, as related in 
the article quoted above. These two deputies were 
Goutchkoff and Shulgin who had been sent by the Pro- 
visional Government to demand the abdication of the 
Emperor. He received them courteously and upon being 
informed of their business calmly said he was ready to 
abdicate in favor of Grand Duke Michael not only for 
himself but for his son also. Retiring into his private 
room he came out a few minutes later with a typewritten 
document which he submitted to Goutchkoff and Shulgin, 
and upon their approving, promptly signed his abdica- 
tion. It was witnessed by Count Fredericks, the Mare- 
schal of the Imperial Court, who had served the Crown 
loyally for nearly forty years. This occurred late Wed- 
nesday evening, March 14th, and the Emperor in a 
private wire conversation with the Empress the next 
morning did not tell her of his abdication. The first 
knowledge she had of it was on the afternoon of Thurs- 
day, on the arrival of an officer with a guard, who 
informed her that she was under arrest "When she 
asked where the Emperor was, he told her that he had 
abdicated. She retorted, "It is a lie, I talked to him 
this morning and he did not tell me of it." What must 
have been her feelings when she was convinced of the 
truth of the abdication ! Did she realize she was respon- 
sible for it? Both the Emperor and the Empress have 
long since paid the penalty of their follies. Upon abdi- 
cating the Emperor asked of the delegates of the Provi- 
sional Government what disposition they proposed to 
make of him. and they replied that he could return to 


Headquarters if he so desired. He did return to Moghi- 
lefY, and remained there four days, during which time 
he was visited by the Empress Dowager, who endeavored 
to comfort him, but from all accounts she was more 
perturbed than he was. The Emperor did not seem to 
realize what had happened. At the end of four days 
when he was ordered to Tsarskoe-Selo Palace he went 
quietly and calmly while his mother, the Empress Dowa- 
ger, in bidding him good-by was overcome with emotion. 

Upon his arrival at Tsarskoe-Selo he was received by 
the Empress, whose spirit had not been broken. Her 
children were seriously ill with the measles and had 
absorbed her attention. A few days later Kerensky, the 
Minister of Justice of the Provisional Government, 
visited the Emperor and had an hour's conference with 
him. Toward the end of the conversation, the Empress 
is said to have entered the room and upon the Emperor 
presenting Kerensky to her, the latter kissed her hand 
and drawing up a chair invited her to be seated. 
Straightening her queenly figure, she remarked, "I do 
not need to be offered a chair in my own palace. ' ' This 
to the man to whom she was probably indebted for her 
life and the Emperor's. Kerensky had during the first 
days of the Revolution exerted his potential influence 
with the violent workmen and soldiers to prevent them 
from committing excesses. Too much credit cannot be 
given Kerensky for his conduct during the first week of 
the Revolution. 

The Emperor and Empress were permitted to have 
private conversation during the first two days after the 
Emperor's arrival, but they were separated during the 
remainder of their stay at Tsarskoe-Selo, only being 
permitted to see each other at meals when there was 
always a representative of the Provisional Government 
in attendance. When someone in authority was asked 



why the Emperor and Empress were not permitted to 
enjoy each other's society, the reply was, "He is too 
weak and she is too strong." 

Upon the occasion of Kerensky 's visit to Tsarskoe an 
incident occurred relating to the Czarevitch. The story 
is told that when Kerensky emerged from the conference 
he was approached by the Czarevitch, who, after making 
known his own identity, asked Kerensky if he was the 
Minister of Justice of the Provisional Government. 

"Yes," said Kerensky, "I am." 

"I want to know," said the Czarevitch, "if my father 
had any right to abdicate for me when he abdicated for 
himself. ' ' 

Kerensky 's reply is not recorded. Another instance 
of children asking questions which learned and wise men 
were unable to answer. 



In the absence of instructions from the Department of 
State I did not feel authorized to have any official com- 
munication with the Provisional Government. Realiz- 
ing, however, that the Embassy was confronted by con- 
ditions with which the Department was unacquainted, I 
determined to take advantage of personal acquaintance- 
ship in order to advise myself authoritatively for the 
purpose of communicating with the Department and 
giving my opinion if not making an outright request for 
authority to act. By telephone I made an engagement 
with Michael Rodzianko, President of the Duma, whom 
I knew personally and who was the man who had offi- 
cially promulgated the decrees of that body which, by 
refusing to obey the decree of the Emperor ordering its 
adjournment, had commanded the attention and in fact 
the admiration and respect of all opponents of autocratic 
government. He received me cordially at his residence 
and in a conversation of about half an hour I learned 
from an authoritative source the plans of the leaders of 
this remarkable uprising which had met with such univer- 
sal approval among all classes of Russia's immense 
population. I told Mr. Rodzianko that I was making an 
unofficial call upon him in order to learn the truth con- 
cerning the state of affairs so that I could cable the same 
to my government and could base thereon my judgment 
as to future developments. ' ' 

Rodzianko had been President of the Fourth Duma 



since its organization and had made a satisfactory pre- 
siding officer; impartial in his rulings and prompt in his 
decisions. He was a large man, over six feet in height 
and very heavy, weighing almost three hundred pounds. 
I had met him several times — in fact he had dined with 
me previous to the Revolution. He was an eloquent 
speaker and had a great voice that could reach thousands 
of auditors in the open air, and it was a familiar saying 
among Russians that Rodzianko 's voice "on a still day 
could be heard a verst" — which is about two-thirds of a 
mile. He was a constitutional monarchist by conviction 
and a large landowner, but very liberal in his views; I 
don't think he acknowledged allegiance to any party. He 
spoke English fairly well and was very affable and 
approachable. He received me in his study or library 
and when I stated the object of my call seemed very 
much interested. At the time of my call the Revolution 
had been in progress six days and during all that time 
he had been in the Duma building, and my recollection 
is that he told me the preceding night was the only night 
he had stayed at home since the Sunday night before. He 
was not as clear in his statements concerning the plans 
of the Provisional Government as was Miliukoff and 
before I suggested calling on MiliukofT as I had intended, 
he advised me to do so and made the engagement for me. 
The President of the Duma while much respected for his 
character and oratorical ability was not considered the 
strongest man in that body. At the time of my call he 
was on the top wave of his popularity; he was President 
of the Commission of Twelve appointed by the Duma to 
select a Ministry for the Provisional Government, and 
his speaking qualities had made him quite prominent 
during the previous six days in addressing soldiers who 
left their barracks and marched to the Duma in bodies 
of a thousand or more, and in addressing the crowds that 


assembled in the building and adjacent grounds. I never 
learned whether it was the President that made the sug- 
gestion to the Duma to adjourn sine die but always 
thought that adjournment was a mistake. The Com- 
mission of Twelve, of which Rodzianko was made Chair- 
man, was vested with full power to select a new Ministry 
and as an extra precaution was instructed by the Duma 
to cease functioning when the Ministers had been named. 
This was also a mistake in my judgment. The Duma 
was the most representative body in Russia at the time 
of the Revolution and if it had not been dissolved by 
its own vote could have remained in session notwith- 
standing the decree of the Emperor ordering its dissolu- 
tion. Furthermore, it could have directed the Com- 
mission of Twelve to report to it and would have thereby 
strengthened the Provisional Government. However, the 
Workmen's Party under the leadership of Chidzi was 
exercising authority in the Duma building, and increased 
its power by giving to the soldiers representation in their 
organization after which it was named Workmen's and 
Soldiers' Deputies; later by adding representation for 
the Peasants it came to be known as the " Workmen's, 
Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies." The members of 
the Duma no doubt reasoned that if they continued in 
session it would provoke a contest with the Workmen, 
Soldiers and Peasants ; furthermore the Clergy and Mon- 
archists constituted a potential faction in the member- 
ship of the Duma. A stronger man in the President's 
chair might have perpetuated the Duma and made of it a 
potential factor in the situation, but Rodzianko was 
not equal to that undertaking. 

Rodzianko remained in Petrograd most of the time 
during the eight months' existence of the Provisional 
Government but after the Bolsheviks came into power 
he lived in retirement if not in hiding. There was a 


rumor in Petrograd a few days after the Bolsheviks 
came into power that they were looking for ten or twelve 
men and Rodzianko's name headed the list. The day 
after this report was circulated I received a note from 
him introducing its bearer as his friend and a man to 
whom I could talk freely. The bearer of this note told 
me that Rodzianko and he had been friends from their 
youth. "When I asked him where Rodzianko was at that 
time he replied that he was in his apartment a short 
distance from the Embassy. He said that Rodzianko 
was in hiding and when I asked if I could see him replied, 
i ' Of course, if you will come to my apartment. ' ' I went 
and had a talk with him. He said his life was in danger 
and asked if he could take refuge in the American Em- 
bassy. I replied that it would be unsafe for him to come 
there but my secretary, Earl Johnston, was living in an 
apartment with a special investigator of the Depart- 
ment of Commerce and that both young men could be 
trusted and, as they were occupying a commodious apart- 
ment, would be glad to furnish him a refuge. This proved 
satisfactory to Rodzianko and he expressed the intention 
of availing himself of the hospitality of the young men 
provided it would be agreeable to them. After consulting 
them I advised Rodzianko that the young men would be 
glad to receive him and care for him as long as he desired 
to stay with them, but he did not avail himself of the 
considerate offer and I heard nothing more from him for 
several days. I afterwards learned that after remaining 
at his friend's house for five or six days unmolested he 
went to Novo Russisk and joined Kaledin — so I wa3 
informed by his friend whom I asked, "How was Rod- 
zianko disguised V He replied, "As a woman," and 
when I expressed doubt about the possibility of success- 
fully disguising the huge figure of Rodzianko as a woman 
he replied he had had a telegram reporting that Rod- 


zianko had arrived safely at Novo Russisk. When I 
asked him how the telegram got through he said it was 
prearranged that the signature should be in an assumed 
name and the telegram should state only "She arrived 
safe. ' ' 

From the satisfactory interview which I had with 
Rodzianko, I returned to the Embassy where I had 
invited to luncheon Baron and Baroness Nolde. Baron 
Nolde had been connected with the Foreign Office for 
many years as its judiciary adviser, having retained that 
place through many changes in the Ministry. He, how- 
ever, could give me little information as he had remained 
in the Foreign Office during the entire week, devoting 
himself to his official duties. Meantime, after learning 
from Rodzianko that Miliukoff possessed the confidence 
of himself and his colleagues as Foreign Minister, I had 
made by telephone an appointment to make an unofficial 
call upon that Minister with whom the heads of all the 
foreign missions had the closest relations. I learned 
from Dr. Miliukoff, with whom I had no difficulty in 
getting telephonic communication, that he could not re- 
ceive me at his residence before 11 :30 p.m. but that if I 
would come to the Foreign Office he would be pleased to 
grant me an interview. I went to the Foreign Office 
promptly, was cordially received by the new Minister 
and learned from him the plans of the Provisional Gov- 
ernment as I had from Rodzianko, but Miliukoff stated 
them more clearly. 

I had met Dr. Miliukoff soon after my arrival in 
Petrograd, having sat beside him at a function given to 
me by the Russo- American , Society, of which Baron 
Rosen, formerly Ambassador to the United States, was 
President. Miliukoff was emphatic in his assurance that 
the Provisional Government was firmly established and 
frould administer affairs until the meeting of the Con- 

Minister of Finance and later Minister of Foreign Affairs under the First 
Provisional Government « 


First Minister of Foreign Affairs under 
the Provisional Government 


Formerly President of the Russian 


stituent Assembly which, would determine the form of 
Government for all the Russias. He was so well equipped 
to be Minister of Foreign Affairs that no other man had 
been spoken of for the place. Miliukoff had lectured in 
America and was well known in the United States as an 
eminent scholar and patriotic Russian. He was sup- 
posed to be the owner of the Byetch (in English 
"Voice"), a Petrograd daily newspaper whose columns 
were ably edited. Dr. Miliukoff had visited several of 
the universities of this country and was personally 
acquainted with many American scholars. He was looked 
upon in Russia, as in all other countries, as a statesman 
who had the courage of his convictions and withal pos- 
sessed of a high degree of culture. He was a thorough 
linguist, speaking English, French, German and Polish 
fluently. His attack on Stunner in the Duma in the 
preceding November had attracted attention throughout 
Russia. He had aroused the revolutionary spirit of the 
country and unquestionably had been a potential factor 
in bringing about the first Revolution. He had been for 
a long time the leader of the Cadet Party which was the 
popular designation for constitutional Democrat ; he had 
lead that party with a firm hand and had been fearless 
in his denunciations of the oppressions of the Monarchy. 
He had long been in disfavor with the monarchial or 
reactionary party when the Revolution began. He 
appeared to be about fifty-three years of age, and his 
manner and speech, although decided, was courteous. 
He had a smooth face with the exception of a slight 
mustache and was about five feet eleven inches in height, 
muscular and active with no surplus flesh. He was never 
at a loss for words with which to express his thoughts, 
and was a facile writer and logical thinker. He im- 
pressed me when I called upon him that Sunday, March 


18th, as a man who realised his responsibility and would 
not shirk it. 

As I looked at him and heard his prompt replies to 
my questions, the thought passed through my mind that 
here was the real leader of the Revolution; here was a 
deep thinker and a genuine Russian patriot. His phil- 
ippic on Sturmer had shown his high sense of honor 
when he appealed to the Duma and to the country to 
uphold at any cost the pledges of Russia to her Allies. 
I left him more convinced than ever that the rule of the 
Romanoffs was ended and that those entrusted with the 
administration of the new Government were right-think- 
ing, sincere and determined Russians who would prose- 
cute the war fearlessly regardless of its cost in blood and 
treasure and would advocate the form of government 
which they thought would best serve the interest of their 

Miliukoff took a leading part in the Council of Min- 
isters; he was outspoken in his defense of what he be- 
lieved to be the right policies regardless of consequences. 
He had no patience with the pronunciamentos of the 
Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. He had precipi- 
tated the Revolution by charging Sturmer and Proto- 
popoff and the Court with negotiating for a separate 
peace with Germany and thereby breaking faith with 
Russia's Allies, and he foresaw that the predominance 
of the principles championed by the Workmen's and 
Soldiers' Deputies would lead inevitably to a separate 
peace with the Central Empires. He was a bitter oppo- 
nent of socialism and had often locked horns with Ker- 
ensky in the Duma. Kerensky was at this time Minister 
of Justice and performed an essential part, and per- 
formed it well in preventing excesses by the radical revo- 
lutionists. Kerensky probably had more influence dur- 
ing the first days of the Revolution than any other Min- 


ister of the Provisional Government and possibly more 
than any other Russian. Therefore when Miliukoff dif- 
fered with Kerensky concerning the retention of Con- 
stantinople by Russia in the event the Central Empires 
should be defeated in the World War and when these 
two distinguished Russians clashed concerning the pro- 
visions of the secret treaties between Russia and her 
Allies, Miliukoff was not only in the minority in the 
Council of Ministers, but decidedly in the minority with 
the Russian people. Notwithstanding this situation, and 
Miliukoff understood it better than anyone, he stood by 
his guns. 

According to the plans, as explained to me by both 
Rodzianko and Miliukoff, the supreme authority of the 
Government was vested in a Ministry under the Presi- 
dency of Prince Lvoff, who is perhaps the most highly 
respected citizen of Russia, who had been President of 
the Union of Zemstvos which Protopopoff several months 
before had prohibited from continuing their meetings not- 
withstanding the very efficient and excellent service they 
had performed in furnishing supplies to the army and 
to the large cities of Russia. It was the duty of this 
Council of Ministers, in addition to administering the 
affairs of the government in these troublous times and 
during the progress of a terrible war, to arrange for a 
meeting of a Constituent Assembly at as early a date 
as practicable ; the prerogative and duty of such assem- 
bly would be to adopt a form of government for Russia ; 
that form when adopted would be binding upon the whole 
people because the membership of the Assembly was to 
be chosen by direct vote of the people at an election held 
on a date to be fixed by the Ministry and at which every 
citizen and soldier of Russia would be permitted to vote. 
The success of this wise and comprehensive plan de- 
pended upon many contingencies but, however problem- 


atical the outcome might be, the best if not the only 
promise of organized government, the maintenance of 
order and the protection of life and property lay in the 
administration of a Ministry composed of patriotic men 
who had character and ability and who were inspired by 
high motives. Such a government merited the support 
of all good citizens and was entitled to the recognition 
of all foreign governments that favor law and order 
and especially of that government represented in Russia 
by me. 

After these conferences I was so thoroughly imbued 
with the conviction that it was wise for the Government 
of the United States to recognize the Provisional Gov- 
ernment, that upon returning to the Embassy I retired 
to my private apartment with my secretary, denied my- 
self to all callers and prepared the following cable to the 
Secretary of State : 

"The six days between last Sunday and this have wit- 
nessed the most amazing revolution in history. A nation 
of two hundred million people who have lived under ab- 
solute monarchy for more than a thousand years and 
who are now engaged in the greatest war ever waged 
have forced their Emperor to abdicate for himself and 
his heir and have induced his brother, to whom he trans- 
ferred the Imperial authority, to accept it on condition 
that a Constituent Assembly of the people so request 
and when so accepted to exercise its functions under 
authority of the Government framed by that Assembly. 
This is official information obtained by my personal 
unofficial calls to-day on Rodzianko at his residence and 
MiliukofT, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at his office. There 
is no opposition to the Provisional Government, which 
is a Council of Ministers, appointed by a Committee of 
Twelve named by the Duma. Quiet prevails here and 
throughout Russia so far as known. Rodzianko and 
MiliukofT both assure me that the entire army accepts 
the authority of the Provisional Government and all 


appearances and advices confirm the same. The plan 
of the Provisional Government is to call a Constituent 
Assembly or convention whose members will be elected 
by the whole people and empowered to organize a gov- 
ernment. Whether that will be a republic or a constitu- 
tional monarchy is not decided but the conclusions of 
the Assembly will be accepted universally and enforced 
by the army and navy. There has been no concerted 
action in the Diplomatic Corps ; no meetings have been 
held or called. It has been customary for British, French 
and Italian Ambassadors to call daily together at the 
Foreign Office and they called upon Miliukoff Friday, 
yesterday and to-day but have not formally recognized 
the Provisional Government. Miliukoff: tells me confi- 
dentially that Buchanan, the British Ambassador, has 
authority from his government for recognition but is 
waiting until the Italian and French Ambassadors are 
likewise authorized. I request respectfully that you 
promptly give me authority to recognize the Provisional 
Government, as the first recognition is desirable from 
every viewpoint. This revolution is the practical rea- 
lization of that principle of government which we have 
championed and advocated — I mean government by con- 
sent of the governed. Our recognition will have a stu- 
pendous moral effect especially if given first. Rodzianko 
and Miliukoff both assure me that the Provisional Gov- 
ernment will vigorously prosecute the war. Further- 
more, upon Russia's success against the Central Empires 
absolutely depends the salvation of the revolution and 
the perpetuity of the government it establishes. The 
third of the eight principles in the manifesto issued an- 
nouncing the new Ministry and signed by the President 
of the Duma and all of the Ministers is ' abolition of all 
class, religious, and national limitations. ' Answer. ' ' 

On March 19th, one week after the Revolution began, 
and the day after I sent my cable to the Department, I 
called on Goutchkoff, the Minister of War. When I 
handed my card to the officer in charge of the outer room 
I was told that the Minister was in conference with dele- 


gates from the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, but 
the officer sent in my card. Goutchkoff came out prompt- 
ly and after receiving me courteously conducted me to a 
private room. I saw that he was in a nervous state and, 
knowing that he had excused himself from a delegation 
to see me, lost no time in stating the object of my visit. 
I asked him if recognition by my Government would 
strengthen the Provisional Government of Russia. He 
replied with alacrity that it would and asked if it could 
be done on the following day. I told him "No," that I 
had only sent the cable the preceding evening and could 
not expect a reply before the 22nd or 23rd. With much 
agitation he expressed doubt as to whether the Provi- 
sional Government could survive until that time. I asked 
him how many soldiers he had in Petrograd. He replied 
about one hundred and twenty-five thousand, but ex- 
pressed the fear that the Government could not rely 
upon more than twenty-five thousand of these soldiers 
being loyal to it, while the remainder would side with 
the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. I expressed 
regret at my inability to recognize the Provisional Gov- 
ernment without authority from my Government. 
Goutchkoff was about fifty-five years of age. He is of 
medium height with keen gray eyes and close cropped 
iron gray whiskers. His eye and the set of his jaw gives 
evidence of decided courage. He is a member of a dis- 
tinguished Russian family, an elder brother having been 
a popular and efficient Mayor of Moscow who was at 
the time of our interview a leading manufacturer of that 
city who had married a Miss Tertiakoff , the daughter of 
the man who gave to Moscow the celebrated gallery 
bearing his name. I had visited Moscow in January, 
1917, and had been shown through the Tertiakoff Gal- 
lery by this brother. Goutchkoff was the leader of the 
Octobrist Party and was the man who, in company with 


Shulgin, had visited the Emperor at Pskoff as the repre- 
sentative of the Provisional Government to demand his 
abdication. He had joined the Boer Army in the South 
African War in 1899, where he had made a brilliant 
record. When I called upon him I was not aware that 
the celebrated General Order No. 1 to the Army had 
been issued. This was the order that contributed more 
than anything else toward the demoralization of the 
superb Russian army because it demoted all the officers 
to the ranks and permitted the army organizations down 
to the smallest units to elect their commanding officers. 
The Workmen's and Soldiers ' Deputies had sent this 
order out without the knowledge of the Minister of War 
and when he learned of it he found himself powerless 
to countermand it. This caused him great distress as he 
had been trained as a soldier and believed in strict 

On March 22nd, four days after the dispatch, I re- 
ceived a sweepingly favorable reply to my cable. That 
was a record time both for the cable service and for the 
State Department. I subsequently learned that on its 
receipt it had at once been submitted by the Secretary 
to the President and by him had been brought up at a 
Cabinet Meeting. 

I immediatley called up the Foreign Office, secured an 
appointment and an hour later told Foreign Minister 
Miliukoff the contents of the cable he had had sent for 
me and of the favorable reply. I said that as Ambas- 
sador I formally recognized the Provisional Government, 
but that I desired to be presented to the President, Prince 
Lvoff, and to present to him my eight Secretaries and 
Attaches and my Military and Naval Attaches in full 
uniform as I thought it important to make the recogni- 
tion as formal as possible. He not only agreed but sug- 
gested that I make the formal recognition not merely 


to President LvofF, but to the entire Council of Min- 
isters. I told him that would be very gratifying to me, 
and he at once arranged for me to meet the Ministry 
at the Marensky Palace at 4 :30 that afternoon. 

At that hour I accordingly appeared before the Min- 
istry, having driven up the Nevsky Prospect with my 
coachman in full livery on the box and the chasseur also 
in full livery standing behind me. I was accompanied by 
the Counselor, the four Secretaries, the Military and 
Naval Attaches in full uniform, the Commercial Attache 
and two Attaches on special mission. Upon being pre- 
sented to Prince Lvoff: I made the formal recognition in 
these words: 

"Mr. President of the Council of Ministers : 

"I have the honor as American Ambassador, and as 
representative of the Government of the United States 
accredited to Russia, to hereby make formal recognition 
of the Provisional Government of all the Russias and 
to state that it gives me pleasure officially and personally 
to continue intercourse with Russia through the medium 
of the new Government. May the cordial relations exist- 
ing between the two countries continue to obtain and may 
they prove mutually satisfactory and beneficial." 

After a brief speech of appreciation by Foreign Min- 
ister Miliukoff, the short but impressive ceremony con- 
cluded. Two days later, with like ceremony, the British, 
French and Italian Embassies made formal recognition 
of the new Government to the Council of Ministers. 

Important as I felt this recognition of the Provisional 
Government by the United States to be I did not at the 
time fully realize its significance. It should be borne in 
mind that at the time of this recognition our country 
was still neutral as we did not enter the war until fifteen 
days later. This recognition undoubtedly had a power- 
ful influence in placing America in a position to enter 


the war backed by a practically unanimous public opin- 
ion. There can be no doubt that there would have been 
serious opposition to our allying ourselves with an ab- 
solute monarchy to make war no matter in what cause. 
President Wilson recognized this by his eloquent refer- 
ence to Russia in his soul-stirring address to the Con- 
gress made April 2nd. 

Moreover this recognition of the Provisional Govern- 
ment, followed as it was within forty-eight hours by 
like action on the part of the British, French and Italian 
Governments, undoubtedly gave strong moral encourage- 
ment to the new Government, which, as the above account 
of my interview with Goutchkoff, Minister of War, shows, 
was in a situation of extreme peril. It was menaced on 
the one side by forces desiring the restoration of the 
Monarchy and on the other by the threat of the Work- 
men's and Soldiers' Deputies to take the administration 
of affairs into their own hands. If either of these hostile 
elements had succeeded an armistice with the Central 
Empires would have followed immediately and conse- 
quently Germany would have sent her hundred-odd divi- 
sions from the Eastern to the Western front almost a 
year sooner than they were sent and at a time when the 
Allied Armies were particularly ill prepared to resist 



My recognition of the Provisional Government de- 
scribed in the preceding chapter had taken place just 
eleven days before President Wilson delivered his mem- 
orable message to the Joint Session of Congress recom- 
mending that a state of war be declared to exist with 

I addressed the following letter to Miliukoff on 
April 5th : 


"I am just in receipt by cable of the following noble 
sentiment eloquently expressed by President Wilson in 
his address to Congress delivered the evening of April 
2nd to the two houses in joint session. 

M 'A steadfast concert for peace can never be main- 
tained except by a partnership of democratic nations. 
No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith 
within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league 
of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue could eat 
its vitals away. The plottings of inner circles who could 
plan what they would and render account to no one 
would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only 
free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor 
steady to a common end and prefer the interests of man- 
kind to any narrow interest of their own. Does not 
every American feel that assurance has been added to 
our hope for the future peace of the world by the won- 
derful and heartening things that have been happening 
within the last few weeks in Russia 1 Russia was known 



by those who knew her best to have been always in fact 
democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought, 
in all the intimate relationships of her people that spoke 
their natural instinct, their habitual attitude towards 
life. The autocracy that crowned the summit of her po- 
litical structure long as it had stood and terrible as was 
the reality of its power, was not in fact Russian in origin, 
character or purpose, and now it has been shaken oft and 
the great generous Russian people have been added in 
all their native majesty and might to the forces that 
are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice and 
for peace. Here is a fit partner for a league of honor. 7 

"I thought this would be of interest to you and hasten 
to communicate it. In my judgment it is not only thrill- 
ing and impressive but should be an inspiration to the 
Russian people and prompt them to a patriotic support 
of the Government which you and your Colleagues are 
so ably and faithfully administering. 

"With assurances of personal and official esteem, I am, 
"Yours sincerely, 

"David R. Francis." 

This same day I also forwarded to the Minister to use 
as he saw fit this wise message to the workingmen of 
Russia from Samuel Gompers : 

"Washington, April 2, 1917. N. S. Tschedzi, Petro- 
grad, Representative of working people of Russia. Ac- 
cept this message to the men of labor of Russia. We 
send greeting. The established liberty of Russia finds 
a warm response in the hearts of America's workers. 
We rejoice at the intelligence, courage and conviction 
of a people who even while concentrating every effort 
upon defense against foreign aggression have reorgan- 
ized their own institutions upon principles of freedom 
and democracy, but it is impossible to achieve the ideal 


state immediately. "When the right foundation has been 
established the masses can daily utilize the opportu- 
nities for progress, more complete justice and greater 
liberty. Freedom is achieved in meeting the problems 
of life and work. It cannot be established by a revolu- 
tion only. It is the product of evolution. Even in the 
Republic of the United States of America, the highest 
ideals of freedom are incomplete, but we have the will 
and the opportunity. In the name of America's workers, 
whose watchwords are Justice, Freedom and Humanity, 
we plead that Russia's workers and masses shall main- 
tain what you have already achieved, and practically and 
rationally solve the problem of to-day and safeguard 
the future from the reactionary forces who would gladly 
take advantage of your lack of unity to reestablish the 
old regime of royalty, reaction, tyranny and injustice. 
Our best wishes are with Russia in her new opportunity. 

1 ' Samuel Gompers, 
"President American Federation of Labor.' ' 

In a dispatch to the Secretary of April 17, 1917, I 
made the following observations on some of the initial 
experiences of the new Government in its efforts to con- 
solidate its power: 

"For a week or ten<days after our recognition of the 
Provisional Government the tension continued very 
great, as the Council of Ministers or Provisional Govern- 
ment was trying to establish itself but was so fearful 
of the consequences of a test of strength with the Work- 
ingmen and Soldiers' Deputies that it proceeded very 
cautiously. The soldiers were permitted to parade with 
banners and bands throughout the city and the working- 
men if returning to work at all were making unreason- 
able demands as to wages and hours and in some or many 
instances were selecting their own foremen. There has 
been, however, no contest between these two authorities 
up to this time and I think there is likely to be none. 


The Provisional Government or Council of Ministers 
has been gaining strength from day to day; they have 
made two visits in a body to the front and at this writing 
the entire situation is much better than it has been at 
any day since March 12th, when the first regiment 

" Representatives of the Workingmen's Party and of 
the Soldiers' continue in session daily at the Duma or 
Tauride Palace, and I think meet in the Duma Hall. On 
Friday last, April 13th, this body passed by an over- 
whelming majority a resolution favoring a vigorous 
prosecution of the war to a successful issue and either 
the same day or the day after adopted another resolu- 
tion endorsing the Provisional Government. 

* * The general impression is that Rodzianko is in favor 
of a Constitutional Monarchy and that Miliukoff is also 
so inclined, but that Minister of Justice Kerensky, who 
is a Social Revolutionist, and who has conducted himself 
most admirably, favors a republic. 

"It has been my effort, and in such effort there has 
been no cessation, to impress upon all the importance of 
a vigorous prosecution of the war and to subordinate 
thereto all questions as to the rights of races or the recog- 
nition of classes. 

"The Jews have undoubtedly been subjected to many 
injustices and unjust restrictions in Russia, and all fair- 
minded people are pleased that most if not all of such 
restrictions have been removed. The prejudice against 
the race, however, has by no means been eradicated; 
it pervades the peasants to a wonderful extent and that 
prejudice will be fanned into flame by opponents of the 
present regime if any reason therefor is given or can 
be charged with any appearance of truth. 

"In reply to your cable concerning a separate peace, 
received the 14th, I cabled the result of a conference with 
Miliukoff. While I was talking with him in the Foreign 
Office,^ delegations of British and French Socialists were 
awaiting an audience and subsequently he phoned me 
that they had come to Russia for the purpose of advis- 
ing Russian Socialists to push the war vigorously and to 
give no thought of a separate peace as the Socialists of 


Germany and Austria-Hungary were more devoted to 
their respective countries than they were to socialistic 
doctrines, or at least were pursuing the policy of achiev- 
ing a victory for the Central Empires first." 

The people of Petrograd learned of America's en- 
trance into the war before I received official notification 

The President's address delivered on April 2nd, 1917, 
to the Joint Session of Congress not only aroused great 
enthusiasm in America but electrified all of Europe. 
There had been no doubt in my mind about America's 
coming into the war since President Wilson had severed 
diplomatic relations with Germany and given Bernstorn 
his passports. 

Our declaration of a state of war existing with the 
German Empire, coming as it did ten or fifteen days 
after the Eussian Eevolution, and our recognition of the 
Provisional Government of Eussia was not only hailed 
with delight in Eussia but was vastly strengthening to 
the Provisional Government, and served to dissipate all 
fear of the restoration of the monarchy. 

There were many assemblages of people throughout 
the country and wherever they were held there were 
demonstrations of great joy. There were some ' ' doubting 
Thomases,' ' as there were in our own country, as to the 
extent of the part we would perform, and some of these 
pointed to Japan's course after she had declared war 
against the Central Empires, but the great bulk of the 
Eussian people were aroused to a high state of enthu- 
siasm ; if they had thought that America would perform 
so important a part in the war as to bring the Central 
Empires to their knees within eighteen months Eussia 
would no doubt have remained in the war to the end. 

I was frequently called upon to make speeches, and 
being well acquainted with the American spirit, pre- 


dieted on every occasion that America having finally 
entered the conflict would prosecute it to a successful 
finish. Our people not only surprised and astonished the 
people of Europe by the rapidity and magnitude of their 
operations but even surprised themselves. 

On Sunday evening, April 22nd, while I was enter- 
taining some guests at the Embassy my colored valet, 
Philip Jordan, came to me and said that the police official 
in charge of the district had called up to warn me that 
an anarchist mob was gathering with the intention of 
attacking the Embassy. Their object was to avenge 
themselves upon the American Ambassador for a death 
sentence which had been passed upon one "Muni" in 
San Francisco. I had never heard of "Muni," and did 
not know what it was all about. I instructed Jordan to 
reply to the police officer that I thanked him for his 
warning, but considered that it was his duty rather than 
mine to protect the Embassy. I then told him to load 
my revolver and bring it to me. In a few minutes the 
police official who had telephoned arrived at the Em- 
bassy with a squad of police. Revolver in hand I went 
to meet the police officer, and told him to station his men 
at the Embassy gate, with instructions to shoot anyone 
who tried to enter the building without my permission. 
I stated I would take my stand inside prepared to shoot 
anyone who attempted to cross the threshold. 

The mob never reached the Embassy although they 
started for it. Reports also differed as to how they were 
dispersed and why they did not carry out their inten- 
tion. One explanation was that while they were gather- 
ing on the Nevsky in front of the Kazan Cathedral, some 
Cossacks happened by and, attracted by the crowd as 
Russians always are, joined in and inquired what was 
on foot. When told that the crowd was going to attack 
the American Embassy because a socialist was to be 


hung in America, the Cossacks replied, "Not if we know 
it," or words to that effect, and began attacking the mob 
which scattered in all directions. 

I later learned with amusement that some of my 
friends had circulated a very much more sensational 
version of this episode. According to this version, the 
angry mob did reach the Embassy where I met them 
with a threat to shoot the first man who crossed the 
threshold and thus violated American territory, and that 
thereupon the mob slunk away. When in Paris on my 
way home I found this was the version of the story which 
had been circulated in the Peace Conference circles. I 
tried to correct it, but with little success. Everyone 
seemed to prefer the more sensational story, so I sup- 
pose I shall have to resign myself to this heroic role. 
It, at any rate, truthfully represents my intentions. All 
I lacked was the opportunity to carry them out. 

Two days afterwards the Spanish and Japanese Am- 
bassadors and the Chinese Minister came to express their 
solicitude and regrets at the threatened indignity to the 
Embassy and myself. The same day the Minister of 
Justice, Alexander Kerensky, called and expressed the 
sympathy of the Government and their indignation at 
the threat to which I had been subjected. 

Alexander Kerensky performed noble, patriotic and 
effective service in this critical stage in the life of the 
Provisional Government. 

I met Kerensky at the time I formally recognized the 
Provisional Government. He was a young man, thirty- 
four years of age, with a smooth-shaven face, not over 
five feet ten inches in height, and of extremely nervous 
temperament. He had been the leader of the Socialist 
Revolutionists in the Duma, where he had shown elo- 
quence of a high order; his speeches always commanded 
attention, because they were logical and delivered in a 


good voice, and they were always characterized by a 
vehement opposition to the Czar's government. Conse- 
quently the Workingmen's and Soldiers' Deputies had 
more confidence in Kerensky than in any other member 
of the Provisional Government. 

Numerous instances of his influence with the Work- 
ingmen's and Soldiers' Deputies and with the populace 
were told me. 

Baron Rosen, who had been Russian Ambassador at 
Washington, one day came to the American Embassy 
fresh from one of these scenes. He told me that he had 
seen a mob on the point of killing an officer, when Ker- 
ensky rescued the doomed man, and speaking to the 
angry crowd said he was the Minister of Justice and 
as long as he held that office no man should be deprived 
of life except after conviction in a fair trial. 

The Ministry of the Provisional Government frequent- 
ly called upon Kerensky to exert his influence at this 
time, and had it not been for his efforts and the recog- 
nition by America of the Provisional Government, it 
would have been deposed and the revolution which took 
place the following November, eight months later, would 
have occurred in March, 1917. 

Kerensky, whom I came to know well, and with whom 
I had close relations during the regime of the Provi- 
sional Government, did such valiant work that we should 
not be harsh in our condemnation of his subsequent mis- 
takes. When Goutchkoff resigned as Minister of War, 
Kerensky succeeded him. Kerensky was responsible for 
the decree abolishing the death penalty in the army, and 
although he issued a later decree, at the instance of 
Korniloff, reinstating the death penalty, his heart was 
too soft to command an army. 

I well remember being present when Kerensky was ad- 
dressing a large audience in the Miransky Theater. He 


was interrupted three times by a man in the gallery, to 
whom he paid no attention at the first two interruptions. 
The audience was spell-bound, but the man in the gallery 
insisted on interrupting the speaker the third time, call- 
ing out, "What about restoring the death penalty ?" 
Then Kerensky, pointing in the direction whence the 
voice came, remarked, "Wait until I order a man put 
to death," thereby demonstrating that his feelings were 
still with the decree abolishing the death penalty. 

After he became War Minister he made several visits 
to the Eastern front, and at one time took command of 
the army and ordered an advance which was successful. 
But he never countermanded Order No. 1, which demoted 
all officers to the ranks and permitted the soldiers to 
elect their own officers, and made provision for the of- 
ficers so elected to be removed by the soldiers when they 
saw fit. 

I was lunching with Kerensky in Terestchenko 's apart- 
ment one day when Nekrassoff, Bakhmatieff, Ambas- 
sador of the Provisional Government at Washington, 
and others were present. 

Terestchenko 's apartment faced the Quay, along which 
a procession was passing. As we watched the parade 
I asked Kerensky if Lenin and Trotzky were not both 
Jews. Trotzky I knew was, and I had heard that Lenin's 
mother was of Jewish descent. Kerensky promptly re- 
plied that he went to school with Lenin, and that Lenin 
was of pure Russian blood. He said his first recollection 
of political life was of being in Lenin's father's house 
at the age of six when the house was searched for Lenin's 
elder brother, who had made an attempt upon the life 
of Alexander III. The brother was afterwards arrested 
and shot. 

This reminds me of a report which was current in 
Petrograd at the time Kerensky escaped. It was said 


that Kerensky could have apprehended Lenin when the 
attempted revolution of July 16th and 17th, 1917, oc- 
curred. Trotzky was arrested at the time and impris- 
oned, although later released. Lenin was never arrested 
by the Provisional Government although he was contin- 
ually trying to undermine it. During the Bolshevik 
Revolution of November, 1917, all the other Ministers 
were arrested and imprisoned in Saint Peter and Paul 
Fortress, but Kerensky escaped. It was rumored that 
Lenin and Trotzky permitted Kerensky to escape in re- 
turn for his having permitted Lenin to escape in the 
previous July. 

The next day after the threatened attack of April 
22nd, on the Embassy, a delegation of one hundred or 
more school children called and through one of their 
number made a little speech condemning the threatened 
action of the mob. I had learned meantime that the 
"Muni" for whose death sentence the mob proposed to 
make me vicariously responsible was Mooney, the labor 
leader, who had been convicted of responsibility for the 
bomb outrage in California. I explained to all my Rus- 
sian visitors that while I was not familiar with the details 
of this particular case that in America persons were con- 
demned to death for two causes only — murder and 
treason. That free speech and free press were per- 
mitted. That if any person so used these privileges as 
to menace the safety of other individuals, of the Govern- 
ment, or of society he was bound over under bond to keep 
the peace if an American citizen, and if an alien he was 
deported to the country whence he came. 
On May 1st, I said in a letter to my son Perry : 
' ' Today is labor day throughout Europe and is a very 
strict holiday. The guests in the hotels were told yes- 
terday that no meals would be served today. The streets 
were and are now practically deserted but the crowds 


have congregated at several places listening to speeches, 
some of which are sensible and some otherwise. Many- 
allowances, however, must be made for people who have 
been living under an absolute monarchy all of their lives 
and who have never been permitted the liberty of free 
speech, which everyone has in our country. 

"This government is still doing a great deal of con- 
structive work but it has not yet asserted its authority 
with any force. There are daily meetings of the Com- 
mittee representing the Workingmen's and Soldiers' 
Deputies and the membership of that Committee, I am 
told, is over two thousand. An ultra-Socialist named 
Lenin has been doing a great deal of foolish talking and 
has advised his hearers to kill all people who have prop- 
erty and refuse to divide. We are living somewhat in sus- 
pense. Lenin's followers are an unknown quantity. We 
occasionally hear rumors of violence being planned. One 
up-rising was said to be fixed for today, but at this hour, 
5 p.m., it has not materialized. My relations with the 
Ministers are very close, and I feel justified in stating 
that the American Embassy never stood so well in Rus- 
sia as it does today." 

In the huge Labor Parade which was the feature of the 
day there were many banners bearing the inscription 
"Peace with Victory but without Annexation or 

Two days later, on May 3rd, Foreign Minister Miliu- 
koff issued the following statement on Russia's war aims 
apropos of America's entrance into the conflict. 

"I never doubted that the United States could join 
only the powers of the Entente. In the definition of the 
objects of the war by President Wilson and the states- 
men of the Continent, there never appeared any diversity 
of opinion. As President Wilson, so also Briand, 
Asquith and Grey recognized as the fundamental object 


of the war — the prevention of war; that is to-day, the 
finding of peaceful means for the settlement of conflicts 
and the creation of a new and equitable organization of 
nations, founded on the triumph of justice in inter- 
national relations. The best pledge of America's enter- 
ing the ranks of the Allied Powers was undoubtedly this 
accord of views in the domain of the conception of the 
war. Assuredly the formula i Peace without Victory,' 
proposed by President Wilson is unadmissible for the 
Allies, but it must be noticed in this connection that the 
logical development of all the ideas on which are founded 
the President's statements imperiously demands the con- 
tinuation of the war by the Allies to a victorious end. 
Only victory is able to give the powers of the Entente 
the possibility of solving those broad international ques- 
tions, the settlement of which President Wilson himself 
recognizes as necessary for the good of humanity. It 
must not be forgotten that in her declarations concerning 
her efforts for peace Germany remains true to her policy, 
wishing to march ahead of a pacified universe. The 
only obstacle to the development of normal international 
relations has always been found in German presentations 
to world domination, to the enslavement of peoples and 
to the transformation of all Europe according to the law 
of the Prussian mailed fist. Without victory over Ger- 
many the establishment of the ideal international order 
of which President Wilson dreams is an utopia impos- 
sible of realization. 

"The concurrence of the views of the Allies with the 
fundamental tenets of President Wilson is not only 
apparent in the definition of these ideal aims of the war, 
but also of those entirely concrete objects, the attainment 
of which is to lead to an international organization of 
the universe. Not one of the Allies can be reproached 
with pursuing a policy of encroachment. The program 
of the Entente powers consists in the realization of the 
leading idea of President Wilson concerning the satis- 
faction of all national aspirations, the restoration of 
crushed nations and trampled rights. The Entente 
powers must fix the map of Europe on lines that will 
include every possibility of a new international catas- 


trophe. I repeat it: none of the Allies is pursuing 
encroaching aims ; the Allies consider necessary only the 
restitution of what was forcibly amputated or the settle- 
ment of national historical questions. Under these cir- 
cumstances it is possible to speak of ' peace without 
annexations' only under the condition that by the word 
' annexation ' is meant a conquest. The fixing of frontiers 
in accord with national endeavors must in no wise be 
considered a conquest. In general the formula 'peace 
without victory' must be treated with great precaution, 
this formula having been launched by the Allies of Ger- 
man social democracy as corresponding to German 
interests only. 

"Starting from the principle of the liberation of 
nations put forward by President Wilson as well as by 
the Entente Powers, the fundamental task of the Allies 
tends toward the liquidation of Turkish rule over op- 
pressed nations beginning with the Armenians, who, 
after the victory, must be under the care of Russia, and 
toward the radical reorganization of Austria-Hungary. 
One of the natural consequences of this transformation 
will be the uniting of the Servian territories ; another — 
the creation of a Czecho-Slovak state — bulwarks against 
Germany 's plans of conquering non-German lands. Hun- 
gary and German Austria must contract within their 
ethnographical frontiers in order to restore Italians to 
Italy, Roumanians to Roumania, and the Ukrainian 
provinces to Ukrainia. 

"All these ideas are entirely conformable to the ideas 
of President Wilson. The same concurrence of views is 
also noticeable in the Russian endeavors to command 
the Straits. As it is known, President Wilson on the 
question of the Straits did not only take the position of 
their possible neutralization, but also of their transfer to 
Russian control. In the establishment of Russian domi- 
nation over the Straits there must be in no wise seen a 
manifestation of tendencies of conquest, but exclusively 
the existence of a national object — the necessity of com- 
manding the gate to Russia without which it is impossible 
to guarantee the safety of the Black Sea. When this 
gate shall have been firmly fortified, we shall not b 



obliged to increase the defenses of the shores of the 
Black Sea, or to maintain a powerful battle fleet. As far 
as the neutralization of the Straits is concerned, this 
solution of the question would give access to the Black 
Sea to foreign battleships, which is precisely the consid- 
eration impelling Russia to prefer to a neutralization the 
retention of the Straits in the hands of a weak power. 
Occupying Constantinople as mere parasites and ruling 
by the sole force of conquest the Turks cannot, in opposi- 
tion to the Russian aims, allege their national rights.' ' 

This statement, although only a reiteration of the dec- 
laration made by the Provisional Government on April 
10th, proved to be a bombshell. I had known for some 
time that a serious difference of opinion in the Cabinet 
was threatened on the question of annexation or foreign 
policy at the close of the war. I knew that Miliukoff, as 
stated in this interview, claimed that Russia must be 
given Constantinople in accordance with the promise of 
the Allies to the Imperial Government before the Revo- 
lution. Kerensky, however, demanded the neutraliza- 
tion of the Dardanelles and was opposed to any annexa- 
tions to Russian territory as a result of the war. I knew 
that the Ministry had been about equally divided between 
these two positions, but had understood that the matter 
had been decided in favor of Kerensky ? s position — that 
is against annexations. The British Ambassador, Sir 
George Buchanan, had told me a few days before that he 
could say nothing because the Allies had promised Con- 
stantinople to Russia before the Revolution, when Rus- 
sia's policy with regard to Constantinople was well 
defined and well known. He added, however, that he 
personally hoped and believed that the result would be 
the neutralization of the Dardanelles. 

Miliukoff gave out this statement without consulting 
that self-appointed branch of the Government, the Work- 
men 's and Soldiers f Committee. This they bitterly re- 


sented and instigated hostile demonstrations against 
him. As I wrote the Secretary at the time : 

"The offense seems to have been that the Provisional 
Government presumed to make a statement without con- 
sulting with and obtaining the consent of the Working- 
men's Committee. In the midst of these hostile demon- 
strations I called upon Miliukoff, who was in a meeting 
of the Council of Ministers in the War Department, and 
told him and Goutchkoff, the Minister of War, in effect 
that having risked my judgment in asking my Govern- 
ment to recognize the Provisional Government and hav- 
ing done all I could to assist the Ministry, I felt con- 
siderable official and personal responsibility concerning 
a stable government in Eussia and that if more satis- 
factory evidence was not given of such government, I 
should feel compelled to advise my Government not 
to extend the aid which I have been continuously 
recommending. " 

I was endeavoring to secure from our Government a 
credit to the Provisional Government of Eussia and had 
fair prospects of success. I was also seeking to have a 
practical railroad man sent to Vladivostok to relieve the 
congestion at that point and generally to make the Si- 
berian railroad more efficient. I had also made public 
addresses urging support of the new government and 
continuation of the war to a successful conclusion. I 
had spoken thus at a great rally at the City Duma only a 
week or so before. I spoke with the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Finance, Commerce and Industry and Ways 
and Communications. The huge hall was crowded to 
overflowing and the enthusiasm great. When I was 
introduced as the first Ambassador to recognize the Pro- 
visional Government, I received an ovation. 

Goutchkoff seemed very much pleased at the statement 
and asked if I would make it public, but before I could 


answer Miliukoff remarked that he trusted there would 
be no occasion for me to do so and added that he expected 
hostile demonstrations against himself at the meeting 
of the Ministry to be held that evening, May 3rd, at the 
Marinsky Palace at 9 o'clock, when there would be a 
conference with the Executive Committee of the Work- 
ingmen's Committee; that his friends had desired to 
make a counter demonstration but he had advised against 
it. The conference did take place and at about 10 p.m. 
a large crowd, including some soldiers in uniform and 
armed, appeared in front of the Marinsky Palace, but 
the friends of the new government were there also and 
in larger numbers than its opponents. In response to 
loud calls for Miliukoff, Nekrassoff, Minister of Ways 
and Communications, appeared and addressed the crowd, 
stating that the Government was confident of its posi- 
tion and would continue to direct affairs according to its 
best lights ; that Miliukoff was in the meeting and was 
at that moment engaged in conference, but would address 
the assemblage in a few minutes. Miliukoff soon ap- 
peared and was given an ovation; he spoke with more 
confidence and firmness than on previous occasions and 
was very much gratified at the reception his remarks 
met with. On his return to the Foreign Office after mid- 
night, he found a crowd assembled there and made an- 
other talk. How much influence my talk with the Minis- 
ters had upon their assuming for the first time a rather 
independent position I cannot say, but the report has 
gained circulation and credence that the stand taken by 
the Ministry was inspired if not demanded by the Ameri- 
can Ambassador. I give you this for what it is worth 
and must rely upon your knowledge of my discretion in 
whatever I did or said. It seemed to me there was a 
crisis in the situation and I endeavored to meet it in 
the most effective manner. The following day, Friday, 


the hostile demonstrations continued for a few hours; 
in fact, I passed one of these demonstrations on the 
Nevsky where there was a procession of workingmen, 
some of whom were armed, and there was one black flag 
with an inscription anarchistic in tone. I communicated 
with Miliukoff by phone, congratulating him on his 
success the previous evening, and was informed by him 
that an agreement had been reached with the Working- 
men's Committee, which would be promulgated within 
a few hours. As the day wore on, friends of the new 
government and opponents of the anarchistic and ex- 
treme socialistic expressions of Lenin, gained courage 
to such an extent that whenever a Lenin banner appeared 
on the streets it was captured and torn to shreds. On 
Friday evening late it became known that an agreement 
had been reached and the Saturday morning papers con- 
tained an explanatory note from the new government 
and also a proclamation from the Workingmen J s Com- 
mittee advising its friends to refrain from congregating 
in crowds and carrying arms. That proclamation con- 
tained only one objectionable paragraph and that was 
a statement that no troops other than the small squads 
for police duty could appear upon the streets without 
the written consent of the Workmen. The result, how- 
ever, was that the streets then became extremely quiet; 
the Provisional Government expressed great satisfaction 
with the situation, and was entirely confident of the ob- 
servance of its authority. 

In a letter to my son David, written the same day, I 
said in commenting on the same events that when the 
Ministry asserted itself it found, to their gratification if 
not surprise, that the overwhelming sentiment of the 
people of Petrograd was in favor of the new Govern- 
ment and against the anarchistic doctrines which had 
been preached from every street corner by an extreme 


Socialist named Lenin and his followers. I am inclined 
to the opinion that Lenin is in the pay of the German 
Government and this Government thinks so too. 

This opinion formed in the early Spring of 1917, when 
Lenin was a mere agitator who had come to Russia from 
Switzerland, traveling through Germany, I have held 
ever since and hold to-day. 

Not long after Lenin reached Russia through Ger- 
many, Leon Trotzky arrived from the United States. 
Neither one would have been allowed to enter Russia 
under the Empire. Both were taking advantage of the 
democratic hospitality of the new Government. The 
way they used that hospitality is an interesting study. 

While these events were taking place in Petrograd, 
conditions were going from bad to worse throughout 
Russia as I learned from reports received from the Con- 
suls and other official sources throughout the country as 
well as from the press. Perhaps one such report will 
serve to indicate the tenor of them all; it was from 
Consul-General Summers of Moscow, and read in part 
as follows : 

" While, under your guidance, we are duty bound to 
do everything possible to encourage a free government 
here, yet there is a limit to everything, and this is being 
reached rapidly. The soldiers are plunging the country 
headlong into anarchy and civil war, and the army as a 
fighting force no longer exists. This is the unanimous 
opinion of everyone who returns from the front. The 
situation in the provinces is still worse. Estates are 
being sacked and the owners beaten and murdered. 
Drunkenness is rampant and the soldiers are plundering 
everywhere. In Moscow no one dares keep anything of 
value in the house. Robberies are of daily occurrence 
and no one protests. The Commanding General of the 
District resigned yesterday, and he stated he could do 
nothing with the troops who absolutely refused to obey 


his orders. The entire garrison of the city spends its 
time riding over the city in the tram cars, refusing to 
pay their fares and generally behaving in a disorderly 

"In every province there are riots and murders daily. 
The landowners dare not go to their estates and many of 
them will not be able to raise crops this year as the 
peasants, who are being inflamed by the soldiers, refuse 
to allow them to cultivate the land. Everywhere the 
soldiers and peasants are threatening the landowners 
with death and confiscation of their property. The 
managers of large factories report that the workmen are 
doing what they please and that they are managers in 
name only. The food supply of the city is rapidly 
diminishing, and it is with the greatest difficulty that one 
can provide a meal. Servants must stand all day in the 
bread, milk, and meat lines and then return with very 

"The local authorities here are desperate and make 
heart-rending appeals to the people, but the soldiers 
are bent on their destructive work and there is no hope 
of improvement. 

"The time has come when strong representations will 
have to be made to avoid one of the bloodiest situations 
in history. God grant that it may pass over, but we must 
be prepared for the worst.' 9 

I then suspected and now feel confident that all this 
disastrous disintegration of Russian society was largely 
accomplished by Lenin and Trotzky and a host of similar 
agitators, liberally provided with German money. They 
worked, in so far as they could, through that potential 
but irresponsible branch of the Government, the Council 
of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, over which body 
they finally secured control. 


In a letter to my son Perry of May 15th, 1917, I 
remarked : * * The first change in the Provisional Govern- 
ment took place Sunday when Goutchkoff, Minister of 
War, resigned. Other changes were made last evening 
and to-day, and you will no doubt hear of them long 
before you receive this letter. At this time these changes 
appear to me to be wise as they will divide the responsi- 
bility with that socialistic element representing the work- 
men and the recalcitrant soldiers who have never 
acknowledged unreservedly the authority of the new 
government. ' ' 

In a letter at about the same time to John F. Stevens, 
the Chairman of the Railroad Commission which was 
then about to land at Vladivostok, I commented on the 
Ministerial changes in these words : 

"The situation in Russia at this writing has just 
undergone a very material change. There have been two 
powers exercising authority — one the Provisional Gov- 
ernment, composed of ten ministers all of whom are able, 
patriotic and courageous; the other a self-constituted 
Committee of forty or fifty who represent the working- 
men and the soldiers and do not recognize the authority 
of the Provisional Government. I say self-constituted 
in the sense that no provision was made by the Duma 
for such committee. I think they have been elected by 
the workingmen and soldiers whom they claim to repre- 
sent. However that may be, this Committee has been 
almost supreme in Petrograd and has claimed the right 



to veto all of the decrees of the Provisional Government 
including those given by the Minister of War to the 
army. For this reason the Minister of War, Goutchkoff, 
resigned two days ago. I have just heard that Kerensky 
who has been Minister of Justice since the beginning of 
the Revolution has been appointed Minister of War but 
he has not yet been installed. Professor P. N. Miliukoff, 
who was looked upon in America as the leading spirit of 
the Revolution, and who has been Minister of Foreign 
Affairs since the organization of the Government, has 
also resigned his portfolio but I understand will take 
another portfolio in the Government — probably that of 
the Department of Education. Terestchenko who has 
been Minister of Finance from the beginning of the 
Government has been made Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
I am also sending with the Commission, my military 
attache, Lieut. E. Francis Riggs. You may talk freely 
with Lieut. Riggs who is familiar with the military 
situation on the Russian front and also in Petrograd. 
Lieut. Riggs, however, is a military man and conse- 
quently is not as sanguine about the outcome of the 
present situation as I am. All army and navy officers are 
naturally pessimistic concerning present conditions be- 
cause the soldiers and sailors have treated their officers 
with little respect and some people think that discipline 
cannot be restored for a long time if at all in the Russian 
army. ' ' 

In commenting on the same situation to a business 
associate, Mr. William H. Lee, I said : 

"The part we are performing in this war is of the 
utmost importance especially in Russia, where the Gov- 
ernment and the people seem to look to America for guid- 
ance and assistance and I may say for leadership. An 
Englishman said a few days ago that when America 
entered the war Russia left it. That may not be entirely 


true but the situation here at this writing is by no means 
satisfactory. The Provisional Government which I so 
heartily endorsed at a critical time more than two months 
ago has grown in strength from that time to this, but 
yesterday the Minister of War, GoutchkofT, one of the 
ablest and strongest men in the Government, resigned. 
He has never been popular with the Workmen's and Sol- 
diers' Deputies Committee because he was looked upon 
as an aristocrat, being a man of property, and further- 
more having had considerable experience as a soldier, he 
had little patience with the position assumed by the sol- 
diers of the left to elect their own officers, and never could 
listen for a moment to the claim of the Workmen's Com- 
mittee to vise his military orders. The fraternizing at 
the front between Russian and German soldiers has 
always been objectionable to him." 

Upon hearing of GoutchkofT 's intended resignation, I 
had attempted to find him for the purpose of remon- 
strating with him and telling him he should not forsake 
the Provisional Government, and that in my judgment 
such an act would be cowardly. I telephoned to the War 
Office and to his residence also and sent a note by mes- 
senger to his house. He could not be found, however, 
and when I finally saw him Kerensky had already been 
appointed as his successor and installed in the office. 

I met GoutchkofT several times after his resignation, 
and learned from him that he abandoned his office be- 
cause he could not endure the dictation of the Working- 
men's and Soldiers' Deputies to which he was subjected. 

The next to leave the Provisional Government Min- 
istry was MiliukofT, who resigned. At a private meeting 
of the members of the Duma, MiliukofT stated that he 
left the Government as a large majority of his former 
colleagues were against him. He expressed as his opin- 
ion that the new foreign policy, adopted by the Socialists, 


was the result of theoretical speculations supported by 
the minorities of socialistic parties abroad, and that the 
realization of this policy would be dangerous for the 
Entente, and that therefore he, Miliukoff, could not take 
upon himself the responsibility to conduct such policy. 
However, he said he hoped that the new Government 
would succeed in obtaining real authority and bringing 
about a change for the better in the army. Therefore 
he stated that all parties should support the new 

When Miliukoff resigned, Terestchenko, the Minister 
of Finance in the Provisional Government, was trans- 
ferred from the Department of Finance to the Foreign 
Office. He was a young man, only thirty-one years of 
age, descended from Cossack ancestors. His family was 
rich; his mother was a widow and universally beloved 
for her charities. 

I recall that while Terestchenko was dining with me 
at the American Embassy, his eye fell upon an engraving 
of Rapine's celebrated painting, "The Cossack's Reply 
to the Sultan of Turkey." "One of these Cossacks,' ' he 
said, "was my ancestor." He was a "Radical" in poli- 
tics, but the party to which he belonged had only a small 
membership. He was reported to have given 5,000,000 
or 10,000,000 roubles to assist the Provisional Govern- 
ment. He spoke English, French, German and Polish. 
His father died long before the war began, and the young 
man had gained much credit by applying himself to the 
preservation of his father's estate, which owned several 
large sugar refineries. His mother purchased a yacht 
for him before the war began at a cost of 500,000 roubles, 
and when Russia entered the war he gave that yacht to 
the Government. He was a close student and a sincere 
lover of his country. The Provisional Government was 


fortunate in having a man so well qualified to fill 
Miliukoff's place. 

Shortly after he became Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
I made an arrangement to see him at a fixed time each 
day; this resulted in our becoming close friends. Ter- 
estchenko was loyal to Kerensky, whom he greatly 
admired up to within two or three weeks of the Bolshevik 
Revolution. I did not know, indeed, that he ever lost con- 
fidence in Kerensky until Terestchenko visited me incog- 
nito in the latter part of October, 1918, at Archangel. 

When, after the fall of the Provisional Government 
and during the Bolshevik regime, the Germans ap- 
proached within twenty-five miles of Petrograd, which 
caused the departure of all of the Allied Missions from 
the city, Terestchenko and the other former Ministers 
were released from the St. Peter and Paul Fortress. 
After living in seclusion for some weeks, Terestchenko 
managed to get through the lines to Sweden, and told 
me when he arrived in Archangel that he had spent the 
summer of 1918 on a farm in Norway belonging to a 
former employee of his. He said he had come with the 
intention of joining Kolchak if he could get through, but 
that if he could not make his way through the lines, he 
wished to go to America. I told him I would give him 
a passport to America, but he was loath to abandon his 
plan to join Kolchak, and was still in Archangel when I 
left that city November 6th, 1918. He did not come to 
America but during my stay in London, I heard that he 
was in Stockholm. I have heard nothing from him since 
I parted with him in Archangel the day before I was 
borne on a stretcher aboard the cruiser Olympia; sup- 
pose he is somewhere in Scandinavian country, awaiting 
the restoration of established order in Russia when he 
will return to his beloved country. 

Shortly after Terestchenko 's assuming the Foreign 


Office portfolio, he issued to the Russian press the follow- 
ing statement of his policy: 

"You ask what is my program? You can read it in 
the declaration of the new Provisional Government 
called to power by Free Russia. This program is short, 
but significant, namely, the reestablishment as early as 
possible of universal peace. A peace which aims neither 
at domination over other peoples, nor a seizure of their 
national patrimony, nor a taking by force of foreign 
territories, a peace without annexations or indemnities, 
based on the principle of the rights of peoples to dispose 
of themselves, a peace concluded in close and indissoluble 
union with the allied democracies. Free Russia, like 
every country which has made a great renovating revolu- 
tion, is moved by two motives profoundly idealistic. The 
first is an aspiration to give a just peace to the entire 
world, not to injure any nation, not to create after the 
war a hatred, an estrangement which remains always 
when one nation comes forth from the struggle enriched 
at the expense of the other nations, when the latter are 
crushed and obliged to accept humiliating conditions of 
peace. We have seen a sad example of that in 1870. 
The wounds dealt to France by Germany remained open 
for forty-five years. The hope of the people of Alsace- 
Lorraine for a better future is not dead up to the present 
and they have now a right to hope for the realization of 
their ideal. Outrage and injustice are not forgotten, 
violence creates hatred. Liberated Russia does not wish 
that either for herself, or for others. 

"The second motive is the consciousness of ties with 
the allied democracies, consciousness of the duty which 
these ties have imposed on her. Revolutionary Russia 
cannot and ought not to break these ties sealed by blood ; 
for her it is a question of revolutionary honor which is 
so much the more precious to her now. The great revolu- 
tion which stirred the public ocean to its greatest depths 
could not but influence the army, which was unable to 
immediately accommodate itself to the suddenly changed 
state of affairs. At the same time, the democracy of 
the west continued to accomplish with tenacity its war- 


like work which was for us a powerful aid. The allied 
armies of whom the great mass is composed, as with us, 
of peasants and workmen, carried on without stopping 
the struggle against the enemy, diverting his strength 
and by their heroic effort are saving the Russian revolu- 
tion from an external defeat. The success of the Rus- 
sian revolution is also bought by their blood; it is with 
a sentiment of profound satisfaction that I must state 
that in Free Russia, in spite of a divergence of opinions 
of the democratic parties, there has not been a single 
party, a single organization as there was in reactionary 
Russia, which would have made a propaganda for a 
separate peace. I know, however, that there exists a 
question capable of stirring the emotions of the numerous 
groups of the Russian democracy, that is the question of 
the treaties concluded by the old Russian regime. This 
question stirs up the passions. But I believe neverthe- 
less that I ought to touch upon this question, expressing 
my entire and true opinion, for the Russian people have 
the right to expect and expects that the Provisional 
Government should only tell it the truth. The Russian 
democracy is afraid that bound by these old treaties it 
will be made to serve purposes of annexation which are 
foreign to it. This disturbs its revolutionary confidence, 
diminishes its spirit and enthusiasm. That is why de- 
mands for the immediate publication of all the treaties 
concluded by the old regime are being made. I think 
that in this case the sentiments which bring forth these 
demands are highly humanitarian, but I am convinced 
that the question is raised in an entirely erroneous man- 
ner and that should be understood by the Russian 

1 ' It ought absolutely to understand that in the name of 
the safety of the Russian revolution and the Allied 
democracies, the immediate publication of the treaties is 
equivalent to a rupture with the Allies and will result 
in the isolation of Russia. Such an act will necessarily 
bring on a separate situation and for Russia will be the 
beginning of a separate peace. But it is exactly this 
which the Russian people repudiates with all its force 
and not only by a feeling of honor. It understands that 


the international war can only be ended by an interna- 
tional peace. It is only this peace which could guarantee 
this justice, this right of the people to dispose of them- 
selves which is ardently desired by liberated Russia, 
Other ways must be chosen, for new Russia must look 
forward and not backward. Now the world at war is 
confronted by some new facts, namely, the great Russian 
revolution and the entry into the war of the Great 
American Republic, which hailed with enthusiasm the 
Russian revolution and has united itself without hesita- 
tion to the Allies after the disappearance of Russian 
absolutism. We must start from these facts and these 
facts cannot but be counted on by the Allied democracies. 
Personal intercourse with representatives of the western 
democracies, as for example Mr. Thomas, makes near 
and clear to all the aims which are now placed before 
Russia and before the world as a result of the Russian 
revolution. In basing oneself on this intercourse, I 
notice the growth of a reciprocal confidence with the 
Allies which will permit the Russian Government to 
undertake preparatory measures for an agreement with 
the Allies on the basis of the declaration of March 27th- 
April 9th, and I will apply every effort to hasten the proc- 
ess of approachment of mutual understanding and agree- 
ment. But to attain this aim with success Free Russia 
must prove that she is accomplishing faithfully her fun- 
damental engagement that she has taken towards the 
Allies, the engagement of united struggle and mutual 

1 ' She must inspire an unlimited confidence in herself 
and prove that her idealism is not derived from weak- 
ness and that she renounces annexations not because she 
cannot realize them but because she does not desire them. 
It is precisely the reason why in the name of the demands 
of the democracy, in the name of a peace rapid and just, 
it is necessary to re-create the military power of new 
Russia, to strengthen it by all the force of her revolu- 
tionary enthusiasm and to prove really the existence of 
this force. The Russian army proved its heroism, its 
great self-denial even when it was sent to the field of 
battle by the old regime. At present being subjected only 


to a discipline freely accepted it must understand and 
understands that it is struggling for what it holds most 
dear, for the integrity and the safety of its freed country 
aspiring to a new life. It understands also that a defeat 
will annihilate this liberty and this new life. And that 
ought to be the only aim to animate it. It is ridculous 
in fact to speak at the present moment of the annexa- 
tionist plans of the Allies as of a real menace to peace, 
just when Russia, Belgium, France and Servia are them- 
selves occupied in whole or in part by the enemy. Now 
it can only be a question of an active defense with a view 
to defending the national independence and liberty. As 
for the future the Allied democracies in their ever grow- 
ing confidence must count with the desire and tendency 
of all. It is not for nothing that Russian liberty comes to 
the world and that its consequences and influences are 
spreading in a large and powerful wave across the 
civilized world. That is all that I can say for the moment 
in regard to what will serve me as a basis for my activity 
and the measures that I propose taking." 

The reader will note how radically this statement dif- 
fers from the pronouncement on the same subject issued 
by Terestchenko's colleague and predecessor, Miliukoff, 
only a few weeks before. In fact there is scarcely any 
similarity except on the fundamental points of the neces- 
sity of winning the war and remaining loyal to Russia's 
Allies. It was the insistence on these fundamentals 
which made it possible for me to continue my coopera- 
tion with the Government. 

The Provisional Government, with which I had close 
relations, was surrounded at this period by many dif- 
ficulties. I saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs daily, 
and attempted to keep my Government advised concern- 
ing the situation. 

Terestchenko, Kerensky and Lvoff, the latter two of 
whom I saw frequently, told me that they did not need 
men but supplies and credit, in order to equip and feed 


and clothe the Russian army. Soon after America 
entered the war a credit was extended to the Provisional 
Government, on my recommendation, by the United 
States of $100,000,000 on condition that the entire amount 
be disbursed in America. After the arrival of the Ameri- 
can Commission, Senator Root and I joined in a recom- 
mendation that $15,000,000 of this $100,000,000 and if the 
entire $100,000,000 had already been obligated, an addi- 
tional credit amounting to $15,000,000 be extended in 
cash for the purpose of paying the Russian army in 
Finland. Finland had an agreement with Russia by 
which the former was to pay the latter 20,000,000 roubles 
annually, and in return Finnish citizens were not subject 
to conscription for service in the Russian army. The 
government of Finland had informed the government in 
Petrograd that the Russian soldiers in Finland threat- 
ened to mutiny in default of their pay, which was 

The Government of the United States followed the 
recommendation of Senator Root and myself and placed 
$15,000,000 to the credit of Russia in the Bank of Eng- 
land, in accordance with an agreement made with the 
Bank of Finland, with which the Russian soldiers in 
Finland were promptly paid. 

Finland had long desired her independence ; in fact a 
number of the richer classes sympathized with Germany 
from the beginning of the war. Germany was continu- 
ously propagandizing in that country with a view of 
creating an uprising of the Finns. During this period I 
realized the importance of maintaining the Russian 
army on the Eastern front, and was well acquainted with 
the trials and tribulations of the Ministry. America had 
entered the war ninety days previously ; and, in my opin- 
ion, it would require at least one year for her to land 
troops in France or Belgium that would be of material 


assistance to the Allied cause. It was, therefore, of vital 
importance that the Russian army should maintain the 
Eastern front, so that Germany and Austria could send 
no assistance to their armies in France. Hindenburg 
and Ludendorff were advancing their lines in France and 
Belgium; consequently, this was a critical juncture of 
the world war. 

This situation, in my opinion, not only justified but 
demanded activities on my part to assist the Russian 
Government to keep the Russian armies fighting which 
under ordinary circumstances would have been not only 
unusual but improper for an Ambassador to undertake. 

About this time I said in a letter to my eldest son: 

"I have not lost faith in Russia coming out of this 
ordeal as a republic and with a government which will 
be founded on correct principles. My constant effort is 
to keep her in the war as her withdrawal would throw 
the bulk of the burden of the defeat of Germany upon 
our country. I realize the magnitude of my responsi- 
bility but at the same time feel fortunate that it has fallen 
to my lot to play such an important part in occurrences 
which are determining not only the future of our country 
and of Russia but of all international relations and in 
fact of society itself." 

On May 31st, I received the following confidential 
report on the experiences of Kerensky at the front : 

"Kerensky is still continuing his inspection of the 
front, and is met everywhere with the greatest enthu- 
siasm. The reception given him at the Frontal Congress 
at Odessa and Sevastopol is characteristic of this enthu- 
siasm. Kerensky entered the Assembly Hall in Odessa 
at the moment when, at the chairman's call, the soldiers 
were handing over their decorations and medals for the 
needs of the war, whereas those who had none, handed 
over money. Young women in the audience came for- 


ward and laid on the chairman's table their jewelry. 
Kerensky, as usual, was met with enormous enthusiasm. 
In his speech, he mentioned amongst other things: 'We 
have gone through a period of destruction, but now we 
must understand that this cannot be continued or re- 
peated, but we must commence the positive work of con- 
struction. Enemies of Russian freedom dare not go 
against us openly. They choose the path of deceit and 
go to the famine-stricken masses, corrupted by the old 
regime and inspire them "to demand everything immedi- 
ately, " and they whisper words of mistrust against us, 
who have, all our lives, struggled for freedom against 
Tzarism. There are also, amongst us, idealists, who, 
much too stubbornly, look towards the skies, and lead us 
to the precipice of anarchy. We must say to them: 
"Stop!" Do not shake the new foundations. It is easy 
to criticize and destroy, but the Russian Revolution 
demands other things of its sons, wise statesmanship, 
and demands that one does not play on the cords of the 
fatigue of the people and of the dullness inherited from 
the old regime. All that we have conquered is in the 
balance. If the Russian people, and especially the Rus- 
sian army, cannot retrieve its bravery and courage, if it 
cannot again put on its steel armor of discipline, we 
shall be lost, and the whole world will despise us, and 
besides us, will despise the ideas of Socialism, in the 
name of which we made the Revolution.' Kerensky 
ended his speech with the words: 'I have come to you, 
not to blush for the Russian army, but in order to, 
together with you, accomplish an heroic action, and for- 
getting the damnation of the past, rush forward in the 
name of freedom, equality and fraternity.' The speech 
called forth great ovations, and all present swore a 
solemn oath, to go forward and only forward. The 
whole audience shouted: 'Lead us and we will follow 
you.' " 

In the midst of our apparently successful efforts for 
the revival of Russia's military power this disquieting 
report among many others was received at the Embassy. 


Under the influence of the Bolsheviks, the Council of 
Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies of Cronstadt had by a 
vote of 210 to 40 decided to take all power into its own 
hands and to repudiate the Provisional Government. 
The local representatives of the Government had been 
dismissed and replaced by the Council's own appointees. 
In order to keep in touch with the rest of the country the 
Cronstadt Council had opened communications with the 
Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. 



President Wilson appointed a Commission to visit 
Russia of which Honorable Elihu Root was Chairman. 
The other members were General Hngh Scott, Admiral 
Glennon, Charles R. Crane, present Minister to China, 
James H. Dnncan, Vice-President of the American Fed- 
eration of Labor, S. R. Bertron, John R. Mott, Executive 
Secretary of the Young Men's Christian Association, 
and Charles E. Russell, at one time Socialist candidate 
for President. 

Upon the arrival of this Commission at Vladivostok 
there was a hostile demonstration on the part of some 
unfriendly spirits, at the instigation of Russians living 
on the East Side of New York City, but it was sup- 
pressed and the Commission proceeded upon its way. 
When it arrived in Petrograd I met it at the station and 
escorted it to the Winter Palace, where provision had 
been made for its accommodation and where the Com- 
missioners were the guests of the Provisional Govern- 
ment during their stay in Russia. The Ministry held a 
special session to receive the Commission, which I had 
the honor of introducing. In the presentation of the 
Commission to the Ministry I said among other things 
that the Commission represented all the interests in our 
country, and had come for the purpose of welcoming 
Russia to the sisterhood of republics, furthermore, that 
the Commission was composed of men eminent in 
America, who were serving without compensation, and 
who had left their avocations at great personal sacrifice ; 



that they represented a country whose institutions were 
based upon the great principle that all just powers c2 
government are derived from the consent of the 
governed, and whose superstructure was universal edu- 
cation, and the crowning arch equality of opportunity. 

Chairman Root spoke eloquently on behalf of the Com- 
mission, and to him Minister Terestchenko made a fit- 
ting reply. The Commission remained in Petrograd 
about six weeks, visiting Moscow in the meantime, and 
General Scott went to the front, while Admiral Glennon 
reviewed the Black Sea Fleet. 

I entertained the members of the Commission at lun- 
cheons and dinners, inviting to meet them at one time 
Rodzianko, at another time Miliukoff; Kerensky, who 
was then Minister of War and Minister of Marine also, 
was invited to meet General Scott and Admiral Glen- 
non. Messrs. Mott and Bertron lunched or dined at the 
American Embassy, and had long talks with the Minis- 
ters of Commerce and Industry. Messrs. Duncan and 
Russell had discussions at the American Embassy on 
several occasions with Tchernov, who was Minister of 
Labor. The American Society of Petrograd honored the 
Commission by giving it a dinner on July 4th in celebra- 
tion of our Independence Day and Minister Terestchenko 
gave visiting Americans an elaborate luncheon at the 
Department of Foreign Affairs. 

The Commission took its departure from Petrograd 
on the 8th of July, 1917, just nine days before the July 
Revolution, which attempted to overthrow the Provi- 
sional Government. Felicitations between the Commis- 
sion and the Provisional Government were hearty and 

The Commission in parting jointly and severally 
expressed their gratitude to the American Ambassador, 
complimenting him on his relations with the Provisional 


Government, and his standing with the Russian people, 
which they attributed to the opportune recognition of the 
Provisional Government by our Government. 

I had recommended the sending of a railway commis- 
sion to Russia. The Allied Missions of England, France 
and Italy by agreement had assigned the transportation 
systems of the Provisional Government to the American 
Ambassador. When I was advised of the commission 
appointments, I was pleased to hear that so eminent an 
engineer as John F. Stevens had been named as its head. 
The State Department had cabled me that Mr. Stevens 
would be appointed Chairman if I did not object, to 
which cable I made prompt reply that if I had had the 
selection of a chairman I did not know of any man I 
would have preferred to Mr. Stevens. I knew Mr. Ste- 
vens personally and esteemed him highly. The other mem- 
bers of the Commission were : George Gibbs, a mechan- 
ical engineer of experience formerly connected with the 
Pennsylvania Railroad; Henry Miller, who had served 
the "Wabash and made a fine record as General Manager ; 
W. L. Darling, a civil engineer of repute, and John E. 
Greiner, Consulting Engineer of the Baltimore and Ohio. 

The Commission arrived in Vladivostok in June, 1917. 
I sent the Commercial Attache of the Embassy, E. 
Francis Riggs, to meet them, with the following letter 
of greeting: 

"My dear Stevens: I was more than pleased when 
advised by the State Department that you had been des- 
ignated to come to Russia as the head of a commission 
of experts whose mission is to relieve the congestion at 
Vladivostok and to improve generally the transportation 
facilities of the Siberian railway. My understanding is 
that you will be given absolute control at Vladivostok, 
and I hope to have that control extended throughout 
the entire length of the Siberian railway. I have not 


asked the latter at this time because it is impolitic to Co 
so. The railroad engineers of Russia are highly educated 
men and claim to be exceedingly practical. They are 
jealous to a degree of any reflection upon their ability 
and qualifications, and consequently they must be handled 
diplomatically as I know you are capable of doing." 

When the Railroad Commission arrived in Petrograd, 
they reported to me that they had inspected the Trans- 
Siberian and had begun the erection of an assembling 
plant near Vladivostok. I promptly secured quarters for 
the Commission in the Department of Ways and Com- 
munications. Mr. Stevens was taken ill soon after arriv- 
ing in Petrograd and was confined to the hospital for 
about two months. In the meantime, Darling and Greiner 
had left for America, via Sweden. Gibbs departed soon 
after and reported from Vladivostok that the assembling 
plant was making satisfactory progress. I requested 
Mr. Stevens — when he recovered from his illness — and 
Mr. Miller to inspect the Donetz system of railroads. 
They had just completed this work and had reached 
Moscow on their return when the Bolshevik Revolution 
took place. Mr. Stevens wired me from Moscow that 
his mission was completed and that he would await 
further orders at Moscow. This telegram was received 
the Sunday after the Bolshevik Revolution began. I 
replied suggesting that the party remain at Moscow 
until the situation cleared up, or as long as it was safe 
to remain in that city, and then come to Petrograd, where 
I would protect them. I don't know whether Mr. Stevens 
ever received this telegram or not, but I learned from 
other sources that he had attached his private car to 
the Siberian Express bound for Vladivostok. 

In the meantime there had been assembled for Russia, 
in accordance with the request of the Railroad Commis- 
sion, endorsed by myself, a party of over 200, consisting 


of railroad operating men, engineers and interpreters, 
under the command of George Emerson, which planned 
to leave Seattle November 19, 1917. I cabled the Depart- 
ment to allow this party to come on to Russia, stating 
in the cable that I had no confidence in the survival of 
the Soviet Government, but regardless of whether it 
survived or not there would be some government in 
Russia, and that that country, which was our ally in the 
war, would accept gladly whatever assistance we could 
render in its transportation. I did not calculate on Rus- 
sia agreeing to an armistice and signing the Brest-Litovsk 
Peace which resulted in Russia withdrawing from the 

These railroad men did arrive in Vladivostok and there 
met Mr. Stevens. There were frequent changes in the 
Department of "Ways and Communications under the 
Bolsheviks, but I had made the acquaintance of several 
subordinates in this department, with whom I kept in 
close touch. The railroad men after landing in Vladi- 
vostok, concluded to reembark and go to Nagasaki, Japan, 
where they remained some months. 

"When at Vologda, I wired Mr. Stevens to send me 
twenty railroad engineers, and cabled the Department 
of State that I had so wired. Mr. Stevens promptly 
replied that the instructions would be followed. The 
Department cabled to know what I wished with these 
railroad men, to which inquiry I replied that it was my 
intention to improve the transportation facilities of Rus- 
sia, with a view to assembling all supplies at Archangel 
and Murmansk to prevent the Germans from capturing 
them. The Department seemed satisfied and cabled that 
Emerson was leaving with ten engineers from Harbin, 
via Vladivostok. Mr. Emerson did not arrive at Vladi- 
vostok, however, until the 12th of May, when it was too 


late for them to reach Vologda on account of the fighting 
between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Red Army along the 
line of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. 

The Bolshevik Revolution prevented the consumma- 
tion of the well-laid plans of these railroad experts. 



Lenin and Trotzky had not belonged to the same fac- 
tion of International Socialists, but they soon saw after 
arriving in Russia that they had the same ulterior ob- 
ject, which was world-wide social revolution, and that 
it could be best promoted by their joining forces. Lenin 
was the stronger intellect of the two. Trotzky was the 
abler executive. Lenin led a simple life; Trotzky was 
fond of display and luxury. Whenever the two dis- 
agreed, Lenin dominated because he had the strongei 
will and the greater following. These two men soon 
became the recognized leaders and drove the moderate 
Socialists out of the organizations which they dominated. 
Both believed in " direct action,' ' that is, they scrupled 
at no means by which their ends could be accomplished. 
In other words, they believed in force rather than argu- 
ment. Plekahnov, at whose feet Lenin had imbibed the 
principles of Socialism, also returned to Russia after the 
first Revolution ; he had championed Socialism and inter- 
nationalism, but believed in putting them into practical 
operation by peaceful means, contending that if the peo- 
ple were educated in the principles of Socialism, they 
would all become its supporters. Lenin claimed that the 
education of the masses in Russia was too slow a process. 
He had been the leader of the "Defeatists" at the be- 
ginning of the war, and had advocated the defeat of 
Russia — his own country — as the surest and quickest 
means whereby the Russian Monarchy could be over- 
thrown, and a world-wide revolution promoted. 



Lenin was living in Switzerland when I arrived in 
Fetrograd, but when the Provisional Government, soon 
after its installation, issued a degree pardoning all po- 
litical offenders, whether in prison or in exile, he re- 
turned through Germany in a special car, and immedi- 
ately set to work to demoralize the Russian army. 
Trotzky, who had been banished from France, was eking 
out an impecunious existence on the East Side in New 
York by contributing articles to radical socialistic pub- 
lications. When he attempted to return to Russia the 
steamer upon which he sailed touched at Halifax, and 
Trotzky was taken ashore by force, after refusing to 
obey the commands of the inspection officer and detained 
in Halifax for several weeks. He was later, at the re- 
quest of the Provisional Government, permitted by the 
British Government to proceed on his way to Russia. 

Lenin on arriving in Petrograd immediately began to 
disburse money which was supposedly furnished by Ger- 
many. He was disregarded by the Provisional Govern- 
ment, and for some time the Workingmen 's, Soldiers' 
and Peasants' Deputies denied alliance or cooperation 
with him. Lenin was persistent, however, and gradually 
gained influence with the enemies of the Provisional 

Across the Neva on the Petrograd side was the palace, 
a beautiful structure, of an influential ballet dancer 
named Dschinskaia, who was reputed to have been the 
Emperor's mistress before he married. This palace 
was pointed out to all visitors as having been the gift of 
the Emperor to the dancer. She had subsequently be- 
come the mistress, according to current rumor, of two 
Grand Dukes with royal connections. Her word was 
still law with the ballet, which was subsidized by the 
Imperial Government, and upon rare occasions she par- 
ticipated in its performances. Soon after the Revolu- 


tion she fled from her palace, and it was taken over by 
the Workingman's, Soldiers ' and Peasants' Deputies. 
Just across the street from this palace was the Circus 
Moderne, which had a seating capacity of from 6,000 to 
10,000. In the same neighborhood was the St. Peter and 
Paul Fortress, which continued under the control of the 
Provisional Government. 

The Circus Moderne was the place of assemblage of 
all the radical elements in Petrograd. Here they came 
to listen to orators, whose themes were opposition to the 
government, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the 
division of all property. Lenin took possession of the 
Dschinskaia palace, but at what time or by whose au- 
thority was never known. There was in the corner of 
the grounds a circular pagoda, or band stand, from which 
Lenin and other orators addressed the crowds which 
congregrated day and night. Lenin and Trotzky, whose 
followers were continually increasing in numbers, de- 
cided upon a " peaceful demonstration" on the evening 
of July 16th, 1917. 

So it was that on Monday evening, July 16th, accord- 
ing to the Bolshevik schedule, demonstrations took place 
all over the city. Parades were everywhere formed. 
Thousands of peasant soldiers, for the most part un- 
armed, formed in lines carrying banners — "Let Us Go 
Home and Harvest the Crops Then We'll Fight!" and 
"All Power to the Workingmen's, Soldiers' and Peas- 
ants' Deputies!" — "All Power to the Soviets!" They 
marched by the thousands to the Smolny Institute. There 
were also gathered hundreds of Kronstadt sailors and 
amongst the masses gathered around the buildings of the 
Smolny Institute were three-inch field pieces with cais- 
sons and other equipment. All during the evening 
speeches were made inciting the people against the Gov- 


ernment and turning them to the Soviet by advocating the 
alluring slogans proclaimed on the banners. 

The Government took no active measures against these 
meetings preferring to await the results and then arrest 
the ringleaders. 

The next day, however, the Government finally decided 
to permit no more demonstrations of this character and 
accordingly called upon the Cossacks with armored cars 
to keep the crowds dispersed and prevent such demon- 

Tuesday evening about 7:30 I received a telephone 
call from Frederick Holbrook, of Holbrook, Cabot ft Rol- 
lins, of Boston, saying that there was going to be trouble 
in the city and that he was coming to the Embassy. About 
the time he arrived the trouble began all over the city. 
The fighting nearest the Embassy took place about 300 
yards away on the Liteiny Prospect, when a calvacade of 
Cossacks riding toward Liteiny Bridge across the Neva 
River four blocks from the Embassy, with the intention 
of controlling the bridge and preventing communication 
between the different organized bands of provocateurs 
and agitators met with resistance. When they rushed 
the crowd with their horses, however, the mob broke and 
ran in all directions. But a new and unlooked-for factor 
now showed itself. An automobile truck loaded with 
Kronstadt sailors appeared on the scene with a machine 
gun on the rear, which they turned upon the Cossacks 
and opened fire. They poured a deadly and disastrous 
fire into the ranks of the Cossacks. They were mown 
down without any chance to defend themselves. Horses 
and drivers fell together and, although there was a driv- 
ing rain a half hour afterward when I visited the scene, 
the street was literally and actually running with blood. 
Bodies were scattered for four blocks along the street 
from the bridge to the Kirochnaya, while those respon- 


sible had driven rapidly away with their death-dealin 
machine. What a catastrophe to the Government an 
what shouts of triumph broke exultingly from the Bol- 
shevik leaders when informed of this coup ! Where were 
the armored motor cars of the government? With the 
same speed with which the Bolsheviks had fled after the 
encounter the Government's armored cars, the only real 
aid which might have saved the Cossacks, had been 
rushed to a different section of the city where they 
thought they might be more needed and by the time com- 
munication had been established with them the scene 
was quiet save for the bodies and the blood in the street 
and the ever curious crowds who gathered as always to 
talk and talk and talk. 

Although the government won a technical victory that 
night, as a survey showed that 450 Bolsheviks had paid 
the penalty and about 70 Cossacks, nevertheless it was 
by so close a margin as to presage their ultimate down- 
fall unless new and radical means were adopted. 

While the July Revolution showed the Bolsheviks that 
their time had not quite come, it showed the Government 
that while they were not helpless yet they still were 
being surely undermined ; and it showed the Allied Diplo- 
mats that unless conditions changed and changed radi- 
cally Russia would soon be out of the war with all of the 
uncertainties and dangers which that would mean not 
alone for Russia, but for the world. 

Lenin is believed to have fled to Kronstadt disguised 
as a sailor. Trotzky was arrested the following day 
but was soon freed upon demand of the Soviet. Soon 
after this temporary inconvenience he was allowed to 
proceed with his work of undermining the democratic 
government without hindrance of any kind. 

Following is a statement by Prince LvofT which ap- 



peared in the "Bourse Gazette* ' of July 4th-17th, con- 
cerning this July Revolution : 

"The crisis in the Provisional Government, which de- 
veloped in connection with the Ukrainian question, was 
somewhat unexpected. Certain members of the Provi- 
sional Government supposed that certain misunderstand- 
ings and even disorders might be produced by this ques- 
tion, but at all events not in such an acute form. The 
cause of the crisis is properly not the Ukrainian question. 
This is only the pretext; the cause lies considerably 
deeper. It lies in the difference of the Socialist and 
bourgeois standpoints. Through their resignation from 
the Provisional Government the Cadets added the last 
touch to a sufficiently difficult situation: Owing to their 
resignation the impression is produced that the best 
organized portion of the Bourgeoisie, the spokesmen of 
which are the Cadets, is in opposition to the whole Gov- 
ernment. There cannot be any question of discussing 
the persons who shall take place in the new Ministry. 
The program for immediate action of the new Govern- 
ment must be made clear and only thereafter would it 
be possible to call those individuals. 

* ' Rumors of the entire breaking up of the Provisional 
Government, which are agitating the population, are en- 
tirely unfounded. The Provisional Government, not- 
withstanding the resignation of some of its members 
who belong to the party of national freedom, continues 
to exist. The Provisional Government is animated only 
by its former endeavors to realize all the main lines 
of the Revolution and to bring the country to the Su- 
preme Constituent Assembly which will settle the destiny 
of the country and the people. The agitation among the 
troops and the excesses that have taken place during the 
evening and the night will, I am convinced, cease by 
morning. Entire calm will very soon be restored. The 
majority of the garrison is on the side of the Provisional 
Government, and this is a guarantee that order will 
speedily be reestablished. The armed demonstration of 
military bodies is shameful and sad, and is not the result 
of the resignation of the Cadets from the Provisional 


Government. The immediate cause for these demon- 
strations must be sought in the fermentation produced 
among the troops of Petrograd by the reformation of 
the Regiment of Grenadiers. The crisis of the Provi- 
sional Government will be closed by the formation of a 
new coalition Cabinet." 

During the outbreak some automobiles, armed with 
machine guns, went to the Warsaw station. The soldiers 
sitting in them stated that they had been ordered to ar- 
rest the Minister of War. The soldiers, however, were 
too late. The train which carried the Minister of War 
to the front had left the station fifteen minutes before 
their arrival. 

Other incidents of the Revolution reported by the 
Bourse Gazette were as follows : 

" At 9 :40 p.m. an automobile armed with machine guns, 
with six armed and four unarmed men, drew up to Prince 
LvofFs door. The men demanded the surrender of all 
the Ministers in the apartment, and stated that they 
requisitioned all the automobiles of the Provisional Gov- 
ernment. This information was carried to the Ministers 
in session, Prince Lvoff, Tseretelli, Chernou and Nek- 
rasoff. Tseretelli expressed the desire to speak with 
the men, but while he was going to the door the armed 
automobile disappeared. At ten o'clock the automobile 
reappeared and the Ministers could not be informed of 
it as one of the two automobiles of the Provisional Gov- 
ernment standing by the door was seized and removed. 
It turned out to be the one belonging to Minister Tsere- 
telli. To the porter who said that Tseretelli had asked 
that the motor should not be touched, they answered, 
'One automobile will do for me,' — During the evening 
Bolshevik soldiers requisitioned all the automobiles of 
the members of the Provisional Government, as well as 
all the motors in the garages of the former palace. 

"Late at night the Minister of Justice was informed 
that the printing presses of the Novoe Vremya had 
been seized. The Minister of Justice applied for assist- 


ance to the Commander of Troops, who replied, 'The 
military authorities are powerless to take any meas- 
ures.' " 

Had the Provisional Government at this time ar- 
raigned Lenin and Trotzky and the other Bolshevik 
leaders, tried them for treason and executed them, Eussia 
probably would not have been compelled to go through 
another revolution, would have been spared the reign of 
terror, and the loss from famine and murder of millions 
of her sons and daughters. 

Prince Lvoff resigned from the Presidency of the Pro- 
visional Government shortly after this attempted revo- 
lution. He was not forced out, but broken-hearted and 
in despair over his country's plight, probably on account 
of the failure of his colleagues to mete out due punish- 
ment to Lenin and Trotzky and their like. The govern- 
ment may not have felt that it had the strength to do 
this, or may have feared the effect of executing Lenin 
and Trotzky would be to make martyrs of them and so 
strengthen their hold on their followers. Whatever may 
have been their reasons, I am persuaded now, as I felt 
at the time, that the government showed decided weak- 
ness. In fact, I so expressed myself at the time to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Terestchenko. Drastic ac- 
tion might have precipitated the revolution which took 
place in the following November, but I am convinced in 
the light of subsequent events that whatever the immedi- 
ate result, the consequences of executing Lenin and 
Trotzky would have been of benefit to Eussia in the long 
run and would have produced less unrest than now pre- 
vails throughout the world. The Eussian army was not 
then so demoralized as it became four months later. 
Korniloff and Alexieff and Brousiloff and other brave 
soldiers were then living and the Intelligencia and Bour- 


geoisie had not been so decimated by famine and slaugh- 
ter as they soon were. 

Furthermore, I doubt whether two more as strong 
characters as Lenin and Trotzky could have been found 
among the Bolsheviks of the entire world. 



Even though Lenin and Trotzky and their fellow con- 
spirators had not been shot as traitors as they should 
have been, Lenin was a fugitive and was supposed to have 
fled to the ever-ready protection of Germany while 
Trotzky was under arrest. The Provisional Government 
had asserted itself even though all too feebly, had put 
down open insurrection, and restored a semblance of 
order. The most reassuring act of the Ministry, at least 
in my view, was the appointment of General KornilofT 
as Commander-in-Chief of all the Russian forces. He 
immediately began to restore discipline. 

On August 7th, 1917, I wrote to Charles K. Moser, 
American Consul at Harbin, China, a letter in which I 
commented on the new government in these terms : 

"It is a Coalition Government in which all political 
parties are represented. Kerensky in addition to being 
President is also Minister of War, but under him Savin- 
kofr" is the Executive Head of the War Department and 
Lebedev is Executive Head of the Navy. Nekrasoff is 
nominal Minister of Finance, but the Director of the 
Department is Bernatsky, a University Professor, and 
the Assistant Minister is a practical banker named Glas- 
berg, a Jew of good standing. So that there are fifteen 
Ministers and three additional executives. Kerensky, 
Nekrasoff and Terestchenko are all supposed to repre- 
sent no parties. Of the remaining fifteen three are Social 
Democrats, four are Social Eevolutionists, two are Na- 



tional Socialists, four are Cadets and two are Radical 
Democrats. I have not the time to explain the difference 
between these parties — don't think I could if I had the 
time. Of the fifteen Ministers, however, nine are Social- 
ists and six are non-Socialists. 

" Lenin is now a fugitive and is supposed to he in Ger- 
many. The Bolsheviks gave a so-called 'peaceful demon- 
stration of power' July 16th and 17th on the streets of 
Petrograd in which four hundred people were reported 
killed, of which seventy were Cossacks, but exactly the 
number of casualties has never been ascertained. The 
Bolsheviks are now in great disfavor, and their leaders 
are being arrested — one, Trotzky, was arrested yester- 
day; he was an exiled Russian Jew, who returned from 
America two or three months ago and immediately set 
his mouth going since which it has never ceased to oper- 
ate. If we could keep such men in America they could 
be handled much better than they can be in Russia at the 
present time. Tseretelli, a well-poised Socialist who 
has been in the Ministry, has resigned and it is feared 
will be the leader of the Workingmen's and Soldiers' 
and Peasants ' Deputies who are likely to oppose the new 

"Kerensky is unquestionably the most influential man 
in Russia; some of his own people say he has it in mind 
to be a second Napoleon, consequently effort is being 
made to undermine him. He is only 34 years of age and 
if his head is not turned by the adulation he is receiving 
he is indeed a wonderful man. He is now living in the 
Winter Palace and sleeping in the bed of Alexander the 
Third, which is not good politically to say the least. He 
addressed last night the all-Russian Congress of Peas- 
ants and when he told them he was appointed their 
President as Minister of the Interior they applauded him 
vigorously. Then he said: "I continue as President or 


The writing across the picture reads in translation: "In memory of friendly 
conversations through bright but difficult days" 


Premier of the Government," whereupon the applause 
was terrific. I will make no prophecies concerning the 
future, which is uncertain. In Russia now it is presump- 
tion to prophesy in the forenoon what will occur in the 

"Food is very scarce here and if at any time you can 
find a man who will bring me fifty pounds of breakfast 
bacon I would appreciate it and will promptly remit you 
not only the cost but will send you a souvenir in addition 
if you will tell me what there is in Petrograd you would 
like to have — always provided it is obtainable, as most 
of the stores here now are closed and those remaining 
open have very depleted stocks." 

In a long letter written to my son David a week later, 
which was really a diary of four or five weeks of this 
critical period, I said: 

' ' The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Terestchenko, told 
me on his return from the front a few days ago, when 
I asked him about General Korniloff, the new Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, some most ab- 
sorbing experiences of his. General Korniloff is a Cos- 
sack, a man of about 50 years of age, rather small of 
stature and not robust in appearance but with an iron 
constitution. He speaks seventeen languages and is thus 
able to address each division and brigade and even each 
regiment in its own tongue. This makes him exceedingly 
popular. The Cossacks follow him around and are ever 
on the alert to protect him against possible danger or to 
do whatever they think will please him. If his constitu- 
tion is iron, his will is steel. Soon after taking command 
he had one hundred deserters shot and their bodies stood 
up by the roadside with a placard on each reading, "I 
was shot because I ran away from the enemy and was 
a traitor to Russia.' When advised that several Ger- 
man and Austrian officers had surrendered, his suspi- 


cions were aroused and he ordered their knapsacks and 
effects searched. Literature in Russian was found, 
which had been printed in Germany, and advocating a 
separate peace along the lines of Bolshevik preachments 
which were demoralizing the army and which had for 
many weeks disturbed Petrograd and other cities 
throughout Russia. He ordered all of those officers shot 
and had their bodies stood up by the roadside also. Gen- 
eral Korniloff was wounded in 1915 and taken a prisoner 
by the Austrians. When he recovered he put on the uni- 
form of a private Austrian soldier and escaped. He 
walked 800 versts, about 600 miles. His linguistic accom- 
plishments enabled him to talk to all the people whom 
he encountered in their own tongue. One night when he 
was being guided by an * Austrian shepherd they both 
climbed a tree while a company of cavalry was passing. 
The shepherd showed General Korniloff a circular in 
the shepherd's language describing Korniloff, stating he 
had escaped from an Austrian prison, and offering fifty 
thousand Austrian crowns for his capture. The shep- 
herd said that he would like very much to capture Gen- 
eral Korniloff and get the fifty thousand crowns. 

1 i I met General Korniloff the day he resigned the com- 
mand of the Petrograd Military District, of which he 
had been in charge since the first day of the Revolution. 
He told me in English that he did not like his position and 
was going to resign to go to the front. The papers next 
morning stated he had resigned. Upon going to the 
front he was given command of a brigade, but rapidly 
rose to be a divisional commander then a corps com- 
mander, next an army commander, and finally to be the 
Commander-in-Chief of all the Russian forces, which 
number at least ten million men. Russia has called into 
service over sixteen million men, but three or four mil- 


lion of them have been killed, are in hospitals or have 

"There was a meeting yesterday afternoon at the 
Narodni Dom, the largest auditorium in Petrograd. All 
of the Ambassadors were invited to take loges, but the 
Japanese Ambassador and myself were the only ones 
in attendance. I arrived accompanied by my Naval At- 
tache, Commander Crossley, an hour or more after the 
exercises had begun and after Kerensky had spoken from 
his loge. After some difficulty experienced by the Rus- 
sian officer who conducted me, I was shown to mine, 
whereupon Kerensky saluted me, and immediately came 
in a white uniform, with his aide, from his loge to mine 
and thanked me for attending. Very few in the immense 
audience knew me, but all of them knew Kerensky and 
when he pointedly made his way through the crowd to 
greet me the curiosity of the audience was aroused as 
to my identity. Kerensky only remained a few minutes 
and then left the building. Some minutes later Miliu- 
kofr* was called to the platform, and made in Russian 
what I was told was an eloquent speech. During his 
talk he alluded to America's part in the war and pointed 
to the American Ambassador, whereupon there was great 
applause, the entire audience rising and continuing the 
ovation for several minutes. I arose and acknowledged 
the compliment and bowed but made no speech. There 
was a call for the American hymn but the band was com- 
pelled to admit it knew no distinctive American air. . . . 

' ' Mrs. Pankhurst, the English Suffragist, came to Pet- 
rograd about five or six weeks ago not for the purpose 
of fighting for votes for women, as suffrage had already 
been thrust upon the Russian women without any effort 
or expressed desire on their part, but for the purpose of 
counteracting the Bolshevik or separate peace influence 
and to infuse some courage into the Russian army which 


had been threatening to cease fighting and was opening 
debating societies not only at every front but in every 
division and brigade, and even in every regiment. Mrs. 
Pankhurst held a meeting at Hotel Astoria, where she 
was stopping, which was presided over by Mrs. McAl- 
lister Smith, an American lady who had interested Lady 
Georgina Buchanan, the wife of the British Ambassador ; 
Mrs. Butler Wright, the wife of my Counselor, and sev- 
eral other ladies. I attended the meeting as did the 
Italian Ambassador and the Roumanian Minister. Mrs. 
Pankhurst was talking when I entered the room and 
quietly took a seat in the audience. I soon became inter- 
ested in her remarks which were extremely sensible, be- 
ing attracted by the intonations of her voice, by her easy 
delivery and most of all by her excellent choice of words. 
"Several days before the formation of the Coalition 
Ministry Mrs. Pankhurst, assisted by Mme. D. C, a Rus- 
sian lady (I would give her name but as she is still in 
Petrograd it might cause her trouble), obtained an audi- 
ence with Kerensky — Mrs. Pankhurst had requested me 
through a third party to secure this audience but I in- 
quired why she did not have her own Ambassador do it 
and was told that she had asked Sir George Buchanan to 
secure the audience but he had refused, whereupon I 
declined also. Immediately after the audience this Rus- 
sian lady came to the American Embassy and in a very 
nervous and excited manner, told me that Kerensky, in 
talking to herself and Mrs. P. (who could understand no 
Russian and K. could speak no English and very indif- 
ferent French), threatened to resign and she feared he 
would and become the leader of the Bolsheviks ; that he 
said he would resign and let some one act who loved Rus- 
sia more than he, if they could find any one. I asked my 
informant what she wished me to do. She replied : * ' Send 
for Miliukoff . ' ' I said he had no influence with Kerensky 


by whom he was forced out of the Ministry ; she replied 
that she was aware of that, but that at an informal meet- 
ing of Duma members, MiliukofT had valiantly and ably 
defended Kerensky. I thereupon agreed to telephone 
MiliukofT and ask him to come to the American Embassy. 
He came and I related to him what I had heard and told 
him the source of my information; he listened atten- 
tively and after remarking that he was going to Moscow 
at 7:30 p.m. that evening (it was 6 p.m. when I was 
talking to him), he said he was not surprised at my 
narrative, as K. had arrived at the parting of the ways, 
and that if he remained as President of the Council of 
Ministers he must break with his old associates, and he 
was in consequence nervous and overwrought. I asked 
him if K. should resign who would form the ministry. 
He replied that K. was the only man to select a cabinet 
and the only one who could save Russia from a Bolshevik 
government. I mentioned NekrasofT who was Vice- 
President of the Ministry, and Terestchenko Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, and Tseretelli a member of the Ministry, 
and holding the portfolio of the Interior, I think, and 
Tchernof, Minister of Labor, but he said no one of those 
could cope with Lenin and Trotzky. "Well," I said to 
him, "you must postpone your Moscow trip and attend 
the meeting at the Winter Palace tonight. ' ' Whereupon 
M. consented to do so ; in my judgment he was the real 
leader of the First Revolution, as I have said heretofore, 
and a sincere and zealous lover of Russia. 

"MiliukofT left the Embassy about 6:30. I went 
to the Foreign Office at 7, according to appoint- 
ment with Terestchenko, and upon arrival was told that 
Kerensky had resigned about an hour and a half pre- 
vious, and that the Council of Ministers would meet at 
9 o'clock to act upon his resignation. The resignation 
was presented, and the Council of Ministers decided to 


call a conference of the leaders of all parties to confer 
about the situation. This meeting assembled in the 
Winter Palace about midnight and continued in session 
until 7 :30 the next morning. Miliukoff was present and 
spoke several times — in fact seemed to be the guiding 
spirit of the meeting. The outcome assumed no definite 
shape but resulted in Kerensky being appealed to to 
form a new Ministry. In the meantime Kerensky had 
left the city and only a few of his closest friends knew 
where he had gone or when he would return, if at all. 
By this time it was the morning of Saturday, August 
4th. Kerensky returned to the city Sunday morning 
and began the formation of a new Ministry which was 
perfected about 4 p. m., Monday, August 6th, and an- 
nounced in the papers the next morning. That is the 
present Ministry which met with general favor and has 
been growing in strength from that day to this. Having 
confidence in this Ministry, I have recommended to my 
Government that an additional credit of sixty million 
dollars be extended to Russia. 

"It is impossible to tell to what extent this course of 
events was affected by the interview of Mrs. Pank- 
hurst and this Russian lady with Kerensky. If, however, 
I had not seen Miliukoff he would probably have gone to 
Moscow as he had planned ; Kerensky might possibly in 
that case have declined to form a Ministry and another 
less able and less worthy Government might have come 
into power/ ' 

It may be admissible to add here a few observations 
which I made in a letter written about this time in regard 
to the effect which it seemed to me the war was bound 
to have upon the position of women and of labor and in 
class distinctions. Obviously whatever interest these 
observations may have is derived chiefly from the fact 
that they were made in 1917 rather than in 1919. I said: 



"The experience of the past two and one-half years 
in the countries engaged in war has taught them many 
lessons valuable indeed, although in some instances very 
costly. I think this war has done more for woman than 
anything which has occurred since the birth of Christ. 
The teachings of the lowly Nazarene did more for woman 
than had ever been done in the history of the world up 
to that time. The demonstration made by woman of her 
ability to aid her country in difficulty and strife and in 
accomplishing a worthy end has been demonstrated in 
this war and hereafter whatever kind of peace may b.e 
negotiated, woman will be given more consideration and 
will be a more potential factor not only in the affairs 
and development of the government to which she owes 
fealty but in international affairs also. Woman has not 
had a position anywhere in the world that will compare 
with that which has been accorded her in America and 
in England. In Russia heretofore women have been 
treated as chattels merely, while in Germany they have 
been looked upon almost as beasts of burden, who were 
compelled to do not only common labor but the lowest 
forms of such labor and at times were obliged to work 
side by side with the dogs. 

"In the next place I think another result of this war 
will be to dignify labor of all kinds ; every country has 
had to reckon with the labor interests whose rights as 
human beings many people have been disposed to ignore. 
In my judgment also another effect will be the abolition 
of class distinctions in countries where such distinctions 
still exist. There have fortunately never been any titles 
of nobility in America; Jefferson prevented that by his 
fight against the law of primogeniture, but they have 
survived in most European countries, and are not only 
a great injustice to all children after the first but pre- 


serve classes of nobility, the representatives of which 
are by no means always worthy of the preeminence and 
good fortune that falls to their lot. After this war every 
man and every woman must by service show why he or 
she is given the privilege of living." 



Not long after the formation of the Coalition Ministry 
there were two Congresses held at Moscow — one the All- 
Russian Cossack Congress and the other the All-Russian 
Congress of Soldiers and Workmen. 

When I mentioned these approaching Congresses to 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Terestchenko he said they 
would result in nothing except talk, but that the Govern- 
ment had nothing to fear from them. The forecast of 
the Minister seems to have been correct as far as it went, 
as indicated by the following comments on the Con- 
gresses and attendant conditions in Moscow received by 
me from Consul-General Summers at the time: 

"The political situation here is interesting. General 
Korniloff arrived yesterday and there is much guessing 
at what he will do. The speech of Kerensky seems to 
have fallen flat, as he laid out no program nor did he 
make any new declarations. There was absolutely no 
disorder, and the local papers content themselves with 
giving the speeches of the orators. Only Korniloff 's 
arrival appeared to interest the public. He was preceded 
through the main streets with an escort of twenty or 
thirty automobiles full of picturesque Cossacks and of- 
ficers of the St. George Cavaliers. He was applauded 
everywhere. All day the streets were crowded with well- 
groomed soldiers and officers of the St. George Cavaliers. 
They were shown sympathy everywhere. 

i l There can be no cooperation with the radical element 
on the part of the intelligencia of the country as long 



as all rights and opinions are trampled down. A man 
is not going to give up without a struggle all that he has 
and for which he has labored. There can be no coopera- 
tion between two parties one of which is doing its level 
best to destroy instead of construct all that stands for 
liberty, freedom and rights of men. Nor can there be 
any hope for a party which stands, for a moment, and 
more particularly at the present time, for any semblance 
of anarchism or insubordination. Who is it that is giv- 
ing their lives at the present to their country? It is the 
body of officers constituting the conservative, patriotic 
backbone of the country, and not the anarchist who seems 
to have the upper hand at Petrograd. There is a wave 
of disgust at the manner in which the Government has 
been conducted up to the present, and to the incompe- 
tency and insincerity of the radical cabinets. This feel- 
ing is rapidly growing and is penetrating all soberly 
thinking people who do not now hesitate to organize 
against a further continuance of such comedies as have 
been pulled off at Petrograd. The Moscow people have 
received the conference with a coldness to be expected. 
The papers give the speeches of the politicians without 
a remark. The people themselves consider that the 
Moscow industrial and conservative element only can 
save the situation. They have no patience with empty 
words and misgovernments. 

"The foreign newspaper correspondents are of the 
opinion that the conferences have fallen flat and that the 
situation is just what it was before, or even more serious, 
as nothing has been done in the way of laying down a 
program. The Council of Workmen and Soldiers re- 
mained seated when the General-in-Chief of the Army 
arose to speak. This is considered here as a challenge 
to the military code of discipline. 

"Miliukoff's speech was not considered what it might 


have been or what the excited feelings of his party might 
have led one to believe that he would make. Korniloff 's 
speech also was not considered as containing a challenge. 
There was, in summing up the whole matter, nothing 
done of any importance, each side only feebly declaring 
what a terrible state the country was in without giving 
the sick man any medicine. Moreover, as a Russian said 
to me this morning, it was a case where the sick man 
was being attended by disagreeing doctors. Woe to him, 
especially as the doctors are young and inexperienced 
in their profession." 

Although both Congresses passed resolutions endors- 
ing the Government these resolutions were so restrained 
and were carried with such lack of enthusiasm as to 
amount to * ' damning by faint praise. ' ' 

The outlook in Russia at this time was indeed dark 
and had been growing steadily worse for several months. 
There was fraternization and mutiny at the front with 
strikes, pillage, robbery and famine in the rear. As if 
the situation was not in all conscience bad enough a tragic 
break between General Korniloff and Premier Kerensky, 
the two main pillars, upon whom what hope there was 
left for the salvation of Russia rested, occurred a few 
weeks later. By this added complication this stricken 
country was simultaneously threatened by ruthless for- 
eign invasion, smoldering internal revolution and open 
civil war. 

I have subsequently learned that the Kerensky-Korni- 
loff break occurred in the following manner : V. N. Lvoff , 
former Procurator of the Holy Synod (who should not be 
confused with Prince Lvoff, former President of the 
Ministry), after several conversations with Kerensky, 
went to General Korniloff and proposed to him that he 
and Kerensky combine against the constantly and alarm- 


ingly growing power of the Bolsheviks, who were work- 
ing through the Council of Workmen's, Soldiers' and 
Peasants ' Deputies. While Lvofr* did not specifically state 
to Kornilofr* that he represented Kerensky it is never- 
theless probable that he allowed him to gain that impres- 
sion. As a matter of fact, Kerensky had not authorized 
him to represent him, or to make such a proposal. He 
was acting entirely on his own responsibility. General 
Kornilofr' replied that he would enter into such an under- 
taking with Kerensky provided he, Kornilofr', were placed 
at the head of the Government; that he would have no 
objection to Kerensky occupying his former post as Min- 
ister of Justice or to Savinkov being Minister of War. 

Kerensky, amazed at this sweeping proposal, which 
came without warning or provocation as far as he was 
aware, called General Korniloff on the long distance 
telephone at his Military Headquarters and inquired 
whether Lvofr* was his representative and authorized 
by him to make the proposal he had just made. Korni- 
lofr* without even taking the precaution to ask Kerensky 
to state the proposal made by Lvofr* replied in the affirm- 
ative. Kerensky, his pride wounded and greatly incensed, 
ordered Lvofr* placed under arrest and notified General 
Kornilofr* that he was relieved of his command and should 
regard himself as under arrest. Kornilofr*, enraged at 
this reception of his reply to the proposal which, as he 
believed, had been sent him by Kerensky, retaliated by 
issuing a proclamation in which he announced his inten- 
tion of marching his army against Petrograd and seizing 
the governmental power. 

This action had the effect of leading Kerensky to turn 
to the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies for the support 
of his threatened Government and led him to make his 
final and fatal blunder of distributing arms and ammu- 
nition to the workingmen of Petrograd, in order that 


they might help to defend his tottering regime against 
Korniloff and his advancing army. In other words, he 
found himself in the predicament where he had to arm 
one group of virtual enemies of his Government in order 
to prevent its overthrow by another and more imme- 
diately threatening hostile group. After things had been 
brought to this pass the position of the Kerensky Govern- 
ment was hopeless. Its overthrow was only a matter of 
time. Had Lvoff been a wise and strong man instead of 
the meddlesome rattle-brain that he was, and had Keren- 
sky been big enough to place his country's welfare above 
his own pride and seek some middle ground upon which 
he and Korniloff might have worked against the Bol- 
sheviks — their common enemies — they might between 
them have rescued Russia and the world from the curse 
of Bolshevism; and have given the Constituent Assembly, 
the time for convening of which had already been fixed, 
a chance to establish a government based upon the con- 
sent of the governed, instead of upon force as was the 
Czar 's government, and as is that of Lenin and Trotzky. 
In the conferences held by the Allied Ambassadors in 
1 ef erence to the Kerensky-Korniloff embroglio I steadily 
maintained, and succeeded in persuading my fellow 
diplomats to accept my view, that we should preserve a 
neutral attitude. I argued that should Korniloff be suc- 
cessful it would not mean a restoration of the Monarchy, 
but merely a new administration and a more vigorous 
prosecution of the war. If, on the other hand, as I said 
in my letter to Judge Priest, Russia should be forced 
out of the war through Kerensky ? s failure to restore 
discipline in the army, the Allied diplomats would re- 
ceive and deserve severe censure for having aided Ker- 
ensky to eliminate Korniloff. If, on the contrary, we 
were to support Korniloff and he should fail we would 


obviously find ourselves in an impossible position with 
relation to the Kerensky Government. 

In a letter written at the time to Judge Henry S. 
Priest, of St. Louis, I commented thus on the situation : 

"We are now in the midst of a counter-revolution 
which appears to have failed. By counter-revolution I 
do not mean a restoration of the monarchy but the re- 
action against the present Provisional Government which 
many think is Socialistic in its spirit if not in its policies. 
General Korniloff who has been Commander-in-Chief for 
about two months past made demands of the Provisional 
Government for powers which were not granted him 
although they should have been as they were essential 
to the restoration of discipline among the soldiers who 
are still maintaining committees and * commissaires, ' 
as they are called, who interfered with the orders of the 
Commander-in-Chief and with the sentences of courts- 
martial. You would inveigh against these conditions 
if you were in my place much more vigorously than I 
have, and I am feeling to-night as if some expressions 
I have made to the Government within the past few days 
might possibly result in my being looked upon as per- 
sona non grata. Being over six thousand miles away 
from Washington with very irregular cable connection 
and most unreliable and uncertain mail communication 
I am often compelled to act solely upon my own judg- 
ment. I always cable to the Government what I have 
done but sometimes act without instructions. 

"To-day at a meeting in the Foreign Office of the 
British, Italian, French and American Ambassadors with 
Terestchenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs, I took issue 
on a matter concerning which the four others agreed, 
but requested the British Ambassador, as Dean of the 
Diplomatic Corps, to call a meeting of the Allied repre- 
sentatives or the heads of Missions representing the 


governments of the Entente. They are eleven in num- 
ber and had met last Monday afternoon and agreed upon 
an expression of their views and a tender of their serv- 
ices to the Government in its controversy with General 
KornilofT. The British Ambassador presented this ex- 
pression to the Foreign Office and phoned me about noon 
yesterday that it would be given to the afternoon papers. 
It did not appear and at 9 :30 p. m. I received an auto- 
graph note from the British Ambassador that the Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs had concluded not to publish 
the action of the Allied representatives because such 
action put General KornilofT on a 'par with the Govern- 
ment, ' but that he would publish a statement in the 
morning papers giving our position and our efforts 'to 
clear the situation.' When I reached the Foreign Office 
at 12 :30 to-day I found those three Ambassadors in con- 
ference with the Ministers and learned they had agreed 
upon a statement for the press in which they wished 
my concurrence. It was in French and, although I under- 
stood it, I told them I wished to consider it before giving 
assent to its publication, and suggested to the British 
Ambassador that he should call another meeting of the 
eleven Allied representatives by whom the expression 
of the Allies was originally framed. By this time it was 
after one o'clock and the British Ambassador asked me 
if I could attend a meeting at half past two. I replied 
that I could attend immediately, but he said that he must 
have his luncheon (English, wasn't it?). I went to the 
British Embassy at 2 :30 p. m. and found there only the 
British, Italian and French Ambassadors and upon in- 
quiry was told that no others had been invited. I then 
stated my position, which was that we should insist upon 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs giving to the press the 
expression originally framed by the Allied representa- 
tives. I was met with the argument that these are the 


days of censorship and that if the Russian Government 
refused to give our statement to the press we should 
have no redress. I replied that we could have in any 
case the satisfaction of stating our views, and by this 
and other arguments finally induced my colleagues to 
insist upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs giving to the 
press the conclusions of the Monday meeting, omitting 
merely the word ' mediation' which did not lessen or 
impair the force of the statement. Sir George Buchanan 
said he would call upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and ask the publication of the original statement. We 
also instructed Sir George to inform the Minister that 
if he did not give out this statement for publication we 

"My objection to being misrepresented in addition to 
the principles involved was that the statement which 
Terestchenko wished to give out concerning our action 
placed us in the position of aiding the Provisional Gov- 
ernment to suppress Korniloff, which we had not done. 

' * Korniloff phoned at 3 :30 this morning that he would 
surrender, consequently the Provisional Government is 
stronger than it was before. If, however, it does not 
immediately restore discipline in the army, Russia 's part 
in this war will be henceforth ineffective and in fact ab- 
solutely futile. In such event the causes leading to such 
condition will become known and will be viewed with a 
critical eye. If the Allied representatives should permit 
the impression that they aided the defeat of Korniloff 
to prevail they would receive and merit severe censure. 
I used these and other arguments with my colleagues 
to-day, and although the position taken may produce 
strained relations with the Kerensky Government, I pre- 
fer such situation to the credit of aiding the Provisional 
Government to condemn as a traitor, and perhaps to 
convict, a brave soldier and patriot whose mistake was 


making demands before public sentiment was sufficiently 
strong in their favor to force their acceptance. 

"I have not yet lost all hope for Russia, as the Pro- 
visional Government can still save the situation if it 
takes prompt and decisive steps to restore the discipline 
of the army and navy. I remained with the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs to-day after my colleagues had left 
and had with him a very plain talk. In answer to his 
statement that Russia or any sovereignty would object 
to the interference of any outside governments in their 
internal affairs I stated that while such a position would 
be tenable under ordinary circumstances the situation 
in Russia at this time is peculiar. Russia is one of a 
number of Allies who are fighting a common enemy and 
Russia is asking and receiving very material assistance. 
I furthermore stated that I felt the responsibility of 
keeping my Government advised concerning the condi- 
tions in the country to which I am accredited and of giv- 
ing my best judgment as to the proper policy to pursue. 

' 'It is unnecessary, however, to tire you any longer 
with this narrative, as I have just received a note from 
the British Ambassador saying that the Minister has 
complied with our request and given to the press for 
publication to-morrow morning the exact expression 
formulated by the Allied representatives September 

In a letter written my son Perry the next day, I said : 

"By a telephone talk with Terestchenko, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, I learn that the report received an 
hour ago of an agreement between the Government and 
General Korniloff is untrue. The Minister claims that 
a division ordered by General Korniloff to attack Petro- 
grad has abandoned the General and is giving allegiance 
to the Government. My Military and Naval Attaches 
contend, however, that Korniloff will undoubtedly domi- 


nate the situation. The Provisional Government ha a 
been weak in that it has failed to restore discipline in the 
army and has given too much license to the ultra-Social- 
istic sentiment whose champions are called 'Bolshe- 
viks/ " 

I further commented upon this complicated situation 
in a letter written at the time to American Consul Mosher 
at Harbin, China, in which I said : 

"The air is full of rumors and general fear is enter- 
tained of a Bolshevik outbreak. The British Embassy 
and Consulate are said to have given notice to all British 
subjects to leave Russia. It is also reported that the 
Scandinavian Legations have given all of their subjects 
advice to do likewise. Many Americans are frightened 
and that condition prevails somewhat in the Embassy 
and in the Consulate also. I do not partake of it in the 
slightest degree, as I feel no concern about my personal 
safety, nor do I anticipate that the Embassy itself will 
be attacked. In compliance with the repeated appeals 
of some members of the Embassy Staff, and of other 
members of the Colony, I have, however, chartered a 
small steamboat upon which Americans who so desire 
can take refuge in the event disturbances should occur. 
I shall remain in Petrograd as long as the Government 
does, and perhaps longer, as there is some doubt ex- 
pressed as to the survival of the present Government. 
The failure of General Korniloff 's attempted overthrow 
of the Government has resulted in strengthening Ker- 
ensky, and the appointment of AlexiefT as Commander- 
in-Chief inspires us with hope, however faint it may be, 
that the Provisional Government will make some effort 
to put the army again in fighting condition. At this 
writing General Korniloff is said to be demanding terms 
for the surrender of himself and his Chief of Staff, Lu- 
komsky. The whole situation may be changed to-morrow 


or before night. I was informed by the Foreign Office 
yesterday noon that General Korniloff had phoned at 
3 :30 a. m. on the 12th to know to whom he should sur- 
render. Russia is certainly going through a severe or- 
deal, and if she should go out of the war the whole burden 
of the contest will fall upon the United States and would 
cost untold millions of treasure and probably millions 
of American lives. 

"The movement of General Korniloff resulted in fail- 
ure because it was ill advised, inopportune and was 
against the only recognized constituted authority in 
Russia. General Korniloff's reasoning that the Govern- 
ment was under Bolshevik influence was denied by its 
president, Keren sky, who immediately ordered Korni- 
loff to relinquish command of the army and directed 
Alexieff, his successor, to arrest him. The present status 
is that Korniloff is under arrest awaiting trial. Alexieff 
has resigned and a new Minister of War, Verkhovsky, has 
been installed, whose policy is broad and liberal, and 
whose expressions have convinced the Soviet of his devo- 
tion to the cause of the Revolution and have resulted in 
the lessening of the hold of the Soviet over that large 
portion of the army which was a menace not only to the 
Government but to the preservation of order. After the 
failure of Korniloff this is the only policy that contains 
any hope for the salvation of Russia and her continuance 
in the war. It may be that the Korniloff fiasco was a 
blessing in disguise. Verkhovsky is a young man, 34 
years of age, who was a Lieutenant-Colonel in command 
of the Moscow District when Korniloff defied the Gov- 
ernment and threatened the arrest of all the Ministers. 
Korniloff sent for Verkhovsky and gave him orders to 
that effect, but he defied Korniloff and said that he would 
be loyal to the Provisional Government. Kerensky, who is 
President of the Council of Ministers and Commander- 


in-Chief of the Army, has issued orders putting into 
effect the policies of Verkhovsky. ' ' 

In a letter to Judge Priest already quoted, I said of 
this period: 

"It is my intention to remain in the Embassy and if 
the Russian Government cannot protect me and the resi- 
dence of the representative of the Government which is 
extending such moral and material aid to Russia, then I 
shall defend myself and the property of my country from 
the mob. Don't understand me as meaning that I shall 
go on the street and defy a bloodthirsty pillaging crowd, 
but I shall remain in the Embassy, and if the doors are 
broken in in face of my remonstrance I shall not attempt 
to escape." 

The National Democratic Conference was called to 
meet in Petrograd on December 25th. It was not recog- 
nized by the Government, but Foreign Minister Teres- 
tchenko told me that the Government had no fear of this 
Congress which was called by the Soviet for the purpose 
of forming a Government to administer the affairs of 
Russia pending the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. 

In a letter of September 24th to my friend, Walter 
Williams, of Columbia, Missouri, I said of the then pre- 
vailing conditions : 

"The greatest menace to the present situation is the 
strength of the Bolshevik sentiment which, intoxicated 
with its success (attributable in no small degree to the 
failure of the Korniloff movement), may attempt to over- 
throw the present Provisional Government and admin- 
ister affairs through its own representatives. If such 
condition should eventuate, failure will undoubtedly en- 
sue in a short time, but meanwhile there may be blood- 
shed, of which there has been remarkably little since the 
beginning of the revolution, when taking into considera- 
tion all of the circumstances. Another menace of which 


I have evidence while dictating this letter is the scarcity 
of food in Petrograd; just across the street is a bread 
line of several hundred people, who stand for hours and 
are sometimes told thereafter that the supply is ex- 
hausted. In walking yesterday afternoon we overheard 
a woman whom we passed, and who was talking with con- 
siderable emphasis, say, 'I have asked for bread so often 
and have been refused it that now I am going to demand 
it. ' These manifestations indicate bread riots. There is 
no scarcity of food in Russia but very imperfect, inade- 
quate and insufficient transportation facilities." 

As I said also at the time in a dispatch to the 
Secretary : 

"Food is very difficult to procure here now and is com- 
manding exorbitant figures; in front of the Embassy I 
counted to-day about 200 people in a bread line, many 
of whom after waiting four to six hours were told the 
supply was exhausted. This is one of many such in 
every section of the city. ,, 

About this time hand bills, of which the accompanynig 
is a copy, were widely distributed throughout the city. 
They read: 


"(Free) America wants to execute a Russian emi- 
grant, Revolutionist, Alexander Berkman. All the Sol- 
diers and Workers of Petrograd must attend a Mass 
Meeting which will be held in Circus Moderne on Sun- 
day, September 17th (30th), at 7 p. m., to find out how 
this (free) country deals with its revolutionists." 

"Admittance free." 

I sent a representative to this meeting who made this 
report on what took place : A resolution was passed to 
the following effect : 


" 'The Soldiers and Workers of Petrograd, assembled 
on the 17th of September, at the Circus Moderne, having 
received reports of the state of things in the United 
States, energetically protest against methods of the so- 
called "free" republic of North America in its repres- 
sive measures against true friends of the liberation 
movement, and fighters for the peace of all nations. 

" "The Soldiers and Workers of Petrograd send their 
fraternal greetings to the revolutionists Goldman and 
Berkman and all those who in "free" America fight for 
the social revolution, and they demand in the name of 
free speech and free press, which are supposed now to 
be the foundation of free society, the immediate release 
of our revolutionist friends, and the abolition of all pro- 
vocative measures of the United States Government 
against internationalist measures which remind one of 
the best days of Russian Tsardom. This meeting ad- 
dresses itself to the Council of Workmen and Soldiers 
as well as to the Central Committee of the Councils, re- 
questing it to send effective protest to the American 
authorities against persecution of men and women whose 
only crime is doing in their country, against autocracy, 
what Russian workers have done here against autoc- 
racy. . . ." 

"There were about six thousand present at the meet- 
ing, counting 200 for each of the sixteen sections of the 
amphitheater and 3,000 for the arena. In addition to this 
there were a great many people coming and going, so 
that it would probably not be wrong to say that 8,000 saw 
all or part of the meeting. 

"Shotoff, an anarchist and former agitator in Amer- 
ica, was the chief speaker. 

"I have reason to believe that John Reed brought 
over the story of the proposed execution of Berkman 
(as far-fetched a tale as has ever been made the subject 
of an appeal to the mob). Also that he obtained exclu- 
sion of the Associated Press from the democratic con- 
gress on the ground of their ' capitalistic' character. I 
have also learned that he has been expelled from Eng- 
land and France and from Russia under the old regime. 


"The Kronstadt sailors, 11,000 in number, passed a 
resolution similar to the one above. 

"A petition to request immediate action on the case 
of Berkman will be presented to the Soviet and the 
American Ambassador." 

The John Reed referred to had come to the Embassy 
about a month before this time with a letter of introduc- 
tion from a prominent federal official of New York: 

"New York, August 17, 1917. 
"Dear Mr. Ambassador: 

"I want to present to you my old friends, Mr. and 
Mrs. Jack Reed, both of whom are of the American news- 
paper world and are visiting Russia with a view to 
studying conditions. 

"Any courtesy at any time which you and the gentle- 
men of the Embassy may extend to them will be deeply 
appreciated by, 

"Yours faithfully, 

On October 1st, I sent the following cable to the Secre- 
tary of State in reference to Reed: 

"Sept. 18/Oct. 1, 1917. 



"Reliably informed that John Reed, holder of Ameri- 
can Passport No. , cordially welcomed by Bol- 
sheviks whom he apparently advised of his coming. Lost 
pocketbook soon after arrival which found delivered 
Consulate containing letter from Hillquit introducing 
Reed to Huymans, Secretary of the Stockholm Confer- 

"Think Bolsheviks' information concerning Berkman 
obtained through Reed and William Shotoff. Under- 
stand Reed secured passport upon affidavit was not going 


Stockholm Conference. Presented personal letter to me 

from (a prominent federal official), presenting 

'my old friends, Mr. and Mrs. Jack Reed' and bespeak- 
ing courtesies. Endeavoring to ascertain inspiration of 
Protest Meeting. Shotoff been in America much past 
twenty years. Returned Russia recently is now Secre- 
tary of some Soviet Committee. Please give record of 

The lost pocketbook referred to contained the follow- 
ing letter of endorsement: 

" Stockholm, Sept. 9, 1917. 
"Hellano Scandinavian Socialist Committee, 

"I beg to recommend to you very warmly the citizen 
John Reed, member of the Socialist Party of the United 
States, editor of the socialist publication, New York Call. 
"He is recommended to me especially by the citizen 
Mr. Hillquit, delegate of the United States to the Inter- 
national Socialist Bureau. 

"Secretary of the Stockholm Conference." 

The personal note also contained in the pocketbook 
was addressed to "Dear Sally" and the whole enclosed 

in an envelope addressed to Mrs. , 

Croton-on-Hudson, New York, and read in part: 

"There may be a possibility for me to make money 

here, so tell not to send me any more money 

until I cable, but then to do it quick or whatever else I 
ask him to do with it. I do not think my benefactors 
are going to lose much on this trip of mine." 

After these disclosures I naturally regarded Mr. Reed 
as a suspicious character and had him watched and his 
record and acts investigated. To an agent of mine he 
expressed these views and made these statements: 


"Says — 'He is Socialist. Believes that the Workmen 
can manage the factories themselves. Some works are 
being run by them with a great deal of success. The 
newspapers only mention the failures. Barring the 
Cadets — the Bolsheviks are the only Party with a pro- 
gram. The other factions of the Socialistic Party are 
at sea in regards to a policy and program. Though the 
Russian workman has not reached the same high stand- 
ard of efficiency of the American — he is farther advanced 
in politics and in political thought. ' Says — ' That if the 
workmen were paid in proportion to their labor they 
would get all the profits. Instead of shutting down, the 
works should be compelled to furnish the material, or 
to turn the factories over to the workmen.' Was at the 
all-night session of the Democratic meeting held in the 
Alexander Theater. Seemed to know all about what 
took place there. Says that if the Bolsheviks get control 
of the Government the very first thing they would do 
would be to kick out all the Embassies and all those con- 
nected with them. Vesey's paper (The Russian Daily 
News, printed in English) is liable to be closed any day 
as he is playing up to the American Embassy and in 
favor of the Cadets. The Embassies are interfering too 
much with the internal politics of the country. Men- 
tioned the Marx theory. Apparently knows a great deal 
about all the Socialistic factions here. ,, 

Thus at this time were the American Bolsheviks com- 
ing to the aid of Russian Bolsheviks in their efforts to 
overthrow the democratic government of Russia just as 
now the Russian Bolsheviks are coming to the aid of 
American Bolsheviks, in their efforts to overthrow our 
democratic government. 
In a letter of October 13th to my son Perry, I said: 
"The air is always full of rumors here concerning 
plots of the Bolsheviks, but the outbreaks that are 
prophesied seem never to occur — it is only the unex- 
pected that happens here. I heard a few days ago that 
the Bolsheviks had made a list of people whom they 


intended to kill, and that, while the British Ambassadof 
heads the list, I am not many removes from the top. I 
do not believe this and consequently I am not regulating 
my actions or movements accordingly.' ' 

And in a later letter I observed : 

"The Bolsheviks are said to be armed and organized 
for a demonstration, which means ' shooting up the town ' 
in our western vernacular. I may be in danger but do 
not feel so any more than I did when that mob on the 
Nevsky, with a black flag, was advancing to attack the 
Embassy.' ' 



On October 11th, 0. S., 1917, Kerensky issued this his 
last appeal to the Russian people to support his Govern- 
ment and its policies until the Constituent Assembly 
could be convoked : 

' ' Great confusion has once more been brought into the 
life of our country. In spite of the swift suppression 
of the revolt of General KornilofT, the shocks caused by 
it are threatening the very existence of the Russian 

1 l Waves of anarchy are sweeping over the land, the 
pressure of the foreign enemy is increasing, counter- 
revolutionary elements are raising their heads, hoping 
that the prolonged governmental crisis, coupled with the 
weariness which has seized the entire nation, will enable 
them to murder the freedom of the Russian people. 

" Great, boundless is the responsibility of the Provi- 
sional Government, on whom devolves the historic task 
of bringing Russia to a state where the convocation of 
the Constituent Assembly will be possible. The burden 
of this responsibility is alleviated only by the deep con- 
viction that, united by the common desire to save the 
fatherland and to protect the achievements of the Revo- 
lution, the representatives of all classes of the Russian 
people will understand the necessity for cooperation with 
the Provisional Government in establishing a firm gov- 
ernmental power, capable of realizing the urgent de- 
mands of the country, and bringing it, without further 
upheavals, to the Constituent Assembly, the convocation 
of which, it is the deep conviction of the Provisional 
Government, cannot be postponed for one day. 

"Leaving to the Constituent Assembly, the sovereign 



master of Russia, the final solution of all great questions 
on which the welfare of the Russian people depends, the 
Provisional Government, the personnel of which has now 
been completed, holds that only by carrying out energet- 
ically a series of resolute measures in all spheres of the 
life of the State, will it be able to fulfill its duty and 
satisfy the urgent needs of the nation. 

"In the firm conviction that only a general peace will 
enable our great fatherland to develop all its creative 
forces, the Provisional Government will continue inces- 
santly to develop its active foreign policy in the spirit 
of the democratic principles proclaimed by the Russian 
Revolution. The Revolution has made these principles 
a national possession, its aim being to attain a general 
peace — a peace excluding violence on either side. 

" Acting in complete accord with the Allies, the Pro- 
visional Government will, in the next few days, take 
part in the conference of the Allied Powers. At this 
conference the Provisional Government will be repre- 
sented, among other delegates, by one who particularly 
enjoys the confidence of the democratic organizations. 

"At this conference our representatives, together with 
the solution of common questions and military problems, 
will strive towards an agreement with the Allies on the 
ground of the principles proclaimed by the Russian 

' ' Striving for peace, the Provisional Government will, 
however, use all its forces for the protection of the com- 
mon, Allied cause, for the defense of the country, for 
resolute resistance to any efforts to wrest national terri- 
tory from us and impose the will of any foreign power 
on Russia, and for the repulsion of the enemies ' troops 
from the borders of the fatherland. 

"For the purpose of securing for the revolutionary 
authorities close contact with the organized public forces 
and thus imparting to the Government the necessary 
stability and power, the Provisional Government will in 
the next few days work out and publish a decree estab- 
lishing a Provisional Council of the Republic, which is 
to function until the Constituent Assembly convenes. 
This Council, in which all classes of the population will 


be represented and in which the delegates elected to the 
Democratic Conference will also participate, will be 
given the right of addressing questions to the Govern- 
ment and of securing replies to them in a definite period 
of time, of working out legislative acts and discussing 
all those questions which will be presented for considera- 
tion by the Provisional Government, as well as those 
which will arise on its own initiative. Resting on the 
cooperation of such a council, the Government, preserv- 
ing in accordance with its oath, the unity of the govern- 
mental power created by the Revolution, will regard it 
its duty to consider the great public significance of such 
a council in all its acts up to the time when the Constit- 
uent Assembly will give full and complete representation 
to all classes of the population of Russia. 

"Standing firmly on this program, which expresses 
the hopes of the people, and calling upon all for imme- 
diate and active participation in the preparations for 
the convocation of the Constituent Assembly in the short- 
est period of time, the Provisional Government presumes 
that all citizens of Russia will now rally closely to its 
support for concerted work, in the name of the basic and 
paramount problems of our time, the defense of the 
fatherland from the foreign enemy, the restoration of 
law and order and the leading of the country to the sov- 
ereign Constituent Assembly. 

"A. Kerensky, 
" Prime Minister." 

As if in brazen response to this appeal appeared the 
announcement by the Bolsheviks, Volodarsky and Mani- 
nef, of the formation of a Military Revolutionary Com- 
mittee organized to seize the power of the Government. 

On the 19th of November, 1917, following the down- 
fall of the Provisional Government and upon the usurpa- 
tion of control by the Bolsheviks, I issued this address : 

* i To the People of Russia : 

"I address you because there is no official in the For- 
eign Office with whom I can communicate, and all of the 


members of the government or ministry with which I 
had official relations are inaccessible, being in flight oi 
in prison, according to my best information. 

"When, on March 5th-18th, 1917, six days after your 
memorable revolution began, and three days after the 
Provisional Government was named, and before I had re- 
ceived official notice of its appointment, I cabled to my 
Government earnestly requesting authority to aid the 
revolution by recognizing the new government at a crit- 
ical juncture of its existence. I had no thought that 
within the short period of seven months you would be 
engaged in civil strife as you are to-day, and so divided 
that the liberty for which you had striven and suffered 
for so many generations would be so endangered as it is 
at present. Within four days I received instructions 
from Washington to recognize the Provisional Govern- 
ment, and did so promptly and in the most impressive 
manner I could command, on March 9th-22nd. 

" Fifteen days thereafter (March 20th- April 4th) Presi- 
dent Wilson sent a message to the American Congress, 
recommending that a state of war be declared to exist 
between the United States and the imperial government 
of Germany. That immortal message electrified the peo- 
ple of my country and thrilled the lovers of liberty 
throughout the world — especially in Russia — by its deep- 
ly-moving allusion to the heart of the Russian people. 

i i The Congress promptly responded to the appeal, and 
very soon thereafter I cabled my Government urging the 
extension of a credit of $500,000,000 to Russia, to enable 
her the more vigorously to prosecute the war against 
Germany whose success would mean the loss of the dear- 
ly bought freedom of the Russian people. Up to the 
beginning of the present revolution, credits had been 
extended to Russia to the extent of $256,000,000 by the 
United States Government, and a cable sent by myself 
two days before the beginning of the present revolution 
recommended an additional advance of $100,000,000. 

"Almost immediately, President Wilson appointed a 
diplomatic mission to Russia under the chairmanship of 
Honorable Elihu Root, to express the good will of my 
country, and to extend encouragement to the Russian 


people in the bold stroke they had made for liberty. The 
factories of the United States, subordinating domestic 
needs to the necessities of Russia, at once devoted their 
energies and resources to the manufacture of munitions, 
railroad equipment and other requirements of your 
country. Soon thereafter American Red Cross missions 
were dispatched to Russia and Roumania to minister to 
the sufferings of a people enervated by years of struggle 
and, for this voluntary offering, no compensation or re- 
ward was asked and none is expected. A railway com- 
mission of distinguished experts also came from America 
to Russia to render what assistance they could toward 
improving your transportation facilities, to the end that 
your magnificent food productions might be so distrib- 
uted as to relieve the famine which seemed to prevail in 
some sections. This commission has already achieved 
great results, but its work has hardly begun. 

" America's motives in entering the war and the ob- 
jects thereof have been set forth clearly and impressively 
by President Wilson in his message to Congress, in his 
note to the Provisional Government on the coming of 
the diplomatic mission, in his flag-day speech, in his 
reply to the Pope, and in many other eloquent utter- 
ances, all of which show that my country has entered 
this war desiring and expecting no annexations and no 
indemnities, but has unselfishly assumed a stupendous 
task in the interests of humanity, to enable all peoples 
to dispose of themselves, to make the world safe for 
Democracy. . . • 

"If reports received daily are to be credited, even 
partially, the Russian people are engaged in fratricidal 
strife and are paying no attention to the approach of a 
powerful enemy who is already on Russian soil. There 
is no power whose authority is recognized throughout 
Russia; your industries are neglected and many of your 
people are crying for food. This need can be supplied 
if you will permit the American railway commission to 
continue its helpful work, as there is sufficient food in 
Russia to feed all her people if properly distributed. 
An able and experienced railroad operator is clearing 
from America to-day with three hundred and forty engi- 


neers, skilled mechanics, and operatives, for Vladivostok, 
in accordance with an agreement between the Depart- 
ment of Ways and Communications and the American 
Railway Commission. I have cabled my Government 
urging that your internal conditions be not permitted to 
prevent the coming of this assistance. The men are 
coming to Russia for a temporary stay only and they 
will not take the places of any railroad men now em- 
ployed. Pood conditions or the scarcity of bread is the 
greatest menace confronting you at this time, and 
America is making every effort to improve the situation. 

"I have not lost faith in the ability of the Russian 
people to solve their own problems. On the contrary, 
I believe that your patriotism, your pride, your sense 
of right, and your love of justice will remove the diffi- 
culties that beset your pathway. But the time you have 
therefor is extremely limited. A powerful enemy is at 
your gates. A desperate foe is sowing the seeds of dis- 
sension in your midst. A hostile, unscrupulous, imperial 
government is maintaining a well-organized espionage 
throughout the land. Your liberties are threatened. 
Your beloved land is in danger. Your unapproachable 
resources may pass into unfriendly hands. Eternal vigi- 
lance is required to preserve for your descendants the 
rich heritage you now hold. Neglect of present opportu- 
nity may entail upon your children a commercial slavery 
worse than serfdom. I appeal to you to be watchful of 
your true interests, and I make this appeal on behalf 
of my Government and my people, with whom you have 
ever borne friendly relations, and who cherish a sincere, 
deep interest in your welfare. I make this appeal also 
for myself. I have lived in your midst for more than 
a year and a half. I have studied your character, and 
admire your many excellent traits. I think if you are 
now mindful of your true interests your future will be 
more glorious than your most sanguine expectations. 

''Your Constituent Assembly, upon which your minds 
and hearts are centered, is less than nine days distant. 
That august body is empowered to formulate a govern- 
ment for Russia. What preparations are you making 
for its assembling? Can it be representative of the soul 


of Russia if her sons are daily shedding the blood of 
each other? 

"It may be true that you are tired of war and desire 
peace, but what kind of a peace can you expect from 
a Government not only imperialistic in form but the 
greatest enemy of Democracy? You are dissipating your 
power and weakening your spirit, and wasting your 
energies, by family dissensions. 

"My country has no secret treaties in connection with 
this war. We are bound to our Allies in a league of 
honor. Our forefathers, the founders of the American 
Republic, warned us against entangling alliances with 
foreign powers, but they also taught us that a govern- 
ment which fails to fulfil its obligations to live up to 
its agreements, cannot command the respect of civiliza- 
tion and neither merit nor receive the loyal support of 
its own citizens, and consequently cannot survive. 

"I appreciate your friendly feeling for my country, 
and your considerate treatment of myself during my 
official stay among you. If by this candid expression of 
thought and feeling I forfeit your friendship, I shall 
regret it sincerely. My hope is that what I have said 
may make you stop and think. If so, it will inure to your 
profit.' ' 

Instead of rallying to the support of the Provisional 
Government the troops in Petrograd acknowledged al- 
legiance to the Bolshevik Revolutionary Committee. 
This meant the overthrow of the Provisional Govern- 
ment just as surely as had the defection of these troops 
eight months before meant the downfall of the Czar. 

"It is reported that a Bolshevik uprising or * demon- 
stration ' is beginning on the other side of the river. The 
immediate cause is the suppression of the four Bolshevik 
newspapers, one of them Maxim Gorky's. These papers 
have been advocating a separate peace and supporting 
extreme socialistic doctrines. ,, This I said in concluding 
a letter to my eldest son on November 6th, 1.91 7. 

On the same day I had a long talk with Terestchenko 


at the Foreign Office. After a brief discussion of routine 
matters I went to a window from which we could see a 
thousand or more soldiers drilling in the open space 
between the Foreign Office and the Winter Palace. We 
were both under great tension, but Terestchenko was 
more nervous than I was. We were alone and neither 
had spoken for some minutes when he said, "I expect 
a Bolshevik outbreak to-night." 

"If you can suppress it, I hope it will occur,' ' I com- 

"I think we can suppress it," the Minister said with 
apparent calmness ; but when he abruptly added, "I hope 
it will take place whether we can or not — I am tired of 
this uncertainty and suspense," I realized to the full, 
the terrible strain under which this young man was 

He was the richest man in the Government and had 
been reared in luxury, but unlike most men so reared ho 
had never wasted his time. Beside his own language 
he knew English, French and German. He had been a 
student both of political economy and of Russian history. 
Having lost faith in his chief, Kerensky (a fact which 
I did not know at the time), he undoubtedly felt that 
the chief responsibility for saving his country from the 
terrible fate that threatened her rested upon his shoul- 
ders chiefly. 

" Whose soldiers are those!" I asked. 

"They are ours," the young Minister replied as he 
turned wearily to his desk, and I took my departure 
feeling hopeful that he was justified in his belief that 
the Government would be able to defeat any effort the 
Bolsheviks might make. 

As I stepped into my victoria, drawn by two gray 
horses with small American flags attached to the rosettes 
of their bridles, I directed my coachman to drive by the 


soldiers who had stacked arms and were talking in little 
groups. I saluted as I passed and the men under their 
non-commissioned officers promptly came to attention 
and returned my salute with all proper military preci- 
sion. I wanted to impress these men with the fact that 
America and her Ambassador were back of the threat- 
ened Provisional Government. 

The next morning I was called up from the Foreign 
Office and told that because of pressing matters the 
Minister could not receive me at one o'clock that day. 
That was the hour of my daily call upon the Foreign 

Shortly after receipt of this message Secretary White- 
house rushed in in great excitement and told me that 
his automobile, on which he carried an American flag, 
had been followed to his residence by a Russian officer, 
who said that Kerensky wanted it to go to the front. 
Whitehouse and his brother-in-law, Baron Ramsai, who 
was with him, accompanied the officer to General Head- 
quarters in order to confirm his authority for making 
this amazing request. There they found Kerensky — the 
Headquarters are across the square from the Winter 
Palace, where he lived surrounded by his staff. Every- 
one seemed to be in a high tension of excitement and all 
was confusion. Kerensky confirmed the officer's state- 
ment that he wanted Whitehouse 's car to go to the 
front. Whitehouse asserted, "This car is my personal 
property and you have (pointing across the square to 
the Winter Palace) thirty or more automobiles waiting 
in front of the palace. ' ' Kerensky replied, * l Those were 
put out of commission during the night and the Bol- 
sheviks now command all the troops in Petrograd except 
some who claim to be neutral and refuse to obey my 

Whitehouse and Ramsai, after a hurried conference, 


came to the very proper conclusion that as the car ha 
virtually been commandeered they could offer no furthe 
objection. After they had left the Headquarters White- 
house remembered the American flag, and returning, told 
the officer who had originally asked for the car that he 
must remove the flag before using the car. He objected 
to doing this and, after some argument, Whitehouse had 
to be content with registering a protest against Keren- 
sky's use of the flag, and left to report the affair to me. 

On hearing the story I approved Whitehouse *s action, 
but gave orders that no mention should be made of the 
occurrence to anyone. A rumor reached me later that 
Kerensky had left the city in an American Embassy auto- 
mobile and under the American flag, but the rumor had 
a very limited circulation and was, I think, for the most 
part disbelieved. At any rate no point has been made 
of the manner of Kerensky 's escape other than the fact 
that he deserted his colleagues. 

He told Whitehouse to inform me that he was going 
to the army and would return within five days with a 
sufficient force to liquidate the situation. He did attempt 
to return at the head of 3,000 to 5,000 Cossacks, but his 
troops were repulsed about fifteen miles from the city 
by a force of about 20,000 men of whom 4,000 to 6,000 
were armed workmen. It is not improbable that their 
arms had been furnished by the order of Kerensky him- 
self when he armed the workmen of Petrograd in order 
that they might aid in repelling Korniloff's army. On 
Friday, November 16th, there came to the Embassy 
after dark a young man whom, although dressed in 
civilian's clothes, I recognized as Captain Kovanko, 
Kerensky 's naval aide. He said he had left Kerensky 
the morning of the previous day after his defeat and 
had returned with papers from him for friends in Petro- 
grad. He said Kerensky had told him to see me and 



advise me of the situation. He said that General Kras- 
noff, commanding the Cossacks, had called Kerensky 's 
attention to the German tactics of the Bolshevik army, 
and that both General Krasnoff and Kerensky believed 
that the Bolshevik army was commanded by German 
officers. It may be that he invented the story of Keren- 
sky's sending him to me, as he again appeared after 
dark the next day and told me he was anxious to go to 
America. Naturally I could do nothing for him in that 
direction. The following day he was arrested and im- 
prisoned in St. Peter and Paul Fortress. 

On November 7th, the day of Kerensky 's flight, his 
colleagues of the Provisional Government held a meeting 
at the Winter Palace. Late in the afternoon the Palace 
was surrounded by Bolshevik troops and Red Guards 
who demanded its surrender, which was refused. There- 
upon the Bolsheviks opened fire assisted by the man-of- 
war, Aurora, which lay in the river and by the guns 
of St. Peter and Paul Fortress across the river — the 
Winter Palace fronts on the River Neva and the Fortress 
is almost directly opposite. The Palace was defended by 
cadets, commonly known as " Junkers" (youths corre- 
sponding to our West Pointers) of whom there were 
several hundred, and by a battalion of women soldiers. 
At 2 :10 a.m., November 8th, the Palace was surrendered. 
The Ministers were captured and compelled to walk, 
under guard and subjected to many indignities, to the 
Fortress two miles distant, where they were imprisoned. 
The four Socialist Ministers were subsequently released, 
but kept under surveillance. The other Ministers were 
said to be well treated, but their friends and relatives 
were in constant fear that they would be killed, which 
seemed to me not improbable. According to one report 
the Ministers were stood up in line to be shot when the 
commander of the prison intervened. 


Madame Terestchenko, the mother of the young 
Foreign Minister, called upon me at the Embassy a few 
days after her son's arrest. She was obviously in deep 
distress of mind and told me that her son's guards, as 
indeed those of all the former Ministers, were being 
changed from soldier cyclists to Kronstadt sailors by 
order of young Rothschild, the President of the so-called 
"Kronstadt Republic." These Kronstadt sailors had 
threatened to kill all the former Ministers. She added 
that her son could be released on the payment of 100,000 
roubles to the Soviet Government — an amount which she 
would gladly pay, but that he refused to accept his 
liberty and leave his colleagues in prison. I explained 
to the distressed mother as best I could how gladly I 
would help her if I could, but that unfortunately any 
interest I might show in her son would simply lead the 
Bolsheviks to deal more harshly with him. 

In a letter to Secretary Lansing written November 
20th, 1917, I said of this period: 

"On the night of November 7th, the Petrograd Coun- 
cil of Workmen and Soldiers, which is mainly Bolsheviks, 
and the National Soviet, of which a congress has been 
called in Petrograd, named a new ministry calling it a 
'Commissaire' and appointed as com miss aires of the 
peope Lenin as President and Trotzky as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, and ten or fifteen others whose names 
are immaterial. The Mencheviks in the Soviet Congress 
thereupon withdrew, and also a few of the Bolsheviks. 
The second day thereafter the right wing of the Social- 
ist Party, including the above Soviet-seceders, the Social 
Revolutionists, and a majority of the Internationals and 
most of the Peasant Deputies, held a conference and 
attempted to agree upon a compromise ministry. Dan, 
speaking for the Social Revolutionists, stated they would 
not participate in any government with Bolsheviks and 


that the Peasants and Railway Union, who have become a 
power in the situation, were of the same mind. Later 
this decision appears to have been altered to the effect 
that a Bolshevik representation would be permitted pro- 
vided neither Lenin nor Trotzky should be selected. Of 
course, Lenin and Trotzky objected, and that is the pres- 
ent situation. An adjourned meeting for the selection of a 
compromise ministry was planned but for some reason 
was not held. In the meantime, Lenin and Trotzky are 
administering whatever government there is, outside the 
City Duma, from the Smolny Institute, an educational 
building which has been headquarters of the Petrograd 
Council and the Bolsheviks since they were put out of 
the National Duma in order that it might be prepared 
for the Constituent Assembly. The military, or that 
portion of them which recognizes the Lenin-Trotzky 
government, is commanded by a revolutionary military 

"A Colonel Mouravief, whose reputation is not good, 
was appointed commander of the Petrograd District, and 
assumed charge of the Petrograd military headquarters. 
He issued an order, No. 1, in which he acknowledged in 
a complimentary way the supremacy of the Revolution- 
ary Military Committee and the Red Guard. It appears 
that the British, French and American Military Attaches 
called on Mouravief and asked him to protect the foreign 
Embassies and Legations. I was not aware of this until 
after it was done, and when informed of it expressed my 
displeasure and gave orders that nothing should be 
done by anyone connected with the Embassy or subject 
to my control that could be construed as a recognition 
of the Lenin-Trotzky Government. 

"A few days before the revolution began — perhaps a 
week, the Provisional Government had sent to the Em- 
bassy seven Junkers or cadets as guards. I had not so 


requested, but gave them quarters and provided some o 
their food, until they were ordered to return to their 
school, which order they received November 12th or 
13th, a day or two before the Junkers had made open 
resistance to the Bolshevik soldiers. I consented to their 
leaving, and have since heard that they arrived safely 
at Nikolai School. The Red Guard has been killing the 
Junkers on the streets and on sight without warning, a 
species of unsurpassed brutality. On or about November 
9th a telephone message was received at the Embassy 
asking whether I desired a guard of Polish soldiers. I 
replied in the negative, but the Polish soldiers, ten in 
number including a lieutenant, arrived next day and were 
also given quarters and food. General Judson, the Mili- 
tary Attache, thought it unwise to keep the Polish sol- 
diers in the Embassy, as they were known to be unfa- 
vorable to the Bolshevik government, and recommended 
that they be replaced by Bolshevik guard. I assumed 
the position that, while I was willing for the Polish sol- 
diers to leave, I would not accept a guard from the 
Revolutionary Military Committee, nor from the Bol- 
shevik Headquarters. 

"I have just had a call from Skobeleff, whom you 
remember as a delegate appointed to accompany Teres- 
tchenko to Paris. He was accompanied by Tchaikovsky. 
They both stated voluntarily that the present govern- 
ment is no government at all and that if it is not soon 
succeeded by a representative ministry anarchy will pre- 
vail throughout Russia, and this country will be dis- 
rupted and will disappear from the face of the earth as 
one of the Great Powers. They said they represented 
the committee of national defense of which Avksentiefr* 
is chairman, but he is not in Petrograd at this time be- 
cause he and his friends thought it unsafe for him to re- 
main here. They believed the situation could be saved if 



the Allies would agree to call a conference for the purpose 
of denning theii aims in continuing the war. They 
asserted the soldiers and everybody in Russia were ask- 
ing what the Russian army is fighting for and that the 
army could only be held together by an announcement 
of war aims by the Allies. If such announcement should 
be made and not accepted by Germany, then the army 
could be reorganized and solidified and would at least 
hold that part of Russia which is not now in the posses- 
sion of the Germans. I am cabling you this proposition 
to-day. Skobeleff and Tchaikovsky said they had just 
left Sir George Buchanan, and that he had promised to 
cable their suggestion to his government with a recom- 
mendation that it be followed. It was their opinion that 
such a conference should not be held in Petrograd nor 
in Russia. I told them there was no objection on our 
part to such a conference as our aims in this war had 
been stated before we entered it and had been repeated 
by President Wilson several times since. 

' 'The situation here is extremely critical. The army 
is without bread, and many of the soldiers are likely to 
come to Petrograd in quest of food. When they arrive, 
it is possible they may indulge in excesses. 

"I have a strong suspicion that Lenin and Trotzky are 
working in the interests of Germany, but whether that 
suspicion is correct or not, their success will unques- 
tionably result in Germany's gain. As I cabled you 
several days ago, it is believed by many that there are 
German officers here in touch with the commanders of 
the Bolshevik regiments. I have also cabled you con- 
cerning the German propaganda at the front, in Moscow 
and elsewhere. You do not need to be impressed with 
what it means to us for Germany to get possession of 

"Your cable of November 16th, 3 p. m., to Morris was 


received by me to-day. You can readily see that cables 
between the Department and the Embassy have beei 
wilfully intercepted, especially when I call your atten- 
tion to the fact that unimportant cables have com* 
through unmolested. I appreciate your concern aboul 
the safety of the members of the Embassy and also about 
American citizens, but as I have cabled you several 
times, no American has been injured either in Petrograd 
or in Moscow." 

The day after the overthrow of the Provisional Gov- 
ernment, I wrote in a letter to Consul-General Summers 
at Moscow: 

"The streets are quiet to-day but some of them are 
barricaded. The principal point of interest is the tele- 
phone headquarters on the Moskaya, which was taken 
by the Bolsheviks night before last. Some cadets at- 
tempted to recapture it yesterday afternoon but were 

"The Foreign Office in reply to my inquiry, phones 
this morning that it does not know where the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs is, and that no one representing the 
new power has appeared at the Ministry, consequently 
all of the officials there are folding their hands. An 
official of the Department of Agriculture called at the 
Embassy this morning and told me that the Ministry 
was closed as it was impossible to do any business with 
the Ministers in prison. I have just received word, how- 
ever, from the Ministry of Ways and Communications, 
that a telegram I sent there to be forwarded to John F. 
Stevens would be promptly transmitted, consequently I 
conclude that the Department is transacting business. 

"It is reported that the Petrograd Council of Work- 
men and Soldiers has named a cabinet with Lenin as 
Premier, Trotzky as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and 
Madame or Mile. Kollontai as Minister of Education. 


Disgusting! — but I hope such effort will be made, as 
the more ridiculous the situation the sooner the remedy. 
It is reported also and generally believed that Ver- 
khovsky, late Minister of War, is at the Smolny Institute 
and directing the military affairs of the Bolsheviks. I 
am inclined to believe the report." 

In a later letter, I said : 

" There has been little fighting here on the streets. 
Last Sunday the Junkers (the cadets) captured the 
telephone office and held it about six hours, when they 
were compelled to surrender. They thought Kerensky's 
forces would enter Petrograd Sunday and they are said 
to have been promised that the three Cossack regiments 
here would attack the Bolsheviks, provided they were 
given an armored motor. The Junkers had heard on 
Saturday that their arms would be taken from them on 
Sunday, consequently on Saturday night they entered 
the garage where the motors are stored, and after bind- 
ing and chloroforming the guards captured eight 
armored motors. About ten o'clock the next morning 
they captured the telephone office, and were engaged in 
more or less street fighting during the day. The Bol- 
shevik soldiers and Eed Guards took the Vladimir School 
across the river, and, after almost demolishing it with 
artillery, captured the inmates, who had offered resis- 
tance, and are said to have practised horrible cruelties 
on those who surrendered. During Sunday and Monday 
whenever a Junker was seen on the street he was shot 
by a Eed Guard or a Bolshevik soldier without being 

"On the night of November 8th, after the fall of the 
Winter Palace, the Petrograd Council of Workmen and 
Soldiers, and the National Soviet, or what is left of it, 
after several factions had withdrawn, passed a decree 
dividing among the people all the land in Eussia except 


that belonging to the Cossacks. They then adopted peace 
resolutions and recommended a three months* armistice, 
for their consideration, and ordered the resolutions sent 
to the army and by wireless to all belligerent and neutral 

"The Embassy has never received any official notice 
that there has been any change in the government, but 
the departments are all closed or operating only par- 
tially and without chiefs. The Lenin-Trotzky Ministry 
has not sent any written or oral communication to the 
Embassy. In fact, I have not heard of its functioning 
at all except to demand the secret treaties from the 
Foreign Office, which were not forth-coming, and to take 
possession of the State Bank. The private banks have 
been closed notwithstanding Lenin's order to them to 
keep open for at least two hours daily. The National 
City Bank tells me it would open for the accommodation 
of its customers but it has no money outside the State 
Bank and can get none from there. Quiet prevails here 
notwithstanding there is no government. 

"When a government is formed and I am officially 
advised, I shall confer with the heads of the Allied Mis- 
sions and the Department upon a course of action. Of 
course, we would not, or I would not, recognize any 
Ministry of which Lenin is Premier or Trotzky Minister 
of Foreign Affairs." 

In a letter to my son Perry written November 26th, I 
thus commented upon later phases of the Bevolution: 

' 1 There has been no firing on the streets of Petrograd 
for the last three days except occasionally. Killing and 
robberies are much more frequent than anyone knows, 
however, because they are not given to the press, and 
for the further reason that all evidence of such crimes 
are rapidly removed. I never knew of a place where 
human life is as cheap as it is now in Bussia. You can, 


however, become accustomed to murders and robberies. 
About ten days ago when I was returning to the Embassy 
in a Ford automobile, driven by Phil, my attention was 
attracted by a crowd congregated on the corner of this 
block, which is about 1,200 feet long, with the Embassy 
within 200 feet of one end of it. Phil was inclined to stop, 
but as I had an engagement at the Embassy I told him 
to drive on, but his curiosity was so strong that after 
leaving me at the Embassy he drove back to the corner 
and about half an hour later came into my office and told 
me the crowd was in front of a branch post-office, the 
woman in charge of which, a 19-year-old girl, had been 
killed and the office robbed of 82,000 roubles. It seemed 
incredible, but I have become so accustomed to such out- 
rages that I only remarked that I was sorry and that 
the scoundrel who did it should be shot, and continued 
to dictate to the stenographer. 

"The Department has given no instructions concern- 
ing recognition of the Lenin-Trotzky government, nor 
have I made any recommendation looking toward such 
recognition. The Constituent Assembly will be convened 
day after to-morrow, but no one can foretell its political 
complexion or its action. I am still having the Embassy 
guarded nightly by two of its employees, who sit in the 
vestibule from 2 a.m. until 7, as I never go to bed until 
2 o'clock, or haven't since the Revolution began/ ' 

In a letter to my wife written on Monday, the 12th, I 
commented : 

"We have had no government here since Thursday. 
Most of the government offices are closed as the em- 
ployees have refused to work under Bolshevik Ministers. 
Some departments have been visited by the new Ministers 
but some have not. I understand all of those called upon 
to do so have declined to recognize the Bolshevik govern- 


ment and those not called upon have ceased to opera 
for want of authority. ' ' 

On November 24th, Consul-General Summers wrote m 
a letter in which he thus described the Revolution as it 
affected Moscow: 

" We were for a week in the center of the fighting zone 
and for four days I could not get out of the house on 
account of the firing on the streets both of artillery an 
musketry. All the houses at the corner near our hous 
were shelled and burned. I was very anxious about th 
Consulate where Poole, Macgowan and Bullard wer< 
sleeping, having been cut off from their homes. The 
Consulate is only about 400 yards from my home — in the 
direction of the National Hotel, and the heaviest fighting 
in Moscow was between us. Fire broke out the second 
night as the result of the heavy artillery fire directed 
against the buildings. Numerous persons were killed or 
burned to death. The Dom Gagarin, the property of my 
wife's aunt, was the stronghold of the Bolsheviks. It 
controlled the entrance to the Kremlin by the Nikitzkaya 
and was hotly contested until the last moment when shells 
set it and the surrounding buildings afire. Our house 
was struck several times by bullets and shrapnel, but we 
were not injured or even worried. 

1 i The Consulate was shot up a little but on the whole 
was respected as much as could have been desired. A 
large building in the yard, however, is torn to pieces by 
shell fire. All Americans are safe, although several at 
the Hotel Metropole, which is a partial wreck, have lost 
their baggage. The number of dead is not yet known, 
though it is very large. Last night thirty-five dead bodies 
were removed from the Dom Gagarin, nineteen were 
taken from a burning house in front and all over the city 
funerals are taking place. The morgues are full of 
Junkers and Bolsheviks. The dead of the latter are 




being buried to-day. Disorders are expected in the 
afternoon, though I think that the terror of the past 
week has cowed resistance. 

"The most horrible atrocities are known to have been 
perpetrated by the Bolsheviks. Large numbers of young 
students from ten to sixteen years of age have been 
murdered because they were cadets, the word Cadet being 
confused with the political party. Junkers were thrown 
into holes made in the ground and buried without funer- 
als. Many of them were subjected to unheard-of cruel- 
ties. The French Consul-General from Warsaw was 
brutally treated and the Roumanian officers at the Met- 
ropole were little less than executed. Concrete cases of 
looting, murder and other rapacious acts are not want- 
ing. Immediately after the firing was stopped and the 
Consular Corps could be gotten together, a meeting was 
held at my home. All were present except the English 
Consul-General, who informed me that he did not pro- 
pose to adopt any definite line of action until he received 
instructions from the Embassy. It seems to me that on 
occasions of this sort, when the life and property of 
foreigners is at stake, the first duty of a Consular officer 
is to see that every protection is given them, regardless 
of who has assumed the power. I have carefully studied 
this question at other times when the question of recog- 
nition of governments, created by revolution, was con- 
cerned, and find that representations to a body which has 
forcibly come into power and de facto occupies the gov- 
ernment, in regard merely to the matter of protection of 
citizens and their properties, is not only in order, but is 
obligatory on Consular officers. 

i ' We have carefully given them to understand that we 
were merely treating with them on matters of the protec- 
tion of our citizens. After long and rather strong argu- 
ments were employed, the representatives of the War 


Revolutionary Committee called at the Swedish Consu- 
late on myself and the Swedish Consul-General, who in 
the meantime had been selected by the Consular Corps 
to represent them, and we succeeded in forcing them to 
place their seal on certain certificates of citizenship and 
residence which we prepared which would at once pro- 
tect each foreigner, and insure his house against search 
except in the presence of a Consular officer. We insist( 
on a strict compliance with the laws of the nations ii 
the treatment of all foreigners and warned them of th< 
consequence of any infringement of such laws. 

"I think in the end we have secured to all foreignei 
here a speedy and effective method of protection. Every- 
one seems to be contented, though there was a great 
panic the first days. The American Red Cross was mak- 
ing every possible effort to get out before anyone else, 
and annoyed the Consulate-General no little by taking up 
our time when we were busy trying to secure to our 
colony all due protection. I confess that it aggravated 
me not a little to have to stop this work to get special 
cars for them to get away. I realized that if all of them 
left precipitately as they wished to do there would be a 
panic here, and I told them that if they did, even though 
it cost me my post, I would telegraph the President what 
they were endeavoring to do and its effect at this serious 

"lam glad to say they have all gone and sincerely 
hope they will not return. I am not by any means done 
with this matter, as I have many things in connection 
with the entire work of this body which I will bring to 
the attention of the government. Some of them are 
earnest men and others are little less than curiosity 
seekers who avail themselves of the official nature of the 
body to make nuisances of themselves and of the Red 
Cross, quite contrary from the Y,M,CJu which has 


done splendid work, as I have cabled the Department. 

1 ' The colony is all quiet and quite untouched. We are 
making all due preparation for them in case we have to 
leave. As far as myself and family are concerned and 
all the staff of this office, we shall stay here until we are 
forced to leave. Like yourself I have no fear of these 
people and feel strongly that we should fight the thing 
to the end. ' ' 

In reply to the question that is often asked me, "Why 
did the Kerensky Government fail?" I reply there are 
many reasons, among which these might be mentioned: 
The great mass of soldiers in the Russian army were 
ignorant peasants who had only the vaguest idea what 
they were fighting for. They had fought long, had lost 
enormous numbers, had been betrayed by some of their 
leaders, and in many cases their families were destitute. 
Lenin and Trotzky and their numerous agents came 
among them and promised them peace and land. They 
longed for peace ! To gain possession of the land upon 
which they worked had been their ambition for genera- 
tions. Under these conditions, to keep these peasant 
soldiers fighting and at the same time build up a demo- 
cratic government in a land that had known only des- 
potism for hundreds of years was a task for a leader with 
the iron nerve of Cromwell and the far-seeing wisdom 
of Lincoln. Not such a man was Kerensky! He was 
first and foremost an orator. He was also, in my belief, 
a patriotic Russian with the welfare of his country at 
heart. But he was weak, and twice in the brief tenure of 
his power he blundered fatally; first, when after the 
attempted Revolution of July, he failed to execute as 
traitors, Lenin and Trotzky. Second, when during the 
Korniloff episode, he failed to seek to conciliate General 
Korniloff and instead turned to the Council of Work- 
men's and Soldiers' Deputies and distributed arms and 


ammunition among the workingmen of Petrograd. By 
this singularly inept stroke he alienated his own army 
and armed his enemies. 

In a private letter written from Vologda on June 23rd, 
1918, 1 told of this incident of Kerensky 's departure from 

"Kerensky was in Moscow four weeks ago after 
reports had stated he had settled in Norway, and I think 
the Government was aware of his presence there, but 
don't know such to be the case. The Ministers of the 
Provisional Government, who were kept in the St. Peter 
and Paul Fortress for four months, have all been re- 
leased. Shingarieff, who was an ex-minister, was killed 
in a hospital to which he had been transferred when the 
feeling against the Provisional Ministers was very bitter. 
His murderers have never been punished. 

"I was informed a few days ago that Kerensky might 
possibly apply for admission to the United States, where- 
upon I cabled the Department recommending that he be 
granted permission to enter. I received a few days ago 
authority to grant him admission. Meantime he has 
gone to Murmansk, by the Murman railroad, disguised 
by a full growth of whiskers, and wearing the uniform of 
a Serbian officer. He arrived safely at Murmansk, and 
while dining on a British man-of-war was so completely 
disguised that he was not recognized by all of his hosts, 
but one of them did recognize him. During the dinner 
when the British officers were talking about Russian 
affairs, one of them mentioned Kerensky in a very un- 
complimentary manner, and said if Kerensky had had the 
courage and wisdom to perform his duty, and had shot 
Lenin and Trotzky when he could have done so, after 
the outbreak of July 17th and 18th, 1917, Russia and 
the Allies would have been spared much trouble and 
expense and loss of life. You can imagine Kerensky 's 


feelings, and the embarrassment of the officer who had 
recognized him." 

Kerensky was in England when I arrived there but did 
not call upon me. He was occupied in writing his book. 
I understand that, at this writing, he is in Paris and 
attends meetings of the Russians there who have organ- 
ized an anti-Bolshevik association. 



Immediately after the Czar's abdication on March 
15th, the Provisional Government had issued its address 
to the " citizens' ' of Russia. It declared the policy t 
be based on principles, one of which was as follows 


"To proceed forthwith to the preparation and con- 
vocation of a Constituent Assembly based on universal 
suffrage which will establish a stable governmental 

The members of the Provisional Government took oath 
of office immediately. Entering the great hall of the 
First Department of the Senate, the Ministers with 
Prince Lvoff at their head took their places in the center 
of the hall at a table, and each repeated this oath, follow- 
ing the text as pronounced by the President of the Sen- 
ate, S. B. Brasski: 

"According to my duty as a member of the Provisional 
Government, established by the will of the people on 
the initiative of the Imperial Duma, I promise and swear 
before God Almighty and my conscience to faithfully and 
truly serve the people of the Russian State, sacredly pro- 
tecting its liberty and rights, its honor and dignity, 
inviolably observing in all my actions and my orders the 
foundations of civil liberty and civil equality, and in all 
measures at my disposal to suppress all attempts, di- 
rectly or indirectly aiming at the re establishment of the 
old regime. I swear to apply all my intelligence and all 
my strength to entirely fulfil all the obligations which 



the Provisional Government has assumed before the 
whole world. I swear to take all the measures for the 
earliest possible convocation of a Constituent Assembly 
on the basis of universal, direct, equal and secret suf- 
frage, to transfer to it the plenitude of authority which 
I am temporarily exercising together with the other mem- 
bers of the Government and to submit to the will of the 
people expressed through this assembly concerning the 
form of government and the fundamental laws of the 
Eussian State. So help me God to fulfil my oath. ,, 

Of like interest, bearing upon the purposes of the Con- 
stituent Assembly, was the order issued by Minister of 
War and of the Navy, GoutchkofT, on the 23rd of March. 

" Officers, soldiers and sailors, trust one another. The 
Provisional Government will not permit a return to the 
past; having laid the foundation of the new order of 
Government, it seeks to quietly await the convocation of 
the Constituent Assembly. Do not aid agitators who 
sow among you dissension and lying reports. The will 
of the people will be strictly fulfilled, but the peril has 
not passed." 

In a subsequent address to "citizens/* the Provi- 
sional Government declared: 

" While taking measures indispensable for the defense 
of the country against a foreign enemy, the Government 
will consider it its first duty to grant to the people every 
facility to express its will concerning the political admin- 
istration, and will convoke as soon as possible the Con- 
stituent Assembly on the basis of universal suffrage, at 
the same time assuring the gallant defenders of the 
country their share in the Parliamentary Election. The 
Constituent Assembly will issue fundamental laws, guar- 
anteeing the country the immutable rights of equality 
and liberty.' ' 

The Petrograd Soviet, describing their organization 
as "Russian Workingmen and Soldiers, united in the 


Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," 
declined to join the cabinet of ministers composing the 
Provisional Government, in March, but issued a procla- 
mation addressed to "Comrades, Proletarians and all 
Laboring People of all Countries." In this proclama- 
tion the Soviet did not oppose the proposed Constituent 
Assembly, but endorsed it. The Soviet said : 

"The people of Russia will express their will in the 
Constituent Assembly, which will be called as soon as is 
possible on the basis of universal, equal, direct and 
secret suffrage. And already it may be said without a 
doubt that a Democratic Republic will triumph in 

Stecklov, who was a member of the Executive Com- 
mittee of the Petrograd Soviet, said that following the 
establishment of the Provisional Government : 

"The Soviet decided to limit itself to presenting to 
the Provisional Government definite political demands, 
and without influencing directly the composition of the 
cabinet, which means without recommending directly 
desirable candidates for ministers, to confine itself to 
the right to veto those candidates who are definitely 
undesirable and definitely opposed and dangerous to the 

The foregoing statement of the policy of the Soviet 
appeared in their organ, Izvestia. 

Even the imperialistic element gave apparent support 
to the proposed Constituent Assembly. The Grand Duke 
Michael Alexandrovitch, in whose favor the Czar abdi- 
cated, announced March 3rd-16th his refusal to accept 
without adherence to the plan of the Constituent As- 
sembly : 

"I have firmly decided to accept the supreme power 
only in case it is the will of our great nation, which. 


through its representatives in the Constituent Assembly 
will decide upon a form of Government and the new laws 
of the Russian Empire. Calling God's blessing, I request 
all citizens of the Russian Empire to submit themselves 
to the temporary government created by the Imperial 
Duma and which has the full power until the time when 
the Constituent Assembly which shall be called upon the 
basis of general, direct, secret and equal suffrage, shall 
decide upon the new form of government. 

(Signed) " Michael. ' ' 

When the Provisional Government was reorganized 
in May, two months after the first organization, six 
Socialists were given places in the Cabinet, Prince Lvoff 
remaining as Prime Minister. Again the Provisional 
Government issued an address promising an early assem- 
blage of the Constituent Assembly : 

"Leaving it to the Constituent Assembly to decide the 
question of transfer of land to the toilers and making 
the requisite preparation for this, the Provisional Gov- 
ernment will take all necessary measures to secure the 
greatest production of grain, in order to satisfy the needs 
of the country and to regulate utilization of land in the 
interests of the country's economic welfare and the needs 
of the toiling masses. The work of introducing and 
strengthening the democratic organizations of self-gov- 
ernment will be continued with all possible assistance 
and speed. The Provisional Government will in like 
manner make every effort to convoke the Constituent 
Assembly in Petrograd as soon as possible.' ' 

These expressions of the purposes of the Provisional 
Government and of the Soviet in the spring of 1917 
seemed to justify a general feeling of hopefulness that 
Russia was about to create an established government of 
the people, but it was not until November 25th that the 
elections to the Constituent Assembly were held, and it 
was not until January 18th that the Constituent Assem- 


bly convened. In that long delay to fulfil the early 
promises and expectations, Russia's opportunity for a 
stable government by consent of the governed was lost. 
From time to time the Provisional Government sent 
out urgent appeals to stay the political disintegration 
and to establish harmony : 

"Citizens of Russia! The fate of our country is in 
your hands. Without you the Government is helpless. 
Together with you it will with courage and determina- 
tion lead the country toward its great future. Remem- 
ber that it is impossible to observe freedom without 
authority and that in the new order the authority is set 
up and guarded by you yourselves, by your inner disci- 
pline and your free obedience. Gathering around the 
authority you have erected, and putting it in a position 
to use in point of fact the entirety of the rights you have 
conceded to it, you will give it force and power to over- 
come all the difficulties and dangers which stand in the 
country's path, and to bring Russia's freedom entire 
and untouched to that great day when the nation itself, 
in the person of the Constituent Assembly it will have 
elected, shall stand at the helm of government, ' ' 

Following the attempted revolution led by Lenin and 
Trotzky in July, the Provisional Government issued an- 
other proclamation on the subject of the Constituent 
Assembly : 

"The Provisional Government will take all measures 
for the election to the Constituent Assembly to take 
place at the appointed time (September 17th) and for the 
preparatory measures to be concluded in time to guar- 
antee the uprightness and freedom of the votes.' ' 

The Bolsheviks made much capital out of the delay 
in calling the Constituent Assembly. They insistently 
demanded that the elections be held. They charged that 
the Provisional Government was purposely postponing 
these elections in order that it might remain in power. 


They called attention to the luxurious style in which 
Kerensky was living. And all of the time they went on 
with plans to set up their own experiment in govern- 
ment. Claiming to be for a Constituent Assembly, they 
organized "The National Congress of the Councils of 
the Deputies of the Workmen and Soldiers." In a com- 
munication addressed to the American Embassy the Bol- 
sheviks announced "a new government of the Russian 
Republic under the form of the Councils of the Com- 
missaries of the People." The communication sent to 
the Embassy stated that "the President of this govern- 
ment is Mr. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, and the management 
of the foreign policy was entrusted to me as Commissary 
of the People for Foreign Affairs. ' ' This document was 
signed by "Leon Trotzky." 

Only a few days before this notice was sent to the 
Embassy Trotzky had publicly charged Kerensky with 
conspiring to prevent the convocation of the Constituent 
Assembly. The date for the election had been postponed 
from September to November, which gave Trotzky addi- 
tional ground for his oft-repeated claims that the Provi- 
sional Government did not at heart sincerely favor a Con- 
stituent Assembly. The Bolshevik government was now 
in power, but it elected only 168 of the 703 deputies to 
the Constituent Assembly. There were 81 election dis- 
tricts, but in only 54 of them were elections held. The 
returns showed that the Social Revolutionists were in 
the large majority. They had polled 20,893,734 votes 
against 9,023,963 for the Bolshevik candidates. The 
total vote cast was 36,257,960. 

As soon as the results of the election were known the 
Bolshevik leaders began to plan for absolute control of 
the Assembly by their small minority. Through the 
Executive Committee of the Soviet, they put forth a 
declaration that where a majority of the voters were 


dissatisfied with the men they had chosen as deputies, 
writs for new elections might be issued. 

The Constituent Assembly had been called to meet on 
the 12th of December. Pending the plans of the Bol- 
sheviks to overcome the majority the meeting of the 
Assembly was postponed until January 18, 1918. The 
scheme of new elections failing, the Bolshevik leaders, 
through their newspaper organ, demanded that the Con- 
stitutional Democrats who had been elected to the 
Assembly be arrested and brought to trial before the 
revolutionary tribunals. The Council of Peoples' Com- 
missaries by a decree announced that this would be 
done. Miliukoff and other Constitutional Democrats 
were threatened with arrest. Some arrests were made. 
Deputies were held in confinement until after the Con- 
stituent Assembly had met and had been dispersed by 
force. Then they were set free. The arrests were purely 
arbitrary acts on the part of the Bolsheviks to overawe 
the majority in the Constituent Assembly. 

Lenin, a short time before the meeting of the Assembly, 
printed an argument that the election had not given clear 
indication of what the people wanted. Briefly Lenin's 
position was: 

"The Soviet Republic represents not only a higher 
form of Democratic institutions, but it is also the sole 
form which renders possible the least painful transition 
to Socialism.' ' 

A part of Lenin's argument was that the division of 
the Social Revolutionists Party into Right Wing and 
Left Wing after the election showed that the people 
had not acted with definite purpose. 

The Social Revolutionists had the largest body of dele- 
gates in the Constituent Assembly. The Right Wing 
was composed of the Conservative Social Revolutionists, 
and the Left Wing was composed of the Radical Social 


Revolutionists. In various ways the Bolshevik leaders 
were preparing local sentiment in Petrograd so far as 
might be for the forcible dispersal of the Constituent 

The Assembly met at last on January 5th-18th, 1918. 
The day before the assemblage of the Constituent As- 
sembly, January 4th-17th, I had a meeting of the Diplo- 
matic Corps, of which I was Dean, in the American Em- 
bassy. I proposed to them that we all attend in a body 
the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, but they ob- 
jected, saying they were not invited. I said no one was 
invited. I insisted on going but as no one would accom- 
pany me, I did not go alone. The Italian Ambassador, 
Torretti, afterwards mentioned it to me in Paris about 
thirteen months later and regretted that he had not gone. 
If we had gone, the presence of the Diplomatic Corps, 
representing Russia's Allies, might have had a pacifying 
effect on that assemblage. 

There were stationed in and about the hall during the 
session sailors and Lettish soldiers armed with rifles and 
grenades and machine guns. Very soon after the open- 
ing of the session, the Bolshevist delegates presented an 
ultimatum to the Constituent Assembly. Among other 
things they demanded the adoption of this decree: 

" Supporting the Soviet rule and accepting the orders 
of the Council of Peoples' Commissaries, the Constitu- 
ent Assembly acknowledges its duty to outline a form 
for the reorganization of society." 

The Constituent Assembly refused to adopt this, 
whereupon the Bolshevik delegates withdrew. The meet- 
ing of the Assembly was attended by many disorders 
and much street fighting. There was violent but scat- 
tered opposition to the Bolshevik program. The Bol- 
shevik newspapers claimed that the Bolshevik soldiers 


were fired on by mobs. The soldiers then fired into th( 
crowds. Uritzky, one of the Bolshevik leaders, was 
among the wounded in this street fighting. He was after- 
wards assassinated and the Bolshevik government shot 
513 people as a reprisal for this deed. 

One of the organs of the Bolsheviks stated the next 
day that the Constituent Assembly began well, but that 
when the Right Social Revolutionists began to assert 
themselves its fate was sealed. "It is now necessary to 
work on the enlightenment of the masses.' ' 

The Dielo Naroda was compelled to suspend publi- 
cation. The Nova Vremya was also suspended, and 
its editors committed to trial for publishing a statement 
that a motor lorry containing Red Guards and Lett 
rifles fired on the barracks of the Ismailov and Petrograd 
regiments. The Red Guard confiscated and destroyed 
all non-Bolshevik newspapers. 

A delegation of the Looga Workmen's and Soldiers' 
Council visited Lenin and handed him a resolution of 
their Council supporting the Constituent Assembly. 
Lenin expressed his surprise at this resolution. The 
delegation replied that not all the Democracy was in 
favor of the Council government and that only the Con- 
stituent Assembly could unite it. Lenin answered that 
he had in his pocket a decree disbanding the Constituent 
Assembly, and that orders had been given to allow no 
one to enter the Tauride Palace. The delegation asked 
what would happen if the Constituent Assembly opened 
in another place. Lenin replied no one would support 
the Constituent Assembly, and that it would be dis- 
banded. Instead a convention would be called which 
would be formed by the forthcoming Congress of Work- 
men's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. 

At 1:30 a.m. following the first day's session of the 
Constituent Assembly, the Central Executive Committee 


of the Council of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' 
Deputies issued the decree referred to by Lenin disband- 
ing the Constituent Assembly. The decree said : 

"The Constituent Assembly, opened on the 5th of 
January (18th), gave, owing to circumstances known to 
all, a majority of the Right Social Revolutionists Party 
— the party of Kerensky, Avksentiev, and Tchernov. 
Naturally this party refused to consider the absolutely 
definite, clear, unmistakable proposal of the supreme 
organ of Council Government, the Central Executive 
Committee of the Councils : to acknowledge the program 
of the Council Government ; to acknowledge ' the declara- 
tion of Right of the Laboring and Exploited People ' ; to 
acknowledge the October revolution and the Council Gov- 
ernment. By this act the Constituent Assembly broke 
all connections between itself and the Council Republic 
of Russia. The withdrawal from such a Constituent 
Assembly of the Maximalist and Left Social Revolution- 
ists Party, which now compose the great majority of the 
Council and have the confidence of the workmen and of 
the majority of the peasants, became unavoidable. 

"Outside the walls of the Constituent Assembly the 
majority party of the Constituent Assembly — the Right 
Social Revolutionists and Minimalists, — carry on open 
war against the Council Government in their papers call- 
ing for the downthrow of it, thus indirectly supporting 
the resistence of exploiters and the transfer of lands and 
factories into the hands of the laborers. 

"It is obvious that the remaining part of the Constit- 
uent Assembly can only in view of this play the role of 
masking the struggle of the bourgeois — counter-revolu- 
tion to overthrow the Council Government. Therefore, 
the Central Executive Committee resolves the Constitu- 
ent Assembly is disbanded.' ' 

Adjournment of the Constituent Assembly at the close 
of its first and only session was enforced in the most 
brutal manner. A drunken sailor said to the deputies : 
"I am tired and want to go to bed. If you don't get out, 
I will turn out the lights. ' ' 


On the morning of the 19th of January guards were 
stationed at the entrance of the palace to prevent the 
entrance of the deputies or delegates, and that was the 
end. The Constituent Assembly, forecasted with such 
promise and hope just ten months previously, never met 
again. Bolshevism, although in the minority and repre- 
senting only one-fourth of the votes cast for deputies, 
was in power by force. 

Anarchy quickly found opportunity in the success of 
Bolshevism. It is interesting to note that coincident 
with the forcible usurpation by the Bolsheviks the Anar- 
chists became boldly aggressive. Three or four days 
before the Constituent Assembly was dispersed, four 
Russians, — two sailors, a workman, and an anarchist 
orator — presented to the Embassy a resolution passed by 
a group of anarchists on the yacht Polar Star. This 
resolution was addressed, "To the Envoy of the United 
States of North America," and was as follows: 

"We, sailors, soldiers and workmen of the town of 
Helsingfors, having become acquainted from all sides 
with the fact of the persecution by the Government of 
the United States of North America of our comrade 
Alexander Berkman, all of whose guilt lies only in the fact 
that he has devoted his whole life to the cause of serving 
the working and disinherited class, demand the imme- 
diate liberation of our comrade Alexander Berkman. In 
the contrary event we openly announce that we shall 
hold the representatives of the Government of the United 
States personally responsible for the life and liberty of 
the revolutionary and champion of the cause of the peo- 
ple, comrade Alexander Berkman. 

"The President: S. Krylov. 
"The Secretary: K. Kutzy. 
Seal of the Helsingfors group of anarchists." 

No attention was paid by the Embassy to the resolu- 


tion further than to send a copy to the Secretary of State 
at Washington, with this explanation: 

" Delegation of four anarchists just visited Embassy; 
after stating they were anarchists said they represented 
sixty per cent of the Baltic Fleet and all the workmen 
and soldiers of Helsingfors, and requested to see the 
American Ambassador. I sent interpreter Secretary 
Phelps and Private Secretary Johnston to ascertain their 
mission. Delegation presented resolution in Russian, of 
which following is translation. Upon hearing the reso- 
lution I directed the two attaches above mentioned to 
say I was engaged and would not see them whereupon 
they asked that the resolution be presented to the Ameri- 
can Government. The delegation was told this would be 
done and advised that no definite time could be fixed for 
reply as cable service was irregular and unreliable. The 
delegation also said a copy of resolution was being sent 
to Smolny (Bolshevik headquarters). Don't permit con- 
sideration for my personal safety to influence govern- 
ment action. ,, 

A few weeks previous, in September, the anarchists 
had held a meeting and had put out " posters' ' according 
to their usual plan of presenting their views. In these 
posters they demanded the release of Berkman. At that 
time an inquiry was made of the Embassy by the Pro- 
visional Government to know who Berkman was and 
what offense he had committed. 

To this I replied that Berkman was utterly discredited 
by organized labor in the United States; that he had 
been an opponent of all kinds of government and an 
enemy of society. I said that he had been arrested for 
interfering with or attempting to interfere with the 
enforcement of the draft law and was awaiting trial on 
that charge. He had served in the penitentiary for the 
attempted assassination of Henry C. Frick, who at the 
time was a partner of Andrew Carnegie. 


This information was given to the Petrograd news- 
papers and printed. Apparently it was not satisfactory 
to the anarchists, but beyond an anonymous communica- 
tion sent to the Embassy nothing more was heard from 
them until the Bolsheviks had set up their government. 
The anonymous communication was signed, "The Black 
Point,' ' and was addressed "Ambassador." It was to 
this effect: 

"You appear too often in the press, and especially in 
the newspaper Russkoe-Slovo with your anecdotes of 
a true American model. You irritate the nerves. Our 
advice is to finish up with this childish occupation. Pack 
the trunk with anecdotes and leave for your native coun- 
try, via Archangel, to your wise Solomons. It would be 
desirable to leave not later than December 15th, 1917, in 
order to arrive in time for Christmas Eve." 

With the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly the 
anarchists began to threaten. Meetings were held and 
violent addresses were made. In a letter addressed to 
my son, dated four days after the dispersal of the Con- 
stituent Assembly, I wrote: 

"The morning of Saturday, January 19th, an article 
appeared in the Bureauvestnik, the anarchistic organ. 
I paid little more attention to this than I did to the 
resolution passed by the Helsingfors anarchists, of 
which I sent you a copy. The next morning, however, I 
learned about 11 o'clock that two well-known men, Ex- 
Ministers. named Shingariefr* and Kokoshkin, had been 
murdered in a hospital about four blocks from the Em- 
bassy. After confirming this report which I was enabled 
to do by sending the Commercial Attache to look at the 
bodies, I began to think that the threat of the anarchists 
should be guarded against. During the afternoon when 
I was presiding at a meeting of the x^llied Chiefs of 
Missions a woman telephoned to the Embassy saying she 


had some important information to impart but was afraid 
to come to the Embassy and desired that I send someone 
to meet her at the intersection of two streets about eight 
blocks from the Embassy. Earl Johnston, and Doctor 
Huntington, Commercial Attache, went and met her and 
heard from her the following story : 

"She had been approached the night before by a sol- 
dier who was under obligation to her, and who professed 
to have some wine for sale. Upon being asked where he 
got the wine he replied it was from the Italian Embassy 
and he was one of the soldiers who had done the looting 
the night or several nights previous. He told her that 
the American Embassy would be attacked that evening, 
and the building burned and the Ambassador killed. 

"I had arranged a reception or tea that evening to 
which 200 guests had been invited, to say good-by to 
General Judson, the Military Attache who will leave to- 
morrow morning for America. I concluded to permit 
General Judson to send to a barracks not far from the 
Embassy for a guard. A guard of ten soldiers (Bolshe- 
vik) was secured after considerable time, and came to the 
Embassy about 9 p.m. They did not look or deport them- 
selves as soldiers, but I told Phil to give them cigarettes 
and tea, soup and bread, which he did — he had to give 
them white bread which is very scarce here and a great 
luxury. They consumed that rapidly and asked for more, 
which Phil provided. The guests began to arrive about 
9 :30, but mostly in uniform as they were military attaches 
of the other Diplomatic Missions. Two of them, how- 
ever, were Russian officers and came in uniform, not 
knowing there was a guard in the Embassy, as there 
never had been one before since the last Revolution. The 
music box was brought into use — it is a great luxury, 
tell your Mother — and some of those who were not play- 
ing bridge began to dance. Phil provided a most excel- 


lent supper which all the guests seemed to enjoy greatly. 
It was unfortunate that there was an entertainment here 
that evening, and more unfortunate that the two Rus- 
sian officers came in uniform. I heard the following day 
from the dvornick at the door that he had difficulty in 
preventing the Bolshevik soldiers on guard from invad- 
ing the salon to take the shoulder straps off of the Rus- 
sian officers. The order has been issued by the Bolshe- 
vik Government that shoulder straps should be abolished 
and officers now get no more pay than soldiers, which is 
five or seven roubles per month. I gave each one of the 
soldiers five roubles when they left the Embassy for 
their barracks the following morning, but was told that 
they regarded the gifts contemptuously. Under these 
circumstances I have concluded not to request any addi- 
tional guard for the Embassy ; consequently, am attempt- 
ing to protect it by its attaches. To-day two members 
of the marine corps who were serving as couriers and 
were about to leave to-morrow morning were ordered by 
me to remain and to live in the Embassy. They remon- 
strated, but I was very emphatic} — don't know at this 
writing whether they will remain or not. If they should 
go after my order to remain I shall cable the Department 
and demand that they be punished. ' ' 

Later in the month, January, 1918, I wrote home as 
follows : 

"At an anarchist meeting held not a great distance 
from the Embassy about two weeks ago a resolution 
was passed demanding the release of Berkman, Mooney, 
Emma Goldman, et al., and threatening * local American 
Ambassador ' with a hostile demonstration in front of 
the Embassy if he did not procure the desired libera- 
tions. That resolution was sent to Trotzky, the Peoples ' 
Oommissaire for Foreign Affairs ; Trotzky was at Brest- 
Litovsk negotiating a separate peace, and his assistant, a 


Russian Jew named Zalkend, forwarded the resolution to 
me saying he felt it his duty to do so. His note contained 
no comment whatever, not even an offer of protection, 
but indicated ' save yourself if you can, ' or might be con- 
strued that way. When Lenin heard of it he was incensed 
and directed Zalkend to write me a note of apology, which 
Zalkend failed to do, but thought he had smoothed the 
situation over by sending a messenger to the Embassy 
last evening at seven o'clock, who stated that the anar- 
chists had planned an attack for last night but that 
Trotzky had attended to it, or prevented it. I have six 
guards at the Embassy — all Americans and well armed, 
whom I kept on duty last night ; furthermore, Earl John- 
ston and American Consul Treadwell and two or three 
others and myself were here on hand in case of neces- 
sity. No attack or demonstration occurred. I have been 
communicating or keeping in touch with Smolny through 
Raymond Robins, a Chicago man who is in charge of the 
American Red Cross Mission here. He says no one be- 
lieves that any demonstration was planned at all. Any- 
how Lenin has removed Zalkend and put in his place 
Tchecherin, a Bolshevik who was interned in London and 
whose release was demanded by the Bolsheviks a month 
ago when Trotzky announced that no British would be 
permitted to leave Russia until Tchecherin and his col- 
league, Petrov, were released. The British Ambassador 
recommended the release of these men, and they were set 
free. The anarchists are now attempting to frighten me 
into recommending the release of Mooney and Berkman 
and Goldman but as you know I don't scare very easily. 
On the contrary I have wired the Department not to per- 
mit consideration for my safety to influence the action 
of the Government. 

"I received last night from the Department a long 
cable evidently composed by the President giving a sum- 


mary of the report of the Commission appointed by him 
to investigate the Mooney case. The Department wired 
that the President had instructed that I be authorized to 
publish the cable if I saw fit. It has not been published 
yet and may not be. 

"The Bolsheviks seem to be gaining all over Russia 
but as our only source of information is the Bolshevik 
press, — the anti-Bolshevik newspapers having been sup- 
pressed, — it is difficult to tell what is going on outside of 
Petrograd and Moscow. I received to-day a telegram 
from American Consul at Odessa which was 21 days 
enroute. I sent two telegrams to the American Consul 
at Vladivostok the 29th of December, or two copies of the 
same telegram, one of which was sent direct, and the 
other around the globe, — or via Washington. To the 
former I have as yet received no reply, but to the latter 
received reply to-day. This shows you how difficult it 
is to communicate with interior points in Russia. I don't 
know how long our cables will be in transmission to the 
United States or any foreign country. Not one of the 
Foreign Missions here has recognized the Bolshevik gov- 
ernment, which is making every effort to obtain recogni- 
tion and consequently is making it more disagreeable for 
the Foreign Missions from day to day. It is possible that 
our cable communications may be cut off. If so, most or 
all of the Foreign Missions will have to leave. The 
Department has not only complied with every request I 
have made, but when I suggested a change of policy in 
regard to the Bolshevik government which it had not 
recognized in accordance with my advice, it declined to 
follow the suggestion saying my course had met with 
approval of the Department and it saw no occasion to 
change it. I suggested such a change because I was dis- 
gusted with all political parties and all capitalistic in- 
terests in Russia for not organizing and deposing the 


Bolshevik government, whose principles were so repre- 
hensible. My advice up to December 24th was to await 
the convening of the Constituent Assembly which was 
the supreme power to which all Eussia and all civilized 
countries had looked; but the time for its assembling, 
November 28th, passed and when the Bolsheviks arrested 
many of the prominent men elected to that Assembly and 
intimidated others from coming I began to feel that the 
only way to keep Russia in the war was by supporting 
the people in authority. One reason for the bourgeoisie, 
as they are called, offering no resistance to the Bolshe- 
viks was that the latter had control of the army which 
numbered 10,000,000 or more men, with guns, who had 
been held in subjection so long that they could not appre- 
ciate liberty when they gained it. All ranks in the army 
and navy were abolished, even shoulder straps being 
prohibited and officers drawing the same pay as men 
after being selected by their comrades but subject to 
removal by the same authority. I don't know what is to 
become of this country as 80 per cent of the people are 
uneducated and many are inclined to follow the false 
teachings of Bolshevism. The ignorant believe that they 
can divide the property and live in idleness if not in 
luxury. It is a great pity that Russia is, in view of these 
circumstances, richer in resources than the United States 
or any other country on the globe. I would write at 
greater length on this subject but have not the time. 

"A telegram just received from Helsingfors, Finland, 
says that the Bolsheviks have driven out the bourgeois 
Senate and assumed control of Finland — a country which 
declared itself independent about a month ago and whose 
independence has just been recognized by France and 
five or six other governments. Finland has been a part 
of Russia for about a century, but the Finns, many of 
whom are in the United States, have preserved their own 


identity by speaking their own language, having their 
own schools, customs, etc. They deserved independence 
and I was in favor of their having it, but like the Rus- 
sians they don't seem to know how to use it. 

U I have just been called to the phone and heard that 
Smolny Institute, Bolshevik Headquarters, has formally 
announced that a revolution similar to that in Russia has 
begun in Germany. The Bolshevik leaders here, most of 
whom are Jews and 90 per cent of whom are returned 
exiles, care little for Russia or any other country but are 
internationalists and they are trying to start a world- 
wide social revolution. If such a revolution can get a 
foothold in Germany where the people are obsequious to 
those above them and domineering and tyrannical to 
those beneath them and where organization and system 
has obtained such a foothold as it never had in history 
before, I begin to fear for the institutions not only of 
England but of the Republic of France and the thought 
arises in my mind whether our own institutions are 

The relationship between the Bolsheviks and the 
anarchists grew closer as the weeks passed. On April 
15th our Consul-General Summers in Moscow cabled the 
Secretary of State: 

"By decrees March 21st Moscow Commissariat Mili- 
tary Affairs incorporated anarchist forces into socialis- 
tic army on equal footing. Since then de facto authori- 
ties have requisitioned and given to official anarchist 
groups approximately thirty large private residences for 
publication newspapers and other propaganda. As re- 
sult of protection present government anarchism has 
openly spread over Russia. As a result of growing 
power and insults offered Colonel Robins of the Ameri- 
can Red Cross, who is on very intimate terms with Lenin 
and Trotzky, orders were given on the 13th to arrest all 


anarchists. This was done after considerable resistance 
and partial destruction by artillery of the houses occu- 
pied by anarchists. It is understood also that Count 
Mirbach, the German Ambassador, who is expected in 
Moscow daily, warned the local authorities that anar- 
chism must cease before he arrived." 


I never saw Trotzky. I saw Lenin on one occasion. 
It was when I went as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, 
accompanied by all Allied and Neutral Chiefs, to demand 
the release of the Roumanian Minister, Diamandi. The 
British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, had left 
Petrograd two weeks before. The Roumanian Min- 
ister had been arrested and put in the fortress on the 
Russian New Year's Evening, our 14th of January, 1918. 
I called the Corps to meet at the American Embassy the 
following day. There were twenty of us altogether, 
thirteen representing the Allied and seven the Neutral 
countries. All of us signed the demand for the release. 
Some of the others were disposed to have me go accom- 
panied by two Neutrals and two Allied Chiefs. There 
was some delay about agreement on the four members 
besides myself, and I proposed that we all go in a body. 
I had arranged a meeting through the telephone with 
Lenin, who speaks English. 

The Bolsheviks had been in control of the government 
about two months when the Roumanian Minister was 
arrested. They retained the same headquarters that they 
occupied when the Provisional Government was over- 
thrown, which was Smolny Institute. Smolny had been 
used as a girls' school. When Lenin appointed the time 
for the Diplomatic Corps to call upon him, he informed 
the leaders of the Bolshevik Party thereof. Some of 
these leaders suggested that Smolny Institute should be 
furnished with rugs and new furniture for the occasion. 



Others advised Lenin to receive the Diplomatic Corps 
in his own office, without rising and without inviting them 
to take seats, and to cut the interview short by asking 
the Diplomats in a curt tone of voice what they wished. 
A compromise was decided on by Lenin, who did not 
procure any additional furnishings, but met us at the 
door of his office. 

I, as Dean of the Corps, accosted him first, saying to 
him I was the American Ambassador and Dean of the 
Diplomatic Corps. I introduced the other Ambassadors 
and the Ministers by their official titles. Lenin thereupon 
invited us into a room about twelve by fifteen feet, and 
showed the Ministers and Charges to seats upon a 
wooden bench. He showed the Ambassadors to chairs, 
and said: "Be seated, gentlemen." I read in English, 
and while standing, the demand which we had all signed, 
and then had Livingston Phelps read it in French. 

Lenin said: "Let us discuss the matter.' ' I immedi- 
ately replied: "No discussion on the subject whatever. ,, 
I said that the person of a diplomatic representative was 
inviolate and was immune; that we stood on this prin- 
ciple recognized in international relations and demanded 
the release of Diamandi. The French Ambassador be- 
gan to talk. A discussion ensued lasting at least an 
hour. Lenin was pleasant in manner throughout the 
meeting. At the close of the talk I got up and said: 
"We'll end this discussion here. ,, 

The Serbian Minister had made a very impassioned 
speech in French in which he had said the Germans and 
Austrians had invaded his beloved land, killing many 
innocent citizens, women and children. He said that the 
Serbians did not revenge themselves on the German Min- 
ister or the Austrian Minister, when they could have 
done so, observing the custom, which had never been 
violated, of giving ministers of the belligerent countries 


safe conduct through the border. It was evident that 
the Bolsheviks saw they were in a very embarrassing 
position. The Diplomats would have left Petrograd if 
Diamandi had not been released. 

Lenin said he would refer the demand to the Council 
of Commissars, that is to say practically the Bolshevik 
Executive Committee, and would let us know by twelve 
o'clock that night, or as soon as the matter was passed 
upon. I told Lenin I would be in the Embassy through- 
out the evening. He phoned me about midnight that the 
Central Soviet had concluded to release Diamandi. The 
release took place the next day about one o'clock, but 
the Roumanian Minister was ordered to leave Petrograd 
within ten days after that, and was given only twenty- 
four hours ' notice. I went to the Roumanian Legation to 
say good-by, but found that Minister Diamandi had 
already gone to the Finnish Station. I followed him 
there, and caught the train before he left. He was going 
to Sweden. He crossed at Torneo, which was about 
thirty hours' distance by regular schedule, but he was 
three weeks in getting there. I heard afterwards that 
the Bolshevik Commissar who had the Minister in charge 
carried a communication to the local Commissar ordering 
that the Roumanian Minister be shot when they reached 
Torneo ; but a revolution had taken place there and the 
Whites were in control, having taken Torneo out of the 
hands of the Reds the day previous. The Whites ar- 
rested the Bolshevik Commissar when he came into 
Torneo and it was reported that they shot him instead of 
Minister Diamandi. 

The arrest and imprisonment of Diamandi will pass 
into diplomatic history as an act of most extraordinary 
character. It was an incident which gained in signifi- 
cance through later developments. 

On the day following the call of the Diplomatic Corps 

Norwegian Minister to Russia 

British Ambassador to Russia 

Roumanian Minister to Russia 

French Ambassador to Russia 


at Smolny, the organ of the Bolsheviks Pravda 
(Truth) printed an astonishing statement that Zalkend, 
the Assistant Commissar (Trotzky being down in Brest- 
Litovsk) had received by telephone information to this 

1 ' American Ambassador assures he will immediately 
after the release of Diamandi go to him with protest 
against the treatment of the Russian troops in Roumania, 
and will make through the American Representative at 
Roumania, a necessary statement to the Roumanian Min- 
istry. He regards the act of Diamandi 's arrest as a 
formal expression of protest of the Russian Government 
against the activities of the Roumanian Commander-in- 
Chief/ J 

As a matter of fact, I had sent no statement and had 
authorized no one to make any statement for me, by tele- 
phone or otherwise, to Zalkend. Apparently the state- 
ment had been given out by Zalkend to save the face of 
the Bolshevik Government. It was not until some time 
later that I learned what was behind this action of Zal- 
kend 's. Diamandi after his release referred to this pub- 
lication in Pravda and expressed to the Diplomatic 
Corps his surprise and regret on account of it. I imme- 
diately addressed to him a letter in which I said : 

' ' My dear Colleague : 

"I am surprised and pained to learn from you that 
you for a moment think that I would or could justify 
your arrest and confinement in Peter and Paul Fortress 
as I have had only one opinion on the subject, and have 
made no expressions concerning it other than to deplore 
such an unprecedented infraction on diplomatic immu- 
nities. I have concurred in the sentiment of our col- 
leagues, allied and neutral chiefs of missions, and as 
the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps accompanied by all 


the members thereof presented to the President of the 
Commissars the demand for your immediate and uncon- 
ditional release and stated in doing so that we could not 
enter into any discussion concerning the causes of your 

' ' I have had no communication direct nor indirect, nor 
have I sent any message to anyone connected with the 
Soviet Government on the subject of your arrest or your 
release. The dragoman of the Embassy by my direction 
telephoned to Smolny Institute about midnight of the 
14th to ask whether the decision concerning your release 
had been determined, but he was not instructed nor 
authorized to make any other inquiry and certainly no 
condition concerning your release, and he informs me 
that he did not do so or even think of doing so." 

There was an echo to this Diamandi incident at the 
meeting of the Bolshevik Councils some weeks later. 
Rabovski, one of the Bolshevik leaders, in that congress 
expressed regret that the Roumanian Minister had spent 
only twenty-four hours outside the walls of his Embassy. 
1 ' This matter can be righted, ' ' he said, ' ' and we will give 
the most active assistance to Roumanian workmen and 
peasants to help them hide away the Messrs. Diamandis 
where they should be." 

The circumstances which led the Bolsheviks to arrest 
and imprison the Roumanian Minister came to my 
knowledge some time after the visit of the Diplomatic 
Corps tc Lenin. Those circumstances went to show not 
only that the Bolsheviks were acting in the interests of 
the Germans in this matter, but under special requests 
from them. 

A letter from A. Joife, and marked "confidential" was 
sent from Brest-Li to vsk, dated December 31st (Old 
Style), 1917, addressed "To the Council of People's Com- 


missars of Petrograd. ' ' A. Joff e was President of the del- 
egation representing the Bolshevik Government in the 
peace negotiations at Brest. This letter opened with: 
"Comrade L. D. Trotzky instructed me to bring to the 
knowledge of the Council of People 's Commissars the mo- 
tives of his telegraphic order about the arrest of the 
Eoumanian diplomatic representatives at Petrograd." 
The letter stated that General Hoffmann of the German 
Peace Delegation "pointed out the necessity of sending 
of sure agents into the Eoumanian Army and the possi- 
bility to arrest the Eoumanian Legation at Petersburg 
(Petrograd) in whole; also to take repressive measures 
against the Eoumanian King and the Eoumanian Chief 
Command. After this conversation Comrade L. D. 
Trotzky ordered in a telegraphic way the arrest of the 
Eoumanian representative at Petersburg (Petrograd). 
The above-mentioned report is sent with a special 
courier, Comrade I. G. Brosoff, who will give to Com- 
mander Podvoyski secret information concerning the 
sending to the Eoumanian Army of persons, the names 
of whom Comrade Brosoff will tell. All of those persons 
will be paid from the fund of the German Kerosene- 
Trade Bank, which bought near Borislave the stock 
society Fanto & Co. The chief direction of the agents 
will belong according to General Hoffmann's indication 
to the well-known Wolff Venigel, who has under his 
observation the military missions of the Allied 
countries. ' ' 
Very significant was the conclusion of this JofYe letter : 
"What concerns the British and American representa- 
tives, General Hoffmann said that the German staff 
approved the measures taken by Comrade Trotzky and 
Comrade Laziniroff concerning looking after their 

Still more convincing evidence, perhaps, of Lenin's 


employment as the agent of Germany was afforded in a 
newspaper interview with General William Hoffmann, 
Chief of Staff of the Eastern Army of Germany, which 
appeared in the newspapers of December 24th, 1920. 
General Hoffmann was quoted as saying : 

"As Chief of Staff of the East Army during the war, 
I directed the propaganda against the Russian Army. 
The General Staff naturally made use of every possible 
means to break through the Russian front. One of these 
means was poisoned gas, another was Lenin. The Im- 
perial regime dispatched Lenin to Russia from the Swiss 
frontier. With our consent, Lenin and his friends dis- 
organized the Russian army. Von Kuehlmann (former 
German Secretary for Foreign Affairs), Count Czernin 
(Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister), and I then closed 
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty so that we could throw our 
army against the West front. While at Brest we were 
convinced that the Bolsheviks could not hold power more 
than three weeks. 

* ' On my word of honor as a German general, in spite 
of the valuable service Trotzky and Lenin rendered, we 
neither knew nor foresaw the danger to humanity from 
the consequences of this journey of Bolsheviks to 
Russia.' ' 

Shortly after the appearance of this interview, General 
Hoffmann attempted to repudiate it. While I was in 
Washington, early in March, 1921, to present my resig- 
nation as Ambassador to Russia to the outgoing Admin- 
istration, I was told that this interview with General 
Hoffmann was shown to him before publication, and that 
he signed his name to it in token of approval. 



The Bolsheviks acted quickly after announcing their 
new government under the form of the ' ' Council of Com- 
missars of the People. ' ' 

On the 7th of November, 1917, Trotzky as "the Com- 
missary of the People for Foreign Affairs,' ' addressed 
this communication to the American Embassy : 

' l In drawing your attention to the text of the proposi- 
tion for an armistice and a Democratic peace without 
annexations or contributions, founded on the rights of 
people to dispose of themselves, proposals approved by 
the Congress of the Council of Workmen and Soldiers, 
I have the honor to beg you, Mr. Ambassador, to be good 
enough to regard the above-mentioned documents as a 
formal proposal for an armistice without delay on all the 
fronts, and for the opening without delay of negotiations 
for peace — a proposal which the plenipotentiary govern- 
ment of the Russian Republic is addressing simultan- 
eously to all the belligerent nations and to their govern- 

"I beg you, Mr. Ambassador, to be good enough to 
accept the assurance of the perfect consideration and 
very profound respect of the government of the Councils 
for the people of the United States, who also, like all the 
other peoples exhausted by this incomparable butchery, 
cannot help but ardently desire peace.' ' 

The armistice between the Bolsheviks and the Germans 
took effect at the end of November, 1917. Trotzky an- 
nounced that hostilities had ceased on the Russian front 
and that preliminary negotiations would be started on 
the 2nd of December. His announcement said: 



"The Allied governments and all diplomatic repre- 
sentatives in Russia are kindly requested to reply 
whether they wish to take part in a negotiation. ' ' 

The British Ambassador, who at that time was Dean 
of the Diplomatic Corps, made public a statement that 
Trotzky 's letter with the proposal of a general armistice 
was not received until nineteen hours after the receipt 
by the Russian Commander-in-Chief of the Bolsheviks 
of the order to open immediate negotiations for an 
armistice. I transmitted the communication from 
Trotzky to the American Government, but made no 
answer to Trotzky, as the United States had not recog- 
nized the Bolshevik Government. Lieut.-Col. Kerth, 
representing the Military Mission of the United States 
at the front in Russia, did address the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Russian Army this protest : 

"In accordance with definite instructions of my Gov- 
ernment, transmitted to me by the Ambassador of the 
United States of America in Petrograd, I have the honor 
to inform you that in view of the fact that the Republic 
of the United States is carrying on a war in alliance with 
Russia, which war has as its basis the struggle of democ- 
racy against autocracy, my Government categorically 
and energetically protests against any separate armistice 
which may be made by Russia.' ' 

It was not until the 12th of March, 1918, that the terms 
of this peace were approved by the Soviet Congress at 
Moscow, but in the meantime Lenin and Trotzky had not 
delayed the work of demoralizing the Russian Army. 
Lenin, it must be remembered, had come into Russia 
from Switzerland, traveling through Germany in a pri- 
vate car and being abundantly supplied with means. 
When I went to Russia there was an army enlisted of 
12,000,000 men. It was increased to 16,000,000 before 


the revolution against the Monarchy in March, 1917, and 
there was a call for 3,000,000 additional. Of those 16,- 
000,000 men, 2,000,000 had been captured and 2,000,000 
had been killed or died from disease, so that the army at 
the time of the armistice entered into by the Bolsheviks 
with the Germans numbered about 12,000,000 men, not 
equaled in numbers by any other nation in any war. 

With the signing of the armistice this army demobi- 
lized itself. It melted away like snow before a summer 's 
sun. Disintegration continued during the period of 
negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, and while the treaty was 
awaiting approval by the Soviet Congress. The soldiers 
left their regiments in large bodies. They would get on 
trains and the trains would start before they asked 
where they were going. Some of these soldiers sold 
their arms for a trifle; others threw their arms away, 
and some took their arms home. 

As soon as the armistice had been agreed to by the 
Bolsheviks, the Germans moved more than 100 divisions 
from their Eastern front to France, and began to pre- 
pare for their drive, in March, 1918, against the Allied 
armies. History records how nearly successful this drive 
was. Had it not been for the demoralization of the Rus- 
sian army by the Bolsheviks, hundreds of thousands of 
lives of French and British and American soldiers would 
have been spared. Lenin and Trotzky demoralized the 
Russian army and thereby caused the war to be pro- 

In various ways the Bolsheviks promptly contributed 
directly or indirectly to strengthen the Germans during 
that period immediately following their armistice. In 
March I received through Consul-General Madden Sum- 
mers, of Moscow, reports from our consuls, — Macgowan 
at Irkutsk, Nielson at Samara, Jenkins at Chita, and 
others, showing the movement of released prisoners and 


of material from Russia to Germany. Nielson from 
Samara reported many cars of cotton loaded and being 
shipped by German firms. 

The Bolsheviks went through the form of inviting 
England, France, Italy and America to enter into nego- 
tiations for peace under the armistice with Germany. 
They waited ten days, professedly to give the other 
countries time to come in. Then they proceeded with 
the negotiation of a separate peace. Trotzky was at the 
head of the Bolsheviks in the first negotiations. Lenin 
remained in Petrograd and was practically the whole 
Bolshevik Government. While I have no doubt that 
Lenin was a German agent from the beginning and dis- 
bursed German money, I believe, and so wired the De- 
partment, that his real purpose was promotion of world- 
wide social revolution. He would have taken British 
money, American money, and French money and used it 
to promote his purpose. He told a man who asked what 
he was doing in Russia that he was trying an "experi- 
ment in government" on the Russian people. Germany's 
desire to demoralize Russia and break up the Provisional 
Government gave Lenin his opportunity, of which he 
made good use. 

When Trotzky demurred to the hard terms offered by 
the Germans in the first peace negotiations, General 
Hoffmann, the head of the German delegation, notified 
him and his Bolshevik associates that Germany would 
not prolong the negotiations more than two or three days 
further, and said: "You will have to say definitely 
whether you will accept these terms or not." Then it 
was that Trotzky showed real ability. He made that 
dramatic stand and replied in effect: "We decline to 
sign those severe peace terms, but Russia will fight no 

This was the situation which rather stunned the Ger- 


mans. Trotzky carried out his declaration by leaving 
Brest-Litovsk and returning to Petrograd. A few days 
later the Germans gave out that they were going to 
march on Petrograd and Moscow. Trotzky replied to 
them that they could not move without violating the 
terms of the armistice, which required twelve days' 
notice before resumption of hostilities. The Germans ' 
reply was, as the armies advanced, "You have already 
terminated the armistice by refusing to sign the peace 

From Brest-Litovsk on the 5th of February, 1918, Karl 
Radek sent a long statement of the purposes of the Bol- 
shevik delegation in the negotiations for peace with Ger- 
many. In the course of that he said : 

u We Revolutionary-Internationalists not only em- 
phatically refused to aid our own Bourgeoisie to gain 
a victory over the proletariat of a neighboring country, 
but we pointed out that a peace which would be the result 
of an agreement between the great capitalistic powers 
would be a peace concluded at the expense of small na- 
tions and their international proletariats. The small 
nations will represent ' small change ' for such a peace, 
and the international proletariat will pay the expenses 
of the war. What is it that you want? — we are asked 
by the Centrist elements ; by the Minimalist Internation- 
alists in Russia. Do you demand that the war shall be 
continued until capitalism is overthrown in all countries 
and all colonies liberated? — and they ridicule us as vi- 
sionaries, who are prepared to consent to the proletariat 
being drained of blood for the sake of India being liber- 
ated from the English yoke. Yes, this would be in- 
sanity; and we answered them, therefore: No, we do not 
want to continue the war until socialism has conquered 
but we want to use, with all our might, the world war — 
the world crisis of capitalism — for directing the maturing 
forces of the labor class to the object of tearing out once 
for all, the roots of war and capitalism. We want to 
transform the war of nations into a civil war." 


The formal notification which the Trotzky delegation 
handed to the Germans at Brest was a curiosity : 

"In the name of the People's Commissaries, which is 
the government of the Russian Federated Republic, we 
hereby bring to the knowledge of the governments and 
peoples at war with us, to our allies and to the neutral 
countries, that refusing to sign an annexationist treaty, 
Russia declares on her part the state of war with Ger- 
many, Austro-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria has ceased. 
That the Russian troops are simultaneously given orders 
to demobolize completely on all fronts." 

When Trotzky returned to Petrograd after making this 
grandstand play, which dumbfounded the Germans, 
Lenin reprimanded him and told him the Russian Soviet 
Government would be compelled to agree to terms still 
more severe, whereupon Trotzky resigned as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and was made Minister of War and 
organized the Red Army, which organization is in exis- 
tence up to the present time, and waged war successfully 
for a time against Poland and is now threatening 
Esthonia. The Red Army is composed of Lettish and 
Chinese troops and conscripted Russians. It has the rep- 
utation of being the most strictly disciplined and the 
most cruel army in history. 

The actions of these Bolsheviks in these peace negotia- 
tions were without precedent as far as I know in the his- 
tory of international relations, but it may be said that 
Lenin and Trotzky have disregarded many precedents. 
While I have no agreement whatever with Lenin's views, 
my judgment credited him with sincerity. (This sentence 
was written soon after my return. I have changed my 
mind in regard to Lenin's sincerity.) He proved ruthless 
and unscrupulous, however, in attempting to carry out his 
convictions. When his power was threatened and could 
not be maintained in any other way, he permitted the 


Reign of Terror. It will be recalled that Trotzky refused 
to be a party in person to the second negotiations with the 
Germans, and that Tchecherin represented the Bolshe- 

While the peace negotiations were going on at Brest 
one of my u scouts,' ' whose duty it was to look, listen 
and report, brought to the Embassy this memorandum : 

"The anarchist movement strengthens daily. During 
a visit to the Foreign Office, the anarchist representative 
said that in case the anarchists condemned in America 
are not released the American Embassy at Petrograd 
and the Ambassador would pay the penalty." 

A short time before the Brest-Litovsk peace was rati- 
fied at Moscow by the All-Russian Soviet Congress I 
had cabled the State Department that the Congress 
would meet to act upon the peace treaty, and that I 
thought the Russian people should have some expression 
of interest on the part of the American people. Presi- 
dent Wilson cabled a message addressed to the Russian 
people through this Soviet Congress. He said: 

1 ' May I not take advantage of the meeting of the Con- 
gress of the Soviets to express the sincere sympathy 
which the people of the United States feel for the Rus- 
sian people at this moment when the German power has 
been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole strug- 
gle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany 
for the purpose of the people of Russia? 

" Although the Government of the United States is, 
unhappily, not now in a position to render the direct and 
effective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the 
people of Russia through the Congress that it will avail 
itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once 
more complete sovereignty and independence in her own 


affairs, and full restoration to her great role in the life 
of Europe and the modern world. 

"The whole heart of the people of the United States 
is with the people of Russia in the attempt to free them- 
selves forever from autocratic government and become 
the masters of their own life. ,, 

On the same day Samuel Gompers, President of the 
American Federation of Labor, cabled the All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets as follows: 

"We address you in the name of world liberty. We 
assure you that the people of the United States are 
pained by every blow at Russian freedom, as they would 
be by a blow at their own. The American people desire 
to be of service to the Russian people in their struggle 
to safeguard freedom and realize its opportunities. We 
desire to be informed as to how we may help. 

"We speak for the great organized movement of 
working people who are devoted to the cause of freedom 
and the ideals of democracy. We assure you also that 
the whole American Nation ardently desires to be help- 
ful to Russia and awaits with eagerness an indication 
from Russia as to how help may most effectively be 

"To all those who strive for freedom, we say: Cour- 
age! Justice must triumph if all free people stand 
united against autocracy ! We await your suggestions. ' ' 

President Wilson's message was presented to the 
Congress. Zinoviev, who was the head of the Bolshevik 
Government in Petrograd, was in Moscow when the cable 
from President Wilson was printed. He returned to 
Petrograd two or three days later and said in a speech : 
"We slapped the President of the United States in the 

The reply to the President's message to the Republic 


of Russia was intended by the Bolsheviks for effect on 
the workingmen of the United States. It was practically 
an invitation to revolution in the United States. It is a 
fair illustration of what Bolshevism means. 

"The All-Russian Congress of Soviets expresses its 
appreciation to the American people, and first of all to 
the laboring and exploited classes in the United States 
for the message sent by the President of the United 
States to the Congress of Soviets in this time when the 
Eussian Socialistic Soviet Republic is living through 
most difficult trials. 

"The Russian Republic uses the occasion of the mes- 
sage from President Wilson to express to all peoples 
who are dying and suffering from the horrors of this 
imperialistic war its warm sympathy and firm conviction 
that the happy time is near when the laboring masses 
in all bourgeois countries will throw off the capitalistic 
yoke and establish a socialistic state of society, which 
is the only one capable of assuring a permanent and just 
peace as well as the culture and well-being of all who 

Immediately following the ratification of the peace 
treaty at Moscow, I gave out a statement for publication, 
March 16, 1918. The Bolshevik papers at Moscow were 
closed against communications from the American Em- 
bassy, but in other cities the statement was printed. I 
had it translated into Russian : 

"I shall not leave Russia until forced to depart. My 
government and the American people are too deeply 
interested in the welfare of the Russian people to aban- 
don the country and leave its people to the mercies of 
Germany. America is sincerely interested in Russia and 
in the freedom of the Russian people. We shall do all 
possible to promote the true interests of the Russians 
and to protect and preserve the integrity of this great 
country. The friendship between Russia and the United 
States which has existed for a century or more should 


be augmented rather than impaired by Russia becoming 
a Republic, and all Americans are sincerely desirous that 
Russians should be permitted to continue free and inde- 
pendent and not become subjects of Germany. 

"I have not yet seen an authentic copy of the peace 
treaty but am sufficiently acquainted with its provisions 
to know that if the Russian people submit thereto Russia 
will not only be robbed of vast acres of her rich territory 
but will eventually become virtually a German province 
and her people will lose the liberties for which their 
ancestors have struggled and sacrificed for generations 
past. My Government still considers America an ally 
of the Russian people, who surely will not reject the 
proffered assistance which we shall be prompt to render 
to any power in Russia that will offer sincere and organ- 
ized resistance to the German invasion. If the Russian 
people who are brave and patriotic will hold in abeyance 
for the time being their political differences and be reso- 
lute and firm and united they can drive the enemy from 
their borders and secure before the end of 1918 for them- 
selves and the world an enduring peace." 

I issued the above address to the Russian people. I 
appealed to them to organize and repel the Germans. I 
said we Americans and our Government still considered 
the Russian people our allies, that we were not going to 
observe the peace. 

About four days after this appeared, Kuehlman, the 
German Minister of Foreign Affairs, made a demand on 
the Bolshevik Government that I be sent out of Russia. 
The German demand said : 

"He is not only violating the laws of neutrality, but 
he has issued an address to the Russian people which is 
a virtual call to arms." 

The Bolsheviks said nothing to me about this demand 
of the German Government. I was not in communication 
with them at the time. I learned, however, that their 


reply to Kuehlman was to the effect that I had not said 
any more than President Wilson had said in his message 
to the Bolshevik Congress. 

Kuehlman, in conversation with Karahan, Secretary 
of the Russian Peace Delegation at Brest in February, 
had said that the Foreign Embassies would have to leave 
Petrograd on short notice from the Germans. One of 
the reports which reached us at the time was that the 
Allied Missions might be arrested. It was even rumored 
that the American Ambassador might be made a prisoner 
by the Germans and held to be exchanged for the German 
ship, The Vaterland, then held in New York harbor. 
There were German officers in Petrograd at the time. 
One of them shot and killed two Russian soldiers at the 
Grand Hotel ' ' for being rude to him, ' ' as the report made 
to the Bolshevik officers stated. 

At this time cable communication with my Government 
was severed; it had been very unreliable and irregular 
since the Bolsheviks came into power. I had no author- 
ity from my Government to make the foregoing address 
to the Russian people, but assumed the responsibility, 
advising the Department of State of the exact wording of 
this appeal to the Russian people. I did not learn until 
two months later that the Department of State approved 
of this address, and then I was informed only through 
a newspaper clipping sent to me by Ira Nelson Morris, 
American Minister to Stockholm. That newspaper clip- 
ping stated the Associated Press correspondent in Wash- 
ington had called at the Department of State and in- 
quired whether the address I had issued to the Russian 
people had been authorized by my government. The re- 
ply, according to the clipping, was : "No, but it was thor- 
oughly approved.* ' 


I had received authority from my government to leave 
Petrograd whenever my judgment so dictated, and all of 
my colleagues had received similar authority from their 
governments. We were meeting in the American Em- 
bassy daily, not all of the Allied Chiefs, but the British, 
the French, the Italian and the Japanese Ambassadors.. 
The Germans were approaching Petrograd. The Bol- 
shevik Government was preparing to move to Moscow. 
I had remained some four weeks after receiving instruc- 
tions to act upon my own discretion about leaving Petro- 
grad. At one of these conferences of the Ambassadors 
toward the end of February, 1918, we decided that the 
time had come to leave. I said to them : "I am not going 
out of Russia.* ' 

" Where are you going V* one of them asked. 

"I am going to Vologda,' ' I said. 

"What do you know about Vologda .f " 

"Not a thing except that it is the junction of the 
Trans-Siberian Railway and the Mo scow- Archangel 
Railway and that it is 350 miles farther away from the 

"Well, if it is unsafe there, what are you going to do?" 

"I am going east to Viatka, which is 600 miles east, 
and if it is unsafe there, I am going to Perm. If it is 
unsafe at Perm, I am going to Irkutsk, and if it is still 
unsafe, I am going to Chita, and if necessary from there 
I am going to Vladivostok, where I will be protected 



by an American man-of-war, the Brooklyn, under 
Admiral Knight.' ' 

We discussed the situation, and I told my colleagues : 

"You ought not to leave Russia now." 

They wanted to get out of Russia and return to their 
own countries. All of them declined to join me in my 
plan except the Japanese Embassy and the Chinese 
Legation. They were willing to go to Vologda, which 
would be on their way home. 

The other missions attempted to get away by going 
west. The British, French, Italians, Belgians, Serbians, 
Portuguese and the Greeks left on trains, attempting to 
go through Finland. They found themselves in the midst 
of civil war between the Bolshevik element and the Bour- 
geoisie. The Bolsheviks had occupied Helsingf ors. After 
considerable negotiation it was arranged that these Allied 
Missions be permitted to go through the lines, but through 
some misunderstanding the British Embassy in its spe- 
cial train was the only mission that got through. The 
lines were again closed and the remaining six missions 
were left on the Red Guard side of Finland. After re- 
maining several weeks on their special trains, some of 
them were instructed by their respective governments 
to return to Russia, which they did and joined me at 
Vologda, The French, Italian and Serbians arrived 
first, and the Belgians about a week later. They lived 
in cars on the tracks at the railway station for some time. 

Having discretionary authority to leave Petrograd 
the natural thing, perhaps, for me to do was to have 
gone with the other missions and stopped in Norway or 
Sweden for orders from Washington, but I did not like 
to abandon the Russian people, for whom I felt deep 
sympathy and whom I had assured repeatedly of 
America's unselfish interest in their welfare. 


Just before leaving Petrograd, I wrote my son Charles, 
under date of February 23rd, 1918: 

" . . . My plan is to stay in Russia as long as I can. 
If a separate peace is concluded, as I believe it will be, 
there will be no danger of my being captured by the 
Germans. Such a separate peace, however, will be a 
severe blow to the Allies, and if any section of Russia 
refuses to recognize the authority of the Bolshevik Gov- 
ernment to conclude such a peace I shall endeavor to 
locate in that section and encourage the rebellion. If 
no section is opposed to same I shall go to Vladivostok 
and endeavor from there to prevent supplies from fall- 
ing into the hands of the Germans, and if there are any 
people organizing in Russia for armed resistance to 
Germany, I shall encourage them and recommend our 
Government to assist them. You may not conclude, 
therefore, that I am planning to return to America." 

I left Petrograd on the morning of February 27th, and 
arrived at Vologda about twenty-six hours later. The 
railroad connections offered the main reason for the 
selection of this stopping place, notwithstanding my in- 
formation was to the effect that the Bolshevik spirit in 
Vologda was deep-rooted and widespread. I lived near- 
ly a week on the train, which was very much crowded 
with the Embassy staff and the military mission. After 
being in Vologda two days, I cabled the Department I had 
concluded to remain as long as it was safe. To this con- 
clusion I was encouraged by the local treatment received. 
The Mayor, the President of the City Duma, the Presi- 
dent of the local Soviet and the local representatives of 
the Central Soviet at Moscow called upon me. Although 
I had never had any official relation with the Soviet or 
Bolshevik government because the United States had 
not recognized the Bolsheviks, these local officers were 
very courteous and accommodating. They offered me 


the use of a club house, a commodious and an imposing 
structure, for the American Embassy. I accepted and 
began living there and conducting the chancellery therein 
from March 4th. I inaugurated the custom of giving 
a tea every Saturday afternoon to which the officials 
mentioned, my colleagues and their families and the sta- 
tionmaster were invited. In an after-dinner speech 
made by me when I was a guest of the Mayor, I desig- 
nated Vologda as "the diplomatic capital of Russia." 
The Russians present seemed very much pleased when 
this was translated to them. 

This action taken by me in selecting Vologda and re- 
maining there was rather unique in diplomatic history. 
I recall that the French Ambassador to the United 
States, Jusserand, when I met him in Paris, during the 
peace negotiations, referred to it and commented. He 
said, i * You discovered Vologda. You put it on the map. 
You made it the diplomatic center of Russia for five or 
six months.' ' 

Vologda was founded 1147 A. D., or about 345 years 
before Columbus discovered America. It is the great or 
one of the great lace centers of Russia. Some very fine 
samples of lace are to be had there. I am told they are 
all handmade and of very fine linen. 

After becoming settled at Vologda, I told in a private 
letter to one of my sons of the gradual development of 
friendly relations. The letter was dated March 19th: 

* * ... I have never recognized this Bolshevik Govern- 
ment, but have established a quasi business or working 
arrangement with it, and to that do I attribute the 
courtesy shown us by the municipal authorities and by 
the local Commissar and by the President of the local 
Soviet. There are local Soviets throughout Russia com- 
posed of workmen, soldiers and peasants; they assume 
and exercise the right to commandeer whatever resi- 


dences they desire to live in, ordering the owners or 
occupants therefrom. There has been no violence here 
that I have heard of; in fact the town is remarkably 
quiet and I have enjoyed my stay here, being domiciled 
in the club house, very well adapted to the Embassy's 
uses. Last night I entertained the local Commissar, the 
Mayor, President of the Local Soviet, President of the 
City Duma, and five other officials, at a dinner in the 
club house, which has become known through the town 
as the American Embassy." . 

At one time I spoke to the Mayor about his affiliations. 
I asked him if he was a Bolshevik. He said he was not 
a Bolshevik, and that he was authorized by the munic- 
ipal assembly — as we would call it in the United States — 
to invite us to remain there ; that we would be protected. 
He continued to administer affairs until we left Vologda, 
although the local Soviet was disposed to dispute his 
authority some time before we left. 

On May 5th, 1918, 1 was shocked to hear that Consul- 
General Madden Summers had died the day before after 
an illness of twenty-four hours. I had not yet regained 
my strength from ten days' illness and was still on diet, 
but I decided to go to Moscow and did so on the first 
train. At the funeral I delivered an address in which 
I endeavored to bring out the significance of Summers' 
splendid work, to emphasize his record as a faithful, effi- 
cient representative of his country. In the course of 
this address I said: 

"He who gives his life for a cause can contribute no 
more. Whether such tribute be rendered on sea or on 
land or in the clouds, whether it be at the cannon 's mouth 
or in defense against an assault or even by some of the 
other horrible devices of modern warfare, whether it be 
in military or civil service, none the less, he has given 
his all and no man can make greater sacrifice than this. 



Madden Summers yielded his life in his country's service 
and did so as effectually as if he had been taken off by 
the enemy in ambush and as courageously as if he had 
fallen in attack on the enemy's works. He realized as 
fully as does an officer leading his troops in a battle that 
his very life was in jeopardy and that realization nerved 
him to renewed effort.' ' 

On the 4th of July, 1918, 1 gave a reception which was 
attended by the members of the Diplomatic Corps then 
in Vologda, all of the attaches of the Allied Missions, 
and by quite a number of Russians. The Mayor was 
present — nominally Bolshevik, but at heart "anti." He 
had been elected by a direct vote of the people before 
the Bolshevik regime. The assistant mayor, Mr. Zu- 
boff, a Cadet, was present. Both the mayor and the 
assistant mayor had been suspended from office the week 
before by a representative of the Bolshevik Government 
at Moscow, named Kedroff. The latter, after arresting 
and sending to Moscow the City Duma of Archangel, 
stopped at Vologda on his return and had placed a local 
Bolshevik "in the saddle" of municipal affairs. 

I made this Fourth of July reception the occasion of 
an address to the Russian people, which was published 
in the Vologda paper, Listok. I ordered 50,000 copies 
printed in Russian circular form, for general distribu- 

At this time the Bolshevik Government at Moscow had 
a representative at Vologda in the person of Vosne- 
senski, who occupied the position of Chief of the Far 
Eastern Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Vosnesenski was a shrewd Jew. He had, as we used to 
express it in Kentucky immediately after the Civil War, 
1 'the cheek of a government mule." He had been sent 
to Vologda by the Bolsheviks to ascertain whether the 
Allies had concluded in principle to intervene, but he got 


no satisfaction from me, and I do not think he received 
any definite information from any of my colleagues. 

There were at this time many rumors afloat concern- 
ing the advance of the Allied detachments. We had 
authentic reports to the effect that the landing of the 
Allied forces would be resisted by Bolsheviks at Arch- 
angel. Those forces were, as we knew, in possession 
at Murmansk, and the local Soviet there was friendly 
to the Allies, because it had seen what had been evident 
to the Allied representatives at Vologda for some time, 
that the Bolshevik Government was absolutely under the 
domination of Germany. At the same time the Bolshe- 
viks at Moscow were manifesting a strong desire to ap- 
pear on good terms with the Allied missions, and espe- 
cially the American Embassy. 

The Fourth of July address to the Russian people 
follows : 

"On this July 4th, the natal day of the American Re- 
public, I feel constrained to say a few words of encour- 
agement to the Russian people for whom my country 
cherishes deep sympathy. One hundred and forty-two 
years ago to-day the thirteen American Colonies pro- 
claimed their independence; they had a population of 
about three million souls occupying a narrow strip along 
the Atlantic seacoast. After a struggle of seven years 
their independence was acknowledged; then followed a 
critical period of internal dissension which ended in the 
adoption of a Constitution and the formation of the 
Government which exists to-day. 

"Americans throughout the world celebrate this day 
in commemoration of the achievements of our ancestors, 
to express our pride in our institutions, to renew our 
pledges of fealty to the principles on which our Govern- 
ment is based and to inspire our descendants with love 
of country and with appreciation of the liberty they 

"France assisted us to gain our independence and we 


have always felt sincerely grateful therefor — and I am 
pleased to note that the French Chamber of Deputies has 
decided to observe the day in testimony of 'indissoluble 
and fraternal friendship. ' 

"The Father of our Country warned us against en- 
tangling foreign alliances and we observed that injunc- 
tion for a hundred and forty years, or as long as our 
self-respect, our sense of duty and our obligations to 
humanity permitted. We were much farther removed 
from Europe when our independence was achieved than 
^vve are to-day; the application of steam as a motive 
power had not then been discovered, there were no ocean 
steamers, no steam railroads; there were no telegraph 
lines, no telephones, no machine guns, no aeroplanes, no 

"Within that period our population has grown by 
rapid strides until it now numbers considerably over one 
hundred millions, and many millions of the increase have 
come from European lands. 

"We are engaged in the greatest war of history — a 
world war in fact — and so earnestly have we taken part 
that the spirit of our people is aroused as never before. 
We have not the slightest doubt as to the outcome. Rus- 
sia is interested in this war as no other country is inter- 
ested because she will lose most in the event of the vic- 
tory of the Central Empires. My country and all of the 
Allies consider the Russian people still in the struggle. 
We do not observe the Brest-Litovsk peace. Surely no 
Russian who loves his country and looks with pride 
upon her greatness is going to submit tamely to her dis- 
memberment and humiliation. 

' ' President Wilson has said feelingly and impressively 
on several occasion that he has no intention of deserting 
Russia, in fact that he is resolved not to do so. That 
means that we will never consent to Germany making 
Russia a German province; that we will never stand 
idly by and see the Germans exploit the Russian people 
and appropriate to Germany's selfish ends the immense 
resources of Russia. We take this stand not because 
we ourselves seek territorial aggrandizement; not be- 
cause we have commercial ambitions in connection with 


Russia; nor because we wish to dictate to the Russian 
people or to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia. 
We assume this position because we wish the Russian 
people to have the right to dispose of themselves and not 
be compelled to submit to the tyrannical rule of Ger- 
many, even though such a disposition might result in a 
temporary peace. It is moreover my opinion that all of 
the Allies agree with America on this subject. 

" Therefore, on this day, which is celebrated in every 
city, in every village and in every hamlet in America, 
I appeal to the Russian people to take courage, to or- 
ganize to resist the encroachments of Germany. The 
Allies are your friends and are willing and able to assist 
you notwithstanding your superb army has been demo- 
bilized. The United States, which had an army of about 
two hundred thousand when we entered the war less than 
fifteen months ago, has already sent to France nine hun- 
dred thousand well-armed, disciplined men and is mak- 
ing rapid progress toward raising an army of five mil- 
lion. The strength of the American Navy and of the 
American shipping has been increased many fold and 
is continuing to grow at a wonderful rate which exceeds 
all calculations and expectations. There is not a craft 
on the broad seas that dares float the German flag or the 
colors of one of the Central Empires. 

"On May 29th, last, my Government authorized its 
representatives throughout the world to express its sym- 
pathy with the nationalistic aspirations of the Czecho- 
slovaks and Jugo-Slavs, and within three days past I 
have received instructions to announce that the position 
of the United States Government is 'that all branches 
of the Slav race should be completely freed from German 
and Austrian rule.' 

1 ' What an inspiration this should be to Russians !" 

When my appeal to the Russian people reached Ber- 
lin, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs again de- 
manded my deportation, on the same ground he had 
previously urged, that I had not only violated the rules 
of neutrality but had criticized the Central Soviet Gov- 


eminent of the Eepublic. I do not know what reply 
was made to this by the Bolsheviks. 

At the same time I made my Fourth of July appeal 
to the Russian people to resist the Germans, conditions 
in Russia favored it. The time was opportune for action. 
Prompt and decisive intervention by the Allied Powers 
might have had far-reaching results. I received from a 
reliable source this account of what was going on at 
Moscow : 

"The Fifth All-Russian Congress of the Soviets 
opened on the 4th of July at the Grand Theater in Mos- 
cow. Strict measures were taken not to allow anybody 
without special permit to enter the theater. The Grand 
Duke's box on the left side of the theater was occupied 
by representatives of the German Embassy with the 
Counselor von Bassovitz at the head. The President of 
the Central Executive Committee, SverlofT, announced 
the Congress opened at 5 p. m., and stated that up to that 
moment 1,035 deputies had arrived, of whom 678 be- 
longed to the Bolshevik party; 269 to the party of the 
Left Social Revolutionists; about 30 Maximalists, and 
about six Internationalists. The floor was given to Alex- 
androff, delegate of the Ukrainian Peasants' Congress. 
His appearance on the platform was met with loud ap- 
plause. He said: 

" 'We have (in Ukrainia) against us the overwhelming 
power of German bayonets. We have no more profes- 
sional Unions, no Cooperatives, and no Workmen's 
Clubs. The regulation respecting the eight-hour day 
has been annulled (shame, shame). When the Ukrainian 
Rada opened the doors to Germany (traitors) we lost 
even that which we gained by the February revolution. 
Germans are destroying with artillery fire whole vil- 
lages, people are executed without trial. ' 

il 'But,' exclaims Alexandrofr", 'the Ukrainian prole- 
tariat are not giving up their struggle with their enemy. 
Peasants refuse to give Germany grain. Trains loaded 
with grain for Germany are blown up by us. Practically 


all stores of munitions have been blown up by us. The 
aeroplane works in Odessa were set on fire. The Ukrainia 
is on the verge of rising against A^tro-Germany.' 

" These words of Alexandroff were met with continu- 
ous applause. The Left Social Revolutionists, standing 
up from their seats and turning in the direction of the 
box occupied by von Bassovitz shouted, 'down with the 
Germans. ' Movement in the box could be noticed. 

" 'I implore you,' continued Alexandroff, 'to come to 
our assistance.' Shouts again: 'Down with the Ger- 
mans ! ' 

" 'I want you to reply with yes or no. We are confi- 
dent that you will come/ continued Alexandroff, 'and 
the sooner you come will our Baron von Mumm be driven 
out from the Ukrainia, as well as your Baron von 
Mumm, Count Mirbach, will be driven out by you from 
Moscow. ' Stormy applause : ' Down with Mirbach ! Down 
with the Germans P 

"After a speech by Karelin, a Left Social Revolution- 
ist, protesting against capital punishment, and his sec- 
ond speech disclosing forgeries practised by the party of 
Bolsheviks during the election in order to insure their 
majority at this ( Jongress, the floor was given to Trotzky. 

"Trotzky stated that some agitators have resumed 
their work against the Soviet Government in different 
parts of the front line. Under the influence of these 
agitators, several Red Army detachments have crossed 
the demarcation line. Several commissars have been 
murdered, and the President of the Bolshevik Peace 
Delegation to the Ukrainia, Rakoffsky, was threatened 
with" a bomb. 'If you will ask me who are these agi- 
tators, I say that I do not know, but presume that among 
them are Right Social Revolutionists, agents of the Ger- 
man war party, as well as agents of those that landed 
troops on the White Sea coast.' 

"Trotzky further stated that he had given orders that 
agitators belonging to parties that want Russia to be 
drawn into war by provoking Germany to occupy Moscow 
and Petrograd should be sent to prison in Moscow and 
Petrograd. Agents of foreign governments who resist 
the government with arms in their hands should be shot 


on the spot. Trotzky requested the congress to give 
sanction of this, his order. 

"KumkofT, a Left Social Revolutionist Deputy, reply- 
ing to Trotzky, stated that the latter had misrepresented 
the actual facts. That the events referred to were not 
perpetrated by agitators, but were an actual result of a 
policy of national treason favored by the Bolsheviks; 
that the men at the front cannot be silent spectators of 
workmen and soldiers being shot by German imperial- 
ists; that they do not want to take any part in these 
deeds of Cain, and mean to fight the scoundrels which 
have also come here. Kumkoff pointed to the box oc- 
cupied by German representatives. Shouts, 'down with 
Mirbach !'" 

On the 6th of July, two days later, the German Am- 
bassador to Russia, Count Mirbach, was assassinated in 
Moscow. An official statement issued by the Bolshevik 
Government said: 

1 ' Two scoundrels, agents of Russian-Anglo-French Im- 
perialism, having forged the signature of Dzerjinsky, 
sneaked through to the German Ambassador, Count Mir- 
bach, under a false certificate, and, under the protection 
of this document, they threw a bomb, killing Count 

The Bolsheviks attributed the assassination to the 
Russian Monarchists and Counter-Revolutionists. They 
claimed to have identified one of the assassins as a mem- 
ber of the Left Social Revolutionists Party. 

About four or five days after this assassination of 
Count Mirbach, Tchecherin, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Bolshevik Government at Moscow, sent me a tele- 
gram marked "urgent," addressing me as Dean of the 
Diplomatic Corps, and saying: 

"Taking into consideration the present situation and 
possibility of danger for representatives of Entente 
powers Soviet Government looks upon Moscow as town 


where security of named representatives can be assured. 
Considering as its duty safeguarding ambassadors' se- 
curity Government sees in their coming to Moscow a 
necessity. We hope that highly esteemed American Am- 
bassador will appreciate this step in friendly spirit in 
which it is undertaken. In order to execute this measure 
and to remove any difficulties People 's Commissariat for 
Foreign Affairs delegates to Vologda as its representa- 
tive, Citizen Radek. ' ? 

To this I made immediate reply, hoping to forestall the 
coming of Radek: 

"Immediately on receiving your urgent message last 
midnight, I called a meeting of the Chiefs of Allied Mis- 
sions, as their Dean. I am requested by them to ask 
you why you think our remaining in Vologda unsafe or 
inadvisable. We have no fear of the Russian people, 
whom we have always befriended and whom we consider 
our Allies, and we have full confidence in the population 
of Vologda. Our only anxiety is concerning the forces 
of the Central Empires with whom we are at war and, 
in our judgment, they are much more likely to capture 
Moscow than Vologda. We realize that in a country 
suffering as Russia is at present there are unreasonable 
and desperate men, but we are confident that they are 
not more dangerous at Vologda than elsewhere. At Mos- 
cow, on the other hand, we hear that the Germans have 
already received permission to introduce their troops to 
safeguard their representatives, and in any case the town 
is directly threatened by the Germans. If you mean by 
your message that the government of Soviets has taken 
without consulting the Allied Missions the decision that 
the latter should come to Moscow and that you are send- 
ing Mr. Radek to carry such a decision into execution, 
we desire to inform you that we consider that would be 
offensive to us and we would not comply therewith. ' ' 

Radek arrived the next day and about 3 p. m. inquired 
at what time I could receive him, and was told at four 
o'clock new time. Radek did not call until after five 


o'clock, when the Allied Diplomats were in session at 
the American Embassy. Leaving my colleagues in ses- 
sion I went to the reception room of the Embassy, and, 
after hearing from Radek that the object of his mission 
was to arrange for the removal of the Allied Missions 
from Vologda to Moscow, I told him that such an invita- 
tion had already been received by wire from Tchecherin 
and had been declined by wire. He disclaimed any in- 
tention on the part of the Soviet Government of forcing 
the Allied Missions to remove from Vologda to Moscow, 
but after mentioning the responsibility of the Soviets for 
the safety of the Allied representatives, stated that if 
this declination would be persisted in he would demand 
a statement in writing from the Allied representatives 
absolving the Soviet Government from all responsibility 
for their safety. I said to Radek that as the Allied 
Chiefs were in session in the American Embassy at that 
moment, perhaps he should himself make this statement 
to them. I returned to the Allied conference and re- 
ported the interview with Radek. The Allied represen- 
tatives decided that I, as the Dean, should state to Radek 
that they stood upon their reply made by wire to Tche- 
cherin until authoritatively advised as to the demands 
of Germany consequent upon the killing of Mirbach, 
having heard by wire from Moscow that armed Germans 
and Austrians were guarding the embassies and con- 
sulates of the Central Empires in Moscow. The Allied 
Conference thereupon adjourned. 

I returned to the reception room and had a talk with 
Radek lasting about an hour. Radek was accompanied 
by an interpreter, Arthur Ransome, the correspondent 
of the Manchester Guardian. I called my stenog- 
rapher, Mr. Johnston, who was also my private secre- 
tary, and he took down the conversation. I told Radek, 
after listening to his argument, that we had decided to 


refuse the invitation to go to Moscow. His reply was : 
"I will station guards around all of your embassies.' ' 
They called all of our legations embassies. " And no one 
will be permitted to go in or out without a passport/ ' 
I said: "We are virtually prisoners then?" "No," he 
said, i l you are not virtually prisoners, you can go in and 
out and the chiefs can all go in and out, but when you 
desire anybody to come in here, you will have to tell tlia 
local Soviet the name of the man and they will give him 
a pass to enter through your guards.' ' 

The guards came there the next morning, or perhaps 
the same evening, but they did not disturb us. They 
were hungry and we gave them food. They were very 
accommodating to us. Radek was in uniform, and car- 
ried a pistol. He was a newspaper man, an Austrian. 
He was intensely devoted to the Bolshevik purpose of a 
world-wide revolution. I understood that Lenin and 
Trotzky depended upon Radek for the composition of 
many proclamations which they signed. After the 
armistice, Radek went to Berlin, and was active in the 
efforts to overturn the German Government and in the 
attempted spread of Bolshevism throughout Germany. 

The day after sending the decision of the Allied Mis- 
sions not to leave Vologda, I received from Tchecheiin 
this message, marked "Urgent": 

"Thanks for telegram. You are obviously badly in- 
formed. It is absolutely false that Germans have re- 
ceived permission to introduce troops at Moscow. This 
is monstrous distortion of true situation. How is it that 
somebody from Moscow deliberately misrepresents to 
you our policy and real state of things ? When you will 
be in Moscow no intriguers will be able to create such 
trouble between us. Moscow is not threatened by Ger- 
mans. If this was the case, we would at once warn you 
and take steps necessary for your departure. You are 
insufficiently informed situation Russia. People are for 


us but conspiring groups like that which acted lately 
systematically create trouble. Such conspirators pre- 
pare stroke. Your remaining Vologda impossible. We 
have responsibility to bear we cannot otherwise. Radek 
goes consult you first.' ' 

I replied to Tchecherin as follows : 

"I have received your telegram in response to mine 
which was sent in reply to your first telegram concern- 
ing the removal of the Allied Missions from Vologda to 
Moscow. Mr. Radek, representative of the Soviet Gov- 
ernment, arrived and had conference with me before the 
receipt of this telegram. He informed me that your first 
telegram was intended for invitation or advice to the 
Allied Missions in Vologda and not a command or a de- 
cision to be enforced by him as your representative. 
After conferring with Mr. Radek I submitted his propo- 
sition to the Allied Diplomatic Corps, which decided to 
stand on its former reply and to decline your invitation 
to come to Moscow until hearing what further demands 
or movements Germany is likely to make as the German 
press and many prominent Germans charge the Allies 
with inspiring, planning and carrying into execution 
assassination of the German Ambassador, Mirbach. Mr. 
Radek when informed by me of this decision demanded 
a written statement from the Allied Missions that we 
absolve the Soviet Government from all responsibility 
for our safety. When again informed that the Allied 
Missions stand on their reply telegraphed you until they 
learn what Germany demands or proposes to do, Mr. 
Radek stated that he would station guards around every 
Allied chancery or residence in Vologda who would be 
instructed to admit no one without his approval or ours, 
as he proposed to remain in Vologda until receiving 
further instructions from you or the Soviet Government. 
While we have not asked for guards and would appre- 
ciate guards stationed around our residences and chan- 
ceries solely for our protection we look upon the plan 
as proposed by Mr. Radek as a virtual arrangement to 
place us under espionage or to make us prisoners. We 
trust such is not your intention ; if it is we protest against 


the plan proposed by Mr. Radek as incompatible with 
the dignity of our Governments. 

"Your telegram states that our remaining in Vologda 
is ' impossible. ' While Mr. Radek disclaimed any inten- 
tion on the part of the Soviet Government to compel us 
to come to Moscow your telegram fails to reply to that 
portion of my message to you based upon the theory that 
Mr. Radek has been sent to Vologda to carry into execu- 
tion a decision of the Soviet Government. We await 
your reply to this telegram.' ' 

Radek remained in Vologda some days. He made a 
bad impression upon the people of Vologda, who showed 
their opposition to him and their preference for the 
Allies against the Germans in many ways. The Bol- 
shevik element called a meeting of about 2,000 workmen, 
including the railroad employees, for the purpose of 
hearing a speech from Radek on the evening of July 
15th. This speech was intended to incite feeling against 
the Allies. Radek even went so far as to say that the 
workmen must unite with the German troops to oppose 
the Anglo-French soldiers. This was too much for the 
audience, who immediately cried out: "We won't do it. 
The Germans have shown what they will do by their 
conduct in the Ukraine. We prefer the Allies, and we will 
join them and fight the Germans.' ' Radek was very 
much incensed, and threatened that the Bolshevik Gov- 
ernment would treat Vologda as it did Yarsolave, and 
would destroy both cities. 

While this pressure was being brought to bear to in- 
duce the Allied diplomats to go to Moscow, I was visited 
at 11 o'clock at night, July 17th, by a British captain, 
named McGrath, who had come down that same after- 
noon from Archangel. Lindley, the British Charge, 
brought McGrath to the Embassy. I had already heard 
from Riggs, who came down from Archangel on the same 


train with McGrath, that General Poole, in command 
of the British, was in closer touch with the situation at 
Archangel than we had previously known. Captain Mc- 
Grath, after telling me in a general way of the military 
plans of the Allies for the occupation of Archangel, said 
he had come down to make a proposition to the Allied 
missions in Vologda, but he knew I would be opposed to 
it. His proposition was that the missions leave Vologda 
for Archangel. 

I immediately replied that I was not opposed to leav- 
ing Vologda or making any other strategic move, but 
that I was opposed to going to Moscow on the "invita- 
tion" of the Bolsheviks, and would not leave Vologda 
by order of the Bolsheviks, and would under no circum- 
stances leave Russia unless forced to do so, or recalled 
by my Government. 

Captain McGrath 's face lighted up and he said Gen- 
eral Poole thought the continued presence of the Allied 
Embassies at Vologda would hamper his military plans. 
General Poole feared the Soviet Government would cap- 
ture the Allied chiefs and hold them as hostages, and 
possibly some desperate Bolsheviks might commit vio- 
lence upon the Allied Ambassadors. 

I asked Captain McGrath what his plan was and he 
said he wanted us to leave Vologda in time to meet Gen- 
eral Poole, who was at Murmansk when the British ar- 
rived in Archangel, but he was not definitely advised as 
to when that would be. Lindley, the British Charge, 
had told me previously when he arrived in Vologda that 
Poole would reach Archangel the first week in August, 
but McGrath said the British plans had been hastened 
by our safety being threatened at Vologda. 

I arranged for McGrath to come to the conference of 
the Allied chiefs the following day. He did so and stated 
in effect what he had told me the night before. I then 


outlined to my colleagues the plan that we should be 
prepared to leave for Archangel on short notice, but 
should not ask consent of the Bolshevik authorities, and 
should distinctly state that we were not going to leave 
Russia, but were only withdrawing to Archangel tem- 
porarily for safety, and to prevent being taken by the 
Bolsheviks as hostages. I proposed that we would leave 
our Embassies and Legations at Vologda functioning as 
usual. I reminded the chiefs that the invitation of the 
Bolsheviks to come to Moscow for protection had been ac- 
companied by the statement that they could not protect 
us at Vologda from unreasonable and desperate Russians 
or from five thousand German and Austrian prisoners 
in the Vologda district. Radek had said that these pris- 
oners were likely to be incensed by the assassination of 
Mirbach, the German people and the German leaders 
having charged the Allied Ambassadors with instigating 
and having carried into execution that dastardly act. 

Captain McGrath said there could be no possible doubt 
about the ability of the Allies to land when they arrived 
at Archangel, and went into sufficient detail to convince 
me that he was justified in making such statement. 

The diplomatic representatives at Vologda agreed for 
the time being that it was best for them to stay there. 
We had entire confidence in the good will of the Vologda 
people, and we believed that Moscow was an undesirable 
residence place for us. We refused to change our loca- 
tion. Tchecherin's telegram to me and my reply thereto 
were given to the press before the arrival of Radek and 
had been published in Vologda and Petrograd papers. 
The party headed by Radek was known as * ' the Extraor- 
dinary Revolutionary Staff. ' ' This staff issued an order 
addressed to the journals of the city, prohibiting publi- 
cation of communications or interviews with us unless 
they were previously censored by the staff. We en- 


deavored to reach the Russian people through a pam- 
phlet containing a copy of the order from the staff, but 
another order was issued prohibiting the distribution of 
these pamphlets. The conclusion of the Diplomatic 
Corps was that the Bolsheviks desired to have us in 
Moscow and hold us as hostages in event of intervention. 
It seems as if our refusal to leave Vologda had settled 
the matter, but on the 23rd of July this message marked 
"Urgent" was received by me from Tchecherin : 

"I entreat you most earnestly to leave Vologda. Come 
here. Danger approaching. To-morrow can be too late. 
When battle rages, distinction of houses cannot be made. 
If all smashed in your domiciles during struggle of con- 
tending forces responsibility will fall upon your making 
deaf ear to all entreaties. Why bring about catastrophe 
which you can avert V 9 

After consulting with my colleagues, and rinding them 
of the same mind with me, that the plan was to hold us 
as hostages at Moscow, or at any rate to hold us against 
the German and Austrian representatives at Moscow, 
I replied to Tchecherin : 

"Thank you for your telegram. We fully appreciate 
the uninterrupted interest you have taken in our personal 
safety and have decided to follow your advice and are 
leaving Vologda." 

Our determination was to go to Archangel, but I did 
not state in the telegram where we proposed to go. 

When we finally decided to go to Archangel, I sent 
word to my colleagues to have their baggage down to the 
train before six o'clock, that the train would leave at 
eight o'clock in the evening. I had held a special train 
on the Vologda tracks for five months. My transporta- 
tion man, Mason, had told me that the stationmaster, 
with whom we had made friends, would furnish me a 
locomotive on an hour 's notice to take that train on any 
road that we wished. I sent for my transportation man 


and said: "You told me that the stationmaster promised 
you a locomotive for this train. I want that locomotive 
attached to the train tonight at 7 :30 and I want to leave 
at 8." He left me, but came back in an hour and said 
that the stationmaster had left on a vacation, and that 
the one he had left in charge could not get a locomotive 
without submitting his request to Moscow. The station- 
master said that Tchecherin had given orders to the Di- 
rector of Locomotive Power that he must not put a loco- 
motive on this train without getting his permission. I 
told the substitute stationmaster to submit the matter to 
Moscow. He did so and the reply was: "Who wishes 
the locomotive V ' I replied through my transportation 
man, "the American Ambassador. ' J 

"Where does he wish to go?" 

"To Archangel.' ' 

When the Diplomatic Corps went to the station we 
were shown a telegram signed by Zaikin, Commissar of 
Exploitation Department of the Bolshevik Government 
and addressed to the Vologda stationmaster, reading: 

"In accordance with an order from People's Commis- 
sar for Foreign Affairs, Tchecherin, I request informa- 
tion immediately as to who from the American Embassy 
and for what purpose is demanding a special train to 
Archangel. Until the receipt of this information and the 
receipt by you of a permit to dispatch the train, same 
should not be dispatched." 

I replied to this : 

"The American Ambassador as Dean of the Diplo- 
matic Corps, received about noon to-day a telegram from 
Tchecherin entreating the Diplomatic Corps to leave Vo- 
logda ' as to-morrow can be too late, ' and it is unsafe for 
them to remain there. This train is desired by the 
American Ambassador for the entire Diplomatic Corps 
to convey them to Archangel. ' ' 


Then came a longer message from Tchecherin still 
urging that the Corps decide to come to Moscow: 

' ' Having heard of your resolve to leave Vologda for 
Archangel, we feel ourselves compelled whilst appreciat- 
ing your clear comprehension of the untenable situation 
in Vologda to be kindly informed by you about some 
particulars of your decision. If your intention is to leave 
Russia, we are powerless to hinder you in doing so, but 
we express our sincerest regrets at your departure from 
our soil together with our hope to see you soon in our 
midst here in the hearts of Soviets of Russia. In case 
you really wish to depart we beg to emphasize that in our 
view the relations between our two countries are not 
going to be affected by an event to which we will not 
ascribe any political symptomatic character. If, how- 
ever, the idea of exchanging Vologda for Archangel was 
not altogether removed from your mind it is unfortu- 
nately necessary to draw your attention to the fact that 
in the expectation of a siege Archangel cannot be a resi- 
dence fit for Ambassadors and that such a question can- 
not possibly be answered in the affirmative. I cannot 
but repeat that under the present condition when our 
foes seeing their impotence to take place in the politi- 
cal inclinations of the great masses seek to conspire and 
to create artificial outbursts and to provoke civil war, 
we can, with complete earnestness, point to Moscow, 
where as experience shows our forces are and cannot 
but remain in undisturbed control of the city and to its 
peaceful gay suburbs with their splendid villas as to an 
appropriate abode which our government deliberately 
proposes to the Ambassador of friendly America. We 
must at any cost avoid the danger of your departure be- 
ing misinterpreted in the eyes of our great masses and 
of American public opinion and of its being understood 
in a sense altogether dissimilar to that in which you and 
myself would understand it. That at the present junc- 
ture would be a fatal mistake, and the best means of 
averting this danger would be your coming to the official 
center of Russia, where a warm, friendly reception 
awaits you. The special train is at your disposal, but 


we do not lose the hope that your decision will be to come 
to Moscow." 

I replied with a detailed statement covering the situa- 
tion, showing how communication with the American 
Government had been practically cut off and referring to 
the censorship which prevented the Corps from printing 
anything without first submitting it to the Soviet Gov- 
ernment. I give this communication in full : 

"On receipt of your urgent telegram of the 22nd, ad- 
dressed to me as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, and 
received about noon of the 23rd, I called the Corps in 
conference. After deliberating, we decided to leave Vo- 
logda, but considered that our previous telegraphic cor- 
respondence had fully settled the question of our going 
to Moscow and that conclusion was negative. As Dean 
of the Diplomatic Corps, I replied to your telegram, ex- 
pressing appreciation for your continued interest in our 
personal safety and advising that we had concluded to 
leave Vologda. Consequently the entire Diplomatic 
Corps repaired to their train at Vologda Station, but 
on giving directions for the train to move we were in- 
formed by the railroad officials that no motive power 
could be furnished without authority from Moscow. We 
were under the impression and had been informed from 
reliable sources that these trains were at our disposal 
and locomotives would be furnished upon our request. 
When such request was forwarded to Moscow the reply 
was received after some delay that locomotives could not 
be furnished without your consent and you desired to 
know who had asked for the train for the American Am- 
bassador and for what purpose he wished to go to Arch- 
angel. I promptly directed that reply be made that the 
locomotive was desired to take the entire Diplomatic 
Corps to Archangel as they had concluded to quit Vo- 
logda upon receipt of your urgent telegram entreating 
them to leave because unsafe to remain in Vologda, and 
stating that postponing departure until to-morrow might 
be too late. 

"In reply to this statement you wired me at length. 


The correspondence up to this time had been between 
myself as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps and yourself 
as Commissar of Foreign Affairs. 

i ' This telegram while sent by me as Dean of the Diplo- 
matic Corps is meant also for my reply as the American 

"Permit me to say to you that while your message 
is appreciated because expressing friendly feeling for 
the people I represent and a desire on your part to main- 
tain relations with them and with my government, your 
treatment of me as their representative does not accord 
with such expressions. While refraining from interfer- 
ing in all internal affairs in Russia I have considered 
that the Russian people were still our Allies, and have 
more than once appealed to them to unite with us in re- 
sisting a common enemy. I have furthermore recom- 
mended to my government many times to send food to 
relieve the sufferings of the Russian people and to ship 
agricultural implements to meet the requirements of 
Russia. A wireless message sent from Washington July 
18th, received at Moscow, was delivered to me after last 
midnight. It stated that no message had been received 
from me of later date than June 24th, except one sent 
through Archangel July 7th, advising of the killing of 
the German Ambassador; it furthermore stated that it 
had cabled me often and fully. I have received no cables 
from my government that were sent after July 3rd, ex- 
cept two wireless messages inquiring why they did not 
hear from me ; I have cabled fully every day. Moreover 
the press of Vologda and doubtless the entire press of 
Russia has received orders to print nothing from any 
Allied Ambassador or representative without first sub- 
mitting same to the Soviet Government. Some journals 
in Vologda and some in Petrograd did print your first 
telegram inviting or ordering the Diplomatic Corps to 
come to Moscow and our reply thereto ; these were given 
to the press by myself for the information of the Rus- 
sian people and because I thought secret diplomacy had 
been abolished in Russia. Upon learning that the press 
was forbidden to publish further correspondence con- 
cerning our removal to Moscow, the Diplomatic Corps 


decided to have printed in pamphlet form in Russian 
the entire correspondence on the subject together with 
some excerpts from a stenographic report of the inter- 
view between your representative Radek and myself. 
These pamphlets have been ready for delivery for two 
days past, but we are informed that the Central Soviet 
Committee or the Extraordinary Revolutionary Staff of 
Vologda has prohibited delivery of same to us. 

"Your last telegram addressed to myself while ex- 
pressing friendly sentiments toward America and con- 
sideration for its Ambassador makes no mention of my 
colleagues representing America's Allies in Vologda. 
This is to inform you if you entertain any doubt on the 
subject that the Allied representatives in Vologda are 
acting in concert and in perfect harmony. 

"The Allied missions and staffs have been living for 
twenty-four hours in special train on track of Vologda 
station, awaiting a locomotive to transport them to Arch- 
angel. Your telegram to me states that if permitted to 
go to Archangel it would be only for the purpose of their 
leaving Russia which you 'are powerless to hinder. ' Your 
telegram states that Archangel is not a fit residence for 
Ambassadors in the event of a 'siege.' Do you expect 
a German siege of Archangel ! You certainly do not 
anticipate Allied siege of that city or you would not 
insist upon the Allied representatives coming to Moscow. 
If you mean a siege of Archangel by Russians I can only 
repeat what I have said to you and to the Russian people 
many times, and that is that the Allies have nothing to 
fear from the Russian people whom they have constantly 
befriended and with whom they consider themselves still 
in alliance against a common enemy. Speaking for my- 
self I have no desire or intention of leaving Russia un- 
less forced to do so, and in such event my absence would 
be temporary. I would not properly represent my gov- 
ernment or the sentiment of the American people if I 
should leave Russia at this time. The Brest-Litovsk 
peace the Allies have never recognized, and it is becom- 
ing so burdensome to the Russian people that jn my 
judgment the time is not far distant when they will turn 
upon Germany and by their repulsion of the invader 


from the Russian borders will demonstrate what I have 
continuously believed, and that is that the national spirit 
of great Russia is not dead but has only been sleeping. 

"The above are my personal views and feelings and 
I think that in cherishing such I am properly repre- 
senting my government and my people. 

"The Allied Diplomatic Corps of Vologda await your 
immediate approval of the locomotive to draw their train 
to Archangel. If local authorities at Archangel consider 
the situation does not allow us to remain, we shall leave 
with deep regret and with the hope of soon returning." 

After the receipt of this telegram, Tchecherin said he 
would go to the direct wire and wished the American 
Ambassador or his representative at Vologda to be there. 
I sent Mr. Lehrs, an attache of the Embassy, with in- 
structions to inform Tchecherin that the Diplomatic 
Corps reiterated with emphasis its request for a loco- 
motive in order to go to Archangel. Mr. Lehrs reported 
that Mr. Tchecherin had given orders that when a defi- 
nite reply from the ambassadors came a locomotive 
should be immediately provided. Tchecherin also said 
to Lehrs that he would telegraph Mr. Popoff of the Bol- 
sheviE Government at Archangel instructing him to pre- 
pare a steamer for the Allied Ambassadors. 

Mr. Lehrs reported this conversation with Tchecherin, 
and at my direction sent the following : 

"I am instructed by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps 
to inform you that the diplomats of the Allied missions 
at Vologda after considering your message decided to 
request you to furnish at your earliest convenience a 
locomotive to draw their special train from Vologda to 
Archangel. ' ' 

The correspondence, part of it by wireless, was com- 
pleted at 11 :20 p. m., July 24th, with the following from 
Tchecherin : 


"We will give instructions that a locomotive be put 
at your disposal at Vologda and that a boat should be 
prepared for you in Archangel. Once more we empha- 
size that we do not ascribe a political meaning to this 
individual leaving of Allied representatives, which we 
profoundly regret and which was caused by a sorrowful 
of circumstances independent of our will. ' ' 

Tchecherin seems to have been under the impression 
that after our departure from Vologda the Soviet Gov- 
ernment had disposed of the American Ambassador. He 
sent this wireless message to Archangel July 29th, 1918 : 

"American Ambassador Francis, 
' ' I take the opportunity of this last moment before your 
departure to express once more my profound regret and 
sorrow at the unfortunate circumstances which have had 
as a result your present journey across the sea and also 
my best thanks for your kindness and courtesy and for 
your good feeling toward the Russian popular masses 
whose most adequate and faithful representatives are the 
Soviets, the councils of the poor and of the toiling. 
Please convey our affection and admiration in the mes- 
sages you will send across the ocean to the great people 
of pioneers on the new continent and to the posterity 
of Cromwell's revolutionaries and of Washington's 

1 i Tchecherin. ' ' 

This telegram was evidently meant for consumption 
by American pacifists, and fearing it would be given to 
the American people by the Department of State, I failed 
to transmit it. 



The plan had been to leave Vologda on the 23rd of 
July but we did not get away until after midnight of 
the 24th; the telegraphic correspondence with Moscow 
taking that interval. The Diplomatic Corps had slept 
on the train and waited. 

I had received a telegram from KedrofT, the Bolshevik 
Commissar, who had removed the City Duma of Vologda 
and the City Duma of Archangel, saying he would meet 
us at a station between Vologda and Archangel, naming 
the station. Our train arrived there before his, but 
after we waited ten or fifteen minutes his train pulled 
into the station. I sent Riggs to ascertain what KedrofT 
wished in requesting us to wait, thinking he might prob- 
ably detain us, and possibly by force take us back to 
Moscow. Riggs, who was second in rank to Col. Ruggles 
of the Military Commission, had learned to speak Rus- 
sian, and had by this time become a major. He was only 
a lieutenant when I arrived in Petrograd, and was my 
Military Attache until he was supplanted by General 
Judson. He returned after a short conference with Ked- 
rofT, and reported that KedrofT desired to inform us 
that a steamboat was awaiting our arrival at Archangel. 
This intelligence was communicated to us and relieved us 
greatly, as we were on our way out of Bolshevik juris- 
diction of Russia. 

On our arrival at Archangel, we were met by a delega- 
tion of local Bolsheviks, accompanied by a representa- 



tive of the Moscow government. These officers pointed 
to a boat on the Dvina River and said: 

" There is a boat. We are instructed to direct your 
attention to that boat, to put you on that boat and to say 
you can use that boat to go where you wish." 

I said: "We refuse to go on that boat." 


"Well," I said, "we do not intend to leave Russia 
until we can communicate with our governments. Cable 
communication has been severed for three weeks." 

The Bolsheviks replied: "Well, we have no other 
orders. ' ' 

The Diplomatic Party numbered about 140 persons, 
counting attaches and domestics. I said to the Bolshe- 
viks : * ' Moreover that boat is not big enough for us. ' ' 

They said: "We will give you an additional boat." 

In the course of further conversation these local Bol- 
sheviks seemed to be perplexed as to their own course, 
and asked us: "What are we to do?" 

I replied: "I do not know what you are to do except 
to go and report what we say to the people at Moscow, 
to Lenin, Trotzky and Tchecherin." 

They stationed guards around the train and left. That 
was on the 26th of July. In about thirty hours they 
returned. We learned that they had been wiring Moscow 
and received answer. The purport of this correspond- 
ence had been made known to us through confidential 
sources. We knew that the Moscow people, while pro- 
fessing to desire us to leave Russia, were telling the local 
Bolsheviks to hold us as hostages. About two or three 
o'clock in the afternoon of the 27th of July, the Bolshe- 
viks came back to the train where we were. By that 
time, acting upon the information we had received as to 
the communications from Moscow, and also upon in- 
formation of local trouble, we had determined that our 


best plan was to get away to Kandalaksha. Information 
had reached us through confidential channels that an 
anti-Bolshevik revolution was about to take place at 
Archangel. We felt that we would not want to be there 
when it occurred. 

When the Bolshevik officers came back to the train, we 
assumed a firm attitude before them, and insisted on 
leaving Archangel for Kandalaksha, which was under 
Allied control. The Bolsheviks, realizing local condi- 
tions and at the same time having their instructions from 
Moscow, were frightened. They did nothing to actually 
detain us, but they threw all the obstacles in the way 
they could. For example: when we had expressed our 
determination to go to Kandalaksha, they said our bag- 
gage did not have diplomatic seals on it. I said to my 
colleagues : "We will go down and identify the baggage/ ' 
After this the baggage was transferred to the boat about 
eight o'clock in the evening. Then the Bolsheviks in- 
sisted that we must all come off the boat and show our 
passports when we reembarked. We complied with this. 
By that time it was midnight. The next excuse was that 
the Bolshevik officers must go across the river to have our 
passports vised. The railroads do not enter Archangel. 
They stop at the south side of the Dvina River, which is 
about a mile wide. The Bolsheviks went over to Archan- 
gel, and were gone until four o'clock in the morning. 
Then they came back, and at that hour on the 29th of 
July, we cleared for Kandalaksha. 

If the Bolsheviks had not given permission for us to 
leave for Kandalaksha, we intended to go anyway. 
There was a British merchantman in the harbor, and I 
had asked the British Commissioner Lindley, "What boat 
is that?" 

His reply was: "It is one of ours." 

I asked: "Will it obey your instructions?" He said: 


"I think so." I said: "If the Bolsheviks do not come 
by seven o'clock, we will get on that boat and go to 
Kandalaksha," but the Bolsheviks came at four o'clock. 
I had had the conversation about the British merchant- 
man two hours previous. 

At Kandalaksha we heard that General Poole, in com- 
mand of the British forces, was at Murmansk, which is a 
port of the railroad that is open all year around as the 
Gulf Stream flows by that port. Kandalaksha is about 
150 miles south of Murmansk. General Poole with about 
2,000 men cleared for Archangel. The forces arrived at 
Archangel on the 2nd of August. Not knowing whether 
he was to be opposed in his plan to land there, he tele- 
phoned in from the pier: "What government is in con- 
trol here?" The reply was: "The Provisional Govern- 
ment of Northern Russia. ' ' 

It seems that the anti-Bolshevik revolution, of the 
plans for which we had learned before we left Archangel, 
had taken place about four hours before the arrival of 
the troops. The General inquired: "Will you permit us 
to land!" The Bolshevik Government, under instruc- 
tions from Moscow, had been prepared to resist the land- 
ing. The reply of the new government was : "Yes, come 
quick." The landing at Archangel was made on the 
2nd of August. 

The first landing of Allied troops on the North coast 
of Russia came about without opposition by the Bol- 
sheviks through an interesting combination of circum- 
stances. It will be remembered that Trotzky refused to 
participate in the second negotiations for the Brest- 
Litovsk treaty. He sent Tchecherin in his place. Tche- 
cherin wired for a special train to return from Brest- 
Litovsk without saying whether he had signed the treaty. 
The terms of the treaty were far more severe than those 
which Trotzky had rejected during the first negotiations, 


and Trotzky supposed Tchecherin had refused to sign 
them. Just at the time of Tchecherin 's request for a 
train on which to return, Trotzky received an inquiry 
from the local Soviet at Murmansk wishing to know 
whether the Bolsheviks there should permit Allied troops 
to land. Trotzky, thinking Tchecherin had not signed the 
treaty because of its severe terms, replied to the inquiry : 
"Yes, permit the Allied troops to land without resis- 
tance/ ' Whereupon the local commissars, or Bolsheviks, 
at Murmansk informed the Allied troops of Trotzky 's 
instructions, and even invited the Allied troops to land. 

Captain Martin, of the American Military Mission, 
just before his departure for Murmansk to meet the 
Allied forces, called upon me at the American Embassy 
in Petrograd, and asked if I had any message to send to 
Captain Bierer, who was in command of the cruiser 
Olympia in Murmansk harbor. I replied: "Tell Cap- 
tain Bierer that I do not assume authority to command 
him to land his marines, but if I were called upon to give 
advice, I should want American marines to land, pro- 
vided the British and French and Italian troops were 

I subsequently met Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, who informed me that Captain 
Bierer, in command of 200 American marines, was in- 
structed to obey my orders. These marines were the 
first American troops to be landed in Russia. 

The Allied missions had held the boats on which they 
had come from Archangel to Kandalaksha. The British 
Commissioner, the Italian Ambassador and the French 
Minister and I went from Kandalaksha to Murmansk 
and were able to communicate with our governments 
from there. I cabled Washington my plan, that I was 
going back to Archangel, and received approval of the 


plan. So I went back to Archangel, and remained then 
until November 6th. 

The revolution against the Bolsheviks at Archange 
established what was known as the Sovereign Govern- 
ment of the Northern Region. This government not 011I3 
welcomed the landing of the Allied forces, but invitee 
the Allied missions to return to Archangel. The head oi 
that government was Tchaikovsky. In a letter writtei 
from Archangel, August 29th, 1918, to Charles R. Crai 
of Chicago, I wrote of Tchaikovsky : 

"He spent four years, 1875-79 in America, and was 
Russian exile in England from 1879 to 1907. When in 
America he lived at Independence, Kansas, where he 
attempted to form a new religious sect, but failed therein. 
He told someone a few days ago that he still cherished 
the belief that God is in every man's soul, and that is the 
sole existence of what the religious denominations call 
the Supreme Being, but that he had abandoned all effort 
to found such a sect because the race has not arrived at 
that stage of development where it can appreciate such 
beliefs. He is an able writer, a fine character and a 
valuable man." 

To my son, Sidney, I wrote on the 30th of July from 
Kandalaksha : 

1 ' The Russian people are divided between a Monarchy 
and a Socialistic Republic, and I am not interfering in 
the slightest degree in any way. Their national pride 
seems to be awakening, and they are so disgusted with 
the Bolshevik rule that they would make an alliance 
with Germany if we don't intervene. Have written you 
that I recommended the intervention in cable of May 2nd, 
but have not been advised whether this principle has 
been passed upon. It is true that American marines 
have been landed at Murmansk, and I believe that Ameri- 
can troops are enroute to Archangel. Suffice it to say 


that Eussia is an immense country abundant in resources, 
and nearly two hundred million people who are unedu- 
cated but who love the land devotedly. I have issued a 
number of statements or pronunciamentos trying to 
arouse the Russian people against Germany and have 
gotten limited circulation therefor. The general instruc- 
tions to diplomats are to do nothing at this time without 
instructions from the Department. I have not been 
1 called down' thus far." 

I very soon established close relations with the Ameri- 
can Expeditionary Forces which had been landed at 
Archangel. The information came to me one day that 
our American soldiers were manning the street cars. 
There had been a general strike in Archangel. When 
the workmen heard of the kidnapping of the Tschaikov- 
sky Ministers, some 30,000 of them quit work, including 
all those in the factories. The street car forces joined 
the strike. As soon as I heard that American forces 
were manning the street cars instead of the strikers, I 
called up Col. Stewart, the commanding officer, or rather 
attempted to call him up, but could not find him. I then 
called for Major Nichols, who was in command of the 
American battalion still remaining in Archangel, — the 
one I had reviewed. I asked Major Nichols, "Is it true 
that American soldiers are manning the street cars?" 


"Do you know that will raise commotion in America? 
By whose orders has this been done ? ' ' 

< < Well, G. H. Q. " ( General Headquarters. ) 

"Was it in writing?" 

1 ' No, it was not in writing. I was called up by phone 
and asked if I had any men here who could act as motor- 
men and conductors in the street cars here. As my 
battalion was recruited in Detroit, and about one-half of 
them are motormen and conductors, I said 'Yes.* I sent 


some of the men down to the car sheds to take the cars 

" Where is Col. Stewart!" I asked. 

Major Nichols replied: "Mr. Ambassador, we are 
charging no fares." I said: "That is different, but I 
want Col. Stewart anyway. ' ' 

For twenty-four hours or perhaps thirty hours, Ameri- 
cans were conducting the street cars, or acting as motor- 
men, and at every stopping place, which in Archangel is 
every two or three blocks, there were two or three Ameri- 
can soldiers to keep the crowds from overloading the 
cars. That was because no fares were being charged. 
In connection with this street car incident, I made an 
announcement of America's position in Archangel. I 
said, "In connection with this street car strike, there is 
one thing I want understood." I said it with the em- 
phasis of an oath, I believe. i l There is one thing I want 
understood. ' ' 

"What is that?" I was asked. 

I said : "Civil strife in the rear of our front. I am not 
going to permit the lives of our soldiers to be jeopar- 
dized by Bolsheviks on one side and a civil war in the 
rear. I will order them back from the railroad, and 
from up the river, and if there is a gun fired we will 
participate in the firing ourselves, if we have to kill 

After that there was no "fear of civil strife. 

Right here, I would like to say a word about the Ameri- 
can soldiers who landed at Archangel. They showed the 
same spirit that they did on the Western front. They 
were just as anxious to get into a fight. They understood 
the cause of the war. 

I had a personal experience with a group of these 
American soldiers, most of whom were from Michigan 
and Minnesota, and seemed to know me by reputation. 


One day while walking along the principal thoroughfare, 
the Broadway of Archangel, I saw three or four soldiers 
engrossed with a war map. I stopped and said to them, 
in English, of course, "You are American soldiers.' ' 
They turned around and smiled at me, and I said, "I 
never was so glad to see American soldiers in my life as 
I was when you landed here a few days ago." They 
looked pleasant, but did not make any answer, and I 
continued, "I am the American Ambassador. ' ' They 
looked more interested and opened their eyes wider, but 
did not reply or ask me any questions. I said something 
more to them — four or &ve more remarks in an interroga- 
tive way — and they answered respectfully, "yes," and 
"no," but did not develop the conversation. I turned to 
go away, when the soldiers stopped the man who was 
with me, and asked "Who is that fellow?" The man 
replied, ' ' That is Governor Francis. ' ' They said, ' ' Why 
in hell didn't he say so." 

Archangel is on the White Sea — a place of about 50,000 
or 60,000 people. It has very substantial structures, 
more substantial than Vologda, although it is not so old. 
On the night of the 5th of September, 1918, occurred a 
coup d'etat. Americans would call it a plain case of 
kidnapping. All ministers but two of the new Northern 
Government were taken from their homes and conveyed 
on a steamer to the Soliovetski Monastery on Soliovetski 
Island, which was about thirty hours from Archangel. 
The kidnapping was done by a party of Russian officers, 
counter-revolutionists, who were against the Tchaikov- 
sky Government, because the ministers were Socialists. 
The head of the kidnapping party was a man named 
Chaplin, a Russian naval officer, attached to the star! of 
General Poole. 

On the morning of the 5th of September, following 
the kidnapping, I was reviewing a battalion of American 


troops. Three American battalions had been landed, one 
of them had been sent down the railroad toward Vologda, 
one was up the Dvina River, toward Kotlas, and the other 
one was held at Archangel. I had just finished reviewing 
this battalion that was left in Archangel, when General 
Poole, who with me on the Government steps had re- 
ceived the salute, turned to me and said : ' ' There was a 
revolution here last night. ' ' I said : ' * The hell you say ! 
Who pulled it off ?" He replied: "Chaplin." Chaplin, 
as I have said, was a Russian naval officer on General 
Poole's staff. I said: "There is Chaplin over there 
now." I motioned for him to come over and join us. 
General Poole remarked, "Chaplin is going to issue a 
proclamation at 11 o'clock." It was then 10:15. I said: 
"Chaplin, who pulled off this revolution here last 
night?" He said: "I did." 

Chaplin had done very good work against the Bol- 
sheviks, getting them deposed and out of Archangel. He 
went on to say: "I drove the Bolsheviks out of here, I 
established this Government" — meaning the Tchaikov- 
sky Government. "The ministers were in General Poole's 
way, and were hampering Col. Donop," who was the 
French Provost Marshal. "I see no use for any govern- 
ment here anyway. ' ' 

I replied: "I think this is the most flagrant usurpation 
of power I ever knew, and don 't you circulate that proc- 
lamation that General Poole tells me you have written 
until I can see it, and show it to my colleagues. ' * 

The Representatives of the Allied Missions met at my 
apartment that day. They came up there at 12 o'clock. 
I had Chaplin there. When the troops landed, I had sent 
for Col. Stewart, who was the commander of 4,700 Amer- 
ican soldiers, and asked him : ' ' Have you any communi- 
cation for me?" He said, "No." I said, "What are 
your orders?" He said, "To report to General Poole, 


who is in command of the Allied forces in Northern Rus- 
sia. " I said, "I interpret our policy here. If I should 
tell yon not to obey one of General Poole's orders what 
would you do?" He said, "I would obey you." 

This conversation had taken place before the kidnap- 
ping. I had arranged beforehand through the Depart- 
ment of State the relations between the Ambassador and 
the American forces. I had cabled the State Department 
that as I was interpreting the American policy in North 
Russia, I requested that the ranking officer in command 
of the American troops be put in close touch with me. 
Basil Miles, who was head of the Russian Bureau in the 
State Department, told me when I arrived in Washing- 
ton six months later that he had taken my cable over to 
General March, who manifested great annoyance on 
reading the cable, and said: "I didn't want the Ambas- 
sador to have anything to do with these troops." Mr. 
Miles returned to the State Department, and told Assist- 
ant Secretary Long of his interview with General March. 
Assistant Secretary Long wrote a letter to the President 
expressing the opinion that I had made a proper request 
in desiring the ranking officer in command of American 
troops to be in close touch with me, as I was interpreting 
American policy in Russia. The President evidently 
agreed with Assistant Secretary Long, as in a war council 
held the following day, he told General March that he 
thought I had made a reasonable request and ordered that 
request complied with. General March immediately 
cabled Col. Stewart to get in close touch with me, which 
accounts for Col. Stewart's reply to me when I asked 
him whose orders he would obey. 

We brought back the Tchaikovsky ministers composing 
this " socialistic government" as Chaplin and his asso- 
ciates called it. It seems those ministers had been 
aroused at their apartment about 12 :30 at night, and had 


been told to put on their clothes. They asked, "What 
are you going to do with us ! ' f Chaplin 's party replied, 
"We are going to put you in a monastery." The minis- 
ters were taken to a boat, and the boat cleared about 
4 :30 in the morning. It was after ten when I heard of 
the coup d'etat, or kidnapping, through General Poole. 
The boat on which the Ministers had been taken away 
had no wireless apparatus, and we could not communi- 
cate with them. We wired to Kem, which is a station 
down the Murman Railroad, about twenty-five miles be- 
low Kandalaksha, to get a boat over there and get these 
ministers when they landed there and bring them back 
to Archangel. 

There was something significant about the time chosen 
for his kidnapping. The American troops had landed 
on the 4th of September, and the kidnapping took place, 
as I have said, on the night of the 5th. It was timed, I 
think, to make the impression upon the people up there 
that it had the sanction, if it was not at the instigation 
of the American Ambassador, occurring as it did almost 
simultaneously with the landing of the American troops. 
I soon gave them to understand that I did not sanction 
the kidnapping at all. 

As soon as the news was spread of the kidnapping, 
petitions and delegations and telegrams were coming to 
me as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, asking that the de- 
posed government of ministers be reinstated. The 
Tchaikovsky administration, I think, was well disposed, 
and intended to administer a very good government. As 
to the position of General Poole, I am satisfied he did not 
want to establish a government of his own, but British 
soldiers have been colonizers for so long that they do not 
know how to respect the feelings of socialists. I do not 
mean to say that is the policy of the British Government, 
but British officers have had to do so much with uncivi- 


lized people, and Great Britain has done so much colo- 
nizing that its officers do not feel as American officers do. 
We brought back the Tchaikovsky Government on Sun- 
day night, and the ministers were reinstalled on Monday 
morning at 9 o'clock. The confused conditions which 
prevailed in Archangel after I learned that Tchaikovsky 
and his fellow ministers had been kidnapped and taken 
to the monastery are thus described in my report to the 
Secretary of State, dated September 10, 1918 : 

1 i I asked Chaplin if he had gone with those detailed to 
arrest the Ministers and was told he had not, but he had 
given a written order to the officer in command, and that 
officer had arrested the Ministers and taken them to the 
steamer in the harbor and they had cleared for the mon- 
astery between 2 a.m. and 4 a.m. General Poole had told 
me that Chaplin was going to issue a proclamation ex- 
plaining to the people that the Sovereign Government 
had been deposed and that he was in command of the 
situation. Chaplin's manner indicated that he was proud 
of the deed, and expected commendation. I told General 
Poole not to permit any proclamation to be circulated 
before submitting it to the Allied Ambassadors, whom I 
requested to meet in my apartment at 12 noon. They 
assembled at that hour, when General Poole brought me 
a copy of the proclamation by Chaplin, and said he had 
held up its circulation until the Allied Ambassadors could 
pass upon it. The Allied Ambassadors immediately de- 
cided to bring back the kidnapped ministers and sent for 
Chaplin, who came with StartsefT, Commissar of Archan- 
gel under the Sovereign Government, who had joined 
with Chaplin in deposing it. We told Chaplin to issue 
no proclamation; that we had ordered the ministers 
brought back, and I told him that I considered his act a 
flagrant usurpation of power, and an insult to the Allied 
Ambassadors. That evening about 10 p.m., September 
6th, Chaplin issued a proclamation, appointing Ignatieff 
to the position from which the Sovereign Government 
had removed him three days previous, and appointing 


Durop, Assistant Minister of War under the Sovereign 
Government, to be Minister of War. 

" Durop came to the ambassadors' meeting on the fol- 
lowing day, September 7th, and said he had been offered 
the post of Minister of War, but had declined it, and 
would not serve under Chaplin, as he considered Chaplin 
an adventurer. Meantime the strongest man in the 
Ministry, Dyedushenko, who held three portfolios, had 
escaped arrest by not sleeping in his apartment. He had 
sent word to me that he would like to call if I would guar- 
antee him against arrest, which I promptly did. He came 
while the ambassadors were in session and was invited 
in. He and another minister, who had escaped arrest, 
Evanoff, by name, had prepared a proclamation, calling 
upon laborers, peasants and citizens to resist the Chaplin 
domination and charging it with being monarchistie, 
stating that the Grand Duke Michael, brother of the 
murdered Czar, was in Archangel, and implying, if not 
asserting, that the Chaplin movement was in concert with 
the Grand Duke's followers. We told Dyedushenko not 
to circulate the proclamation, and he went to the tele- 
phone in my apartment and gave an order to that effect. 
The four Allied Ambassadors issued a statement which 
was circulated, a copy of which is enclosed. The morning 
of September 7th, crowds were gathered around these 
three declarations, namely: The Ambassadors, and the 
one from Chaplin and Startseff and the third from Dye- 
dushenko and Evanoff. To say that the populace was 
confused inadequately expresses the condition of their 

"Meantime I had been visited by delegations of work- 
men, of peasants, of Zemstvos and of Cooperatives, all of 
which protested against the Chaplin government, and 
stated they were in favor of the deposed ministers. I 
also received telegrams and petitions from organizations 
of Zemstvos and peasants in the outlying districts, some 
of them stating that organizations were arming and com- 
ing to Archangel to reinstate the Sovereign Government. 
The strike committee ordered a general strike of the 
workmen, including those at the electric light plant and 
conductors and motormen of street cars. I thought that 


the situation justified and demanded that the Allies 
should assume control. My colleagues and General Poole 
agreed thereto, and a proclamation or statement was 
prepared setting forth such conclusion. By the time this 
proclamation was translated into Russian it was 8 p.m., 
and upon sending it to the printers we were informed 
that the printers were on strike, consequently the procla- 
mation was never published. 

"The Ministers returned at 9 p.m. on Sunday, Sep- 
tember 8th, and were held on the steamer in the harbor 
until a representative of the Allied Ambassadors, Lind- 
ley, could tell them of the action of the Ambassadors. 
Lindley returned to my apartment about 11 p.m., and 
reported that President Tchaikovsky appeared grateful 
that he and his colleagues were so promptly returned and 
promised to perform no act of government until meeting 
with the Ambassadors at 11 a.m., the following day, 
September 9th. 

" After we succeeded in bringing them back the Allied 
Ambassadors conferred with them in the hope of being 
able to reestablish the Tchaikovsky Government on a 
firm basis.' ' 

The report made by me on September 12th, 1918, to the 
Secretary of State sets forth the discouragement that 
attended our efforts: 

" Yesterday afternoon the three Ministers who at- 
tended the conference with the four Ambassadors sur- 
prised us very much by reading a declaration to the effect 
that they were going to abdicate and appoint a Governor- 
General, who would report direct to the new government 
combination, whose headquarters are at Samara. The 
main cause given for the abdication was that their decree 
of mobilization had been a failure. It appears that 
Chaplin had assembled in Archangel about 300 Russian 
officers, who were completely under his control, with, I 
suspect, the encouragement of some British and French 
military officers. Tchaikovsky, who was an old man and 
unaccustomed to the responsibilities of the position he 
had held for six weeks, appears 75 years of age. He told 


us in tremulous tones that only three officers, of the 300 
or more he had expected, had obeyed the call for mobili- 
zation. That call specified that officers desiring" to serve 
in the army should report first to the Sovereign Govern- 
ment and fixed dates therefor. Furthermore, he stated 
that while the Allied Diplomatic Chiefs were well dis- 
posed toward the new government, friction was constant- 
ly arising between the British Military control, repre- 
sented by the British Intelligence Bureau under Colonel 
Thornhill, and the Russian Military officials. He drew 
out the official newspaper of the government and ex- 
hibited the work of the censor commission, which had 
condemned over half of the matter in the proposed issue 
of the paper, and consequently it was not issued. 

"I have just written to General Poole a note demand- 
ing American representation on this censor commission. 
General Poole appointed a French Military Governor, 
Colonel Donop, for the city of Archangel, and he has had 
friction not only with the ministry but with the minis- 
try's military appointees; this French Colonel is sus- 
tained by the French Ambassador, who has suggested a 
modus vivendi which leaves the Sovereign Government 
a government in name only. I have not consented to this 
project, and shall not without modifications. The Min- 
istry planned to announce to the Zemstvo meeting at six 
p.m. this intention of abdicating and appointing a Gover- 
nor-General to report to the head of the new movement at 
Samara, but we prevailed upon them not to do so. Tchai- 
kovsky went to the Zemstvo meeting and at my request, 
translated, sentence by sentence, a speech I delivered 
there. While Tchaikovsky, who preceded me, spoke in 
Russian, I had an interpreter who told me that Tchaikov- 
sky said nothing about the intention of abdicating. This 
new Government at Samara is under three directors who 
are higher than the Ministers in Archangel, in Samara 
and in Siberia; these three directors are: Avksentieff, 
Aleksieff and Stapenoff. I told Tchaikovsky as we were 
going to the Zemstvo meeting that he knew I was friendly 
to him and his Government and that he should not take 
such a serious step without consulting me. I have been 
waiting for a call from him, but up to this hour, noon, he 


has not phoned or called. The objection I have to the new 
Government abdicating is that it will give an appearance 
to the presence of the Allied troops here of a decided 
military character and may possibly arouse opposition 
among the peasants and Zemstvos and Cooperatives 
against the Allied forces." 

After deciding to abdicate, the Ministers of the Sove- 
reign Government appointed a Governor-General, but 
on the 25th of September reconsidered that decision and 
decided to remain in office. Tchaikovsky also continued 
as President. The selection for Governor-General was 
Duroff. He was appointed on the 18th of September, 
but issued no orders until several days thereafter. 

President Tchaikovsky, the Governor-General, and 
General Poole met with the ambassadors in my apart- 
ment, and reached an understanding as thorough as 
seemed possible under the circumstances. 

On the 24th of September, President Tchaikovsky tele- 
phoned me he would like to meet the ambassadors, and I 
called them in session at my apartment at five o'clock 
that day. When they were all assembled, Tchaikovsky 
said that the government in view of conditions in Samara 
could not abdicate without vesting the Governor-General 
with dictatorial power. This the government could not 
think of doing on account of its responsibility to the 

"Of course,' ' I said, but my colleagues were not so 
prompt, and while they made no objections I thought they 
were disappointed that the government had concluded to 

Three ministers after the "irrevocable decision" of 
the government left Archangel by boat for Omsk. These 
were the three ministers most objectionable to the opposi- 
tion, and also the ministers least liked by my colleagues. 
As the vessel on which they sailed had no wireless appa- 


ratus and could only be reached at some place on the Ob 
River, where they might make their first landing, Lindley 
and Noulens advised that no effort be made to reach 
them. I did not object to permitting them to remain 
away, as I knew their return would bring discord, or 
promote any that already existed. President Tchaikov- 
sky did not say what he would do, but I learned that he 
attempted to reach them by wire and failed, because he 
expressed great concern lest they might be shot by the 
Bolsheviks, who had captured the town to which he wired. 

After the abdication of the Sovereign Government took 
place Tchaikovsky was thoroughly disheartened. He 
came to my apartment several times during the effort we 
were making to reestablish the Sovereign Government of 
Northern Russia. Impressed with his sincerity and be- 
lieving that he had the confidence of a great many Rus- 
sians, we endeavored to persuade him to accept some 
official position. One suggestion made to him was that 
he become Military Governor. He put this aside. The 
French Ambassador suggested that Tchaikovsky become 
the Diplomatic Representative of the Government of 
Samara. This proposition was taken under advisement 
by Tchaikovsky, and when he came to see me the next 
day he told me that he had concluded not to accept, and 
said he would like to go to England if I would assist, 
which I promptly agreed to do if he had fully decided to 
go, but expressed the hope that he would remain in 

I took advantage of this private conference with Tchai- 
kovsky to ask him the real reason for the Government 
abdication. He told me that another coup d'etat was 
being planned and when I assured him that I would take 
steps to prevent same and to protect the Ministers in the 
discharge of their duties, he replied that the Sovereign 
Government could not get along with General Poole, who, 


while apparently desirous of doing the right thing, was 
constantly under the influence of the British officers sur- 
rounding him and the French officers also, and that the 
British especially and he thought the French also were 
discouraging Eussians from joining the Eussian army, 
and doing propaganda work to induce them to join the 
British army. He said the French had recently opened 
a recruiting station also. He was confident that the 
British officers together with some of the French officers 
had planned a coup d'etat, or kidnapping, of himself and 
associates ; that General Poole was approving orders is- 
sued by his subordinates which sent all Eussian soldiers 
of democratic inclinations out of Archangel to the front, 
and consequently the Eussian soldiers remaining were 
friends of Chaplin and opposed to the Sovereign Govern- 
ment or to any regeneration of Eussia that did not look 
to the restoration of monarchy. At this juncture Lind- 
ley entered and Tchaikovsky told him that he had decided 
not to accept the diplomatic post which Noulens had 
suggested the previous evening. 

Of the events which followed, I wrote the Department 
of State on the 4th of October : 

"I advised President Tchaikovsky to fill the vacancies 
with representatives of elements not represented, such 
as commerce and shipping interests, etc., and to agree to 
make effort to do so. At the next meeting, held two days 
later, he informed us that he was unable to fill the vacant 
portfolios because he could find no members of the Con- 
stituent Assembly among those interests and was imper- 
vious to our arguments that it was not essential that 
ministers should be members of the Constituent Assem- 
bly, which had been dissolved by the Bolsheviks when it 
attempted to meet in Petrograd in January last and had 
never met since. Furthermore, the membership of that 
Constituent Assembly was depleted by assassination and 


flight and some of the members, such as Rodzianko, were 
open advocates of monarchy, and others, such as Miliu- 
koff, had made terms with the Germans. He was immov- 
able, but was finally prevailed upon to reduce the Minis- 
try to five members, Matushin, Minister of Finance; 
Ivanoff, Minister of Agriculture; Goukovsky, Minister 
of Justice; Zouboff, Minister of Post and Telegraph — 
Zouboff was not a member of the Constituent Assembly, 
but was Secretary of the Government, and while he met 
with the Ministers he had not the privilege of voting on 
their decrees. 

" At the next meeting President Tchaikovsky informed 
us that Matushin, Ivanoff and Zouboff had resigned. 
Consequently he and Goukovsky were the only remain- 
ing members of the Constituent Assembly. He said that 
he had attempted to persuade Grudestofr*, a well-known 
commercial man representing timber interests, to become 
a minister without a vote, as he was not a member of the 
Constituent Assembly, but that Grudestoff* had pleaded 
want of time, whereupon the Ambassadors asked me to 
attempt to persuade Grudestoff, whom I knew, to con- 
sent to become a member of the Government. I tele- 
phoned Grudestoff and he came to my apartment about 
11 p.m. ; instead of my convincing him, he convinced me 
that it was better that he should remain outside of the 
government, and organize an executive commission of 
fifteen, who would represent all interests and to such 
commission the government would refer financial, eco- 
nomic, and all questions other than military over which 
the Governor-General had supreme control, subject to 
the approval of the Ministry. 

' ' The next meeting held at 11 a.m., the following day, 
was attended by the Ambassadors, President Tchaikov- 
sky and Grudestoff. The Ambassadors advised that a 
minister be appointed from the bourgeois classes ; several 


names were suggested, but as the bourgeoisie who were 
active and influential had been arrested and taken to 
Moscow by the Bolsheviks, or fled from Archangel before 
the Sovereign Government was installed, the supply of 
available men was limited. Several were suggested dur- 
ing that day and the following day, but everyone 

"At the next meeting of the Ambassadors with Tchai- 
kovsky, it was agreed that he and Goukovsky would rep- 
resent the Government and cooperate with the Executive 
or Advisory Commission, of which Grudestoff was to be 
Chairman, and with Col. DurofT, who in the meantime had 
talked with General Poole, as I had, and arranged for 
harmonious action. At this juncture the subject which 
I had avoided at previous meetings was brought up, and 
that was punishment of the Eussians who had planned 
and executed the kidnapping. General Poole was pres- 
ent and in his defense of these men was very emphatic 
and insistent, saying he knew that if effort were made to 
punish them there would be greater discord than ever. 
I then told General Poole that I had heard confidentially 
from President Tchaikovsky, previously, that the Gov- 
ernment Secret Service had informed President Tchai- 
kovsky that another coup d 'etat or kidnapping of Colonel 
DurofT had been planned. The result of this conference 
was that General Poole guaranteed there would be no 
more coups d'etat and President Tchaikovsky agreed to 
issue a proclamation of amnesty and appeal to all Eus- 
sians to unite in the formation of an army for the resto- 
ration of order, the expulsion of the Germans and the 
regeneration of Eussia. 

"At the next meeting President Tchaikovsky informed 
us that Goukovsky had resigned because they had dif- 
fered over the form of the proclamation which DurofT 
had drawn up and Tchaikovsky had approved with a 


few alterations. He read the proclamation to us and we 
commended it. He thereupon said that Goukovsky, who 
is a lawyer and a Jew, a man of fifty-odd years, insisted 
on stating in the proclamation in legal phraseology all 
the reasons why this amnesty was granted and they had 
argued four hours without coming to any agreement. I 
related a story of an old St. Louisan who said that he 
employed lawyers not to tell him what to do, but to 
arrange methods for his doing what he had concluded to 
do. Tchaikovsky said that the Ministers when they had 
all resigned several days previously had empowered him 
to form a new ministry, but he could find no members of 
the Constituent Assembly to whom he could assign port- 
folios, and as no supreme power could exist outside of 
the Constituent Assembly there would be no branch of 
the government authorized to legislate. 

1 ' The next and final meeting of the Ambassadors with 
Tchaikovsky was held two days ago, and he then stated 
that he had ' ordered' Matushin and Zouboff to resume 
their former positions in the government, and was now 
looking around for the fourth man, or a fifth counting 
Duroff, who would confer and advise without a vote. 
For two days past he had been endeavoring to find such 
a man, and when he succeeds will inform the Ambassa- 
dors. I think now he will not appoint a minister to 
whom we object. 

"In the meantime quiet prevails throughout the city, 
and the forces up the Dvina and down the railroad to- 
ward Vologda seem to be resting on their arms, as no 
engagements have been reported by General Poole for 
three days past — the warfare has been of a guerrilla 
character from the beginning. A few days ago three 
British sailors were surprised and captured on the rail- 
road by the Bolsheviks, were killed after they had sur- 
rendered, and their arms severed from their bodies. A 


French interpreter was captured about ten days ago, was 
killed after capture and his head cut off and his heart 
taken out. Roger Simmons and Peter Bukowski, have 
just arrived in Archangel, but I have not seen them. 
Simmons told my secretary that Lockhart was in prison 
and would surely be shot; that a young Jewish lawyer 
whom I knew well — but Simmons could not remember the 
name — was in the same cell with Simmons and was taken 
out and shot because he had been the legal adviser of the 
British Embassy. Simmons said he would have been 
shot the next day, if Poole, Acting Consul-General, had 
not intervened. Simmons also says that the doctor who 
attended me during my illness of ten days in April in 
Vologda, Dr. GortalofY, a man of sixty years, was ar- 
rested because he gave him a certificate of illness, and 
has probably been shot ere this. The Bolsheviks are 
inhuman brutes. Simmons says they have heard that 
General Poole said he would kill every commissar he 
could capture, and that numbers of innocent people had 
been killed in anticipation of the execution of General 
Pooled threat. I do not blame General Poole for feel- 
ing that way, but if he made the threat, which I do not 
believe, it was indiscreet. I have been satisfied from 
subsequent developments as well as from what I heard 
at the time of cabling you, that it was the intention of 
the Soviet Government at Moscow to hold us Allied 
diplomats as hostages at Archangel when we arrived the 
first time and remained there two days before leaving 
for Kandalaksha. The reason why we were not detained 
was because the local Soviet knew that a revolution was 
brewing here and feared it would be successful with the 
aid of Allied forces, who were reported as coming from 
Murmansk for days before they left that place, July 31st. 
"I think I did not write you or cable that the Moscow 
Central Soviet ordered the Siberian Government to ar- 


rest the Japanese Ambassador Uchida (now Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in Japan), when he left me at Vologda, 
March 4th and started for Vladivostok. The Siberian 
Government replied that they would not arrest the Japa- 
nese Ambassador, because they feared it would bring the 
Japanese army in Siberia. These Bolsheviks have per- 
sistently endeavored by special favors and hypocritical 
expressions of friendship to American representatives 
to create discord between the Allies. They are in 
my opinion German agents and have been from the 

"As cabled you yesterday, if the American troops had 
not arrived when they did this Government of the North 
would have been overthrown and a civil war in the rear 
of our front, which would have been the result, would 
have left the few British and French soldiers on the 
Dvina and on the railroad toward Vologda completely at 
the mercy of the Bolsheviks, and we diplomatic repre- 
sentatives would have been forced to leave Russia. As 
General Poole stated to me, before the arrival of the 
4,500 American soldiers, he was playing a great game of 
bluff; he had less than 2,000 soldiers all told. If the 
Allied forces had numbered 50,000 when they first landed, 
they could have advanced to Vologda, could have taken 
Kotlas and possibly Viatka, but now the Bolsheviks have 
had time to get reenforcements and are commanded by 
German officers, who are directing them how to offer 
spirited resistance. Only four American soldiers have 
been killed in battle, but about sixty have been wounded 
and brought back to Archangel. ' ' 

Personal letters written by me from Archangel give 
possibly more detailed and intimate descriptions of the 
confusing situation than do the official reports. 

To Thomas H, West, St. Louis, in a letter dated 
Archangel, August 27th, I wrote : 


1 ' This letter is written from Archangel and is dictated 
from my bed. My colleagues come to my apartment, as 
do members of the new government and the British Gen- 
eral and the Military Governor also. I am determined, 
as Mr. Britling said, 'to see it through' even although 
it may cause a shortening of my life, which I hope it 
will not do. But if it did, I would be willing to remain 
here if I thought I could best serve my country by doing 
so. My whole heart and soul is in this war, and I am 
hoping and praying that I may be spared to see Germany 

"At Murmansk I received newspapers from America 
for six months back, and although I have not been able to 
read them carefully, have gathered therein information 
that is very gratifying to me, and that is that our people 
are aroused and determined to succeed in this struggle 
which is one between force and humanity, between autoc- 
racy and democracy, between feudalism and civilization, 
between the old and the new, in fact a struggle between 
the old theory of classes and the new and broadening, 
principles of Christianity; a struggle between slavery 
and freedom, between a favored few who think they can 
exploit their fellows, by their own superiority if not by 
divine right on the one side, and individual responsi- 
bility to God and society on the other. I feel that if 
Germany is successful in this war, not only will our liber- 
ties in America be jeopardized and all of our principles 
subverted, but that this world will not be a desirable 
place for an intelligent freeman to live in. ' ' 

On the 29th of August, 1918, I wrote from Archangel 
to Festus J. Wade of St. Louis a letter describing the 
conditions then existing in Northern Russia. 

"The situation here is critical. Cable communication 
is very irregular and unreliable, and connection with 
Moscow, Petrograd, Vologda and Siberia is absolutely 


severed. The new government in the saddle here is sin- 
cere but not strong. I am having difficulty in lessening 
the friction between the Military Governor, a Britisher, 
General Poole, and the new civil government. None of 
the Allied governments have yet recognized this * Sover- 
eign Government of the Northern Regions' as it calls 
itself, but its principles are correct, and that is more 
than could at any time have been said of the Bolshevik 
Government. The new government is attempting to or- 
ganize an army with which to fight Germany, and it has 
the sincere motive of attempting to resurrect Russia. 
At the same time it has its enemies in Russia, the Bolshe- 
viks and the Monarchists are persistently endeavoring to 
undermine and overthrow it. As I said to the President 
of the new government, Tchaikovsky, in a conversation 
a few days ago, 'The situation at Archangel is anoma- 
lous, unprecedented, difficult and delicate. ' American 
representatives here are less disliked than the represent- 
atives of any other foreign country. There is some prej- 
udice against the Allied governments, as their objects 
are suspected. It is believed by some Russians, and they 
are a suspicious race, that England, France and Japan 
are planning to subordinate the resources and the man 
power of Russia to their own interests, and the Bolshe- 
viks are doing all in their power to foster this suspicion. 
Thanks to the expressions of our President and the 
American Ambassador in Russia to a limited and less 
extent, our objects are not considered selfish. Lenin and 
Trotzky called the American Government imperialistic 
and capitalistic and all Bolshevik orators do likewise, 
and find thousands of hearers who believe them, as it is 
difficult for Europeans to understand why a people thou- 
sands of miles away are interfering in affairs which do 
not affect their material welfare. It has been very dif- 
ficult to make clear to them that America is unselfishly 


fighting for a principle, for humanity, for civilization, 
for society itself as it should be constituted. I flatter 
myself that I have made some impression on the Russian 
people by the addresses I have issued and the interviews 
I have given. All that I have said and done, however, 
cannot be compared with the utterances of President 
Wilson, whose speeches and messages I have assiduously 
circulated and with good effect. I must close now as the 
Financial Adviser of the British Embassy is waiting for 
me in an outer room. I hear him coughing as if he were 
impatient. ' ' 

In a letter to Breckinridge Jones of St. Louis, dated 
Archangel, September 4, 1918, I wrote of the confusion 
and difficulties attending the establishment of govern- 
ment in Russia: 

"The British Empire was not diplomatically repre- 
sented in Russia from February to July, when on the 
7th or 10th of that month F. 0. Lindley, who had been 
Charge after the departure of Sir George Buchanan in 
January, came to Vologda. The Allied forces here, 
numbering only about 3,000 are under the command of a 
British General, named Poole. About 4,000 American 
soldiers are expected to-morrow, but the State Depart- 
ment has not advised me specifically of their coming. 
Reconciling their presence with our Governments decla- 
ration of Russian policy is a delicate task. The British 
and French are impatient with the Russians and have 
lost patience with the latter 's ability to govern them- 
selves. The new government here, calling itself i Sover- 
eign Government of the Northern Region ' has an exag- 
gerated judgment of its importance and power and is 
constantly complaining to me of the encroachments of 
the military on the civil prerogatives. I am Dean of the 
Diplomatic Corps, by reason of being longest in service 
as Ambassador, and have my hands full in endeavoring 


to reconcile these discordant elements. The new govern- 
ment, it is true, has declared that it does not recognize 
the Brest-Litovsk peace and is attempting to mobilize an 
army with which to fight Germany. I had to tell the 
President a few days ago in answer to some grievance he 
presented that if the Allied forces should withdraw from 
Archangel, the officials of the new government would be 
driven into the Arctic Ocean, if they escaped being killed 
by the Red Guard of the Bolsheviks. This is not the 
only menace of the new government; officials of that 
government are Socialists and are considered by the 
Monarchists as little better than the Bolsheviks, conse- 
quently the Monarchists are constantly attempting to 
undermine the Sovereign Government of the Northern 
Region and to supplant it with a dictatorship.' ' 

On the first of October, 1918, I wrote to my son 
Charles : 

"My request for additional American troops to come 
to Archangel has not met with favor. In fact, I am in 
receipt of a cable, dated September 26th, stating, 'You 
are advised that no more American troops will be sent 
to the northern ports of Russia.' The same cable con- 
tains the following: 'The course that you have followed 
is most earnestly commended. It has the entire admira- 
tion of the President, who has characterized it as being 
thoroughly American. I highly approve of your actions. 
They have been very consistent and have been guided by 
a very sound judgment, exercised under the most trying 
and complicated circumstances.' Of course, this is con- 
fidential. I replied, 'Thanks for personal commendation 
but am not resting on past efforts, ' — and then went on to 
say that I did not despair of inducing the Russians to 
form a republic." 

In a letter of September 23rd from Archangel to Miss 
Isabel F. Hapgood, Atlantic City, who visited Russia 


while the Root Commission was in Petrograd, and who 
took great interest in Russian affairs, I wrote of the fate 
of the Czar, giving the official information which had 
come to me direct from the American Consulate at 

"The Emperor was shot by the Bolsheviks on the 16th 
of July, last, after having been removed from Tobolsk 
to Ekaterinburg. He was killed by order of the local 
Soviet, whose action was subsequently approved by the 
Central Soviet at Moscow. A courier from the Ameri- 
can Consul at Ekaterinburg to myself, who left Ekaterin- 
burg August 2nd, and after many vicissitudes arrived in 
Archangel, August 24th, told me that the Emperor was 
shot July 16th, but nobody knew it until July 18th, when 
it was officially announced. He said that the disposition 
of the body was not known but the rumor was that it had 
been thrown into a coal mine and burned. He said that 
the members of the Red Guard or Red Army who were 
ordered to shoot the Emperor refused to do so, and a 
detachment of Lettish soldiers was ordered to shoot him, 
but when they found it was the Emperor, they declined 
to shoot, and thereupon the local Commissar himself shot 
him. The killing of the Emperor, whom the people of 
Russia once looked upon with affection and reverence as 
the ' Little Father/ aroused no resentment on the part of 
the people whatever. In fact, it was forgotten within a 
short time — so accustomed have these people become to 

Of events at Vologda, following our departure on July 
25th, a letter sent from Stockholm, September 12th, to 
me at Archangel by Norman Armour, the Second Secre- 
tary of the American Embassy whom I left in charge at 
Vologda, gave the following account : 

"After receiving your telegram instructing me to re- 
main in Vologda, until it should be possible to join you, 


I went to the Soviet and explained to Vitoshkin, as Presi- 
dent of the Extraordinary Revolutionary Committee, 
that I had received orders from you to stay. Things 
went all right for three days, when suddenly we were 
ordered by an officer sent by Kedroff to leave town imme- 
diately for Moscow. I flatly refused, saying that having 
twenty nationals I should have to remain in order to 
protect them. If it was dangerous for me to remain it 
was equally dangerous for them. However, Kedroff re- 
fused to see this point of view and a train was prepared 
and we were told to go on board. Upon our again refus- 
ing, troops entered the Embassy during the night (the 
French, as you know, had already moved into our build- 
ing) and forced us to enter an automobile, which took us 
to the station, and put us on board the train. On the 
train was a guard of ten soldiers. Before our depar- 
ture, we were informed by the Commissar of War that 
our train would stop 40 versts away where we could 
await our nationals. Contrary to this promise, the train 
continued to Daniloff, from which station I sent a tele- 
gram to the Commissar of War, telling him he had broken 
his word and demanding the train to remain there. He 
complied with this request, and I was able three days 
later to see the Y.M.C.A. and National City Bank pass 
through safely." 

Secretary Armour requested to remain with me upon 
my leaving Petrograd. He is at the present Secretary 
of the American Legation at The Hague. I saw him in 
London when I was confined in the hospital there, imme- 
diately before he returned to Stockholm, where he mar- 
ried the Russian Princess Koudachev. 

I was confined to my apartment in Archangel during 
almost my entire stay in that city, and in my bed the most 
of the time. Five surgeons, who were called in, two 
Americans, two British, and a French-Russian, agreed 


upon the diagnosis of my ailment and said it required a 
major surgical operation for my relief. I said to them, 
1 ' Perform it here and now. ' ' But they refused. After 
suffering ten or twelve days longer, I advised the State 
Department of my condition and of my exasperation at 
the surgeons for refusing to perform the surgical opera- 
tion. The Department replied in a very complimentary 
cable, which is set forth in the Introduction, and a sub- 
sequent cable informed me that it had obtained the con- 
sent of Admiral Sims and Secretary Daniels to send 
the Olympia for me. The cruiser arrived on the 
28th of October, under command of Rear Admiral 
McCully and Captain Bierer, but was held in the Archan- 
gel harbor until the 6th of November, just five days be- 
fore the Armistice was signed, when I was carried on 
board on a stretcher, borne by eight sailors. 

Terestchenko, former Minister of Finance and Minis- 
ter of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government, 
came to Archangel and dined with me twice. He was 
going under the name of Titoff. He came from Stock- 
holm, having gone there from Norway, where he had 
been living quietly with a peasant since his release from 
prison in Petrograd, about March 4th. He was attempt- 
ing to join Kolchak, traveling as a courier of Goul- 
kevitch, the Russian Minister to Sweden. He was de- 
cidedly anti-German and pro-Ally in his feelings, but 
like most Russians was suspicious of the intentions of 
the British. He thoroughly approved of the American 
policy, and told me at our second meeting that while liv- 
ing in Archangel incognito he had seen many of his 
bourgeoisie friends and was pleased to inform me that 
not only the local government, but the people generally 
considered the American Ambassador the best friend 
they had in the Diplomatic Corps. He told me that 
he and Kerensky were not friends, or did not agree 


in their policies after the Korniloff affair. He further- 
more assured me that about August 1st, 1917, he re- 
ceived advantageous peace proposals from Germany; 
that he showed them to no one in the Ministry except 
Kerensky and gave Kerensky the credit of siding with 
him against a separate peace. He was very proud of his 
position on that issue and claimed credit therefor, cor- 
rectly saying that if Russia had concluded a peace at 
that time, four months after America entered the war, 
the Central Empires would have been able to concen- 
trate their strength against the Allied armies before 
America could transport troops to France. If this was 
true, and I have no reason to doubt it, the course of 
Terestchenko, supported by Kerensky, not only brought 
the war to an earlier end than it would otherwise have 
had, but it cost the Allies less blood and far less treasure. 
I always had faith in the sincerity and loyalty of Teres- 
tchenko. He is a more practical man than Kerensky, 
and is much more highly esteemed in Russia. 

The reasons which inspired Terestchenko to reject the 
proposal of the Central Empires for a separate peace 
were the same reasons that inspired me to sustain the 
Provisional Government to the extent of my influence, be- 
cause I knew that when the Bolsheviks came into power 
they would withdraw Russia from the conflict and thereby 
permit Germany and Austria to send their forces on the 
Eastern front to the Western front. It is possible that 
our Governments recognition of the Provisional Gov- 
ernment on my recommendation perpetuated the Provi- 
sional Government during its administration of affairs. 
If the Provisional Government had been shorter-lived, 
Germany would have sent 105 divisions to the Western 
front sooner than they were sent, and that would have 
been before Pershing and his men could have gotten to 
France from America. 


In my Archangel cables of October to the Department 
of State, I reported in detail the friction existing among 
the different forces there and especially the attitude of 
the British, who were inclined to be overbearing, and 
who attempted to conduct all affairs in the Archangel 
region according to their own ideas. The State Depart- 
ment informed me that General Poole had been cautioned 
regarding his policy in Russia, and to keep in touch with 
me. Immediately following receipt of this cable from 
the Department, I noticed a change in the General 's atti- 
tude. However, it was reported to me that he was going 
to England and would not return unless I was removed 
or recalled from Archangel, and that that was one of the 
objects of his visit to England. 

Under date of October 19, 1918, 1 cabled from Archan- 
gel to the Department : 

* ' The general conduct and bearing of all British repre- 
sentatives, military and civil, at Archangel and Mur- 
mansk indicate a belief or feeling on their part that if 
they do not have exclusive privileges at these ports, they 
should have, and they will not be contented with not 
having a decided advantage. Every move on their part 
indicates a desire to gain a strong foothold. There were 
20,000 tons of flax in Archangel and the British, after 
stating to the French and our representatives that we 
should not compete therefor and thus advance the price 
to unreasonable figures, and after we consented thereto, 
contracted for the entire holdings of the cooperatives. 
Three thousand tons were apportioned to us, and as the 
same is shipped Captain Proctor, the British represent- 
ative, demands payment for purchase shall be in pound 
sterling in London, — notwithstanding shipments are 
made to America, and the cooperatives or the sellers wish 
and request payments to be made in dollars in America. 
At this writing I have instructed Consul Poole and 
Berg's representative (Berg is making purchases for a 
linen thread company of America) to inform the coopera- 


tives and Captain Proctor that the sellers of this flax 
when shipped to America can receive purchase money 
in dollars in America. 

"I cabled you that Lieut. Hugh S. Martin, our repre- 
sentative at Murmansk, had sent me confidential infor- 
mation by Crawford Wheeler, ranking Secretary of the 
Y. M. C. A. in Russia, that he had proof the British were 
attempting to negotiate commercial treaties of an exclu- 
sive, preferential character with the Russians at Mur- 
mansk. I cannot believe this is true, but am waiting the 
arrival of Lieut. Martin before making up my mind on 
the subject. The British have been experienced in inter- 
national commerce for centuries and consequently 
they have the advantage over others who have less 

Under date of October 18th, 1918, 1 cabled the Depart- 
ment of State, as follows : 

"General Ironsides, the successor of General Poole, 
dined with me last evening ; he told me he had made two 
or three quick tours of inspection to the fronts, and 
while he realized that the soldiers on both fronts should 
have more relief than he is able to give them, on account 
of the small number of soldiers at his disposal, he had 
arranged that each company at the front should spend 
eight days in the month in Archangel. Acting Naval 
Attache Riis returned from the railroad front and re- 
ported that American soldiers there were very dissatis- 
fied and the French were more so. The French, having 
heard that there was an armistice, had openly declared 
that they would not fight any more in Russia if the 
hostilities had ceased in France, because they did not see 
why they should fight for British interests in Russia. 
The American soldiers and officers were partially innocu- 
lated with the same sentiment, but Riis told them that no 
armistice had been agreed upon and hostilities had not 

* * General Ironsides is six feet four inches tall without 
shoes, weighs 270 pounds, and is only thirty-seven years 
old. He is descended direct from the last Saxon king of 


England, was dismissed from St, Andrew's School when 
he was ten and one-half years old because he whipped 
the teacher. He was the first British officer to land in 
France; in fact he landed on the night of August 2nd, 
before England had entered the war, on August 6th. He 
was in command of a division on the French front, when 
he was ordered to Russia. He relinquished his command 
and cleared in an aeroplane for England. After a flight 
of three and one-half hours he landed somewhere in 
England, spent three days acquainting himself with Rus- 
sian conditions and arrived in Archangel September 
20th; he does everything that way. He speaks six lan- 
guages with equal fluency — English, French, Russian, 
German, Italian, Swedish, and can converse although not 
fluently in eleven other languages. In other words, he 
has studied seventeen languages, and has mastered six 
of them sufficiently to be able to converse therein flu- 
ently and grammatically. He told me that the War 
Office had turned down his request or appeal for per- 
mission to transfer 5,000 or 6,000 troops from Murmansk 
to Archangel, but he said that while greatly disappointed 
thereat he was making the best of the troops under his 
command, few as they are." 

Under date of October 23rd, 1918, I cabled the De- 
partment : 

1 l General Ironsides seems to have impressed every- 
body favorably. President Tchaikovsky told me he was 
pleased with General Ironsides, and believed him to be 
a sincere man and more disposed than his predecessor 
was to respect the rights of the civil government. Gen- 
eral Ironsides told me that he was encouraging in every 
way the mobilization of an army by the Archangel Gov- 
ernment, and President Tchaikovsky confirmed this by 
saying that he was experiencing less difficulty in procur- 
ing clothing and supplies for the mobilized army since 
General Ironsides came. General Poole or his staff were 
delaying honoring such requests with the view to forcing 
into the British-Slav legion all men desiring to enlist." 

Almost my last act before I was taken on board the 


Olympia was to issue an address to the American sol- 
diers in North Russia in which I gave a short account 
of the work they had done, the hardships they had suf- 
fered, the illness and deaths among the men, calling 
attention to their splendid response in spite of all these 
difficulties and expressing my appreciation of their spirit 
of service and sacrifice with which they had performed 
every duty. I said: 

"I trust you do not underestimate the importance of 
the service you are performing as American soldiers in 
Russia. Our Government has no desire for territorial 
conquest anywhere, especially in Russia, in whose wel- 
fare and integrity President Wilson has repeatedly as- 
sured the world of his deep and abiding interest. . . . 
President Wilson reflects the views and feelings of the 
American people when he says he proposes to stand by 
Russia. Regardless of sympathy with the people who 
have been oppressed for centuries, if the Allies had con- 
sented for Germany to appropriate Russia, German 
methods would have begun immediately to organize the 
immense man power of this country and to develop itself 
immeasurable resources in preparation for another effort 
to establish Deutschland tiber Alles. . . . 

"The Bolsheviks, who control the Soviet Government, 
are completely under the domination of Germany and 
consequently in resisting them you are not only perform- 
ing a humanitarian service but you are preventing Ger- 
many from securing a much stronger foothold in Russia 
than she has up to this time been able to establish. Your 
service is as important as that which any American 
soldiers or Allied troops are performing anywhere. I 
have no doubt that you would prefer to be in France or 
in Italy, but like soldiers you are performing the duty 
to which you are assigned and are entitled to all the more 
credit theref or.' ' 


In December, 1917, the Bolsheviks in a series of decrees 
began to develop their strange financial policies. These 
decrees declared the banking business to be a "monopoly 
of the government," instructed all proprietors of safes 
in safe deposit institutions to present themselves immedi- 
ately with their keys i l in order to be present at the revi- 
sion of the safes," otherwise all property contained 
therein would be confiscated and become the property of 
the nation. Later decrees announced the cancelation of 
all loans contracted by former Russian governments, all 
guarantees for these loans, and all loans made from 
abroad. There were nine other decrees : nationalization 
of land, of factories and works, of banks (including the 
opening of all safe deposit boxes) ; the suspension of 
payment of all bond coupons; taxation amounting to 
confiscation of buildings, whether or not belonging to 
foreigners ; annulment of all loans ; confiscation of shares 
of stock in former private banks ; and nationalization or 
confiscation of every ship belonging to private individ- 
uals or corporations. 

The diplomatic corps was unanimous with the excep- 
tion of myself, in approving a protest to the Bolshevik 
government against all these decrees. I believed that 
with the decrees pertaining to domestic affairs we had 
nothing to do and consequently we should not protest in 
the form proposed. As for the decree abolishing debts to 
foreigners, or to foreign countries or interfering with the 
property rights of our nationals, I was willing to join 
in the protest. 



Finally a protest was agreed upon by all of us and 
served on the Soviet Government. This protest stated 
that we regarded the repudiation of state debts, confis- 
cation of property, etc., in so far as they concerned the 
interests of foreign subjects, as non-existent and that our 
governments reserved the right to demand satisfaction 
for all damage or loss which may be caused foreign states 
in general and their subjects who live in Russia in par- 
ticular, by the operation of these decrees. 

On the 2nd of May, 1918, I cabled the State Depart- 
ment that the time had come for the Allies to intervene 
in Russia, and gave my reasons in detail : 

"In my opinion the time has arrived for Allied inter- 
vention. I had hoped Soviet Government would so re- 
quest and have discreetly worked to that end. 

"First, by remaining here with the approval of the 
Department when other Allied Missions had departed. 

"Second, by fostering friendly business relations with 
the, Bolsheviks and allowing Robins to remain in Moscow 
for that purpose — this although Summers objected, say- 
ing he was humiliated thereby. 

"Third, by taking position against Japanese inter- 
vening alone. 

"Fourth, by suggesting and arranging for Allied mili- 
tary advice in forming new army; as stated to you I 
was confident I would be able at proper time to influence 
such army; I also persuaded my French and Italian 
Colleagues to permit their military chiefs to cooperate. 
This movement, however, had not been carried into effect 
when your cable was received prohibiting its execution 
until advised of the object for which the new army was 
to be organized; that object was never varied from Trot- 
zky's first statement that it was to defend and promote 
the world-wide social revolution not only against existing 
monarchies but against our government also. 

"Fifth. I requested that six railroad units be sent to 
Vologda for consultation with me and an experienced 


Soviet Railroad official. Stevens at first wired he was 
sending six units and I so advised the Soviet Govern- 
ment, but later Stevens having opposed the sending of 
any men whatever these units were not directed to come 
and I was embarrassed by having to explain to Trotzky 
through Robins and Riggs their failure to come as 
promised. I later asked that Emerson be instructed to 
bring three able engineers to Vologda and you replied 
April 24th that Emerson had been ordered to come or 
send Goldsmith and advise me of their leaving Harbin. 
Receiving no advice from Harbin of the departure of 
Emerson, I did not advise Trotzky or the Soviet thereof, 
fearing I might be again embarrassed. I am not com- 
plaining or criticizing Department action concerning 
military and railroad matters but merely stating facts. 

1 ' Sixth. I have in every way encouraged international 
commercial relations between America and Russian 
merchants while throwing around the same proper 

"I was ill nine days, from April 19th to April 28th, 
possibly from ptomaine poisoning, by which I was greatly 
weakened, being confined to my room if not to my bed, 
but I never ceased to work or lost spirit; am fully 
recovered now. 

" Seventh. I informed the Soviet Government of the 
Department's action concerning Chinese Embargo and 
ignored the offensive prohibition issued to American 
Consul at Irkutsk concerning cipher messages and over- 
looked the demand for recall of the American Consul at 
Vladivostok notwithstanding there were no evidences 
that he was guilty of charges made which if proven were 
not incriminating. I furthermore paid no attention to 
the demand of the Soviet Government to define the 
American view of the landing of Japanese and British 
marines at Vladivostok but gave two carefully worded 
interviews on the subject. I have herein made a hasty 
resume of my policy since arriving in Vologda. 

"Am not aware of the Department's view concerning 
Allied intervention, while knowing American and Rus- 
sian opposition to exclusively Japanese invasion which 
I heartily endorse. Last information on this subject 


received by me was from the Ambassador at Tokio and 
was to the effect that Japan would not intervene against 
our wishes. Since then Motono has resigned but if our 
Japanese policy has been altered I am not advised. It 
is possible that Japan may not intervene without being 
compensated but any reasonable compensation other 
than territorial if demanded by Japan I think should be 

"I fully realize the import of this recommendation 
which is given now for the following reasons : 

" First. Germany through Mirbach is dominating and 
controlling Bolshevik Government and Mirbach is prac- 
tical dictator as all differences even between Russians 
are referred to him. 

" Second. I call attention to Consulate-General J s No. 
439 of April 29th, which contains an account of Soviet 
protest and appeal to Berlin against violation of Brest 
Treaty and contains also Mirbach's reply of April 30th 
that German encroachments would cease when Allies 
evacuated Murmansk and Archangel; this last informa- 
tion was obtained through the French Embassy who say 
it was received from Lockhart, British Representative 
in Moscow. In my opinion such evacuation would be 
very unwise. 

"Riggs, just arrived from Moscow, says the Soviet 
Government won't oppose Germany in absence of Allied 
encouragement and is confident that the Soviet Govern- 
ment will approve Allied intervention when it knows the 
same is inevitable ; he furthermore says that if the Mili- 
tary Missions are informed of the proposed interven- 
tion previous to occurrence thereof the Missions can 
probably influence Bolsheviks to become reconciled 
thereto. Possibly the Soviet Government when informed 
of Allied intervention would advise Germans; we must 
take that risk. Riggs advises the Embassy moving from 
Vologda to Moscow or that a diplomatic representative 
be established there. I do not concur because I think it 
would result in recognizing Soviet Government or widen- 
ing existing breach. 

"Russia is passing through a dream or orgy from 
which it may awaken any day, but the longer awakening 


is delayed the stronger foothold will Germany acquire. 
Robins and probably Lockhart also have advocated rec- 
ognition but the Department and all Allies have persis- 
tently declined to recommend it and I now feel that no 
error has been committed. 

"I have postponed this recommendation of Allied in- 
tervention not only because I hoped the Soviet Govern- 
ment would request intervention but expected that the 
Department would approve my requests for purchasing 
supplies to prevent such falling into the hands of Ger- 
many and also in the hope that Russian people would 
awaken from their lethargy and request Allies to inter- 
vene. Many organizations in Russia have informed the 
Allied Missions and myself that Russians would welcome 
Allied intervention but whether such sentiment would 
result in material physical assistance I much doubt as 
the Bolshevik policy has been severe and has inflicted 
death penalty upon all charged with being counter- 

" Lenin is the ablest intellect in the Bolshevik party 
and tyrannizes the situation. In every speech he calls 
the Brest-Litovsk peace only a breathing spell and pre- 
dicts success of world-wide social revolution, exulting 
over the exhaustion of what he calls capitalistic-imperi- 
alistic governments by their bloody struggle. In an 
address of April 28th he glorified the struggle for terri- 
torial aggrandizement and said that by such conflict the 
dictatorship of the proletariat was brought nearer. 
Lenin's last utterances are devoted to what he calls the 
danger to the proletariat from small bourgeois, as he 
claims the rich bourgeoisie are already exterminated. 
He has said that he was trying an experiment in govern- 
ment in Russia; is relentless and far-seeing and appre- 
ciates the danger from the middle classes and the desire 
on the part of the peasants to own their own homes and 
till their own soil. 

"Finally I doubt the policy of the Allies longer tem- 
porizing with a Government advocating the principles of 
Bolshevism and guilty of the outrages the Soviet Govern- 
ment has practised. 

"I await instructions or information." 


On the 15th of May I saw Colonel Raymond Robins 
who was on his way to the United States. We had a 
private conversation of about twenty minutes. After 
our conversation Robins told Rennick, the Associated 
Press representative at Vologda, and a man named 
Groves who was one of the employees of the Embassy, in 
charge of the telegraph department, that if he could get 
one hour with President Wilson he would persuade the 
President to recognize the Bolshevik government. He 
made the remark, "I have the goods on my person/ ' I 
heard afterwards that Colonel Robins was the courier 
for the Soviet Government of proposals to our govern- 
ment to grant us the same concessions, privileges, and 
advantages that it had been forced to grant Germany in 
the Brest-Litovsk treaty. 

I received no reply to my May 2nd cable, recommend- 
ing Allied intervention, for a month thereafter. I con- 
cluded to go to Petrograd. I wished to demonstrate to 
the Germans and Austrians that the American Govern- 
ment still had a representative in Russia who was not 
afraid; and besides I wished to see what progress was 
being made in removing munitions and supplies out of 
the possible reach of the Germans. These were the 
ostensible objects of my journeying to Petrograd. The 
real object was to see what organized opposition, if any, 
existed to the Bolshevik Government. I found Petrograd 
a very different city from the Petrograd I had left a 
little over three months previous. The streets presented 
a deserted appearance, a great many of the shops were 
closed. The Central Soviet Government had removed 
from Petrograd to Moscow, and the office buildings were 
deserted or only partially occupied. After remaining 
four days in Petrograd, I returned to Vologda. The 
two women and the dvornick that I left in charge of the 
American Embassy in Petrograd were very much pleased 


at my return there. My first act was to have the Stars 
and Stripes raised over the Embassy and the Norwegian 
flag taken down. This was my last visit to Petrograd. 
I understand that at this writing, April, 1921, it is a 
deplorable sight, and a travesty upon its former great- 
ness as the capital of all the Russias and the gayest city 
in Europe. 

To my son, Tom, I wrote from Vologda, June 4th, 1918 : 
"I am now planning to prevent if possible the dis- 
arming of 40,000 or more Czecho-Slovak soldiers, whom 
the Soviet Government has ordered to give up their arms 
under penalty of death, and has prohibited their trans- 
portation by every railroad line and threatened to pena- 
lize every railroad official who violates such instructions. 
The Czecho-Slovaks were Austrian prisoners of war, 
confined in Russian military prison camps; they were 
conscripted men, and have long felt themselves to be 
oppressed by Austria, — consequently were serving 
against their wishes in the Austrian Army. They will 
be treated as deserters now if they return to Austria, 
They are well disciplined soldiers, good fighters, and hate 
bitterly the Austrian rule and more bitterly, if possible, 
Prussian militarism. I have no instructions or authority 
from Washington to encourage these men to disobey the 
orders of the Soviet Government, except an expression 
of sympathy with the Czecho-Slovaks sent out by the 
Department of State. I have taken chances before, 

' 1 1 was visited last week by Vosnesinski, an attache of 
the Soviet Foreign Office, who has charge of the Division 
of the Far East. He is a shrewd, talkative little Rus- 
sian. He came to me on a ' fishing expedition/ to ascer- 
tain whether Allied intervention is likely to occur soon if 
at all, and whether if it should occur it would interfere 
with the present Soviet Government. I told him as you 


will see from the enclosed cable that I did not know, but 
when he told me that he would return this week I in- 
formed him that I would not be as candid with him again 
and on his return would not tell him whether I knew or 
not. When he asked my individual opinion, I told him 
that sometimes I thought Allied intervention would take 
place, and other times thought otherwise, sometimes 
changing opinion several times a day during these long 
Russian days." 

From Vologda under date of June 20th, 1918, I wrote 
to my son Talton : 

"Affairs are approaching a crisis here. The last re- 
port is that the Bolsheviks have made an agreement with 
the Germans which contemplates the latter taking pos- 
session of Moscow with two army corps immediately and 
joining in an effort to suppress the Czecho-Slovaks. 
These Czechs are in control of various cities throughout 
Siberia and are encouraging the organization of a new 
Siberian Government. Tchecherin, the Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs, has addressed a note to the American, 
French and British representatives here demanding that 
their war vessels leave Russian ports. I have forwarded 
the American note to the Department at Washington, 
but have recommended that the demand be not complied 
with, and I think it will not be. It has been a question for 
some weeks past whether the Bolsheviks would come to 
terms with the German Government, or whether the In- 
telligencia, or educated and thinking people, would form 
a German alliance. I have been in fear that the latter 
would be effected. Consequently, am not displeased with 
the reported agreement between the Bolsheviks and the 
Germans. I have cabled the Department that the sen- 
sible, patriotic Russians who are inclined to favor the 
Allies are getting weary in waiting for Allied interven- 
tion and are likely to make terms with Germany, — in 


fact, as cabled, they would make terms with the devil him- 
self in order to get rid of the Bolsheviks. 

"I have recommended Allied intervention and the Gov- 
ernment at Washington has it under consideration. We 
have no forces, however, to send to Russia as we are 
sending all of our available men to France. The only 
country that can send a formidable army into Russia at 
this time is Japan, against which there is a strong prej- 
udice among the Russians, who fear that Japan will have 
a covetous eye toward Siberia. If the Germans move 
into Moscow, they will probably come to Vologda, which 
is only about 300 miles from Moscow. If the Germans 
should approach Vologda, of course I shall have to leave. 
It is possible I may have to go to Archangel, but I prefer 
to go East, or to Siberia, as I am determined not to leave 
Russia until compelled to do so. ' ' 


I sent a dispatch to the Department of State after the 
Armistice, in which I recommended that I be sent back 
to Petrograd as soon as my operation was performed 
and I was strong enough. My plan, as I recommended, 
was to occupy the Embassy at Petrograd. I said I would 
require not more than 50,000 American soldiers. I was 
satisfied that as soon as the English, the French and 
the Italians learned I was returning to Petrograd they 
would send their Ambassadors to join me. Our soldiers 
would be strengthened by a detail of at least 50,000 
French, 50,000 English, and 20,000 Italian soldiers. 

The plan as I outlined it was that I, as Dean of the 
Diplomatic Corps, would announce in Petrograd to the 
Russian people that we had not come for the purpose 
of interfering in their domestic affairs, but for the pro- 
tection of our Embassies and to enable the Russian peo- 
ple to hold a free election with a fair count for members 
of a constituent assembly, that assembly to choose a 
form of government preferred by the majority of the 
Russian people. 

During the visit of President Wilson to London I en- 
deavored to secure an audience with him, and to take 
up this recommendation, but was unable to do so. I sent 
a note to the President by my private secretary, Earl 
M. Johnston, and had it delivered at Buckingham Pal- 
ace. The President's reply to this note was that his mind 
had been running in the same lines as mine, and while 
he could not fix any date or time to give me an audience, 



he would undoubtedly see me before his return. I sup- 
posed that meant before his return to Paris from 

I attended a dinner that King George V. gave to the 
President at Buckingham Palace, one or two days after 
Christmas, 1918. At the dinner the President remarked 
to me that he had hoped to have some opportunity there 
to talk with m,e about Russia. But we were not thrown 
together. While he was talking to the King and the 
Premier, Lloyd George, and the former Premier, 
Asquith, I was talking to the ladies. As the President 
took his departure from the dinner, he offered his arm 
to the Queen. King George, who was escorting Mrs. 
Wilson out of the reception room, when he met me, said : 

"Mr. Ambassador, what do you think we ought to do 
about Russia !" 

I replied I thought the Allies should overturn the Bol- 
shevik Government. 

The King rejoined by telling me he thought so, too, 
but President Wilson differed from us. 

The next day being Saturday a luncheon was given at 
the Mansion House, which is the residence of the Lord 
Mayor. President Wilson spoke. I attended the luncheon 
and heard the President speak. That afternoon, follow- 
ing the luncheon, Mr. Wilson went to Carlisle, England, 
where his grandfather, Rev. Woodrow, had a Presby- 
terian congregation. The next day, Monday, he visited 
Manchester, returning to London late that evening. As 
he had not fixed a time for giving me an audience, I in- 
structed my private secretary to get Admiral Grayson 
on the phone at Buckingham Palace and to say to him 
that although I had been confined to my bed, I would 
journey to Dover with the President, if agreeable, as the 
itinerary provided for a special train to convey him 
there. As Dover was about two hours ' ride from Lon- 


don, I thought I could in one hour discuss with him my 
recommendations concerning Russia, — my plan to return 
to Petrograd with a military support as outlined in the 
recommendation made to the Department of State. 

Admiral Grayson replied over the phone to my private 
secretary that he would confer with the President and 
call me later, asking where I could be found. Admiral 
Grayson did call up about half an hour thereafter, and 
said that as the Hyde Park Hotel was not far from Buck- 
ingham Palace, he would come over to see me if I would 
receive him. He came about half past eleven o'clock 
that night, bringing with him Captain Jones, of Hous- 
ton, Texas. Admiral Grayson told me that the President 
had made other arrangements about his trip to Dover, 
and asked what my plans were. I told him they would 
depend on whether Dr. Hugh H. Young would consent 
to perform the operation for me that my ailment re- 
quired. I explained that a celebrated British surgeon 
had refused to perform it; that Dr. Young had been in 
London since the 22nd of December, having been ordered 
to report to me as soon as possible by Secretary Lansing. 

The operation was performed in a London hospital 
by Dr. Young on the 4th day of January, 1919. I left 
the hospital four weeks to a day after the operation, and 
arrived in Paris at 11 p. m., February first. On arriv- 
ing there I got in touch with Admiral Grayson and 
told him that I desired an audience with the President, 
The Admiral promised me to secure an audience with 
the President if possible. In the meantime I stated my 
recommendation and plan to return to Petrograd in con- 
versations with Secretary Lansing, General Bliss, 
Colonel House, General Pershing, and Henry White. 
With each of them separately I went over the recom- 
mendation, and each one of those men said to me, ''You 
tell that to the President. " Not one of them, however, 


told me, if he knew it, about the President's contem- 
plated return to America. I asked my chief, Secretary- 
Lansing, if he had any orders for me. He requested me 
to remain in Paris, because, he said, the Peace Con- 
ference would probably wish me to come before it. 

Not hearing from Grayson during the next week and 
seeing him at a dinner at the Ritz, I accosted him and 
remarked to him that I was only awaiting the President's 
pleasure in Paris, but if I did not hear from the Presi- 
dent during the following week, I would proceed to 
America. Thereupon the Admiral said: "We are going 
to America, leaving Paris on the 14th, and clearing from 
Brest on the 15th of February. Come and go on the 
steamer George Washington with us." 

I replied to the invitation that I had orders from the 
Secretary to remain in Paris until further instructed, 
but that I would call on the Secretary and tell him that 
I had been unable to secure an audience with the Presi- 
dent, and inform him of the invitation that the Admiral 
had extended to me to go to America on the steamer. 
I saw Secretary Lansing the next day, and he advised 
me by all means to accept the invitation to accompany 
the President to America, because he thought that was 
the only way I could secure an audience, as the President 
had engagements that would consume his entire time 
up to his departure. Admiral Grayson had asked how 
many there were in my party, and I had told him my son 
Perry and his wife, my private secretary, and a colored 

I left Paris on the special train with the President the 
evening of February 14th. We went on the steamer 
the next day and cleared immediately. In a note to the 
President, I said to him I awaited his pleasure for an 
audience. The President did not reply in writing, but 
two or three days later came to the cabin I was occupy- 


ing. I outlined my recommendation about Russia to 
him. He replied that sending American soldiers to Rus- 
sia after the armistice had been signed would be very 
unpopular in America. I ventured to differ with him; 
I expressed the opinion that many of the 2,000,000 sol- 
diers he had in Europe were disappointed that the armi- 
stice was signed before they could engage in a battle. 
I said: "You could get 50,000 volunteers out of the 2,- 
000,000 of American soldiers who would be glad to go 
to Russia to protect a representative of their govern- 
ment in that country." The President replied that he 
had mentioned my recommendation to Lloyd George and 
that Lloyd George's expression was, if he should order 
any British soldiers to go to Russia they not only would 
object but refuse to go. The President furthermore 
stated that he had mentioned the same subject to Clem- 
enceau, and he had met with the reply that if Clemenceau 
should order French troops to go to Russia they would 
mutiny, but the President said he would give further 
consideration to my recommendation. I never broached 
the subject again to the President, and did not see him 
after landing in Boston until his term expired, except 
for a moment when he arrived in New York from Paris 
July 8, 1919. 

I think that if the recommendation had been carried 
out it would have saved Europe from Bolshevism, which 
came near overturning the German Government, and did 
succeed in deposing the Austrian and Hungarian Gov- 
ernments, and menaced France, and threatened England 
and was the cause of unrest in America and throughout 
the world. 

From the George Washington I sent by radio to Secre- 
tary Lansing, General Bliss, Colonel House and Henry 
White this report of my conversation with the President ; 


"I had a thorough talk with the President concerning 
Russia. I presented the plan that the Allied Missions 
return to Petrograd to occupy their domiciles accom- 
panied by 100,000 Allied troops and abundant food sup- 
plies. I also suggested that the proposed Prinkipo in- 
vestigation be transferred to Petrograd and that all pro- 
fessed Russian governments be summoned there and 
their statements be confined to replying to questions 
asked. I further proposed that the Allied Missions issue 
an address to the Russian people disclaiming any inten- 
tion of interfering in the internal affairs of Russia and 
stating that the Russians were still considered Allies and 
that the object in reoccupying domiciles was to assist 
Russia in her misfortunes and difficulties and to afford 
them unawed the opportunity for a free election and 
a fair count for the election of a constitutional assembly 
to select a form of government by the majority. In 
order to accomplish this, order would necessarily be re- 
stored. The President said he would give the plan con- 
sideration; he admitted that the withdrawing of Allied 
forces from Russia would mean the deplorable slaughter 
of the Russian friends of the Allies, but repeated the 
statements of Lloyd George and Clemenceau concerning 
the difficulty of ordering British and French troops to 

' ' I expressed the opinion that an army of 200,000 com- 
posed of American, British, French and probably Italian 
soldiers would volunteer when the appeal was made to 
them to go to Russia to protect the representatives of 
their governments, but stated that I thought 100,000 
would be ample. 

" Radios indicate that Secretary of War Baker has 
said the Allied troops will be withdrawn from Northern 
Russia early in the spring; my judgment is that such a 
policy would be a mistake and would delay peace nego- 
tiations because no peace treaty would be effective with 
Russia left out. If treaty is signed with Bolsheviks 
dominating Russia or disorder prevailing there, Ger- 
many will so utilize Russia's immeasurable resources 
and so organize Russian manpower as to convert defeat 
into victory in ten years or shorter time. Furthermore, 


Bolshevism prevailing in Russia would extend its bane- 
ful influence to other countries and become a more po- 
tential menace than it is now not only to organized gov- 
ernments but to society itself. Bolshevik doctrines de- 
stroy family relations and if they predominate they will 
mean return to barbarism. 

"I shall not return with the President but shall keep 
in touch with the State Department and can be in Paris 
on two weeks' notice." 

" While I was in the hospital at London, I received 
through the American Embassy this cable addressed to 
me and signed "Polk, Acting": 

"Kindly telegraph the American Ministry which has 
already received the text of the following telegram full 
comments on the points which are raised therein. Em- 
bassy and Consulate cables relating to these questions 
have been received by the Department but it now wishes 
to have such a collective statement as you could furnish. 
It is urgent to have an answer as soon as possible." 

The telegram he enclosed was from Tchecherin, Peo- 
ple's Commissar of Foreign Affairs at Moscow. The 
comments on the points in the telegram were desired 
for the use of the American Peace Commission then in 
session in Paris. Tchecherin began by referring to the 
reasons for sending American troops to Russia as they 
had been presented in the United States Senate by Sen- 
ator Hitchcock, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee. Tchecherin took up these reasons, giving the 
Bolshevik answer to them, and then made his argument 
for the recognition of the Soviet Government by the 
United States. This long dispatch by Tchecherin was 
manifestly intended for effect in connection with the 
peace negotiations going on at Paris. 

Tchecherin 's cable stated : 


" First reason given is desire prevent establishment 
of German submarine base Archangel. Whether pre- 
viously justified or not, at any rate this reason exists 
no longer. 

"As to second reason, namely, safeguarding Allied 
stores, I beg to remind that already in Spring of last 
year we entered into negotiations with view guarantee- 
ing interests of Entente in this respect, and we are ready 
now to give every reasonable satisfaction on this ques- 
tion. As to danger of the stores falling into hands of 
Germans, whether previously justified or not, danger 
exists no longer. 

"Third reason given is maintaining gateway for ar- 
rival and departure of diplomats and others. I beg sub- 
mit that best way attain that end is to enter into an 
agreement with my Government. Mr. Francis, Ameri- 
can Ambassador, at time of leaving our country was 
able to depart and arrive unhindered, our sole reason 
for asking him not remain Vologda was the great danger 
which threatened his personal safety, and we offered 
him most appropriate residence in or near Moscow. 

"Fourth reason given is guaranteeing safety of 
Czecho-Slovaks, but there is nothing to prevent this be- 
ing attained by agreement with my Government. We 
have officially proposed Czecho-Slovaks free passage 
home through Russia on conditions guaranteeing their 
safety and we have come to complete understanding with 
Professor Maxa, President Czecho-Slovak National 
Council in Russia, who has now gone to Bohemia to com- 
municate our proposal to Czecho-Slovak Government. 

"Last reason given by Senator Hitchcock is preven- 
tion of formation of army composed of German- Austrian 
prisoners. At present only obstacle barring way home 
to all prisoners of war is presence of Entente troops or 
White Guard under their protection. We are therefore 
at loss to understand what justification there can be for 
further maintenance of American troops in Russia, As 
can be seen from above-mentioned radiogram, some prom- 
inent leaders of principal political parties of America 
equally fail understand the reason. They expressed de- 
sire that American troops be withdrawn from Russia ' 


as soon as possible. We share their desire for resuming 
normal relations between two countries and are ready to 
remove everything that can be hindrance to such rela- 
tions. It is not first time we make such offer. In Octo- 
ber we sent communication to that effect through Nor- 
wegian Minister in Russia. A week later we made sim- 
ilar verbal offer through Mr. Christens en, Attache Nor- 
wegian Legation, when he was leaving Moscow. On 
November 3rd we invited all neutral representatives in 
Moscow requesting them transmit written proposal to 
Entente Powers to enter negotiations for putting end to 
fighting Russia. On November 26th all-Russian Con- 
gress of Soviets declared to the whole world and to En- 
tente Powers that Russia wished to open peace negotia- 
tions. On December 23rd, our representative, Mr. Lit- 
vinoff, informed Entente Ministers in Stockholm once 
more of desire of Russian Government of peaceful set- 
tlement all outstanding questions. He also appealed to 
President Wilson in London. Responsibility, therefore, 
lies not with us if settlement not yet been reached. We 
had opportunity of hearing some American officers and 
soldiers expressing perplexity at their presence in Rus- 
sia, especially when we pointed out to them this to be 
attempt to put upon Russian people yoke of oppression, 
which it cast away. Result of this explanation was not 
unfavorable to our personal relations with these Ameri- 
can citizens. We hope that peaceful aspirations of above- 
mentioned Senators shared by whole American people 
and we request American Government kindly make 
known place and date for opening peace negotiations 
with our representatives. ,, 

I made my comments on the above dispatch from Tche- 
cherin, dictating what I had to say from my bed in the 
hospital. In accordance with Acting Secretary Polk's 
request, on January 22nd, I sent to the American Peace 
Commission at Paris this statement: 

"Neither we nor any of the Allied governments nor 
any Neutral have recognized (with possible exception of 
Persia) the Tchecherin message from Soviet Govern- 


ment, which message is absolutely false in its claim that 
it represented Russian people. In spite of the importu- 
nities of Robins and some other Americans I refused 
to recommend recognition. I always maintained, as 
shown by the records, that world-wide social revolution 
was the object of the Soviet Government and also as 
subsequent developments proved, their efforts were en- 
tirely directed to that end. It was clearly established 
that Lenin accepted German money and used it to cor- 
rupt Russia, but to gain the same end he would have 
accepted American, British or French money. Lenin 
is a fanatic. He openly stated that he was trying an 
experiment on Russia in government. Trotzky is an ad- 
venturer, absolutely without conviction and saturated 
with personal ambition. Until the Brest-Litovsk Peace 
I encouraged Soviet opposition to Central Empires, after 
which peace I made an address trying to arouse Russian 
spirit and saying that the United States still considered 
herself the ally of the Russian people and would not 
recognize such a peace. The German Government de- 
manded that I be sent out of Russia. This they de- 
manded of the Central Soviet Government because of 
the above address referred to and the one to the Rus- 
sians of July 4th. In the meantime I had left Petrograd 
on February 27th on account of threatened German ap- 
proach and stopped at Vologda, in which place I re- 
mained five months, being joined there subsequently by 
Belgian, French, Serbian and Italian missions. As 
shown by the records my requests that railroad engi- 
neers be sent from Vladivostok to me at Vologda and 
that American officers be sent to aid Trotzky in organiz- 
ing army had ulterior objects. 

" Answering Tchecherin message, while first reason is 
dissipated it unquestionably existed when Allied troops 
were sent into North Russia. 

"Second reason: While Soviet Government was nego- 
tiating for retention of supplies at Archangel it was re- 
moving such supplies at the rate of a hundred cars daily 
and the British and French assured me was breaking 
faith by doing so in addition to having repudiated obli- 
gations given for purchase of such supplies. I refrained 


from participation in such negotiations as America ha 
little if any supplies there. Undoubtedly the Soviet Gov 
ernment would now negotiate for retention of such sup 
plies at Archangel or make other promises for recog- 

" Third reason: A few days after Mirbach's assassina- 
tion the Soviet Government wired Allied Diplomats at 
Vologda, inviting or ordering them to Moscow and say- 
ing Radek was sent to Vologda to i execute ' removal. 
The Allied chiefs unanimously declined the invitation or 
order, saying if order was meant they considered it of- 
fensive. Furthermore, German press was charging Mir- 
bach's death to Allied instigation and demanding of 
Soviet Government that German and Austrian troops 
be permitted to come to Moscow for protection of their 
Embassies and Consulates. Ten days later, after mid- 
night July 23rd, I received as Dean of the Diplomatic 
Corps telegram from Tchecherin urging that Allied Dip- 
lomats quit Vologda and saying another day might be 
too late. To this we replied we had concluded to accept 
the advice and would leave Vologda, requesting a loco- 
motive to convey the special train on track at Vologda 
to Archangel. When Tchecherin heard we contemplated 
going to Archangel he wired going there meant leaving 
Russia. I replied, repeating the request, stating we 
would not leave Russia unless compelled by force and 
then absence would be temporary. A locomotive was 
furnished after twenty-four hours ' delay and the Diplo- 
matic Corps arrived in Archangel July 26th. When 
told by the Local Soviet and the representative of the 
Central Soviet that a boat was waiting to convey us 
where we elected we replied refusing to embark before 
communicating with our governments, with which com- 
munication had been severed for three weeks or more. 
After some colloquy our decision was wired the Soviet 
Government at Moscow, who replied that communication 
was impossible. We decided to go Kandalaksha which 
was occupied by Allied troops if furnished an additional 
steamer because one was inadequate. The additional 
steamer was provided July 28th, but many useless 
obstacles prevented clearing until four a.m. July 29th. 



Meanwhile we heard from credible sources that while 
the Central and Local Soviet professed willingness for 
our departure the Central Soviet was secretly urging 
Local Soviet to detain us as possible hostages to prevent 
landing of Allied troops, which I have heard since was 
their object in insisting on our removing to Moscow 
rather than regard for our safety. The Local Soviet, 
however, was afraid to detain us as a local Anti-Bolshe- 
vik revolution was impending. This was not the first 
evidence we had of Tchecherin's hypocrisy. The Anti- 
Bolshevik revolution occurred August 2nd, Allied troops 
landed four hours later and the Allied Missions returned 
to Archangel August 9th. 

" Fourth reason: Czecho-Slovak detention no longer 
obtains. It was a burning issue when Allied troops landed 
at Archangel. Permitting Czecho-Slovaks to depart now 
is no reason why Soviet Government should be recog- 
nized, and it should be remembered that when the 
Czecho-Slovaks started leaving Russia they were prom- 
ised safe conduct with their arms and all Czecho trouble 
w r as caused by the treachery of Trotzky, who issued a 
secret order that they should not be permitted to leave 
without giving up their arms and, when given up, they 
should be detained notwithstanding. 

i ' Answering the last reason: Allied missions had posi- 
tive evidence that German- Austrian war prisoners were 
being armed and German officers were instructing Bol- 
shevik forces. While German-Austrian prisoners may 
now be free to return home, the fact remains that Bol- 
sheviks are propagandizing among prisoners and offer- 
ing every inducement to join the Red Army. Probably 
the Soviet Government did send communications, written 
and verbal, to us through Norwegian representatives 
that if American troops were withdrawn they would 
establish diplomatic relations, but that involved recog- 
nition of Bolshevik Government, which neither we nor 
any other well ordered government could afford as Bol- 
shevik orators not only charged our Government with 
being capitalistic but openly advocated opposition to all 
organized government everywhere. I was compelled to 
leave Archangel for a surgical operation November 


6th, but the Soviet Government had already instituted 
a reign of terror to maintain themselves in power ; they 
were pillaging and murdering inoffensive citizens with- 
out trial and when they could not find men they were 
arresting wives, mothers and sisters as hostages for the 
appearance of the men to serve in Red Army. I recom- 
mended weeks before leaving Archangel armed interven- 
tion for restoration of order knowing that the same 
would involve extinction of Bolshevism, which I consid- 
ered not only irreparably injurious to Russia but a dis- 
grace to civilization and a reflecting on Allies. I con- 
sider Bolshevism as practised in Russia means a return 
of the race to barbarism if it should prevail throughout 
society. That is why I studiously avoided encouraging 
the Soviet Government, refused going to Moscow and 
failed to establish even a modus vivendi with it. I have 
never doubted its willingness to make any arrangement 
that would secure our recognition as Tchecherin's mes- 
sage demonstrates. I heard through Radek after Robins' 
departure that the latter was the messenger from the 
Soviet Government to extend to our Government all of 
the privileges and concessions granted Germany in the 
Brest-Litovsk treaty, but Radek said that the offer did 
not include England and France. I never heard that 
Robins was permitted to present this proposition to our 

"I think furthermore that if peace is consummated 
with the disorder prevailing in Russia or if the Bolshe- 
viks are permitted to dominate there, that Russia will 
be exploited by Germany so completely as to effectually 
recoup her losses by war and become again a menace to 
civilization. ' ' 

Three days after my statement had been sent to the 
American Peace Commission, Mr. Poole, whom I had 
left in charge of the Embassy at Archangel, forwarded 
his comments upon the Tchecherin communication. He 
wrote : 

"The entire absence of good faith on the part of the 



Bolsheviks would render futile Tchecherin 's proposal of 
an agreement for the establishment of diplomatic rela- 
tions even if it were not acceptable for other reasons. 
No reliance can be placed on the solemn assurances of 
the Bolshevik party. For example, the Consulates-Gen- 
eral of Great Britain and France were forcibly violated, 
as reported from Moscow on August 5th and 6th, two 
hours after Tchecherin had most earnestly assured the 
Japanese and Swedish Consuls-General and myself that 
under all circumstances the immunities of foreign repre- 
sentatives would be respected. You will no doubt hear 
from Mr. Francis about his ' unhindered private move- 
ments' during the latter part of July. Even now Tche- 
cherin is constantly lying about the circumstances relat- 
ing to the departure of the Ambassador. First proof of 
this is an intercepted wire communication between him 
and Kadek while the latter was working on this matter 
at Vologda, a copy of which has been given the Depart- 
ment; second proof lies in a subsequent admission made 
by Tchecherin in his report to the All-Russian Soviet 
Congress held in September, translation of which was 
sent me from Moscow, to the effect that 400 German 
soldiers were admitted during July to Moscow as a Ger- 
man Embassy guard. On at least two occasions Karahan 
and Tchecherin solemnly assured me, in reply to a cate- 
gorical inquiry on my part, that there were no German 
soldiers in Moscow and none would be admitted. When 
these men spoke the soldiers were in Moscow. The third 
proof is contained in a letter addressed to Karahan by 
Larin, the Bolshevik negotiator in Berlin, translation of 
which was forwarded from Stockholm. There is an ad- 
mission in the next to last paragraph of this letter that 
one of the true motives in forcing the Ambassadors to 
go to Moscow was to play them off against the German 
Government in connection with negotiation of the 
treaties by which the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was sup- 

' i The problem is gravely complicated by the utter bad 
faith of the Bolsheviks. Even were it possible to disre- 
gard the virtual alliance which existed between the Im- 
perial German Government and the Government at Mos- 


cow after conclusion of the treaties supplementary to 
that of Brest-Litovsk (which differed from the latter in 
that they were actively sought after rather than accepted 
under constraint) or the nauseous and destructive 
butchery of the terrorism and other evils, — even if it 
were possible to overlook all these, — it would still be 
impracticable to renew de facto relations with the Mos- 
cow Government because of the impediment of complete 
and proven bad faith on their part. The President found 
this an insuperable obstacle to peace negotiations with 
the German Government. The futility of Bolshevik en- 
gagements is due, not only to the dishonesty of their 
leaders, but to the natural disorderliness of a loose knit 
Government, many of whose most active members are 
anarchists by temperament. At the caprice of Trotzky 
and the Commissariat of War or the Extraordinary 
Commission against counter-revolution or of any other 
strong personality of the moment, the most democratic 
decision or engagement of the Commissariat of Foreign 
Affairs may be altered. 

"The Czecho-Slovak matter has given Department 
evidence of Bolshevik bad faith. Unfortunately my files 
on this were burned. 

"It is of interest to note following representative 
statements regarding Tchecherin's proposal. These are 
taken at random from 'The Fall is Near of Lloyd George 
and Wilson, ' a piece of Bolshevik propaganda prepared 
for distribution among our troops here : 

u 'Pitiless conditions which are more cruel than those 
of Brest-Litovsk and which are more threatening to the 
world's peace have been imposed by the Allies on the 
enemy which they have vanquished. ' 

' ' ' The League of Nations which Wilson proposes is a 
fake.' " 

DeWitt C. Poole, Jr., was sent to Russia by the De- 
partment of State. I recommended him for Acting Con- 
sul-General after the death of Madden Summers at Mos- 
cow in May, 1918. The Department followed my recom- 
mendation and gave him that appointment. He was a 


fearless, loyal and able representative of his government. 
I had known his mother and grandfather, who formerly 
lived in St. Louis. I was not acquainted with his father, 
who was an army officer. Old residents of St. Louis 
will remember well the firm of Pettus & Leathe. Poole 
was a grandson of that Mr. Pettus. 

Poole remained in Moscow until he was forced to leave 
by the Bolsheviks. He succeeded me as Chief Represen- 
tative of the American Government at Archangel, after 
my health necessitated my leaving Russia. He was Chief 
of the Russian Bureau in the Department of State at 
Washington for a number of months, and was given a 
long leave of absence. He is connected with the Depart- 
ment of State at this writing, assisting Mr. Carr, the 
head of the Consular Bureau. His special duty is teach- 
ing new consuls as well as those not new to the service 
their duties and responsibilities. 

On the 22nd of January, President Wilson presented 
to the Peace Conference what is known as the ' i Prinkipo 
Proposal. ' ' This was an invitation to i ' every organized 
group that is now exercising or attempting to exercise 
political authority or military control anywhere in Si- 
beria or within the jurisdiction of European Russia" to 
send representatives to a conference on the Princes 
Islands. The invitation included the Bolshevik Govern- 

The official report of a conference held by members 
of the Peace Conference the preceding day, January 21st, 
1919, represented President Wilson as saying: "That 
if on the other hand the Allies could swallow their pride 
and the natural repulsion which they felt for the Bol- 
sheviks and see the representatives of all organized 
groups in one place, he thought it would bring about a 
marked reaction against Bolshevism." 

This action of the President drew from Acting Chief 


Poole the following protest, which included the offer of 
his resignation, and which was received by the American 
Peace Conference at Paris on the morning of February 

"It is my duty to explain frankly to the Department 
the moral perplexity into which I have been thrown by 
the statement of Russian policy adopted by the Peace 
Conference January 28th, on the motion of the President. 
The announcement very happily recognizes the revolu- 
tion and confirms again that entire absence of sympathy 
for any form of counter-revolution which has always 
been a keynote of American policy in Russia; but it con- 
tains not one word of condemnation for the other enemy 
of the revolution — the Bolshevik Government. However, 
this Government is accepted apparently on the same foot- 
ing for the purpose of the invitation to Princes Island. 
Those other groups which, however weak they may be, 
are inspired with reasonable decency and patriotism and 
have been loyal in the fight against growing Imperial- 
ism. Having reread within the past few days practically 
every pronouncement of the President on foreign policy 
and having remarked especially his statement at Mobile, 
October 27th, 1913, that we dare not turn from the prin- 
ciple that morality and not expediency is the thing that 
must guide us and that we will never condone iniquity 
because it is most convenient to do so, I feel that some 
further utterance of the Conference must follow which 
will reveal the United States and its associates as the 
outspoken champions of right aligning our Russian pol- 
icy in the future with that of the past as exemplified in 
the note of September 20th to the Neutral Powers. The 
Department knows that I am not a stubborn or obstinate 
advocate of any specific course of action against the 
Bolshevik Government. I had thought only that unceas- 
ing condemnation of its evil methods had been accepted 
beyond all changing as a part of our policy. I have 
given all there is in me to reveal, and possibly thereby 
slightly to counteract, the utter wickedness of much the 
Bolsheviks have done and are still doing. I had thought 


that I might be contributing in some slight way to better 
the world's affairs. Knowing as I do, possibly better 
than any other American, the complete unmorality of 
the Bolshevik leaders — though the aspirations of a few 
be sincere — and the demoralization which their cynicism 
and cruelties work upon those whom they lead, I cannot 
in honesty or self-respect do other than protest against 
any course of action which does not take unmistakable 
account of these facts. If I have misconstrued the Paris 
announcement, or any subsequent action is to give it a 
different color, I know that the Department will set me 
right with the same understanding and indulgence which 
it has invariably shown me. Affairs at Archangel are 
critical. I should be loath to evade responsibility and 
my departure would add uncertainty and conjecture to 
a situation already overwrought. In tendering my res- 
ignation, therefore, I desire not only to express the sor- 
row which the necessity for this action causes me and 
my deep appreciation of the kindness which I have al- 
ways met at the hands of my superiors, but also my 
readiness to abide by the Department's determination 
of the moment when it will be opportune to let me go. 
My only purpose is to avow readily to the Department 
my state of mind, in order that it may determine the 
possible future value of my services, and secondly to 
assure my early disassociation from any Russian policy 
which does not include, regardless of its other compo- 
nents, unremitting public denunciation of, or in any other 
way seems to condone, the methods by which the Bol- 
sheviks have come into power, which they have continued 
to employ and are still to-day employing in order to 
maintain themselves." 

I cabled to Poole on February 8th, as follows : 

u Iam inclined to think you misconstrue therein the 
President's policy as he offered the resolution as a com- 
promise for the proposition of Lloyd George which was 
to invite representatives of all Russian Governments to 
appear before the Peace Conference in Paris. I consider 
the Prinkipo suggestion merely an investigation or in- 


quiry court to enable the Conference to officially acquire 
knowledge of Russian conditions as the Commission 
would have no power to act but would refer back findings 
to the Conference accompanied or unaccompanied by 
recommendations. The Commission can make rules of 
procedure designating hours for each delegation and 
thereby preventing delegates from even seeing each 
other. I have stated in interview here that patriotic 
Russians put themselves no more on a level with the out- 
law Bolsheviks than you would put yourself on the level 
with a burglar when subpoenaed as witness to identify 
stolen property. 

"Your cable is very able, clear and creditable, but I 
regret its presentation at this juncture. Confidentially 
I am reliably informed that the British, French, and 
Italian members of the Conference told the President 
that if their armies were ordered to Russia they would 
not obey. 

"I am here under Department instructions, but no spe- 
cific duty has been assigned as yet. I have recommended 
that the Allied Missions be sent to Petrograd, which 
from their viewpoint is still the Russian capital, accom- 
panied by sufficient troops to protect and sufficient food 
to subsist, with the announcement that they are sent to 
reoccupy domiciles there, to befriend the Russian peo- 
ple, whom we still consider Allies, and to enable Russia 
after order is restored to make untrammeled choice of 
the form of Government preferred by the majority. This 
would mean extinction of Bolshevism, would save our 
faces and would probably induce troops to obey orders. 
What think you? Would 100,000 troops be sufficient f " 

I think, and stated at the time, that the Russian repre- 
sentatives of the anti-Bolshevik factions who were in 
Paris and the Soviet Government itself made a mistake 
in not accepting this Prinkipo invitation. In the light 
of subsequent events, I have not changed my mind in 
that respect up to the present time. As I told the Rus- 
sians in Paris at a luncheon given to me the Monday 
before my departure for America, they did not have to 


cross their legs under a table with murderers and rob- 
bers, as the Commission appointed by the Peace Confer- 
ence would summon as witnesses the representatives of 
every government in Russia, including Lenin and 
Trotzky, and the commission would make rules for its 
procedure and report to the Peace Conference. 

I furthermore stated in a speech at the luncheon given 
to me in Paris on the 10th of February, 1919, as I did 
in the above-quoted cable to Acting Consul Poole that 
they would no more degrade themselves by appearing 
before this commission and would no more associate with 
murderers and robbers than I would if summoned by a 
court to identify stolen property when the burglar was 
being tried. 

All of the Russian factions declined to appear before 
the commission, so the Prinkipo Conference was aban- 
doned. Notwithstanding, however, the President ap- 
pointed William Allen White, Italy appointed Terretti, 
who had been with me in Russia, and some other Italian 
of prominence to represent Italy on the commission. I 
cannot recall whom England appointed to represent the 
British Government, nor whom France appointed to rep- 
resent the French Government, if, indeed, they appointed 
representatives at all. 

The Russians in Paris notified the Peace Conference 
that they would not associate with murderers and rob- 
bers representing the Soviet Government of Russia, evi- 
dently thinking they would have a general conference 
instead of a commission making its own rules for pro- 
cedure and summoning witnesses to appear before it. 
The Soviet Government also declined to participate in 
the Prinkipo Conference, but not until after refusal of 
the Anti-Bolshevik factions in Paris had resulted. 

Tchecherin was one of the two Bolsheviks who had 
been interned in England. A letter from Trotzky to the 


British Ambassador conveyed the thinly veiled threat 
that unless these men were released, public opinion in 
Soviet Russia would turn against the many Englishmen 
living in Russia who openly expressed counter-revolu- 
tionary attitudes. 

That this letter was not entirely a bluff may be seen 
in the fact that on August 31st Captain Cromie, a British 
officer, was killed by the Bolsheviks in an attack on the 
British Embassy. On the sixth of September Balfour 
addressed a note to Tchecherin strongly protesting 
against this attack and demanding immediate satisfac- 
tion and severe punishment of all those responsible: 
"If the Russian Soviet Government will not give com- 
plete satisfaction or if violence be used against British 
subjects/ ■ he said, "the British Government will con- 
sider every member of the Russian Government individ- 
ually responsible, and will take measures to insure that 
all the governments of civilized nations shall consider 
them outside the law and that there shall be no asylum 
for them to go to." 

While in Archangel, Lindley told me that every civi- 
lized government in the world had been notified they could 
not become a harbor for Lenin and Trotzky without in- 
curring the serious displeasure of the British Govern- 
ment; that the British Government would pursue Lenin 
and Trotzky to the ends of the earth. Yet, notwithstand- 
ing this statement of the British High Commissioner 
and the announcement of Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Balfour, less than three years after that the British Gov- 
ernment entered into a commercial treaty with Lenin, 
Trotzky, Tchecherin and Krassin, representing the Bol- 
shevik Government of Russia. Selah ! 

Two weeks after this note was sent the American Gov- 
ernment issued under date of September 21st, 1918, a note 
addressed "To all the Associated and Neutral Govern- 


merits" to be communicated through American repre- 
sentatives. This note referred to the state of terrorism 
then existing in Russia in which thousands of persons 
were executed without trial and numberless barbaric 
crimes committed, and asking what action, if any, each 
of these governments expected to take to show the atti- 
tude with which civilization regarded such acts. 

On the 24th of October, 1918, Tchecherin addressed a 
long open letter to President Wilson sneering at the 
President's professed sympathy for the Russian people 
and the League of Nations, charged the Allies with in- 
spiring counter-revolution, and protested against the 
arrival of Allied troops. The note concluded a denuncia- 
tion of capitalists and stated that the source of war could 
be destroyed by transferring the control of banks and 
industries into the hands of the masses. 


How has it been possible for the Bolsheviks to main- 
tain themselves in power when they represent a small 
part of the Russian population, certainly not one-fourth, 
probably not more than one-tenth? This question has 
been put to me many times. My reply is that the " bour- 
geoisie/ ' who include the middle classes, and all the 
land-owning peasants, have been so unjustifiably and 
cruelly treated by the Bolsheviks that they have lost all 
courage. Many of the Bolshevik followers, or those who 
were followers when the Bolshevik Government first 
came in power, have deserted them. Bolshevism would 
not have gained such headway in Russia had not the 
army been demoralized by General Order No. 1, which 
permitted the soldiers to select their own officers, and 
this was followed by Kerensky, when he became Minister 
of War, issuing a decree abolishing the death penalty. 
It is true that Kerensky afterwards restored the death 
penalty; it was made a condition by Korniloff upon his 
accepting the position of Commander-in-Chief. 

The Russian army, when Trotzky made the dramatic 
statement at Brest-Litovsk in February, 1918, that the 
peace treaty would not be signed but that Russia would 
fight no more, numbered about 12 million men, accord- 
ing to the records, but it had probably been reduced 25 
to 33% or more by desertions, as the soldiers had been 
going home ever since the Bolshevik Government had 
come into power in the previous November, 1917. After 
Trotzky 's statement that there would be no more fight- 



ing every freight and passenger train was filled with sol- 
diers who paid no fare and did not ask where the train 
was going until after embarking on it; they were on the 
roofs, and on the trucks and on the platforms. 

The Bolshevik army, which has been estimated va- 
riously from two hundred thousand to seven hundred 
thousand, is scattered through Central and Western and 
Northern Russia and is composed of Letts and Chinese, 
together with conscripted Russians. The Bolshevik 
leaders arrest women and hold them as hostages until 
their husbands, and sons and brothers reappear and ac- 
cept service in the Bolshevik army. The discipline in 
this army is very strict. The Russians act from impulse 
and that accounts for the following that Bolshevism had 
in the beginning. The leaders, Lenin and Trotzky and 
Radek, Peters and Zinovieff and others promised peace 
to the army wearied by three years of fighting — peace, 
food, and land. 

Russia is inhabited largely by the Slav race; a race 
possessed of more than ordinary common sense, with 
good impulses, but with paradoxical characteristics. 
When I first arrived in Petrograd, I was impressed by 
the religious sentiment of the people. That sentiment, 
however, has grown smaller by degrees and beautifully 
less under Bolshevik rule. I could see a decided change 
even in the cab drivers. Under the Czar, who was the 
head of the Greek Church, a driver would not pass a 
church or cathedral without crossing himself, although 
he might pass the same cathedral thirty times during the 
day; under the Bolshevik rule it was a rare thing for a 
cabby to cross himself, although he might come into the 
very shadow of St.; Isaac's or the Kazan Cathedral. The 
Provisional Government attempted to foster the church, 
but the Bolshevik Government recognizes no religious 
sentiment and no Supreme Being. With the abdication 


of the Czar, the church lost its titular head, but the min- 
istry of the Provisional Government still recognized tlio 
existence of the church by appointing a Procurator of 
the Holy Synod. Russians are naturally sympathetic 
and tenderhearted, but they are fatalists ; they are super- 
stitious to a degree. I have never visited a country 
where human life was held as cheaply as it is in Russia. 
During the first Revolution and during the attempted 
Bolshevik Revolution of July 17th-18th, 1917, and during 
the Bolshevik Revolution of November, 1917, and during 
the whole period from that time to the present when a 
murdered person was found on the streets no questions 
were asked, no effort was made to apprehend the mur- 
derer, but the corpse was taken to the morgue (provided 
the deceased had no friends cognizant of the murder) and 
interred in the public burying ground. I remember one 
incident when a woman came out of a house chasing a 
man and yelling that he had stolen her pocketbook. The 
woman was soon joined by an angry mob who pursued 
the fleeing man and captured and cruelly murdered him. 
Meantime the woman had returned to her apartment and 
had found her purse which she accused the man of steal- 
ing, and attempted to restrain the mob saying she had 
found her pocketbook. Thereupon the crowd turned 
upon the woman and put her to death. Occurrences of 
that character were frequent from Nov., 1917, to Nov., 
1918, when I left Archangel and I learn from well au- 
thenticated sources that they have continued with in- 
creasing frequency since, as the Bolshevik rule has been 
characterized by augmented cruelty and mercilessness. 
In the midst of the strenuous effort to form a stable 
government out of the uncertain elements at Archangel, 
I received a letter quoting from Lovat Fraser, a traveler 
and writer and considered one of the best authorities 
on the Russian people : 


1 ' The only possible course for the Allies until stability 
has been restored is to insist on the Russians obeying 
their orders. There must be no speechifying, no more 
quarreling with rival parties, no more meetings of the 
illiterate rank and file to consider whether they will or 
will not do this or that. I do not in the least believe that 
there will be a recrudescence of Bolshevism as a result 
of Allied action. The Russian people will obey strength, 
and the nearest strength, and nothing else. That Russian 
general who said the other day that many of his country- 
men would fight for any man with a big stick knew what 
he was talking about. 

" Germany understood the Russian character better 
than any other country. Until the beginning of the war 
Germany was making rapid progress toward monopo- 
lizing the foreign trade of Russia, and if the war had 
been postponed or deferred for ten years, Germany 
would have had such a firm foothold in Russia that it 
would have been impossible to dislodge her; Germany 
was better acquainted with Russian resources than was 
the Russian government itself. Germany took advantage 
of Russia's misfortunes to end the Russo-Japanese War 
and of the threatened revolution to negotiate a very 
advantageous commercial treaty of ten years' duration. 
Under the treaty Germany had succeeded in capturing 
more than fifty per cent of the entire foreign commerce 
of Great Russia. The Russian merchants and manufac- 
turers, and the Russian people who were not under the 
domination of Germany, became very restive under the 
commercial treaty of 1905, which had been in operation 
for nine years when the war began. Germany well knew 
that this treaty on its expiration would neither be re- 
newed nor extended, and that was one of the potential 
reasons why Germany thought she could subjugate Rus- 
sia and France, and consequently did not hesitate to 


bring 1 on the war, little thinking that England would 
come to the rescue of Belgium, and not dreaming that 
America would be involved in the contest. The world 
war was waged with the loss of eight millions of lives 
and untold and incalculable treasure. After four years 
of struggle, hostilities nominally ceased. Almost two 
and a half years have elapsed since the armistice was 
signed, and the work of reconstruction in the victorious 
countries has made slow progress. Germany, familiar 
as she was with the deplorable result of an invaded do- 
main, took care when she saw the tide of war turning 
against her that her industries should not be destroyed 
as she had dismantled and stolen those of France and 
Belgium; took care that her fields should not be laid 
waste and her cities, villages and hamlets leveled to the 
ground, as were those of the countries she had invaded. 
It was the boast of the German Emperor that "the soil 
of the Fatherland was not desecrated by the tramp of 
hostile armies." 

The Military Party in Germany had used Lenin and 
Trotzky to demoralize Russia's immense army, and had 
succeeded in withdrawing Russia from the contest. This 
was done in the face of the protests of the conservative 
element of the German population, but was aided by the 
Socialists in Germany. Little did the General Staff of 
the Imperial Government think when the fatal dose was 
handed to Russia that the poisoned chalice would be com- 
mended to her own lips within twelve months. Germany 
was defeated on the battlefield, and her armies have been 
subjugated and shorn of their power, but it is not so 
with industrial Germany. Germany is using the same 
means and pursuing the same policy in her economic 
war, which has not only begun but has made considerable 
headway with Russia. Germany's commercial agents 
are the only ones admitted into Soviet Russia. Germany 


is making her plans to wage an economic war by the same 
unscrupulous methods which she used in waging the 
world war. She has quit the manufacture of poisonous 
gases which had physical effect, but she has not aban- 
doned her devious ways by which she hopes through 
neutral and deceitful agencies to capture the commerce 
of the world. She has been prohibited from constructing 
submarines with which to prey upon the commerce of 
the neutral countries and destroy innocent lives, but she 
has not forsaken her manufacturing power; on the con- 
trary she is rapidly utilizing it in her efforts to extend 
German trade. 

The German people have changed their form of gov- 
ernment, but it is as difficult for a leopard to change his 
spots as it is for the Germans to change their character. 
The present government of Germany is following in the 
footsteps of the Imperial government in all matters per- 
taining to German domination in the commercial world. 

I was astounded upon returning to this country to find 
a much larger number of advocates of Bolshevism than 
I thought possible. The basic principle of the Bolshevik 
government is what they call the " dictatorship of the 
proletariat, ' '■ — which means the severe oppression of a 
class or of certain classes. It is a worse form of tyranny 
than absolute monarchy — bad as that is. This basic 
principle put in practise is that no man or woman is al- 
lowed to vote who does not perform manual labor. The 
Bolshevik constitutition prohibits from the exercise of 
suffrage all merchants, or dealers in securities, or pro- 
fessional men who are not in the employ of the govern- 
ment, and even domestics or servants who work for the 
proscribed classes. The Bolshevik theory strikes at the 
home as Americans understand it. The decrees of Bol- 
shevism made marriage and divorce so easy that they 
were to be had for the asking. Simply a verbal an- 


nouncement to an irresponsible citizen legalized both 
marriage and divorce under the Lenin and Trotzky 

After I returned to the United States, still being Am- 
bassador to Russia but on the inactive list, I was asked 
repeatedly as to the reports of the Bolshevik theories 
on personal or domestic relations. I replied it was true 
that in some part or parts of Russia local authorities 
had issued decrees nationalizing women. I saw nothing 
of the application from my own observation. I only 
know of such decree or decrees from having seen them in 
official publications of the Bolshevik government. 

The Central Organization, that dominated by Lenin 
and Trotzky, had never nationalized women by a decree 
when I left, but it had issued a decree which I saw in 
Izvestia, the official publication of Lenin and Trotzky, 
making divorce and marriage as easy as to require only 
a notice to some man by a married couple that they had 
agreed to separate, and likewise a notice that two un- 
married people' had decided to marry. There was no 
limit of time as to how long the marriage should hold. 

There are some well-meaning people in the United 
States who advocate leaving Russia "to stew in her own 
juice.' ' Passing over for a moment the selfishness of this 
policy, I would call attention to the effect of Bolshevism 
already seen on the uneducated of every European coun- 
try. All of the unrest throughout Europe and in this 
country and in every country on the Western hemisphere 
can be traced back to this Bolshevik experiment in Rus- 
sia. The Allies could have exterminated Bolshevism in 
Russia and saved their face if they had taken steps to this 
end before the armistice was signed. This Bolshevism 
or Soviet Government as operated in Russia has been a 
disgrace to civilization and a reflection upon the Allies. 
Bolshevism even dared to show its head in this country. 


It has made strenuous effort to depose the conservative 
administration of the labor organizations of the United 
States. It has presumed to induce the members of those 
organizations to assume control of the Government by 
' 1 direct action. ' ' Lenin and Trotzky and their followers 
have not hesitated from the time they came into control 
to call the Government of the United States, under which 
this country has been the haven of the oppressed at all 
times and for all races, a " capitalistic government." 

A temporizing policy with Bolshevism in the United 
States is not only unwise but may result in the under- 
mining of our institutions, which have withstood the test 
of time, and which every American citizen should be will- 
ing to sacrifice his life to maintain. I advocated the 
eradication of Bolshevism in Russia because it is a blot 
on the civilization of the Twentieth Century, and for the 
additional reason that it is to our interest to exterminate 
it in the land of its birth. I say "our interest" from 
two points of view. First: If Bolshevism is permitted 
to thrive in Russia it will promote unrest in all coun- 
tries. Second: It is our duty to the Russian people, 
who have always been favorable to America, and whose 
greatest offense is that they favored the Allies as against 
Germany in the world war, to relieve their country of 
the injury and disgrace inflicted upon it by Soviet Rule. 

When I first returned to America from Russia it ap- 
pears that I was misunderstood in expressions of my 
opinion of Lenin. I said he was not only honest com- 
mercially but honest intellectually, and a fanatic who 
would sacrifice his sons and his wife and his own life for 
the promotion of a world-wide social revolution. This 
was said to contrast him with Trotzky, whom I consid- 
ered an adventurer pure and simple, without convictions, 
fond of display and luxury, liking to be in the limelight, 
but possessed of executive ability of a high degree. 


Trotzky foresaw the outcome of the war more clearly 
than Lenin, which accounts for his grandstand play at 
the first Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference, and his refusal 
to attend the second conference, and his resignation as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Trotzky after accepting 
appointment as Minister of War flirted with the Allied 
Military Missions when he asked their assistance in or- 
ganizing an army, professedly for the promotion of 
world-wide social revolution and incidentally for oppos- 
ing the German advance — Germany had an imperialistic 
government at that time — but Lenin would never con- 
sent to fighting Germany. This move was encouraged 
by me, as I felt confident that the army when organized, 
and after checking the Germans and interesting them so 
that they could not send assistance to Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff at the Western front, could be influenced 
against a world-wide social revolution. 

Lenin was the great intellect that dominated the Bol- 
shevik Revolution in Russia. Every time that Lenin and 
Trotzky disagreed, Lenin came out victor. Lenin led 
a simple life, while Trotzky lived a luxurious life. They 
both, however, were ruthless. They agreed in the policy 
of instituting a reign of terror to perpetuate Bolshevik 
supremacy, and now, after they have inflicted untold 
damage on Russia, which it will require two or more 
generations to repair, they are professing to abandon 
communism. In my judgment this is camouflage, a mere 
pretense, a move to strengthen their tottering reign and 
to afford an opportunity to propagandize their perni- 
cious doctrines in other countries. 

I have sometimes wondered what would have been the 
result if I had not been compelled to leave Russia when 
I did, or had remained in Russia after the Armistice was 
signed. Admiral McCully, whom I saw in Washington 
within the last three months, said when he put me on 



the cruiser Olympia at Archangel on the 6th of No- 
vember he never expected to see me alive again. Major 
Williams, of the Ked Cross Mission to Northern Russia, 
whom I also met in Washington, expressed the same 

As narrated in the foregoing, King George of Eng- 
land agreed with my policy of exterminating Bolshevism, 
and that had been the desire of the French Government 
from the beginning. When on the eve of my departure 
from Archangel I received a cable from the Department 
of State saying "It is the plan of our Government for you 
to return to Archangel when your health and strength 
permit,' ' it would have been my effort as the result of 
my deep-seated convictions that Bolshevik supremacy 
should be overthrown in Russia. 

It is likely that President Wilson would not have ob- 
jected to sending more American troops to Archangel; 
and if he had consented thereto, England and France 
certainly would have cooperated, and Italy and the other 
Allies possibly would have also. I certainly would have 
requested additional troops, because I knew well that 
the Bolshevik Soviet Government did not represent more 
than ten per cent at the outside of the Russian people, 
and only maintained itself in power by the assistance 
of Chinese and Lettish soldiers whom they were able to 
pay with the Russian and Roumanian gold that they had 
commandeered or stolen. 

The Secretary of State at that time would, I think, 
have been favorable, and the sending of troops there 
would have enabled the Allied forces in Northern Russia 
to depose the government of Lenin and Trotzky, and 
thereby have spared Russia at least two years of suffer- 
ing and Europe an equal period of difficulties which came 
near producing chaos on the Continent and threatened 
England itself. 


I do not mean that this Bolshevik Soviet Government 
should have been overthrown by any other power than 
the Russian people themselves, but the presence of Al- 
lied troops in Russia would have encouraged the people 
to hold their differences in abeyance for the time being, 
and I certainly would have contributed all in my power 
to that end. 

From the first I contended that Bolshevism did nor 
have followers in Russia exceeding twenty per cent of the 
Russian people, and that following has been diminishuu 
until it is now less than five per cent. I furthermore ex- 
pressed the opinion in cables and dispatches from Arch- 
angel to the State Department and from London that 
order could not be restored in Europe as long as there 
was chaos in Russia. Lloyd George recognized this by 
advocating that Russia should be authorized to send 
delegates to the Peace Conference and President Wilson 
recognized this by suggesting the Prinkipo Conference. 

My conclusions as to the character and purposes of 
Bolshevism, as set forth in the private letters and official 
reports sent by me during my residence in Petrograd, 
Vologda and Archangel have not undergone changes, save 
that they have become intensified, if possible, since my 
return to the United States. I received a telegram from 
a prominent newspaper recently asking my opinion about 
Lenin's reported change of heart on world-wide social 
revolution. I was asked, "Do you believe Lenin sincere 
or that he can hold fanatical followers?" My reply, 
which shows my present attitude, was : 

"I would not trust Lenin's promises and doubt his 
sincerity. He has stated on more than one occasion that 
he would not hesitate to violate a written contract if he 
could promote his main object of a world-wide social 
revolution by so doing. I have always charged that Lenin 
would sacrifice his wife and children and even his own 


life if he thought he could promote a world-wide social 
revolution by doing so. He has been ruthless in his ad- 
ministration of Russian affairs for almost three and one- 
half years and when England first offered to make a com- 
mercial treaty with the Bolshevik Soviet Government on 
condition that the latter would cease propagandizing in 
British territory, he manifested willingness to enter into 
an agreement to this effect. But when the British Gov- 
ernment demanded that the agreement should include the 
Third Internationale also, Lenin said he could not con- 
trol the Third Internationale, and thereby was guilty of 
falsifying. I agree with English sentiment that calls 
the commercial treaty with the Soviet Government 'the 
unclean thing/ Lenin was first sent into Russia as a 
German agent to demoralize the Russian army and with- 
draw Russia from the world war. His administration 
has been marked by theft and murder. I do not believe 
in trusting thieves and murderers. ' ' 

Three days later I received from a different city this 
inquiry : 

" Russia has asked the United States to enter into a 
trade agreement following Great Britain. Will you 
kindly wire your opinion whether such an agreement 
should be made together with your reasons why it should 
or why it should not?" 

To this I made the following reply : 

"If we wish to strengthen the Bolshevik Soviet Govern- 
ment of Russia the most effective way to do is to enter 
into trade relations with it. The invariable rule of that 
government is that all foreign commerce is directly and 
absolutely under its control. I think I have answered your 
inquiry completely by this statement unless we desire 
to promote a world-wide social revolution and to assist 
in maintaining an experiment in government which is 
'the greatest failure in all history' and an experiment 


which is not new but has met with signal failure every 
time it has been tried. I think it would be a grievous 
mistake for any government and a stultifying crime for 
our government to enter into trade relations with the 
Bolshevik government of Russia. " 



Who will gainsay that Russia was and is the chief vic- 
tim of the World War! Belgium and France are rapidly 
recovering, as are the Balkan States; Germany and 
Austria were never laid waste by a hostile army, nor 
was England. Turkey is no worse off than before the 
war, and all the other belligerents were too far removed 
from the scene of battle to have suffered any devastation 
whatever. Russia not only lost more of her sons in the 
war than did any other nation, notwithstanding she with- 
drew from the contest almost a year before it ended; 
but no progress has been made toward her recuperation. 
On the other hand Russia was in the throes of civil war 
for two years after the Armistice; her industries have 
been wrecked ; her transportation lines are idle for want 
of motive power and equipment ; her intelligencia are in 
exile; her proud capital is deserted and infested with 
epidemics and racked by famine. And what is the cause f 
Bolshevism ! 

She deserves a better fate. Twice she saved the con- 
flict before America entered the war. Twice she has de- 
fended our Government, once when England was about 
to recognize the Southern Confederacy, and once when 
our country was in the panic of 1893, by tendering three 
hundred million dollars in gold — true the offer was not 
accepted, but the good will was manifested; nor should 
we forget that Russia sold us Alaska for the paltry sum 
of $7,000,000. 

In my judgment too much credit cannot be given the 



labor unions led by Samuel Gompers and his conserva- 
tive colleagues in France for not siding with the Bol- 
sheviks in Russia. I have no sympathy with any move- 
ment which has for its object the disruption of labor 

On my return to St. Louis after three and one-half 
years' absence a banquet was given me at which I made 
an address which was published in full in the dailies of 
the city, but I do not think that speech can be summarized 
more tersely than it was in "America at Work," of Octo- 
ber 16th, 1919, under the caption of, "The Message of 
Ambassador Francis to America": 

"First, that Russia's continuation in the World War 
under the Provisional Government, until March, 1918, 
shortened the conflict by at least a year, and perhaps 
saved European civilization. 

"Second, that the issued joined by Lenin is one which 
the whole world will have to meet, that true democracy 
and sound economic development must either conquer 
Bolshevism or be conquered by it, 

"And, third, that in the hour of Russia's bitter need 
that help which she so richly deserves at the hands of 
the world by reason of her self -forgetful sacrifice of pre- 
cious lives and treasure in the cause of liberty and de- 
mocracy can only be rendered through the instrumen- 
tality of the League of Nations. 

1 i For three years this citizen of the United States has 
occupied a unique position in our diplomatic service. 
He has worked unafraid in the very teeth of the flames 
which were threatening the whole fabric of civilization. 
He has said, as a great missionary of liberty, of life and 
faith nineteen centuries ago, 'This one thing I do.' It 
was an impressive moment when at the banquet tendered 
him by his friends and fellow townsmen, he said, *I hold 
myself ready to go back to Russia at the call of my Gov- 
ernment ; I may even return without that call. ' 

"Ambassador Francis returns to America not simply 
as the Ambassador of the United States ; he has received 


a commission from a higher power. He stands before 
his countrymen to proclaim the inexorable working of 
laws written not in human statute books but in the 
eternal constitution of men and nations by Him who 
'hath made of one blood all men who dwell upon the 
earth. ' He has come back to tell us that it is impossible 
that we should leave 180,000,000 human beings helpless 
and hopeless in command of a ruthless, conscienceless 
and bloodthirsty oligarchy, directed by a man with the 
brain of a sage, and the heart of a monster, without our- 
selves being involved in the threatened ruin of the great 
people Which compose one-seventh of all the land of the 

' * Never was Ambassador Francis on a more truly dip- 
lomatic mission than now. Against him in his message 
are ranged the traditional provinciality of the people 
of the United States, the sense of the remoteness of the 
Orient, the deadening effect upon our sensibilities and 
sympathies of the breadth of the Atlantic and half the 
continent of Europe on the one side and the whole width 
of the vast Pacific on the other, and the narrow contrac- 
tile councils of a group of blind and selfish political 
leaders, distributed somewhat impartially among both 
parties in the United States. ' ' 

When I was cabling to our Government from Arch- 
angel recommending armed intervention and when I was 
arguing with President Wilson and appealing to him 
on the steamer George Washington to let me go back 
to Petrograd, accompanied by American soldiers, I used 
the above reasons. President Wilson suggested per- 
mitting the Russians to settle their own differences, and 
when I told him that would entail great human slaughter 
he replied that no one abhorred bloodshed more than he 
did, but if I was right that he thought "it must needs 
come." This was on his first return to America, when 
he made a stay of only eight days in Washington. Presi- 
dent Wilson may have been influenced by my emaciated 


physical condition and apparent weakness, or he may 
have thought the League of Nations would be formed and 
America would join the League and that would serve the 
same purpose. He returned to New York July 8th, 1919. 
I met him there, but only for a moment, and did not have 
opportunity to broach the Russian problem. He soon 
started on the tour of the country, and if he had not 
broken down I have always thought the result would have 
been different — America would have joined the modified 
League and Russia would have been saved. 

In my opinion Woodrow Wilson will live in history 
as one of the greatest of Presidents, as a lover of his fel- 
lows, and as a patriotic American! 



The foregoing pages, with the exception of a few inter- 
lineations, were written over two years ago, but were not 
published because I was still nominal American Ambassa- 
dor to Russia. I presented my resignation to President 
Wilson on March 3rd, 1921, in the following communica- 

"My dear Mr. President: 

"I beg herewith to tender my resignation as Ameri- 
can Ambassador to Russia. I have made effort to resign 
three or more times since my return from Russia, but 
have been asked by the Secretary of State not to do so — 
have drawn no salary since April 26th, 1919, since which 
time have been on the inactive list of ambassadors." 

Shortly after Secretary of State Hughes announced 
his Russian policy, I wrote congratulating him thereon, 
and called attention to my resignation with the request 
that it be accepted. Secretary Hughes replied that the 
letter of resignation could not be found in the State De- 
partment nor at the White House, and that if I would for- 
ward my resignation he would submit it to the President 
and have it promptly accepted. I did so in two communi- 
cations, a copy of the one presented to President Wilson, 
and one dated May 18th, 1921, which was an exact copy 
thereof, addressed to President Harding, who chose to 
accept the latter, and a letter dated 31st of May, 1921, of 
which the following is a copy : 

"My dear Mr. Francis: 

"There has come to my attention yours of May 18th, 
tendering your resignation as Ambassador for the United 



States to Russia. I beg to advise you of the acceptance 
of your resignation, and at the same time thank you for 
the signal service which you rendered to your country 
in that capacity. 

"Very truly yours, 
(Signed) "Warren G. Harding." 

This much in explanation of the delay in publication 
of "Russia from the American Embassy/ ' 

In correcting the proof of this book there is one thought 
that impresses me, and that is the horror of Bolshevism 
and how Russia is to be saved from its curse and all other 
countries from its menace. 

I still believe that Germany employed Lenin to demoral- 
ize the Russian Army, that fact having been proven by 
General Hoffmann, and that the entente would have been 
justified in deposing the Bolshevik-Soviet Government of 
Russia before the armistice was signed, as recommended 
in my cable of 2nd of May, 1918, from Vologda, framed 
after I had given the Soviets every encouragement to 
resist the encroachments of Germany. 

When I arrived in London from Archangel, during all 
the two weeks I spent in Paris, in my home-coming on 
Steamer George Washington, in my testimony before 
the Overman Committee of the Senate on Bolshevism, in 
all my public addresses, interviews, magazine articles, I 
endeavored to impress my hearers and readers with the 
menace of Bolshevism. I argued that it was impossible 
to restore peace to Europe with chaos prevailing in 
Russia. These predictions have all been fulfilled. You 
cannot pick up a newspaper or periodical without seeing a 
dispatch or an article about the deplorable plight of Rus- 
sia under Bolshevik rule, or the growing danger of the 
spread of Bolshevism into some other country. The 
I. W. W. chief, "Big Bill" Haywood, has gone to Russia 
and forfeited his bond by doing so ; I was told by a well- 


informed man that the I. W. W. organization had four 
million members in the U. S. and the cables inform us 
that Haywood received an ovation in Moscow. Further- 
more, at the national meeting of the Socialist Party held 
in Detroit in July, 1918, a resolution was introduced to 
the effect that the convention should yield obedience to 
the Soviet Government of Russia, and that resolution had 
such enthusiastic support that it was laid over for con- 

At the American Federation of Labor now in session in 
Denver, Gompers had the fight of his life for reelection 
to the Presidency. He was opposed by the radicals in the 
organization because he had courageously stood against 
Bolshevism — the opposition polled over 12,500 votes. 
The Bolsheviks are propagandizing continuously and 
zealously. I have changed my mind about Lenin; upon 
returning to America I expressed belief in his sincerity, 
while a fanatic and ruthless and unscrupulous. I have 
lost confidence in his honesty and think him as great a 
hypocrite as Tchecherin, who, while professing to pursue 
the policy of establishing friendly commercial relations 
with all countries, secretly instructs his representatives 
therein to do all in their power to stir up revolution and 
opposition to the governments to which they are ac- 
credited. Lenin is quiet at the Third Internationale, 
which is meeting in Moscow at this writing, while the 
radicals seem to have captured the Assembly — Trotzky, 
Zenovieff and Radek and that ilk. Lenin has always been 
able to have his own way in Russia. 

If the Russians opposed to the Bolsheviks had con- 
sented to go into the Prinkipo Conference as President 
Wilson proposed, this state of affairs might, and most 
likely would, have been avoided ; they may say that the 
Soviet Government refused to go to Prinkipo also; if 
they had stayed away, their very absence would have been 
the death knell to Bolshevism. The Kolchak, Deniken, 


and the Tchaikovsky Governments should have been pres- 
ent, and their attendance would have encouraged the peas- 
ants and the intelligencia to organize and overthrow the 
Soviet Government and would have justified the Peace 
Conference in establishing some kind of a protectorate 
over Eussia, as the Peace Conference called the Prin- 
kipo meeting and at that time Eussia was considered an 
ally by the victors in the world war, notwithstanding 
the peace of Brest-Litovsk. I cabled the State Depart- 
ment to inquire whether the President included Eussia 
when he demanded that all the territory of the allied 
countries should be evacuated, and received a prompt 
reply that Eussia was included and Eoumania also. 

The situation might have been saved, had President 
Wilson permitted me to return to Petrograd, accom- 
panied by 50,000 troops, but he doubtless felt that some 
antidote to Bolshevism would be found by the Peace 

It would have inspired the Eussians with some courage 
to organize and depose the Bolshevik- Soviet Government, 
which represented at that time not over three per cent 
of the people. 

Do you ask why the Kolchak and Deniken and Wrangle 
movements failed? I will tell you why, notwithstand- 
ing they were aided by the British and by the French 
also. The Bolsheviks were propagandizing all the while 
by telling the peasants if Kolchak or Deniken or Wrangle 
were successful they would restore the big estates to the 
barons, and that England and France would take Eussian 
territory for the assistance which those governments 
were rendering. The Eussian peasant loves the land 
which he tills, and all Eussians cherish a pardonable 
pride in the magnitude of their country. 

Only America could have assisted Kolchak or Deniken 
or Wrangle without her motives and her objects being 


But what is to be done now? The wounds of millions 
of Russians cry trumpet tongued to save their beloved 
land from the curse of Communism. Are we allies of this 
afflicted country going to persist in ignoring these ap- 
peals? As I have said in these pages, Russia was the 
chief victim of the world war. We owe her a duty which 
gratitude should prompt us to discharge. But beyond 
that, if we could but realize it, we owe it to ourselves, if 
we would preserve our institutions, to eradicate this foul 
monster — Bolshevism — branch, trunk and root. We owe 
it to society. We owe it to humanity. If we would save 
society from barbarism and humanity from slaughter. 

America saved civilization and thus became the moral 
leader of the world. Let us retain this leadership by sav- 
ing Russia, because we are the only government on the 
face of the earth that can do it. The League of Nations 
is in active operation and forty-eight or forty-nine gov- 
ernments have joined it. Let us join also. By that 
course we can save Russia and put an end to Bolshevism. 


Alexandrieff, speech against Ger- 
many by, 243 ff. 

Alexieff, appointed Minister of War, 
162 ff.; resignation of, 163. 

American Commissioner to Russia, 
membership of, 128; arrival of, 
128; entertainment of, 128 ff.; de- 
parture of, 129. 

American Embassy, fighting in 
neighborhood of, 59, 64; guard 
supplied for, 74 ff.; threat of at- 
tack on, 101 ff . ; Junker and Po- 
lish guard for, 183 ff . ; anarchist 
threat against, 209; reception at, 
209 ff.; Bolshevik guard for, 210; 
American guard at, 211; Trotz- 
ky's address to, 223. 

American Expeditionary Force in 
Russia, landing of, 265 ff . ; Fran- 
cis in touch with, 267; on strike 
duty, 267 ff.; praise of, 268 ff.; 
review of, 270; Francis in charge 
of, 271; Francis's farewell to, 

American Relief Corps, German and 
Austrian prisoners aided by, 4; 
Sturmer disliked by, 9. 

Anarchists, in ranks of Bolsheviks, 
206; resolution sent Francis by, 
206 ff.; threats made by, 208, 229; 
murders committed by, 208; Bol- 
shevist relations with, 214; ar- 
rest of, 214 ff. 

Archangel, Terestchenko in, 119; 
Diplomatic Corps attempts to 
reach, 251 ff . ; Diplomatic Corps 
at, 262 ff.; departure from, 263; 
counter-revolution at, 264, 266; 
landing of English at, 264; Ameri- 
can troops at, 266 ff.; strike in, 
267 ff. ; ministers kidnapped in, 
269; ministers returned to, 271 
ff.; report of conditions in, 282 
ff.; attitude of British in, 293. 

Armour, Norman, Vologda conditions 
reported by, 209 ff. 

Asquith, Herbert, Francis's meeting 
with, 307. 

Austria, prisoners of, in Russia, 4. 

Austrian Embassy, Americans in 
charge of, 4, 59; revolutionary 
refugees in, 60 ff . 

Avksentieff, Chairman of the Com- 
mittee of National Safety, 184. 

Azef, corruption of, 7. 

Bakhmatieff, Provisional Govern- 
ment 's ambassador at Washington, 

BrJfour, Arthur, note to Bolsheviks 
from, 326. 

Bark, Finance Minister, U. S. -Rus- 
sian cable and, 28 ff. 

Belgium, German willingness to in 
demnify, 21; German advance in, 

Belloselsky, Prince, oath of alle- 
giance given by, 66. 

Berkman, Alexander, protest meet- 
ing for, 165 if. ; anarchist resolu- 
tion for, 206; demand for release 
of, 207, 210 ff.; Francis's report 
on, 207. 

Bernatsky, Director of Department 
of Finance, 145. 

Bernstorff, Count, passports given 
to, 54. 

Bertron, S. R., on Russian Commis- 
sion, 128; at American Embassy, 

Bierer, Capt., Olympia and marines 
commanded by, 265. 

Bjorke, Treaty of, terms of, 5; 
Count Witte's opposition to, 5. 

Bliss, Gen., Francis's talk on inter- 
vention in Russia with, 308, 310 

Bolshevik Revolutionary Committee, 
support of, 177, 179. 

Bolsheviks, early German support of, 
26 ff . ; Rodzianko sought by, 74 
ff.; Council of Ministers arrested 
by, 105; Terestchenko 's escape 
from, 119; July Revolution of, 
129 ff.; Lenin and Trotzky lead- 
ers of, 134 ff. ; " peaceful demon- 




stration of," 136 ff., 144; street 
fighting of, 137; temporary fail- 
ure of, 138; fear of outbreak of, 
162 ff.; 170; Berkman Protest 
Meeting held by, 165 ff . ; success- 
ful uprising of, 173 ff . ; new min- 
istry named by, 182; minority of, 
201; plans for control by, 201 ff.; 
Constituent Assembly given ulti- 
matum by, 203; Constituent 
Assembly opposed to, 203; Con- 
stituent Assembly disbanded by, 
205 ff . ; power seized by, 206 ; 
Berkman 's freedom demanded by, 
207 ff . ; reason for power of, 213 ; 
Finland won by, 213 ff. ; an- 
archists ' relations with, 223 ff.; 
aid given Germany by, 225 ff . ; 
Diplomatic Corps' protest against, 
297 ff . ; Allied intervention sought 
against, 298 ff.; Eobins the 
courier of, 302 ; Prinkipo Proposal 
submitted to, 321; Prinkipo Pro- 
posal refused by, 325; British 
Commercial treaty with, 326, 339 ; 
army of, 328 ff.; Kussian religion 
under, 329 ff . ; American support 
of, 334 ff. ; Nationalization of 
women under, 334; other countries 
affected by, 334 ff. 

See also Commission of Work- 
men's and Soldiers' Deputies. 

Bourse Gazette, account of July 
Eevolution in, 140. 

Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, Trotzky 
and, 210, 225 ff.; negotiations of, 
220 ff., 225 ff.; signing of terms 
of, 224; disintegration of army 
during negotiations for, 223; 
Trotzky 's refusal to sign, 226 ff.; 
Tchitcherin and, 229; ratification 
of, 231. 

Brobinsky, Minister of Agriculture, 
resignation of, 47. 

Brosoff, I. S., diamandi affair and, 

Brousiloff, General, victory of, 23. 

Buchanan, Sir George, English Am- 
bassador, 41; at Czar's reception, 
48; authorized to recognize Pro- 
visional Government, 91; attitude 
on Dardanelles question, 109; 
statement of war aims asked from, 
185; departure of, 216. 

Buchanan, Lady Georgina, at Mrs. 
Pankhurst's meeting, 148. 

Bvreauvestnik, Anarchist organ, 209. 

Cadet Party, Miliukoff's leadership 
of, 87. 

Carlton, Newcomb, Eussia-U. S. 
cable and, 29. 

Central Empires, peace overtures 
of, 52. 

See also Germany. 

Chaplin, Northern Government min- 
isters kidnapped by, 269 ff . ; Fran- 
cis 's rebuke of, 270, 273 ff.; army 
officers under, 275. 

Chidzi, Workmen 's Party led by, 84. 

Cnina, Japan in, 32; Eusso- Japan- 
ese treaty on, 23; relations with 
Germany severed by, 55. 

Circus Moderne, radical assemblages 
in, 136, 165 ff. 

Clemenceau, Georges, on French in- 
tervention in Eussia, 310. 

Commission of Workmen's and Sol- 
diers' Deputies, manifestoes is- 
sued by, 68 ; meetings of, 70 ff . ; 
soldiers influenced by, 74; grow- 
ing power of, 84, 92; Miliukoff's 
opposition to, 88; army demoral- 
ized by, 93; Provisional Govern- 
ment 's fear of, 98 ; war policy of, 
99; faith in Kerensky of, 103; 
size and growth of, 106; hostility 
toward, 112; disintegration ac- 
complished by, 114; right to veto 
decrees claimed by, 115 ff.; 
Goutchkoff 's hatred of, 117; Cron- 
stadt Council joins with, 126 ff. ; 
Circus Moderne used by, 136; 
1 ' peaceful demonstration ' ' of, 
136; street fighting of, 137 ff.; 
Kerensky distributes arms to, 156 
ff.; new ministry named by, 182; 
Assembly disbanded by, 204 ff. 
See also Bolsheviks. 

Constantinople, Eussian desire for, 
108 ff. 

Constituent Assembly, promise of, 
196 ff . ; Soviet endorsement of, 
198; Grand Duke Michael's en- 
dorsement of, 198 ff. ; elections 
held for, 199 ; postponed convening 
of, 200, 202 ; arrest of members of, 
202; parties in, 202 ff.; meeting 
of, 203; Bolshevist ultimatum de- 
livered to, 203; Bolsheviks op- 
posed by, 203; disbanding of, 
204 ff. 

Council of Workmen's Soldiers' and 
Peasants' Deputies. See Commis- 
sion of Workmen's and Soldiers' 



Council of Ministers, appointment 
of, 66; authority vested in, 70, 
84; Lvoff, president of, 71, 89; 
duty of, 73, 89 ff. ; imprisonment 
of members of, 105, 181; changes 
in, 115 ff.; release of, 194. 

Court Party, German sympathies of, 
6; reactionary policy of, 20, 23. 

Crane, Charles R., on American 
commission to Eussia, 128. 

Cromie, Captain, Bolsheviks' mur- 
der of, 326. 

Cronstadt Council of Workmen's 
and Soldiers' Deputies, Provision- 
al Government repudiated by, 126 
ff.; street fighting, 137. 

"Cronstadt Eepublic,' , 182. 

Crossley, Commander, 147. 

Czar Nicholas, Treaty of Bjorke 
signed by, 5; Czarina's influence 
on, 6; Empress Dowager sent 
away by, 6; declaration of war 
told to, 10 ff. ; Francis received 
by, 13 ff . ; German-American re- 
lations discussed by, 14 ff. ; domes- 
tic relations of, 17 ff . ; Sazonoff 's 
resignation and, 20; Protopopoff 's 
deception of, 34; Rasputin's 
death and, 44; Diplomatic Corps 
received by, 47 ff . ; Duma pro- 
rogued by, 57, 61 ff.; abdication 
of, 67 ff., 75 ff. ; execution of, 289. 

Czarina Alix, Witte disliked by, 5; 
German sympathies of, 6; Stur- 
mer made Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs by, 10; Francis received by, 
16; Nicholas's devotion to, 17 ff.; 
description of, 18; Sazonoff 's res- 
ignation and, 20; Rasputin's in- 
fluence on, 42; Rasputin's death 
and, 44; protection sought by, 67; 
Nicholas 's abdication and, 79 ff. 

Czarovitch, Nicholas's devotion to, 
17; abdication for, 8. 

Czecho -Slovaks, disarming of, 303 ff. 

Czernin, Count, Brest-Litovsk Treaty 
and, 222. 

Dardanelles, Russian desire for, 108 

Darling, W. L., on American Rail- 
road Commission, 130; departure 
of, 131. 

Dearing, First Secretary, 9, 12 ff.; 

de Buisseret, Belgian Ambassador, 
American severing of German rela- 
tions and, 54 ff. 

Demitry, Prince, Rasputin's death 
and, 43 ff.; arrest of, 44 ff.; ban- 
ishment of, 45. 

Diamandi, Roumanian Minister, de- 
mand for release of, 216 ff . ; re- 
lease of, 218; Bolshevik statement 
on, 219; Francis's letter to, 219 
ff.; cause of arrest of, 220 ff. 

Dielo Naroda, suspension of publica- 
tion of, 204. 

Dshesinskaya, ballet-dancer, Czar 
Nicholas and, 17 ; flight of, 135 ff . 

Duma, Sturmer's reluctance to meet 
with, 35; Miliukoff's oration be- 
fore, 35 ff. ; Trepoff before, 40 ff . ; 
Purishkevich 's speech on treason 
before, 41 ff.; defiance of liberal 
sentiment in, 50; proroguing of, 
57, 61 ff. ; assembling of, 61, 64 ; 
Rodzianko made president of 
Council of Ministers by, 61; ar- 
rested ministers taken before, 65 
ff.; order partially restored by, 
66; ministry appointed by, 66 ff,; 
Grand Duke Michael before, 67 ff. ; 
program of, 70; dissolution of, 

Duncan, James H., on American 
Commission to Russia, 128; Tcher- 
nov introduced to, 129. 

Duroff, made Governor General of 
Northern Government, 277. 

Economic Conference of the Allies, 
24; resolution passed by, 25; Pro- 
topopoff at, 33. 

Emerson, George, railroad men in 
charge of, 132; in Russia, 132 ff. 

Empress Dowager, Czarina and, 6; 
Demitry and, 45; Nicholas's ab- 
dication and, 80. 

Finland, payment of Russian Army 
in, 124; desire for independence 
of, 124; German propaganda in, 
124; Bolshevik control in, 213 ff. 

France, Treaty of Bjorke and, 5; 
peace terms submitted to, 21; de- 
sire of Russian trade by, 24; Ger- 
man advance in, 125 ; Eastern Ger- 
man Armies moved against, 225; 
March, 1918, drive against, 225. 

Francis, David R., arrival in Russia, 
3 ; Sazonoff 's interview with, 8 ff . ; 
Sturmer 's interview with, 9 ff. ; 
Americans entertained by, 11; 
Nicholas 's reception of, 13 ff . ; 
Czarina's reception of, 16; Rus- 



sian-American cable question and, 
28; Diplomatic Corps reception 
and 47 ff . ; dinner to Diplomatic 
Corps given by, 53; resignation 
of tendered, 55 ft". ; last diplomatic 
dinner given by, 58; Revolution 
witnessed by, 59 ff . ; Revolution 
reported by, 69 ff., 90 ff.; Rodzi- 
anko 's reception of, 82 ff . ; Rodzi- 
anko's later meeting with, 85; 
Miliukoff 's reception of, 86 ff . ; 
recognition of Provisional Govern- 
ment recommended by, 90 ; Goutch- 
koff 's reception of, 90 ff . ; Provi- 
sional Government recognized by, 
93 ff.; threat of attack on, 101 ff.; 
Kerensky described by, 102 ff . ; 
Provisional Government aided by, 
110, 124; Terestchenko's friend- 
ship with, 119; endeavors to keep 
Russia fighting made by, 124 ff . ; 
American Commission welcomed 
by, 128 ff.; Railroad Commission 
desired by, 130; Russian transpor- 
tation in charge of, 130 ff . ; Ker- 
ensky 's meeting with, 141; Miliu- 
koff 's interview with, 149 ff . ; Ker- 
ensky-Korniloff break described by, 
157 ff . ; John Reed 's Bolshevism re- 
ported by, 167 ff . ; Russian people 
addressed by, 173 ff. ; conditions 
after Bolshevist uprising reported 
by, 182 ff. ; Anarchist resolution 
addressed to, 206 ff.; "The Black 
Point" addressed to, 208; threats 
against, 208 ff., 229 ; reception 
given by, 209; Bolshevik guard 
for, 210; release of Diamandi ac- 
complished by, 216 ff.; Lenin's 
reception of, 217; Pravda's state- 
ment regarding, 219; letter to 
Diamandi from, 219 ff.; Trotzky's 
request for armistice reported by, 
224; publication of message of, 
231 ff. ; German demand for dis- 
missal of, 232 ff., 242; German 
threats against, 233; depar- 
ture from Petrograd of, 234 
ff.; Bolshevik reception of at 
Vologda, 236 ff.; Summers's 
death and, 238 ff.; reception given 
by, 239; 4th of July address by, 
240 ff . ; Tchitcherin 's telegrams 
to, 245 ff., 248 ff., 253, 255 ff., 260; 
replies to Tchitcherin of, 246, 248 
ff., 253, 255 ff.; Radek's inter- 
view with, 247 ff . ; urged to go to 
Archangel, 251; removal to Arch- 

angel planned by, 253 ff . ; at Arch- 
angel, 262 ff . ; departure from 
Archangel, 263; at Kandalaksha, 
263 ff.; at Murmansk, 264 ff.; re- 
turn to Archangel, 266; Archan- 
gel's attitude toward American 
soldiers and, 267 ff . ; American 
troops reviewed by, 270; kidnap- 
ping affair and, 270 ff.; French 
and British attitude opposed by, 
276; Tchaikovsky and, 276 ff.; 
Archangel conditions reported by, 
282; Russian conditions reported 
by, 283, 285 ff ., 294 ; assassination 
of Nicholas reported by, 289; ill- 
ness of, 290 ff.; on Olympia, 291; 
Terestchenko's visits to, 291; 
British friction reported by, 293 
ff.; General Ironsides praised by, 
294 ff . ; Bolshevik financial policy 
protested by, 297 ff.; Allied inter- 
vention sought by, 298 ff ., 304 ff . ; 
trip to Petrograd of, 302 ff., 306; 
attempt to see Wilson of, 306 ff . ; 
interview with George V. on Rus- 
sia, 307; Admiral Grayson's in- 
terview with, 308 ff . ; operation on, 
308; ordered to Paris by Lansing, 
309; departure from Paris with 
Wilson, 309 ff.; Wilson's inter- 
view with, 310; Wilson's refusal 
to intervene reported by, 310 ff.; 
Tchitcherin 's cable answered by, 
312 ff.; Prinkipo Proposal de- 
fended by, 323 ff . ; Bolshevism de- 
scribed by, 328 ff . ; eradication of 
Bolshevism desired by, 335 ff., 342 
ff.; Lenin described by, 335, 338; 
Trotzky described by, 335 ; opinion 
Bolshevik treaty of, 339 ff.; res- 
ignation of, 345. 

Galicia, Russian victory in, 23. 

Gapoa, Father, corruption of, 7. 

German Embassy, Russian destruc- 
tion of, 4. 

Germany, American charge of in- 
terests of, 4; influence of, 4 
ff ., 26 ff . ; Russian commercial 
treaty with, 6, 12; Russian ha- 
tred of, 11 ff . ; peace terms 
submitted by, 20 ff.; Bolsheviks 
supported by, 26 ff . ; Japanese re- 
lations with, 32; severing of 
American relations with, 54; 
American entrance in war against, 
95; Finnish popaganda of, 124; 
Bolshevism an aid to, 185, 225 ff.; 



Bolshevism in, 214; arrest of Rou- 
manians ordered by, 221; Bolshe- 
vik armistice with, 223; removal 
of armies to Western Front by, 

P225; Brest-Litovsk peace of, 224 
ff.; diplomats in Russia threat- 
ened by, 233; removal of Francis 
demanded by, 232 ff ., 242 ; Ukrai- 
nian opposition to, 243 ff . ; Moscow- 
demonstration against, 243 ff . ; 
Bolshevik agreement with, 304 
ff. ; present economic war of, 
332 ff. 

Gibbs, George, on American railroad 
commission, 130; report of from 
Vladivostok, 131. 

Glennon, Admiral, on American Com- 
mission to Russia, 128; Black Sea 
fleet reviewed by, 129; Kerensky 
introduced to, 129. 

Glasberg, Assistant Minister of Fi- 
nance, 143. 

Goldman, Emma, release demanded, 
210 ff. 

Golitzin, Prince, Trepoff succeeded 
by, 47. 

Gompers, war message to Russia of, 
97 ff.; message to Soviet Congress 
of, 230. 

Gorky, Maxim, suppression of paper 
of, 177. 

Goukovsky, Minister of Justice, 
Sovereign Government of North- 
ern Russia, appointment of, 280; 
resignation of, 281 ff. 

Goutchkoff, Provisional Minister of 
War — Francis's interview with, 91 
ff.; description of, 92 ff.; Nicho- 
las's abdication demanded by, 79, 
93; demoralization of army op- 
posed by, 93; Bolsheviks feared 
by, 92, 95; resignation of, 103, 
115 ff . ; American attitude and, 
110; Bolshevik hostility toward, 

Great Britain, influence of in Rus- 
sia, 12; peace terms submitted to, 
21; desire of Russian trade by, 24; 
commercial domination of, 28; at- 
titude toward U. S., 54; in 
Northern Russia, 276 ff.; Bol- 
shevik commercial treaty with, 
326, 338. 
Greece, Queen Dowager o£ — petition 

for Demitry presented by, 46. 
Grenier, John E., on American 
Railroad Commission, 130; de- 
parture of, 131. 

Grigorovitch, Minister of Admiralty, 
arrest avoided by, 65. 

Harding, Warren G., Francis's resig- 
nation accepted by, 345 ff . 

Hindenburg, General von, advance of 
line of, 125. 

Hitchcock, Senator, Chairman For- 
eign Relations Committee — Ameri- 
can troops in Russia and, 312. 

Hoffman, General William, arrest of 
Roumanians ordered by, 221; 
Lenin called German agent by, 
222; Brest-Litovsk peace nego- 
tiated by, 226. 

Holbrook, Frederick, Bolshevik fight- 
ing and, 137. 

House, Col. Edward, Francis's talk 
on intervention with, 308; Fran- 
cis's interview with Wilson re- 
ported to, 310 ff. 

Hughes, Charles E., Francis's resig- 
nation accepted by, 345. 

Hurd, Dr., battle front experience or, 

Ignatieff, Minister of Education, 
resignation of, 47. 

Ironsides, General, Poole succeeded 
by, 294 ; description of, 294 ff . 

Isvestia, Soviet Organ, 198. 

Ivanoff, General, Nicholas's abdica- 
tion and, 77. 

Japan — Russo-Japanese War, 5 ; 
peace terms submitted to, 21 ; Rus- 
sian commercial treaty with, 31 ff.; 
double dealing of, 32; in China, 
32; in the war, 100. 

Joffe, A., arrest of Diamandi ex- 
plained by, 220 ff. 

Johnston, Earl, revolution sightsee- 
ing of, 62 ff.; 67; Rodzianko and, 
85; threat against Embassy re- 
vealed to, 209. 

Jordan, Philip, Francis's valet, 3, 
6, 8, 101. 

July Revolution, 129, 131 ff.; street 
fighting in, 137 ff.; failure of, 
138 ff. 

Junkers, Bolsheviks opposed by, 181, 
183 ff., 187, Bolshevist outrages 
on, 184, 187, 191. 

Kaledin, Rodzianko with, 85. 
Kandalaksha, Diplomatic Corps at, 

263 ff. 
Kedroff, 261. 
Kerensky, Alexander, Minister of 

Justice of Provisional Govern- 



ment, restraint exerted by, 80, 88 
ff.; 102 ff.; Muliukoff's opposi- 
tion to, 88 ff., 109; Eepublic de- 
sired by, 99; description of, 102 
ff.; Francis's acquaintance with, 
103 ; as minister of war, 103 ff ., 
116 ff.; death penalty and, 103 ff.; 
Lenin described by 104 ff.; es- 
cape of, 105, 180, 194 ff.; war 
aims of, 109, Terestchenko 's rela- 
tions with, 119; Provisional Gov- 
ernment's needs outlined by, 123 
ff.; war-front experiences of 125 
ff.; American Commission intro- 
duced to, 129; made President of 
Ministry, 143 ff . ; at meeting with 
Francis, 147; Mrs. Pankhurst re- 
ceived by, 148; threat to resign 
made by, 148 ff. ; resignation of, 
149; return of, 150; new Ministry 
formed by, 150; at Moscow con- 
gresses, 153; Korniloff's break 
with, 155 ff.; Korniloff's failure 
an aid to, 162 ff . ; last appeal of, 
171 ff.; flight of, 179; return and 
repulse of, 180; causes of failure 
of, 193 ff.; luxurious living of, 
201; separate ,peace opposed by, 

Kerth, Lieut. Col., protest against 
Russian armistice by, 224. 

Kieff, Empress Dowager in, 6, 45; 
Eevolution in, 69. 

Kokoshkin, murder of, 208. 

Kolchak, Terestchenko 's desire to 
join, 119. 

Kollontai, Mile., Bolsheviks' Min- 
ister of Education, 186. 

Korff, Baron, Francis's call on, 
12 ff. 

Korniloff, General, 103, made Min- 
ister of war, 143; discipline re- 
stored by, 143; experiences of, 
145 ff. ; at Moscow Congresses, 153 
ff. ; Kerensky 's break with, 155 ff. ; 
attack on Petrograd by, 156 ff.; 
failure of, 160 ff. 

Kovanko, Captain, return of, 180, 
report of, 180 ff . ; arrest of, 

Krasnoff, Cossacks commanded by, 

Krassin, British treaty with, 326. 

Lansing Sec. Robert, Francis's in- 
terview with, 308 ff. ; Francis 's in- 
terview with Wilson reported to, 
310 ff. 

Lebedev, Executive Head of the 
Navy, 143. 

Lenin, Vladimir I., Kerensky 's ac- 
count of, 104 ff.; Francis's ac- 
count of, 106, 112 ff.; 335 ff.; 
338 ff. ; disintegration of army 
accomplished by, 114 ff.; Trotzky 
compared with, 134; "direct ac- 
tion" policy of, 134; arrival in 
Russia of, 135; German money 
used by, 135; power of. 135; 
1 ' peaceful demonstration ' ' de- 
sired by, 136; flight of, 138, 
143 ff . ; Provisional Government 's 
leniency toward, 141 ff.; made 
President of the Soviet Commis- 
saire, 182, 186 ff. ; government ad- 
ministered by, 183; pro-German 
suspicion of, 185; defiance of elec- 
tion results by, 202; Constituent 
Assembly disbanded by, 204 ff.; 
release of Diamandi demanded 
from, 216; Diplomatic Corps re- 
ceived by, 217; Francis's inter- 
view with, 217; as pro -German 
agent, 221 ff.; Trotzky repri- 
manded by, 228; reign of terror 
permitted by, 227 ff.; British 
treaty with, 326; 1. 

Lindley, F. O., Commissioner at 
Archangel, 251, 263; British 
Charge, 287. 

Lloyd George, Premier, Francis's 
meeting with, 307; on interven- 
tion, 310. 

Long, Assistant Secretary, Fran- 
cis supported by, 271. 

Looga Workmen's and Soldiers' 
Council : Constituent Assembly 
supported by, 204. 

Lorraine, German offer to cede, 21. 

Ludendorff, Gen., advance of line 
of, 125. 

Lukomsky, surrender of, 162. 

Lvoff, Prince, President of Council 
of Ministers, 71, 89, American 
recognition conveyed to 93 ff . ; 
Provisional Government needs out- 
lined by, 123 ff . ; on the July 
Revolution, 139 ff. ; resignation of, 

Lvoff, V. N., Kerensky-Korniloff 
break precipitated by, 156; arrest 
of, 156. 

McCulley, Capt., Naval Attache, 
Revolution reported by, 61; Fran- 
cis and, 337. 



McGrath, condition at Archangel re- 
ported by, 251 ff. 

March, Gen., Francis opposed by, in 
connection with request that com- 
mander of troops in Russia consult 
with him, 271. 

Marinef, Government defied by, 173. 

Martin, Hugh S., landing of Ma- 
rines suggested to, 265; English 
commercial treaties reported by, 

Michael, Grand Duke, abdication in 
favor of, 67 ff . ; authority accepted 
by, 68, abdication of, 70; Con- 
stituent Assembly endorsed by, 
198 ff. 

Miles, Basil, revolutionary refugees 
and, 60 ff . ; head of Russian Bu- 
reau in American State Depart- 
ment, 271. 

Military Revolutionary Committee, 
formation of, 173. 

Miliukoff, Paul, oration of, 35 ff. ; 
Francis received by, 84 ff.; de- 
scription of, 87 ff . ; Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, 86 ff.; socialism 
opposed by, 88; Kerensky op- 
posed by, 88 ff.; American recog- 
nition of Provisional Government 
and, 93 ff . ; American entry in 
war and, 96 ff.; 106 ff.; consti- 
tutional monarchy favored by, 
99; war aims of, 106 ff.; 173; hos- 
tility toward, 110 ff.; ovation for, 
111; resignation of, 116 ff.; Amer- 
ican Commission introduced to, 
129; Speech on America by, 147; 
Kerensky and, 149 ff. ; at Mos- 
cow Congresses, 155. 

Miller, Henry, on American Rail- 
road Commission, 130. 

Mirbach, Count, anarchy opposed by, 
215; demonstration against, 244 
ff. ; assassination of, 245. 

Mooney, demand for release of, 

210 ff.; investigation of case of, 

211 ff. 

Moscow, Revolution in, 69; Tertia- 
koff Gallery in, 92; American 
Commission's visit to, 129; Rail- 
road Commission in, 131; out- 
break of Bolshevism in, 131; All- 
Russian Cossack Congress at, 153; 
All-Russian Congress of Soldiers 
and Workmen at, 153; conditions 
in, 190 ff . ; Brest-Litovsk Peace 
approved at, 224; threatened Ger- 
man advance against, 227; Bol- 

shevik Government's removal to, 
234; report of conditions in 243 
ff.; anti-German demonstration 
in, 243 ff. 

Moscow Commissariat of Military 
Affaiars, anarchists in, 214 ff. 

Motono, Japanese Ambassador, 
Russo-Japanese treaty negotiated 
by, 31. 

Mott, John R., American Commis- 
sion to Russia, 128 ff. 

Mouravleff, Col., in command of 
Petrograd district, 183. 

Murmansk, Gen. Poole at, 264; 
American marines at, 265 ff. 

Narychkine, Elizabeth, Francis 's 
call on, 12. 

National Congress of the Councils of 
Deputies of the Workmen's and 
Soldiers' organization of, 201. 

National Democratic Congress, meet- 
ing of, 164. 

Nekrassoff, lunch with, 104, Min- 
ister of War, 143, 149. 

Nicholas, Grand Duke, Sukhomlinoff 
accused by, 6; reported Com- 
mander in Chief of Armies, 61 ff. 

Nichols, Major, American Force in 
Russia commanded by, 267. 

Niloff, Admiral, abdication of Nich- 
olas and, 75 ff. 

Nolde, Baron, Francis's luncheon 
with, 86. 

Noove Vremya, printing presses 
seized by Bolsheviks, 140; sus- 
pension of, 204. 

Nostitz, Count, taken before Duma, 

Pankhurst, Mrs., Russian mission of, 
147 ff . ; Kerensky 's interview with, 
148, 150. 

Pershing, General, Francis's inter- 
view with, 308. 

Petrograd, Francis's arrival in, 3; 
Empress Dowager 's departure 
from, 6; Americans in, 11; Rus- 
sian army in 21 ff. ; pro-German 
newspaper in, 42; March revolu- 
tion in, 59 ff . ; Provisional Gov- 
ernment supported by, lllff.; 
power of Bolsheviks in, 115; 
American Commission in, 128 ff. ; 
American Railroad Commission 
in, 131; July Revolution in, 137; 
conditions in, 145, 165, 186 ff., 
302; threatened German advance 



on, 227, 234; diplomat's depar- 
ture from, 234 ff. 

Phelps, Livingston, Lenin's inter- 
view with, 217. 

Pistelcorse, Count, Basputin's body 
removed by, 44. 

Plekahnov, Lenin taught by, 134. 

Pokrovsky, N., Comptroller of the 
Empire, 27; Wilson peace over- 
tures delivered to, 52; escape of, 

Poole, DeWitt C, American troops 
in Bussia justified by, 318 ff.; ap- 
pointment of, 320 ff. ; in Moscow, 
321; Francis succeeded by at 
Archangel, 321; Prinkipo Pro- 
posal protested by, 322 ff. 

Poole, Gen., conditions at Arch- 
angel reported by, 251; plans of, 
251; at Murmansk, 264; at 
Archangel, 264; Chaplin on staff 
of, 269; kidnapping affair and, 
271 ff.; American opposition to, 
276; Eussian disagreement with, 
278, 286; Tchaikovsky's agree- 
ment with, 281; cautioned, 293; 
withdrawal of, 293. 

Pravda, Bolshevik organ, 219. 

Prebensen, Norwegian Minister, 55. 

Prinkipo Proposal, Wilson's submit- 
ting of, 321; Poole's protests 
against, 322 ff.; Francis's defense 
of, 323 ff.; abandonment of, 

Protopopoff, made Minister of In- 
terior, 33; career of, 33; German 
peace supported by, 33 ff.; reac- 
tionary policy of, 34; Czar de- 
ceived by, 34; insanity of, 34 ff.; 
Purishkevich 's attack on, 41 ff . ; 
hostility toward, 46 ff ., 62 ; sur- 
render and imprisonment of, 65 ff . ; 
Miliukoff's attack on, 88. 

Provisional Government — organiza- 
tion of, 64, 66; order preserved 
by, 69 ; authority of, 70 ; American 
relations with, 82, 90 ff.; policy 
of, 88 ff ., 102 ff . ; British, French, 
Italian recognition of, 94 ff . ; dan- 
ger to, 95, 98; treatment of Lenin 
by, 105; hostility toward, 110 ff.; 
American support of, 110 ff . ; fall 
of, 119, 173 ff.; foreign policy of, 
120; difficulties of, 123; Cron- 
stadt repudiation of, 127; July 
Ee volution put down by, 137 ff. ; 
Kerensky's last appeal for, 171 
ff.; soldiers' betrayal of, 177; 

surrender of, 181; Constituent 
Assembly promised by, 196 ff., 
199; Assembly called by, 199 ff.; 
last appeals of, 200. 
Purishkevich, Gen. pro-German deal- 
ing revealed by, 41 ff . ; Proto- 
popoff attacked by, 41 ; Rasputin 's 
death and, 44. 

Babovski, on Diamondi's release, 

Eadek, Karl, statement of Bol- 
shevik purposes by, 227; sent to 
Vologda, 246 ff.; career of, 248; 
hostility toward, 250. 

Eailroad Commission (American), 
115 ff . ; appointment of, 130 ; 
membership of, 130; in Vladi- 
vostok, 130 ff.; in Petrograd, 131; 
in Nagasaki, 132. 

Eamsai, Baron, oath of allegiance to 
Provisional Government, 66; in 
Bolshevik uprising, 179. 

Eansome, Arthur, Eadek 's inter- 
preter, 247. 

Easputin, Stunner promoted through 
influence of, 10; Protopopoff 
supported by, 34; murder of, 
42 ff. 

Eed Army, newspapers destroyed by, 
204; Trotzky's organization of, 
228; success of, 228; composition 
of, 228. 

Eeed, John, Berkman information 
given by, 166; introduced by Ma- 
lone, 167; papers found on, 167 
ff.; policy of, 169. 

Eiggs, Lieut. Francis, on Eussian 
affairs, 116; sent to meet Eail- 
road Commission, 130; on trip to 
Archangel, 261. 

Eobins, Raymond, with American 
Eed Cross, 211; intimacy with 
Lenin and Trotzky, 214 ff.; as 
Soviet Courier to U. S., 302. 

Eodzianko, Michael, President of 
Duma. Protopopoff hated by, 47; 
promotion of, 61; order restored 
by, 66 ; Francis received by, 82 ff . ; 
description of, 83; Duma ad- 
journed by, 84; Bolshevik pursuit 
of, 85; escape of, 86; Constitu- 
tional Monarchy favored by, 99; 
American Commission introduced 
to, 129. 

Roosevelt, Franklin D., marines 
placed in Francis's command by, 



Eoot, Elihu, in Russia, 124; Chair- 
man of American Commission to 
Russia, 128 ; speech of, 129. 

Rosen, Baron, Russo-American So- 
ciety President, 86; on Kerensky, 

Rothschild, President of the "Cron- 
stadt Republic/ ' 182. 

Eoumania, Russian readiness to 
abandon, 39, 41; German mach- 
inations against, 221. 

Russell, Charles E., American Com- 
mission to Russia, 128 ff. 

Russia, Francis's arrival in, 3; 
Austrian and German prisoners in, 
4 ; German influences in, 5 ff., 
26 ff. ; German commercial treaty 
with, 6, 12; American desire for 
treaty with, 8 ff ., 14 ; Germany 
hated by, 11 ff.; England's influ- 
ence in, 12; German peace terms 
submitted to, 20 ff. ; army of, 21 
ff.; trade opportunities in, 24; 
wealth of, 27 ff.; U. S. cable to, 
28 ff . ; Japanese commercial treaty 
with, 31 ff.; readiness for separate 
peace in, 39 ff . ; Dardanelles 
promised to, 41; unrest in, 56 ff.; 
March Revolution in, 59 ff . ; Pro- 
visional Government in, 64 ff . ; 
demoralization of army of, 93, 
328 ff.; conditions in, 113 ff., 145, 
162 ff., 282 ff ., 329 ff. July Revo- 
lution in, 129 ff . : American aid of, 
174 ff. ; demobilization of army 
of, 225; German understand- 
ing of, 331; result of war in, 

Russian Commission in America, 
treason in, 7. 

Russian Secret Service, corruption 
of, 7. 

Russo-American Society, 86. 

Russo-Japanese Treaty, publication 
of, 31 ff.; terms of, 32 ff. 

Russo-Japanese War, 5. 

Russkoe-Slovo, Francis in, 208. 

Savinkoff, Executive Head of War 
Department, 143. 

Sazonoff, Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs, Francis's audience with, 
8 ff . ; description of, 10 ; American 
commercial treaty and, 8 ff . ; 25, 
31 ; resignation of, 19 ff . ; admira- 
tion of, 23. 

Schidloffsky, Duma Committee of 
Twelve, 70. 

Scott, Gen. Hugh, on American Com- 
mission to Russia, 128 ff. 

Shulgin, Emperor's abdication de- 
manded by, 79, 93. 

Shingarieff, murder of, 208. 

Shotoff, William, Berkman meeting 
and, 166 ff . 

Skoboleff, Bolshevik Government op- 
posed by, 184 ff. 

Smith, Mrs. McAllister, at Mrs. 
Pankhurst's meeting, 148. 

South African Colonies, German 
willingness to cede, 21. 

Sovereign Government of the North- 
ern region, 266; kidnapping of 
ministers of, 269; release of min- 
isters of, 271 ff.; abdication of 
ministers of, 278; attempted re- 
organization of, 279 ff. 

Soviet Congress, Brest-Litovsk peace 
approved by, 224; American mes- 
sages to, 229 ff . 

See also Bolsheviks, and Com- 
mission of Workmen's and Sol- 
diers' Deputies. 

Stackelberg, Lieut. Gen., killing of, 
64 ff. 

Stecklov, Member of the Executive 
Committee of the Petrograd So- 
viet, Constituent Assembly and, 

Stevens, John F., Chairman of 
American Railroad Commission, 
appointment of, 130, illness of, 
131; at Moscow, 131, departure 
of, 131. 

Stewart, Col., marines in command 
of, 267 ff. 

Stone, Senator, Francis's disagree- 
ment with, 56. 

Slurmer, President of Council of 
Ministers, 8 ; Francis and 8 ff . ; 
Made Foreign Minister, 19, 22; 
character of, 23; Miliukoff on, 
36 ff.; dismissal of, 40; death of 
40; imprisonment of, 65. 

Sukhomlinoff, Minister of War, 
charged with treason, 6 ; imprison- 
ment of, 6, 66. 

Summers, Madden, Consul at Mas- 
cow, conditions reported by, 113 
ff., 353 ff., 190 ff., 214 ff.; death 
of, 238, funeral of, 238 ff. 

Tchaikovsky, Bolshevik government 
opposed by, 184 ff . ; government 
of Northern Region headed by, 
266; description of, 266; kidnap- 



ping and release of, 270 ff . ; fail- 
ure of, 275 ft".; Poole criticized by, 
278 if. ; attempted reorganization 
by, 279 ff. 

Tchernov, Minister of Labor, Amer- 
ican Commission introduced to, 
129; inability of, to cope with 
Bolsheviks, 149. 

Tchetcherin, Zalkend succeeded by, 
211; imprisonment and release of, 
211; representative of Eussia at 
Brest-Litovsk, 229, 264 ff.; Fran- 
cis 's telegraphic communication 
with, 245 ff . ; departure of Allied 
warships demanded by, 304; cable 
from, on presence of American 
troops, 312 ff.; internment of, 325 
ff.; British treaty with, 326; de- 
nunciation of Allies by, 327. 

Terestchenko, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, appointment of, 116, 118; 
description of, 118 ff.; Kerensky's 
relations with, 119; escape of, 
119; policy of, 120 ff.; American 
Commission welcomed by, 129; on 
Korniloff, 145, 161; inability of, 
to cope with Bolsheviks, 149, 178 
ff.; imprisonment of, 182; at 
Archangel, 291; release of, 291; 
separate peace opposed by, 292. 

Terestchenko, Madame, 182. 

Torneo, Diamandi saved at, 218. 

Trepoff, Sturmer supplanted by, 40; 
character of, 40; resignation of, 

Trotzky, Leon, a Jew, 104; impris- 
onment of, 105; arrival in Eussia 
of, 113, 135; disintegration ac- 
complished by, 114; Lenin com- 
pared with, 134; "direct action' ' 
policy of, 134; "peaceful demon- 
stration' ' planned by, 136; arrest 
and release of, 138, 143 ff . ; Soviet 
Minister of War, 182, 186 ff.; gov- 
ernment administered by, 183; 
pro-German suspicions of, 185; 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 201; 
resolution against Francis sent to, 
210 ff.; attack on Embassy pre- 
vented by, 211; arrest of Diamandi 
ordered by, 221; German agent, 
221; armistice announced by, 223 
ff.; negotiation of, 226 ff.; notice 
of peace given Germans by, 228; 
Minister of War, 228; Red Army 
organized by, 228; Allies allowed 
at Murmansk by, 264 ff . ; British 
hatred of, 326; British treaty 

with, 326; Francis's opinion of, 

335 ff. 
Tsabel, General, at abdication of 

Nicholas, 75 ff. 
Tschedzi, N. S., Gompers 's war mes- 
sage to, 97 ff. 
Tseretelli, in July Eevolution, 140; 

resignation of, 144; Minister of 

Interior, 149. 
Turkey, Russia's attitude towards, 

108 ff. 

Uchida, Baron, Japanese Ambas- 
sador, friendliness of, 57; dinner 
for, 58; arrest of ordered, 284; 
Siberians refuse to arrest, 285. 

Ukraine, struggle against Germany 
in, 243 ff. 

Union of Zemstvos, meetings of, pro- 
hibited, 89. 

United States — hope of Russian com- 
mercial treaty with, 8 ff ., 14; op- 
portunities in Eussia for, 24 ff . ; 
28 ff.; Russian cable question and, 
28 ff.; German relations severed 
by, 54 ff.; Provisional Govern- 
ment's relations with, 82, 90 If ., 
96; entrance in war of, 96, 100, 
106 ff . ; Provisional Government 
aided by, 110 ff., 124, 173 ff.; in 
France and Belgium, 124 ff . ; inter- 
vention in Russia sought from, 290 
ff.; troops in Russia, 312 ff.; atti- 
tude toward Bolshevism in, 334 ff . 

Uritzky, shooting of, 204. 

Usoupoff, Prince, Rasputin killed in 
house of, 43 ff . ; banishment of, 
, 44. 

Venigel, Wolff, German spies in 
charge of, 221. 

Verkhovsky, Minister of War, de- 
scription of, 163 ff . ; Bolshevist 
armies directed by, 187. 

Vladivostok, American Railroad 
Commission at, 115, 130; Ameri- 
can Commission at, 125; difficulty 
of communication with, 212. 

Voeikoff, General, at Nicholas's ab- 
dication, 75, 77 ff. 

Volodarsky, Provisional Government 
defied by, 173. 

Vologda, Francis's removal to 
234 ff . ; Allied Embassies at, 235 
Francis's reception at, 236 ff. 
life at, 237 ff.; departure from, 
247 ff.; conditions at, 289 flf. 



Von Kuehlmann, Brest-L i t o v s k 
Treaty and, 222; Francis's dismis- 
sal demanded by, 232 ff . 

Von Lucius, peace terms submitted 
by, 21; Sazoueff's relations with, 

Vosnesenski, Bolshevik Govern- 
ment's representative at Vologda, 
239; mission of, 239 ff.; disarma- 
ment and, 303 ff. 

White, Henry T., Francis's talk on 
intervention with, 308. 

White, William Allen, appointed to 
Prinkipo Conference, 325. 

Wilhelm, Kaiser, Czar influenced by, 

Wilson, Woodrow, peace overtures 
of, 52; fourteen points an- 
nounced by, 52ff.j war declared 

by, 96, 100, 106 ff.; Russian Com- 
mission appointed by, 128; 
Mooney case reported by, 211 ff . ; 
message to Bolshevists from, 229 
ff.; Francis supported by, 271, 
288; Eobins's mission to, 302; 
Francis 's interview on intervention 
with, 306 ff.; Prinkipo Proposal 
submitted by, 321. 
Witte, Count, Treaty of Bjorke op- 
posed by, 5. 

Young, Dr. Hugh H., Francis op- 
erated on by, 308. 

Zalkend, anarchist resolution sent 
Francis by, 211; Lenin's removal 
of, 211; report of Francis's prom- 
ise to, 219. 

Zinoviev, on President Wilson, 230.